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Abstract 
This thesis analyses the significance of oil to British strategy during 1914-1923. It 
shows that by 1923 Britain had a coherent oil policy, which affected naval 
strategy, diplomatic relations, policy towards the oil industry and post-war aims 
in the Middle East. Previous works have looked at only part of the picture and 
have not appreciated the extent to which oil affected all these areas. This work 
brings all these different facets together into a single study. The most important 
British user of oil was the Royal Navy, which was replacing coal with oil as its 
principal fuel even before the First World War, which saw great growth in the 
use of oil. Aircraft and land vehicles powered by oil fuelled internal combustion 
engines transformed both warfare and civilian life, but their overall usage of oil 
was much less than that of the RN. British industry was slower than the RN to 
adopt oil because coal was cheaper; the RN put the technical advantages of oil 
ahead of cost.  
Britain's power and prestige was based on its naval supremacy; British dominance 
of naval fuel bunkering was a key factor in this. Britain had substantial reserves 
of coal, including Welsh steam coal, the best in the world for naval use, but 
little oil. Britain's oil strategy in 1914 was to build up reserves cheaply in 
peacetime and to buy on the market in wartime. An oil crisis in 1917 showed 
that this was flawed and that secure British controlled supplies were needed. 
The war created an opportunity for Britain to secure substantial oil reserves in 
the Middle East. Attempts to obtain control of these affected the peace treaties 
and Britain's post-war relations with its Allies. The USA was then the world's 
largest producer and was the main supplier to the Allies during the war. It 
believed, wrongly, that its output would decline in the 1920s and feared that 
Britain was trying to exclude it from the rest of the world. France also realised 
that it needed access to safe and reliable supplies of oil.  
The largest available potential oilfield was in the Mosul vilayet, part of the 
Ottoman Empire in 1914, and now part of Iraq. The 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement 
allocated about half of Mosul to France, which in 1918 agreed to include all of it 
in the British mandate territory of Iraq in return for a share of the oil and British 
support elsewhere. Other disagreements delayed an Anglo-French oil agreement, 3 
but one was finally signed at San Remo in 1920. It was followed by the Treaty of 
Sèvres with the Ottoman Empire, which appeared to give Britain all that it 
wanted in the Middle East. The resurgence of Turkey under Mustafa Kemal 
meant that a new treaty had to be negotiated at Lausanne in 1923. Sèvres 
angered the USA, since it appeared to exclude US oil companies from Iraq. For a 
period Britain focused on the need to have a large British controlled oil 
company, but it was eventually realised that control of oil bearing territory was 
more important than the nationality of companies. This allowed US oil 
companies to be given a stake in Iraqi oil, improving Anglo-American relations. 
Britain's need for oil meant that it had to ensure that the Treaty of Lausanne left 
Mosul as part of the British mandate territory of Iraq. Turkey objected, but the 
League of Nations ruled in Britain's favour. Britain had other interests in the 
region, but most of them did not require control over Mosul. Mosul's oil gave 
Britain secure supplies and revenue that made Iraq viable without British 
subsidies. By 1923 Britain had devised a coherent strategy of ensuring secure 
supplies of oil by controlling oil bearing territory. 4 
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Definitions 
The measure of oil used by UK Government documents, which provide the bulk 
of the source data, is the long ton of 2240 pounds, called a ton in this thesis. 
Some sources quoted use metric tons; in these cases, the measure is described 
as being in metric tons of 2204.6 pounds. If necessary for comparative purposes 
metric tons are converted into long tons at the ratio of 1 ton equals 1.016 metric 
tons. The difference between tons and metric tons is often cancelled out by the 
rounding error when quoting figures to the nearest 1,000 or 10,000 tons. 
A barrel equals 42 US Gallons or 34.9723 Imperial (UK) gallons. 
 
Abbreviations 
 
API      American Petroleum Institute 
BEF      British Expeditionary Force. 
BL      British Library, London. 
C.-in-C.    Commander-in-Chief. 
CC      Churchill College, Cambridge. 
CID      Committee of Imperial Defence. 
DMO      Director of Military Operations. 
DNC      Director of Naval Construction. 
DNI      Director of Naval Intelligence. 
IEF      Indian Expeditionary Force. 
IJN      Imperial Japanese Navy. 
RAF      Royal Air Force. 
RN      Royal Navy. 
NA      United Kingdom National Archives, Kew, London. 
NAS      National Archives of Scotland, Edinburgh. 
NMM      National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, London. 
ODNB      Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. 
PID      Political Intelligence Department. 
USN      United States Navy. 12 
Oil Companies 
APOC   Anglo-Persian Oil Company. William D'Arcy obtained a licence to 
explore for oil in Persia in 1901, going into partnership with 
Burmah Oil in 1905. Oil was found in 1908 and APOC was formed 
the next year to develop the discovery. Sir Charles Greenway 
became Chairman in 1914, the same year that the British 
government took a majority shareholding and gave APOC a long 
term contract to supply the RN. Renamed Anglo-Iranian in 1935 
and British Petroleum in 1954. British Petroleum was originally a 
German owned oil distribution and marketing company, which 
was sequestered by Britain during the First World War. Now 
known as BP. 
Burmah  British oil company whose oilfields were located mainly in 
Burma, then part of the British Empire and sometimes spelt 
Burmah. The Chairman during this period was J. T. Cargill. A 
subsidiary of BP since 2000. 
CFP  Compagnie Française des Pétroles. Established in 1924 to hold 
France's stake in the TPC. Owned by French oil companies and 
banks, but with close links to the French government. Now 
known as Total. 
Mexican Eagle  Founded in 1909 by Sir Weetman Pearson, an engineer and 
Liberal MP who became Lord Cowdray in 1910. It operated 
exclusively in Mexico and was sold to RDS in 1919 and 
nationalised in 1938. 
RDS  Royal Dutch Shell. Royal Dutch merged with Shell, a British 
company, in 1907. They split their assets 60 per cent Royal Dutch 
and 40 per cent Shell, but remained separate holding companies 
with their own boards of directors and stock market listings until 
2007. During this period Shell's chairman was its founder Sir 
Marcus Samuel, later Lord Bearsted, and Henri Deterding was 
President of Royal Dutch. 
Standard (NJ)  Standard Oil of New Jersey. Largest of the companies that 
resulted after Standard Oil was broken up by a US Federal Court 
in 1911 because it had broken anti-trust laws. Re-named Exxon in 
1972 and merged with Mobil to form ExxonMobil in 1998. A. C. 
Bedford became Chairman in 1917, with Walter Teagle replacing 
him as President. 
Standard (NY)  Standard Oil of New York. The second largest of the former 
Standard Oil companies. Re-named Mobil in 1966 and merged 
with Exxon in 1998. The other former Standard companies 
operated almost entirely in the Americas at this time. 
TPC  Turkish Petroleum Company. Formed in 1912 to explore for oil in 
the Ottoman Empire and initially owned 25 per cent by RDS, 25 
per cent by Deutsche Bank and 50 per cent by the British 
controlled National Bank of Turkey. In March 1914 the National 
Bank of Turkey's stake was transferred to APOC. RDS and APOC 
each gave up 2.5 per cent of the profits, but not the votes, to 13 
Calouste Gulbenkian, a British citizen of Armenian ancestry who 
owned 30 per cent of the National Bank of Turkey. 14 
Glossary of Oil Industry Terms 
Benzene  At this time a by product of coke, but now mostly produced from 
petroleum. Added to petrol to improve its octane rating. Use 
now limited for health reasons. 
Bitumen  A black viscous mixture of hydrocarbons, which occurs both 
naturally and as a residue of refining. Natural sources were used 
for water-proofing and as adhesives for thousands of years 
before the development of the oil industry. 
Bunker oil  Fuel oil used by ships. 
Cannel coal  Type of coal with a high hydrogen component from which 
paraffin/kerosene can be extracted. 
Coal tar  By product of the carbonisation of coal to produce coke.   
Creosote oil  Heavy oil distilled from coal tar and suitable for burning in 
boilers. 
Crude oil  Unrefined oil. A classification system using the API Gravity was 
introduced in 1921. Light crude (API gravity over 31.1°) produces 
a greater proportion of lighter and more valuable products such 
as petrol than medium crude (API gravity 22.3°to 31.1°). The 
output from heavy crudes (API gravity under 22.3°) is mostly 
suitable only to be burnt in boilers. 
Distillation  Separation of the components of a mixture by the difference in 
boiling points. 
Diesel fuel  Refined oil used to power a compression ignition internal 
combustion engine of the type invented by Rudolf Diesel. 
Fuel oil  Technically any oil used to fuel an engine, but here refers to the 
heavy residue left after the refining process, which is burnt in 
boilers to power steam engines. Unrefined crude   can be burnt 
in boilers, but it is more economic to use the residue that 
remains after more valuable products have been extracted from 
the crude. 
Gasoline  See petrol. 
Hydrogenation  Process used to produce oil from coal. The Bergius process was 
patented in 1913 and the Fischer-Tropsch   one was developed 
in the 1920s. 
Kerosene  See paraffin. 
Lubricating oil  Oil used to lubricate the moving parts of internal combustion 
engines. 
Octane  Properly a hydrocarbon, but popularly used as measure of the 
quality of petrol; the higher the better. 
Paraffin  Refined product used for cooking, heating and, before the 
introduction of electricity, lighting. Also known as kerosene. 
Petrol  Refined oil used to power a spark-ignition internal combustion 
engine. Also known as gasoline. 15 
Petroleum  Another term for crude oil, from the Latin for rock oil. 
Refining  Process of converting crude oil into end-products. Distillation is 
the first stage, and may be the only one at an unsophisticated 
refinery. 
Shale oil  Oil extracted from oil shale, an organic-rich sedimentary rock. 
     
Toluol  Vital component of explosives, which can be extracted from coal 
or oil.16 
Introduction 
Oil has affected military and diplomatic strategy since the First World War. A 
number of books published in the 1920s and 30s argued that Britain and the USA 
were fighting an undeclared war for control of the world‟s oil resources. They 
had titles such as The World Struggle for Oil, We Fight for Oil, Oil Imperialism, 
The Secret War, The Oil Trusts and Anglo-American Relations and The Oil War.
1 
Their conclusions split broadly along national lines. Frenchmen such as Francis 
Delaisi and Pierre L‟Espagnol De La Tramerye were concerned that their country 
was being left behind because the French oil industry was dominated by a cartel. 
It was happy to make monopoly profits importing products from Standard Oil of 
New Jersey
2, whilst showing no desire to take the risks involved in going out and 
exploring for oil. Americans, including Ludwell Denny and Frank Hanighan, 
feared that the British were winning the battle to control the world‟s oil; they 
attributed this to the British policy being more coherent that of the Americans 
rather to any greater perfidy on the part of the British. Anton Mohr, a Dane, 
believed that the British had a strong lead over the Americans. The British 
authors E. H. Davenport and Sidney Cooke wished that if only it were true that 
Britain had as well thought out and successful strategy to control the world‟s oil 
as its foreign critics believed. This thesis aims to show that the Britain's oil 
strategy was far more coherent than Davenport and Cooke realised. It affected 
many areas, including diplomatic relations, especially with France and the USA, 
war aims and Middle Eastern policy. 
The battle for oil in the 1920s followed the First World War, which showed the 
importance of oil to modern warfare. At the end of the war Lord Curzon claimed 
                                         
1 E. H. Davenport, S. R. Cooke, The Oil Trusts and Anglo-American Relations (London: Macmillan 
and Co. Ltd, 1923); F. Delaisi, Oil: Its Influence on Politics, trans., C. L. Leese (London: George 
Allen & Unwin, 1922); L. Denny, We Fight for Oil (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928); L. 
Fischer, Oil Imperialism: The International Struggle for Petroleum (Westport, CT: Hyperion 
Press, 1976; reprint, originally published by G. Allen & Unwin, London, 1926.); F. C. Hanighen, 
The Secret War (Westport, CT: Hyperion Press, 1976; reprint, originally published by the John 
Day Co., New York, NY, 1934); P. L'Espagnol de la Tramerye, The World Struggle for Oil, 
trans., C. L. Leese (London: G. Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1923); A. Mohr, The Oil War (London: Martin 
Hopkinson & Co. Ltd, 1926). 
2 Standard Oil was split into several companies by a US Federal Court in 1911 because it had 
broken anti-trust laws. The most important of them was Standard Oil of New Jersey, hereafter 
referred to as Standard (NJ). 17 
that 'he might say that the Allies floated to victory upon a wave of oil.‟
3 This 
comment has subsequently been widely quoted; one of the objectives of this 
work is to examine its accuracy.
4 One the authors who quotes Curzon is Daniel 
Yergin. He argues that oil significantly altered many aspects of life during the 
twentieth century, not least warfare. Before 1914 armies depended on horses 
and railways for mobility. During the conflict warfare was transformed by oil 
fuelled motor vehicles, tanks, aircraft and submarines. An increasing number of 
surface warships were powered by oil rather than coal. This created a problem 
for Britain, which was a leader in the adoption of oil for its navy. It had 
substantial coal reserves; the best coal in the world for maritime use was Welsh 
steam coal, a type found only in south Wales. Britain had a worldwide network 
of bunkering facilities.
5 Ian Lessor argues that this dominance of the supply of 
the world's maritime fuel meant that in the late nineteenth century Britain had a 
similar position in the world fuel market to that now possessed by Saudi Arabia. 
Britain supplied the USN with coal at Hong Kong just before the start of the 
Spanish-American War but refused Russia coal during the Russo-Japanese War.
6 
The analogy with Saudi Arabia is not entirely accurate, as the USA was the 
largest coal producer in the world, but Britain dominated the global export 
market. In 1913 it exported 100 million out of its total output of 292 million 
metric tons of coal. Germany exported 35 million of a production of 279 million 
metric tons; the USA sent only 20 million of its output of 518 million metric tons 
abroad. No other country exported over 8 million metric tons that year.
7 Britain 
was in a very strong fuel position in the age of coal but had little oil. Most of the 
oil that has been subsequently discovered in its Empire could not have been 
developed with the technology of the day. Oil had become crucial to national 
security, but Britain lacked secure supplies. During the war most Allied oil came 
                                         
3 Delaisi, Oil, p. 87. The report of the speech in The Times of 22 November 1918 quoted Curzon as 
saying 'we might almost say', making his comment less emphatic, but Leese, the translator of 
the English language edition of Delaisi's book, stated that he was provided with a copy of the 
original speech by Curzon. See footnote, p. 86. 
4 For example. G. Jones, The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry (London: 
Macmillan, 1981), p. 249; F. Venn, Oil Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1986), p. 35; D. Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power (New 
York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1991), p. 183. 
5 J. T. Sumida, 'British Naval Operational Logistics, 1914-1918', Journal of Military History 57, no. 3 
(1993), pp. 460-61. 
6 I. O. Lessor, Resources and Strategy: Vital Materials in International Conflict, 1600-Present Day 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989), p. 25. 
7 J. H. Ronaldson, Coal (London: John Murray, 1920), pp. 6-7., Tables I & II, 18 
from the USA, then easily the largest oil producer in the world. It was not 
certain that the USA would be either willing or able to supply Britain in a future 
conflict. It might be unfriendly, and it might not be able to supply British needs 
even if it were friendly; in the early 1920s US domestic demand was rising, and 
it was widely believed that its oil output would soon decline.
8 
The modern oil industry is commonly accepted to date from 1859, when Edwin 
Drake successfully drilled a well in Pennsylvania. A kerosene industry existed in 
Central Europe, but on a small scale because it was dependent on manual labour 
until the development of drilling techniques.
9 For many centuries animal and 
vegetable oils had been used for lighting and heating purposes. In some parts of 
the world, notably the Middle East but also Central and Eastern Europe, there 
were natural seepages of oil that were exploited by locals long before the 
modern oil industry was even dreamt of. Marco Polo reported such activities in 
Baku in the 13
th century; Herodotus wrote of the use of bitumen as cement in 
Babylon.
10 The development of drilling techniques allowed the growth of the 
global oil industry in the second half of the nineteenth century. In the early 
twentieth century navies started to adopt oil in place of coal as their main fuel. 
The RN was one of the first navies to switch to oil, requiring Britain to adopt an 
oil policy. 
By 1914 Britain had made the first steps towards having an oil policy, but the 
process had a long way to go. This is a story that has played a part in many 
histories, including those of the oil industry, Britain and the Middle East, the 
Mesopotamian Campaign of the First World War, Anglo-American relations and 
the history of the RN. It has not until now been the central part of a single work. 
Paul Ashmore gave a conference paper titled „Ideology and Empire: Securing 
Britain‟s Supplies of Oil, C.1918-1929‟ in 2006. Its emphasis is on the ideology 
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and the way in which attempts to obtain oil from the empire was intended to 
bring Britain and the Dominions closer together.
11  
There are a number of monographs on Britain and oil: these concentrate on 
Mesopotamia/Iraq
12, take a longer time period or are more interested in the 
industry than in politics, diplomacy and military factors. The author who is the 
most adamant that oil was the central factor in British strategy towards 
Mesopotamia and later Iraq is Helmut Mejcher. He claims that in 1918 and later 
there were no objections from other policy makers towards the Admiralty‟s 
desire for Middle Eastern oil. Maurice Hankey, the Cabinet Secretary, influenced 
by Admiral Sir Edmond Slade, the Admiralty‟s oil expert, pushed for Britain to 
occupy Mosul and overcame the objections of Arthur Balfour, the Foreign 
Secretary. Keeping control over the potential oil of Mosul was a key aim of 
Curzon, Balfour‟s successor, when negotiating the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923.
13 
Marian Kent makes the case that Britain had an oil policy by the end of the First 
World War.
 14 She does place more emphasis than Mejcher on the other factors 
that influenced British strategy in the Middle East, such as protection of the 
route to India and Britain‟s traditional position in the Persian Gulf. Her Oil and 
Empire studies the attempts of the British Government to secure oil supplies for 
both military and other economic purposes, the development of a state oil policy 
and its impact on foreign policy. Persia and Mesopotamia were the most 
promising areas for Britain to obtain significant quantities of oil. Since Britain 
gained control of Persian oil just before the start of the First World War, the 
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bulk of the work is devoted to the potential oilfields of Mesopotamia; Kent 
points out that oil was not discovered there until 1927.  
Kent and Mejcher concentrate on the Middle East and do not give much 
consideration to the RN. This thesis will go further and analyse the implications 
of oil for the British government's naval strategy, diplomatic relations and policy 
towards oil companies. Until about 1912 the only involvement of the British 
government with the oil industry was to give its nationals diplomatic support in 
attempting to win concessions in a foreign country. The RN's need for oil and the 
government‟s close relationship with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company meant that 
the government became involved in APOC‟s attempts to obtain participation in 
the Turkish Petroleum Company and the Mesopotamian oil concession. Oil was a 
major factor in the first years of the war; other considerations played a 
significant part in military operations in Mesopotamia and early discussions of 
post-war desiderata in the Ottoman Empire. The first step towards a national oil 
policy came in 1914 when the government took a 51 percent stake in APOC. 
There were efforts in 1916 to create a national oil company. These failed, as did 
other attempts post-war to bring Royal Dutch Shell
15 under British control. The 
oil supply crisis of 1917 and the growing importance of oil to the war effort 
meant that an apparatus had to be set up to manage the supply of oil. Post-war 
the desire for British control over the potential oilfields of Mosul had a major 
impact on relations with France, since the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 had 
put Mosul into France‟s sphere of influence. George E. Gruen points out how 
many countries were interested in the province of Mosul: as well as Britain and 
France, Germany and American investors tried to obtain railway oil concessions 
there. Kemalist Turkey attempted to retain it in 1923. This was largely due to 
the potentially huge oil reserves that the province contained.
 16 
Geoffrey Jones, a business historian whose focus is on the companies, disagrees 
with Kent‟s view that Britain had a „coherent oil policy‟
17 after the war. His view 
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is that „British oil policy remained rather vague and vacillating even after the 
war‟
18; in the early years of the twentieth century British politicians and civil 
servants distrusted oil companies, especially the largest ones such as Standard 
(NJ) and RDS. They were concerned both by the potential pricing power of such 
big concerns and by their foreign ownership. There were few signs of an oil 
policy before the war as the government pursued a laissez-faire attitude towards 
industry. It was the oil companies that wanted the government to become more 
involved with their business and the government that resisted doing so. Only in 
the Middle East did the British government play a significant role. During the war 
and afterwards it became more involved, but its attempt to create a large 
British oil company failed, showing its policy to be ineffective. The US 
companies were admitted to Iraq and the final terms were agreed by the 
industry rather than governments since the Foreign Office put Anglo-American 
relations ahead of oil.
19 Brian McBeth‟s analysis of British oil policy is not as 
focused on the Middle East as that of most other writers on the subject. He 
believed that the Middle Eastern oilfields were not developed quickly enough for 
Britain‟s needs, leaving it reliant on US oil. Starting in the late 1920s, attempts 
were made to reduce this dependency with imports from Venezuela.
20 Correlli 
Barnett, whilst not writing specifically about oil, believes that one of the 
reasons for the decline of British power in 1918-40 was the failure to develop the 
empire‟s natural resources. Too little effort was devoted to exploration within 
the empire resulting in a dependence on imports for commodities such as oil. 
Barnett argues that a lack of technical education meant that the importance of 
raw materials and industrial capacity in modern strategy was not appreciated.
 21 
Yergin notes that Britain had to consider US President Woodrow Wilson‟s ideals 
at the same time that it was trying to secure oil supplies. Before the war the 
Wilson Administration was suspicious of Standard (NJ); anger at the Anglo-French 
agreement to divide up Iraqi oil and fears of a US shortage of oil cemented the 
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reconciliation between the US government and the US oil industry that had 
begun during the war. Eventually US companies were admitted to Iraq; their 
technical expertise would speed development, and this eased British diplomatic 
problems with the pro-business Harding Administration.
22 Fiona Venn is mainly 
concerned with the impact of oil on international relations and does not go into 
naval strategy or government policy towards companies. She contends that oil 
started to become important in international diplomacy before the First World 
War. She agrees that the war accelerated the growth in its significance. Even 
without oil Britain would still have wanted to dominate much of Mesopotamia 
and Persia, but the British occupation of Mosul in 1918 was motivated by its 
potential oilfields. Oil was a major factor in Britain‟s post-war strategy in the 
Middle East. The British desire to obtain control over substantial oil reserves 
brought them into conflict with the USA, which feared that its production had 
peaked and that US companies were being excluded from the rest of the world. 
The situation was exacerbated by mistakes and resentment that resulted from 
the change in the balance of power between the two countries. She argues that 
Britain allowed the US companies into Iraq because Britain placed good relations 
with the USA over the need for control of oil. This brought a temporary halt to 
the Anglo-American rivalry until it flared up again in the late 1920s.
23 This thesis 
will show that Britain realised that it was control of oil bearing territory rather 
than ownership of companies that mattered. Britain retained control over Iraqi 
oil even after giving US companies a share in it. 
William Stivers thinks that British and American interests were aligned, at least 
once US oil companies were allowed a stake in Iraqi oil. British control of Iraq 
was important both for its oil and for the defence of India. At the end of the war 
Britain was over-extended and faced the threat of Turkish nationalism. 
Withdrawal from Iraq would have been a severe blow to British prestige, but 
British control was obtained cheaply by establishing a client state. This plan 
required Iraq to be financially self-sufficient, meaning that was in Britain's 
interest that the oil concession should benefit Iraq. Britain wanted the 
Americans to support the British Empire; attempts to persuade them to take on 
                                         
22 Yergin, Prize, pp. 194-96. 
23 F. Venn, 'A Futile Paper Chase: Anglo-American Relations and Middle East Oil, 1918-34', 
Diplomacy and Statecraft 1, no. 2 (1990), pp. 165-84; Venn, Oil. 23 
the Armenian mandate failed. US goodwill was obtained by ending both the 
Anglo-Japanese Treaty and the policy of excluding US oil companies from Iraq. 
The Americans wanted stability and peace in Iraq, which Britain and its client 
state provided.
24 Michael Hogan has a similar view, arguing that the USA did not 
retreat into isolationism after the War. It remained closely intertwined with the 
world economy. Political involvement was to be avoided but American private 
businesses were encouraged to collaborate with overseas companies, especially 
by Herbert Hoover. The Americans needed other countries to be willing to work 
with them, most of all Britain. It was generally willing to do so because it 
needed the help of American business and hoped to co-opt the USA into sharing 
its global burdens. Concentration on Anglo-American rivalry at the start and end 
of the 1920s ignores the collaboration that took place during the middle of the 
decade in fields such as cable, radio and oil. Both countries were keen to 
protect their interests, but their governments were happy to allow many 
commercial arguments to be settled between private companies.
25 Other 
histories of the oil industry in the Middle East, such as those by Stephen Longrigg 
and George Stocking, tend to take a longer time period and devote relatively 
little space to the period up to 1924. These two authors are more interested in 
the industry and companies than in government and diplomacy. Stocking 
suggests that Britain ended up with control over Mesopotamian oil thanks to a 
combination of luck and planning. Iraqi nationalism was not allowed to obstruct 
Britain‟s plans to control the oil. The American companies were admitted after 
pressure from the State Department and inter-company negotiations; the open 
door closed behind them.
26 
By far the largest user of oil was the RN. Britain's power and prestige depended 
on naval supremacy, which required access to secure fuel supplies, making naval 
strategy key to the analysis of Britain's oil policy. The RN's fuel supplies are the 
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subject of David Snyder and Warwick Brown's unpublished PhD theses.
27 Both 
cover longer time periods and consider naval technology, including comparisons 
with coal, as much as efforts to obtain oil supplies. Snyder‟s work is concerned 
with the USA as well as Britain. He argues that, because of the importance of 
Britain‟s coal reserves to its naval supremacy, logistics meant that the switch to 
oil was a factor in the loss of this hegemony and that oil was not clearly superior 
to coal. Brown says that the Royal Navy‟s move to oil meant that it ceased to 
control its fuel supplies and became dependent on the oil industry for these.  
The RN's switch to oil before the First World War and Britain's subsequent need 
for secure supplies is commented on by the leading naval historians of the RN, 
such as Eric Grove and Arthur Marder.
28 Jon Sumida has analysed British naval 
logistics during the First World War, including the need for increasing quantities 
of oil.
29 Stephen Roskill's work on British naval policy shows the need for oil 
storage in the 1920s.
30 Details of how it impacted broader British strategy are 
outside the remit of these works. Naval histories of the war, such as those of 
Paul Halpern, Richard Hough and Robert Massie, mostly mention the RN's switch 
to oil and make some comment on tanker losses and oil shortages in 1917.
31 
Winston Churchill, who was First Lord of the Admiralty from 1911-15, discusses 
the RN's switch to oil but says very little about oil during the War in The World 
Crisis.
32 In the British Official Histories efforts to import oil and the importance 
of stocks and bunkering facilities are covered by C. E. Fayle's volumes on the 
economic aspects of the naval war.
33 The history of the Ministry of Munitions 
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describes the administrative aspects and attempts to boost home production.
34 
There is no volume bringing together all aspects of oil policy in the manner of D. 
J. Payton-Smith's work on the Second World War.
35 
The theatre of the land war most associated with oil is Mesopotamia. It was 
widely and correctly assumed to contain oil and was close to the existing Persian 
oilfields. In the 1970s the Middle Eastern Centre at St Antony‟s College, Oxford 
published a series of monographs including, as well as the book by Helmut 
Mejcher on oil referred to earlier, two works on British policy towards 
Mesopotamia/Iraq; one by Stuart Cohen on the period 1903-1914 and another by 
Peter Sluglett taking the story up to the end of the British Mandate in 1932. 
Cohen has published journal articles on British strategy towards Mesopotamia 
before and at the start of the war.
36 A revised edition of Sluglett's book was 
published in 2007. Cohen shows that Britain had long standing interests in 
Mesopotamia: defence of the route to India, trade, and a desire for security in 
the region and good relations with its inhabitants. The importance of these 
expanded in 1903-14, but all could be discerned earlier. The expeditionary force 
sent to Mesopotamia in 1914 was intended to protect these interests; Britain 
then wanted to preserve the existing system and had no plans to take over 
Mesopotamia. Sluglett agrees that the original reason to send troops to Basra 
was to protect existing British interests. The objectives expanded into control 
over Iraq in order to protect the air and land routes to India and to control the 
oil.  
Most writers on this campaign, including A. J. Barker, Lord Carver, Paul Davis, 
John Galbraith, Matthew Hughes and Ron Wilcox, follow Frederick Moberly‟s 
official history in saying that troops of the Indian Army were initially sent to 
Basra and Abadan for a number of reasons. Protection of the Persian oilfields 
was one; others included protection of Britain‟s traditional position in the 
Persian Gulf and hopes that the Arabs could be persuade to revolt against the 
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Ottoman Empire. The consensus is that, after the Persian oilfields had been 
secured in early 1915, oil played little role in the military operations in 
Mesopotamia until the end of the war when Britain moved to secure Mosul and 
its potential oilfields. The protection of oil supplies from German and Ottoman 
forces was a significant reason for the British military presence in Persia and the 
Caucasus.
37  
This thesis will argue that oil had little direct impact on military strategy during 
the war, but that the lessons of the war made oil important in war aims from 
1918 onwards and in post-war diplomacy. The Allies benefitted from having more 
oil than the Central Powers, but their supplies were never secure. Britain's pre-
war policy of building up stocks in peacetime and buying on the market in 
wartime was shown to be flawed by an oil crisis in 1917. The war showed that 
Britain had to control its own supplies in the future; doing so became a post war 
aim in 1918. 
Early English language histories of the whole war, such as those of Basil Liddell 
Hart and C. R. M. F. Cruttwell, emphasised the Mesopotamian campaign and the 
importance of the oilfields. The space devoted to what is now regarded as a 
sideshow has diminished in more recent books. Initially this was in favour of the 
Western Front orientation exemplified by John Terraine. More recently the 
emphasis has shifted to the more global approach of David Stevenson and Huw 
Strachan, which puts oil in the context of various factors affecting the war in the 
Middle East. Niall Ferguson‟s The Pity of War, a work whose arguments are 
based to a large extent on economic factors, makes little mention of oil.
38 
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Writers on Britain‟s strategy and aims during the war do not say very much about 
oil. V.H. Rothwell points out that Britain went to war with no clear objectives 
other than the preservation of Belgian independence, French security against 
aggression and an end to Prussian militarism. It was considered that the Ottoman 
Empire should suffer for its entry into the war. The initial consideration of 
British objectives in the Ottoman Empire by the de Bunsen Committee favoured 
a federal system, with the loss only of Constantinople to Russia and perhaps 
Basra to Britain; British influence would be extended without annexation. The 
acceptance that Russia should have Constantinople was a major departure in 
British foreign policy, which had previously aimed at preservation of the 
Ottoman Empire as a buffer state against Russia. There were discussions later in 
the war about a separate peace with the Ottoman Empire with the Arabic 
speaking parts and Armenia becoming autonomous rather than independent. The 
Admiralty had been arguing in favour of British control of the potential oil of 
Mesopotamia since at least 1915, but the India Office had little interest in oil. 
Not until August 1918, when Hankey convinced the War Cabinet of the 
importance of Mesopotamian oil, did Lloyd George and Balfour decide that 
British control over Mesopotamia should be a key war aim.
39  
David French contends that oil was only one of a number of factors driving 
British strategy towards the Middle East, although in 1918 the British captured 
Mosul because of the Admiralty‟s need for its oil.
40 Paul Guinn makes little 
mention of oil; he argues the principal reason to despatch forces to the Persian 
Gulf in 1914 was to impress the Turks and Arabs. Guinn believes that the main 
reason for General Maude‟s offensive towards Baghdad in 1917 was to increase 
the British Empire, but makes no mention of oil as a reason for this.
41 Keith 
Neilson argues that British strategy was driven by imperial considerations that 
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included the defence of India and the need to secure oil supplies for the RN; the 
fate of the empire depended on the navy.
42 
Oil receives little mention in works specifically on the Treaty of Versailles such 
as those of Antony Lentin and Ruth Henig, and the papers presented at the 75th 
anniversary conference.
43 It is mentioned a little more by writers covering the 
whole peace process from 1919-23 but not much; Margaret MacMillan devotes a 
few pages to it, and Alan Sharp makes only a couple of references.
44 Erik 
Goldstein argues that Britain wanted to dominate the Eastern Mediterranean. 
Palestine was a key component of this strategy, but control of Middle Eastern oil 
is not mentioned.
 45 Goldstein has contended that Britain was the most successful 
of the Great Powers at the Paris Peace Conference because of the great deal of 
detailed preparation that it undertook, starting whilst the war was still 
underway. The Petroleum Executive and the Admiralty were responsible for 
planning how Britain could obtain the oil that it would need in the post-war 
world.
46 
Most writers on the Middle East argue that Britain ended up with control over 
Mosul's oil as a fortunate consequence of strategies intended principally to 
pursue other aims. Michael Dockrill and Douglas Goold say that oil was not the 
main issue for Britain in the Middle East, but the British were starting to see its 
significance from 1920.
47 Elie Kedourie says very little about oil in England and 
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the Middle East.
48 Jukka Nevakivi points out that the British had to reconcile the 
promises that they had made to the French, the Arabs and the Zionists and to 
consider their own objectives, notably controlling Mesopotamia and its oil, and 
ensuring that the safety of imperial communications and borders. The only 
significant area of dispute with the French in 1918-19 was the Middle East, but 
this threatened to prevent agreement over other, apparently more important, 
issues in Europe. Eventually the British realised that co-operation with the 
French was the only way to come to an agreement over Turkey. An old style 
imperial agreement was concluded in order to meet French wishes, which 
included Syria and a stake in Mesopotamian oil.
 49  
Elizabeth Monroe devotes a chapter of Britain’s Moment in the Middle East to 
oil, but starts it by pointing out that „people forget how lately this asset began 
to dominate the region‟s economy and disturb its politics.‟
50 She contends that it 
was luck that put the Middle Eastern oilfields along the British route to India and 
luck that in 1908 oil was found in Persia adjacent to the British sphere of 
influence laid in the Anglo-Russian agreement of the previous year. John 
Darwin‟s Britain, Egypt and the Middle East
51 argues that, whilst the British 
Government was aware of the possibilities offered by a British controlled oil 
industry in the Middle East, the establishment of this was a useful by-product of 
strategies followed for other reasons. In his view almost all the focus of British 
politicians was on the setting up of lasting and friendly states in Turkey, Iraq and 
Persia. Balfour and Curzon wanted to transfer Mosul from the French to the 
British sphere and Curzon wanted to extend Britain‟s involvement in Persia. Oil 
was put forward as one of the reasons to do so; Darwin argues this was in order 
to help win the support of colleagues for measures primarily aimed at the 
protection of Britain‟s existing interests.  
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Curzon‟s impact on British Imperial policy has been examined by John Fisher.
52 
His view is that Curzon‟s principal motivation was to expand the British Empire, 
but that he was unable to achieve many of his goals in the new era of self-
determination. Some of the territories that he wanted to acquire, such as Mosul 
and the Caucasus, contained oil, but, according to Fisher, this was not Curzon's 
motivation. Curzon‟s imperial policy in Mesopotamia and Persia is criticised by 
Roger Adelson, who argues that it was overtaken by the need to come to an oil 
agreement with the USA.
 53 Briton Cooper Busch‟s trilogy covers the involvement 
of Britain and the British government of India in the Middle East from 1894 until 
the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. It shows oil playing an increasing role in British 
Government thinking over this period but argues that it was just one of a 
number of factors.
54 David Fromkin‟s A Peace to End All Peace
55 shows how the 
events of the war and the subsequent peace conferences created the modern 
Middle East. His view is that the British government had to come to 
arrangements that would allow Britain to rule at little cost to itself; British 
public opinion would not accept a system that was expensive in either British 
lives or money. He does not say much about oil; other authors, such as Peter 
Sluglett, have pointed out that oil contributed much of the revenue of what 
became Iraq, enabling to British to dominate it at relatively little cost to 
themselves.
56  
There is no agreement amongst oil industry historians on the question of 
whether or not Britain had a coherent oil policy during this period. Britain 
obtained control of the oilfields of Mesopotamia as a result of the war, but it 
had other interests in this territory, including protection of the land route to 
India and Britain's position in the Persian Gulf. Oil impacted post war relations 
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with the USA and France. Writers on British wartime strategy, the peace 
treaties, and Britain's role in the Middle East mostly emphasis the other factors. 
Because oil has been looked at from the point of view of the RN, Middle Eastern 
policy or the industry no previous work has taken all the factors together in 
order to determine the coherence of British oil strategy. This thesis will seek to 
determine the importance of oil in such questions and to decide whether or not 
Britain had a coherent, consistent and successful oil policy in 1914-1923. 32 
1  British Strategy and Oil, 1914-16 
By 1914 the growing importance of oil to the RN meant that the British 
Government had to formulate a policy for the supply of oil. This was based 
mainly on a desire to build up reserves relatively cheaply in peacetime. The 
focus was on ownership of oilfields and companies rather than control of 
territory. Little oil had been found in the British Empire. The largest British 
oilfield was in Burma; the rising use of oil fuel by the RN meant that as early as 
1905 the CID considered it to be vital that the Burmah Company should remain 
entirely British.
57 The government invested in APOC and gave it a long term 
contract to supply the RN in order to keep it British. Consideration was given to 
bringing RDS under British control. Some consideration was given to Mosul's 
potential oil, but the main impact of oil on military strategy was that measures 
were taken to protect APOC's Persian oilfields. 
1.1 British Oil Strategy in 1914 
The RN first experimented with oil in the 1860s. In the 1890s it adopted a policy 
of experimenting and observing efforts by other navies, commercial ship owners 
and railways. Significant progress was not made by the RN until the development 
of pressure spraying in 1902.
 58 Subsequent objections to the use of oil were 
mainly on the grounds of security of supply.
59 From 1905 most destroyers were 
exclusively oil fuelled; fears over the security of supply meant that cruisers and 
battleships used oil only as an auxiliary to coal.
60 For the same performance, an 
oil ship would be smaller than a coal one and require a smaller crew. For the 
same size, the oil vessel would be faster and better armed and armoured. The 
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last coal burning destroyers, the Beagle class of 1908, cost £106,000 each. The 
later oil fired Defender class had a similar performance but cost £86,000 each.
61  
From the Arethusa class of 1912 most cruisers ordered for the RN were fuelled 
exclusively by oil because coal fired cruisers were too slow to work with the 
newest destroyers and carry out their scouting duties.
62 The world's first 
exclusively oil fuelled battleships were the Queen Elizabeth class. Oil allowed 
them to be the first dreadnoughts to be armed with 15 inch guns and to be 
faster than any other battleships without sacrificing protection. The first of the 
class, HMS Queen Elizabeth, was laid down on 21 October 1912, 10 days before 
the next of her four sister ships, HMS Warspite, and a fortnight ahead of the first 
all oil American battleship, the USS Nevada. 
1.1.1 The Royal Commission on Fuel and Engines 
On 19 January 1912 a Committee on Oil Fuel, chaired by Captain William 
Pakenham, the Fourth Sea Lord, reported that war reserves should be a year‟s 
supply at wartime rates of consumption. There had been no formal Admiralty 
body dealing with oil since 1906. Britain imported 93 per cent of its fuel oil and 
demand was rising. As storage was insufficient for existing ships, no change 
towards more oil should be made in ships of the 1911-12 programme.
63 Despite 
this, Churchill, who replaced Reginald McKenna as First Lord of the Admiralty in 
October 1911, wrote after the war that the RN did not use enough oil to make its 
oil supply a significant issue until the construction of the Queen Elizabeth 
class.
64 Oil had to be found, stored and bought regularly and as inexpensively as 
possible. Wartime supplies had to be completely secure. The Royal Commission 
on Fuel and Engines was established to solve these problems, chaired by Admiral 
Lord 'Jacky' Fisher, First Lord of the Admiralty from 1905-11.
65 In 1886, as 
Director of Naval Ordnance, he had written a memorandum advocating that the 
RN should switch from coal to oil, earning himself the nickname of the „Oil 
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Maniac‟.
66 Eric Grove describes him as possessing 'considerable, if erratic, 
genius'
67, arguing that he convinced Churchill of the merits of oil.
68 
The Commission favoured the use of oil over coal as the fuel of warships and 
emphasised the importance of storage of reserves and of supply. Reliable and 
ample supplies of oil for the Royal Navy could be obtained for the next 15 to 20 
years but could not be relied upon under the current system of ad-hoc 
purchases. The Admiralty was forced to do this because it lacked sufficient 
storage facilities for reserves. Unlike coal oil did not deteriorate so could be 
stored for longer. Reserves should be built up over a number of years. In 
wartime supplies could be disrupted and the price was likely to rise so this policy 
would be both cheaper and safer. Substantial reserves were required; four 
years‟ peace consumption was recommended. Large storage capacity offered the 
opportunity to take advantage of short term price weakness and a hedge against 
the risk of the delivery of poor quality oil under contract. The actual quantity to 
be stored would depend on the extent to which oil was adopted and whether 
there was a move towards internal combustion engines. Three tons of oil was 
equivalent to four tons of coal when powering steam turbines but 10 tons of coal 
if internal combustion engines were adopted. Requirements were rising each 
year as oil fuelled destroyers, battleships and light cruisers were completed.
 69 
Oil would be used to power steam turbines. Fisher believed that warships would 
eventually be powered by internal combustion engines, but the technology was 
not yet ready.
70  
Few large warships were ever powered by internal combustion engines. Fisher 
had argued that such vessels would not need funnels so could have a low 
silhouette but this proved not to be the case, removing one of their potential 
advantages.
71 When the Washington Treaty restricted the displacement of 
warships the definition used was the standard displacement, omitting fuel. 
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Diesel engines required less fuel than steam turbines but were heavier so were 
penalised by the use of this measure.
72 
1.1.2 The Government and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company 
APOC, a British company, had discovered oil in Persia. Persia was nominally 
independent, but was divided into British and Russian zones of influence. APOC's 
founder, William D'Arcy, had previously had dealings with the Admiralty, which 
in 1905 had arrange for one of its oil suppliers, Burmah, to invest in his 
exploration company.
73 APOC lacked the capital required to develop its 
discovery. The prospect of it paying dividends was too distant for it to be able to 
raise further funds from private shareholders. It could raise the capital from the 
government, meaning the Admiralty since the Indian Railways declined to 
become involved.
74 Alternatively APOC could be taken over by another oil 
company, probably RDS, which had a better understanding than private investors 
of the risks and rewards involved. RDS was regarded by many as a foreign 
company because of its Dutch majority shareholding; the Netherlands was 
regarded as a country that was potentially pro-German.
75 This fear would prove 
to be unfounded, but it influenced policy at this stage. 
In October 1913 an Admiralty Commission, chaired by Admiral Sir Edmond Slade, 
formerly DNI and C.-in-C. East Indies, was despatched to investigate the Persian 
oil industry. Slade and another of its members, John Cadman, Professor of 
Mining at Birmingham University and Petroleum Adviser to the Colonial Office, 
would become major figures in British oil policy. Slade would later advocate 
policies aimed at maintaining British naval supremacy by obtaining control over 
the world's oil supplies. Phillips O'Brien has described him as 'probably the most 
anti-American sailor in the Admiralty.'
76  
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The final report concluded that APOC‟s concession would be capable of 
supplying a substantial proportion of the Royal Navy‟s oil needs for a long time. 
It was vital to keep the concession and the company in British hands. The RN's 
needs could be met from the existing fields in northern Persia. There was also a 
possibility of further discoveries in the south. The recommendation that the 
Admiralty should invest the capital needed by APOC to develop the fields and 
remain independent was accepted. A supply contract giving the RN oil on 
advantageous terms whilst still allowing the company a reasonable return was 
signed. The government provided £2,200,000 in shares and debentures in return 
for 51 per cent of the ordinary shares and the right to appoint two directors.
77  
The question of oil fuel supply for the RN was debated in the House of Commons 
when the Naval Estimates were considered on 17 July 1913. Churchill laid down 
the principles on which the Admiralty‟s oil supply policy was based: supplies 
should be widely spread geographically, sources should be kept open and 
independent competition maintained and where possible sources should be 
under British control with secure transport. Ernest Pretyman, a Conservative 
who had chaired the Admiralty Oil Fuel Committee until the change of 
government in 1905, agreed with these, but did not see how they could be 
maintained if the Admiralty was to be reliant on a single large oilfield.
78 A 
further debate took place on 17 June 1914 on the Admiralty‟s intention to invest 
in APOC. Churchill argued that whilst the RN controlled the seas, Britain would 
be able to import oil even if the enemy declared it to be contraband. The 
riskiest period would be early in a war; storage of reserves was being provided 
against shortages of supply in this period. Points made in the debate included 
concerns over the lack of security of the Persian oilfields; allegations of price 
fixing by financiers; calls for the money spent in Britain on the shale oil industry 
and on developing means of extracting oil from coal; and concerns over the 
impact on the Welsh coal industry of a switch by navies to oil. The motion was 
carried easily.
79  
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1.2 Mesopotamian Oil 
APOC was interested in the potential oil of Mesopotamia. The oilfields of the 
remainder of the Middle East were yet to be discovered, but it was widely 
believed that there was oil in the Mosul vilayet. As well as the proximity to the 
Persian oilfields, the frequent occurrences of oil seepages showed that this was 
almost certainly a rich oil province. Travellers in the region, including Captain F. 
R. Maunsell, a British artillery officer, and the Frenchman M. de Morgan, 
commented on this. Bitumen had been used in that part of the world since 
ancient times; there was a legend that the coating of pitch on Noah's Ark came 
from Hit. There had been no attempt to test the reserves by modern means; 
attempts to exploit them had been confined to crude ones by local inhabitants.
80 
In 1912, the Turkish Petroleum Company was formed by RDS, Deutsche Bank and 
the British owned National Bank of Turkey to obtain the rights to explore for oil 
in this region. This alarmed APOC whose Persian oil would lose much of its value 
if a large discovery was made across the border. It convinced the British 
government that it needed to be involved in the TPC. Anglo-German government 
negotiations concluded with an agreement of 19 March 1914 that split TPC's 
shareholding 25 per cent Deutsche Bank, 25 per cent RDS and 50 per cent APOC. 
RDS and APOC each gave up 2.5 per cent of the profits, but not the votes, to 
Calouste Gulbenkian, a British citizen of Armenian ancestry who had brokered 
the original deal to set up TPC; he owned 30 per cent of the National Bank of 
Turkey.
81 On 28 June 1914 the Grand Vizier wrote to Britain and Germany 
indicating that the Ottoman Empire intended to grant the TPC a concession. The 
outbreak of war meant that no contract was ever signed. The question of 
whether or not TPC had a valid concession would be a major issue after the 
war.
82 
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1.3 Britain and the Ottoman Empire in 1914 
Its proximity to India meant that Mesopotamia was of major strategic interest to 
Britain, which also had significant commercial interests there. Before the war 
Britain was pursuing its traditional policy of maintaining the territorial integrity 
of the Ottoman Empire whilst hoping that it would reform itself. The agreements 
made with Germany and the Ottoman Empire in 1914 were aimed at halting 
German encroachment into British interests and at strengthening the Ottoman 
economy.
83 Britain tried to keep the Ottoman Empire neutral in the early months 
of the war via a series of ambassadorial talks and notes, including offers to 
guarantee the territory of the Ottoman Empire, but these efforts failed.
84 
Hostilities began formally on 5 November 1914. Britain had no war aims in the 
Ottoman Empire and took some time to develop any. The maintenance of the 
status quo was no longer an option. Britain's position in the Persian Gulf meant 
that it would have to participate in whatever arrangements were made for the 
future of the Ottoman Empire. 
1.4 Development of British War Aims in the Middle East 
By the end of 1914 stalemate had been reached on the Western Front, most 
German warships outside European waters had been destroyed and the Russian 
offensives towards Germany had failed. British attention turned to the 
possibilities of using Britain's naval power to win the war by operations in other 
parts of the world. Operations in the Baltic and the Balkans and landings in Syria 
were suggested. The option taken was an attempt to force the Dardanelles.
85 
Hankey argued that opening the Dardanelles would enable Russia to receive the 
supplies that it needed in order to launch an offensive. The Balkan countries 
might enter the war on the Allied side and a line of communications up the 
Danube would be opened. Russian wheat supplies would end of the threat of 
British food shortages. The revenue from these would allow Russia to pay for its 
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imports of war supplies and interest on its loans from France. Hankey did not 
mention the possibility that Russian oil could be exported through the 
Dardanelles, both earning it revenue and giving Britain another source of 
supply.
86 In 1913 Russia exported 670,000 tons out of its total production of 
8,370,000 tons; Britain took 130,000 tons, 7.7 per cent of its needs.
87 Russian oil 
was exported via two pipelines to Black Sea ports, one from Baku to Batum and 
the other from Maikop to Tuapse. Persia, Mesopotamia and their oilfields were 
not mentioned as reasons for the operations. 
1.4.1 Alexandretta and Mesopotamia 
The only mention of oil in papers written before the attack on the Dardanelles 
was by Fisher, again First Sea Lord. He proposed a complex operation against the 
Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires. It included attack on Alexandretta (now 
Iskenderun), a port in the north-eastern corner of the Mediterranean, because of 
its rail connection to Mesopotamia and its oilfields. A force of obsolete British 
pre-Dreadnought battleships would force the Dardanelles.
88 In November 1914 
Indian Army troops had invaded Mesopotamia from the Persian Gulf and captured 
the town of Basra. If Britain held Mesopotamia it had to be linked by railway to 
the Mediterranean; Alexandretta was one of the prime candidates for the 
Mediterranean terminus of the railway. 
Lord Kitchener, the Secretary of State for War, pointed out that an Allied victory 
in the war would mean that Russia would control Constantinople and France 
would control Syria, affecting the strategic position of Egypt. The possibility of 
future conflict with either or both of Russia and France had to be considered. If 
Britain controlled Mesopotamia it would be necessary to hold Alexandretta, 
which would otherwise be a risky outpost of no value. Reinforcements from 
Britain could reach Mesopotamia a fortnight quicker by rail from Alexandretta 
than by sea via the Suez Canal, Red Sea and Persian Gulf. Holding Alexandretta 
would mean that the peacetime garrison in of Mesopotamia could be smaller 
                                         
86 CAB 24/1 G8, Hankey. 
87 CAB 24/59, G.T. 5267 'Petroleum Situation in the British Empire', E. J. W. Slade, 29 July 1918, 
pp. 2-3. 
88 Churchill, Gilbert, eds, Companions. vol. iii, part 1, 'Fisher to Churchill, 3 January 1915', pp. 367-
68, map on p. 1596; Guinn, British, pp. 44-54; CAB 24/1 G2, Lloyd George. 40 
than would otherwise be the case. Alexandretta would threaten the flank of a 
Russian advance. If Britain did not take over Mesopotamia the Russians would, 
threatening Britain's position in the Persian Gulf. Mesopotamia possessed great 
agricultural potential through the development of irrigation schemes. It would 
provide an outlet for the surplus population of India. It protected Britain's 
Persian oil interests and the land route from the Mediterranean to the Persian 
Gulf. Only a small hinterland around Alexandretta need be occupied. This was 
readily defensible, as was Mesopotamia, thanks to its mountainous northern 
frontier, provided that the Tigris and Euphrates were secure. The potential 
wealth and population of the region should mean that its defence would be a 
burden on Britain for only a short period of time. It was preferable that a 
Turkish or Armenian state would provide a buffer to Russia, but a frontier with 
Russia was better than Franco-Russian domination of the land route from the 
Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf.
89  
The Admiralty argued in favour of Alexandretta and stressed oil as one of the 
reasons why. Two papers were submitted to the Cabinet on the subject. One, 
written by Admiral Sir Henry Jackson, was mainly concerned with the merits of 
Alexandretta, a large natural harbour, as a British base. British plans for 
Mesopotamia and possession of the Persian oilfields meant that Britain would 
need a Mediterranean port on the Baghdad Railway. Alexandretta was the most 
suitable; Beirut was a possible alternative, but the railway would have to be 
extended to it. Possession of Alexandretta by another power would threaten 
British communications and would require the construction of a fortified base on 
Cyprus; there would be no return on the cost of this.
90 The other focused more 
on Mesopotamia and the land link to it. The question of a land link from the 
Mediterranean to the Euphrates had been considered since around 1830. The 
likely end of the Ottoman Empire, leading to Russian annexation of 
Constantinople and British acquisition of Lower Mesopotamia, changed the 
situation. Britain was entitled to compensation for its role in the war. It was 
necessary to restore Mesopotamia to its former wealth and also to link it to the 
Mediterranean as a counter balance to Russia's new strength in that key region. 
The Admiralty had an extra and vital interest; the need to have an oil supply in 
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the region. Russia would have the supplies of the Black Sea available at 
Constantinople so Britain must be able to access those of Mesopotamia at 
Alexandretta.
91 The naval historian Julian Corbett was involved in the 
preparation of this paper. He wrote to Fisher expressing his concern that he had 
not emphasised oil enough in the paper. Oil was replacing coal as the principal 
fuel of warships, and the Mediterranean was again becoming a vital area of the 
world. An opportunity had arisen for Britain to obtain control of great reserves 
of oil close to this region. This should not be passed up. Corbett's papers contain 
two drafts of this letter; it is not clear which version he sent to Fisher. In one he 
attributes the renewed importance of the Mediterranean to the forthcoming 
breakup of the Ottoman Empire, in the other to the impending acquisition of 
Constantinople by Russia. He says in both that the opportunity to obtain supplies 
of oil in the Middle East is 'a gift of god'.
92 
Haifa was favoured over Alexandretta as the Mediterranean outlet for the British 
oil pipeline. General Sir Charles Callwell, the DMO, persuaded the de Bunsen 
Committee, set up in April 1915 to consider British war aims in the Middle East, 
that the route from Alexandretta to Mesopotamia would have to go through 
French territory. Haifa was almost as good in other respects and could be linked 
to Mesopotamia by a railway through British territory. The only disadvantage was 
that this railway would not be commercially viable.
93 
1.4.2 The De Bunsen Committee 
The de Bunsen Committee was the first formal body established to study British 
war aims in the Ottoman Empire. Its official title was the Committee on British 
Desiderata in Turkish Asia but it is generally known after its Chairman Sir 
Maurice de Bunsen, Ambassador to Vienna until the outbreak of war. It reported 
on 30 June 1915. British desiderata had to take into account the desires of its 
Allies, who might be its rivals in the future.
94 Britain had nine aims in the region. 
Three could be left for now. The Moslem Holy Places had to be under Moslem 
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rule; this, along with the future of the Caliphate, was important for Indian 
Moslem sentiment. Solutions to the problems of Armenia and of Palestine and 
the Christian Holy Places were needed. Britain would have had an interest in 
these issues even if it had not had any other involvement in the Ottoman 
Empire. Before the war Britain had aimed to maintain the Ottoman Empire. Its 
impending demise meant that Britain had to stake a claim for part of it to 
protect the interests laid out in the other six points. These were: 
1.  A clear and lasting acceptance of Britain's position in the Persian Gulf. 
2.  The elimination of discrimination against British trade and either 
maintenance of current markets or compensation for their loss. 
3.  The carrying out of promises made to various Arab leaders and the 
people of Basra. 
4.  Industries in which Britain was interested to be developed. Oil was one 
of those mentioned along with river navigation and irrigation schemes. 
5.  Irrigation schemes to grow corn supply and perhaps lead to 
immigration from India. 
6.  Continuation of Britain's strategic position in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf with as little increase as possible 
in defence expenditure and responsibilities.
95 
 
British business interests in Turkish Asia were mostly located in the Basra, 
Baghdad and Mosul vilayets. Britain had already decided to annex the Basra 
vilayet and could not return it to the Ottomans because of promises made to the 
local population and their leaders. It would valueless if another power controlled 
Baghdad. Mosul was needed in order to have a defensible frontier in the hills. 
Baghdad would protect the existing oilfields just across the border with Persia. 
The acquisition of Mosul's oil by a rival power would harm British interests. Mosul 
could supply water supply for irrigation schemes to restore Mesopotamia as a 
granary that could supply Britain. Russia was to have Constantinople. Greece 
would receive the Smyrna vilayet if it entered the war. 
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Figure 1-1: De Bunsen Committee Proposals 
 
 
Source: CAB 27/1, Map, No. V. 
The Committee laid out four possible schemes, as shown in the map above: 
A.  Partition. Turkey would be restricted to Anatolia, with the rest of the 
Ottoman Empire being divided amongst European powers. Britain would 
need a railway to the Mediterranean in order to transport military 
reinforcements. Haifa was preferred to Alexandretta as the terminus 
because the latter would be too close to French and Russian territory to 
be secure; two maps were provided, one with each option. 
B.  Zones of Interest: The Ottoman Empire would continue but other powers 
would have zones of interest. A British railway link to the Mediterranean 
would not be needed as any line would now be built for commercial 
reasons, not strategic ones. 
C.  Maintenance of an independent Ottoman Empire: The Ottoman Empire 
would lose its European territory and Constantinople to Russia, the Basra 
vilayet to Britain and perhaps Smyrna to Greece. Various Arab Sheikhdoms 
would be granted independence in order to comply with promises made to 44 
them by Britain. The Armenian reform measures agreed before the war 
but then suspended would be adopted. 
D.  Decentralised Administration: The Ottoman Empire was divided 
ethnographically and historically into five provinces: Anatolia, Armenia, 
Syria, Palestine and one roughly equivalent to Mesopotamia, termed Irak-
Jazirah. The intention of removing Constantinople, the centre of 
government, allowed the possibility of setting up a decentralised form of 
government. The French sphere of interest was roughly the same as Syria 
and the British one corresponded to Palestine plus Irak-Jazirah.  
Decentralisation was preferred. It was in line with the political theories of the 
Allies and the desires of the Arabs and Armenians. It avoided the problems of the 
others; potential conflicts between powers, construction of new naval bases, 
Turkish resentment, problems with Indian Muslims and possible exclusion of 
Britain from other powers' spheres. If it proved to be unworkable then the 
nucleus of independent states would have been established. The main problems 
were persuading the Turks and the Allies to agree to it and setting up the 
provincial governments.
 96 
At the Committee's second meeting on 13 April 1915 Admiral Jackson said that 
the Admiralty believed that Britain should not take over more territory than it 
had to. Oil made it vital for Britain to control the Baghdad and Basra vilayets. On 
his suggestion Slade attended the next meeting two days later to explain the 
importance of oil.
97 De Bunsen started that meeting by saying that Mesopotamia 
contained substantial oil resources and that Britain's commitments to APOC 
meant that it was vital to know what should be done to protect these interests. 
Slade's view was that protecting the interests of the Persian Concession was 
paramount. Asiatic Turkey contained a great deal of oil: 
A strip of oil-bearing regions was known to run from the southern 
extremity of Arabia along the west coast of the Persian Gulf, through 
the valley of the Tigris and Euphrates, and so on to the northern coast 
of Asia Minor almost to its European end. There was also known to be 
a valuable oil district in Palestine to the south of Haifa...it would be 
sufficient, however, from our point of view if we secured the vilayet 
of Mosul, as that district contained some very rich oil-bearing lands 
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connecting with the Persian oil fields, which it was essential we 
should control to prevent undue competition with the Anglo-Persian 
Concession. It would of course be necessary to connect the fields by a 
pipe line with the Mediterranean...Haifa would do quite well as the 
terminus port.
 98 
Much of this oil had not then been discovered, but most now has been, apart 
from in Palestine. De Bunsen summed up by saying that Slade's opinions on 
Britain's 'requirements in regard to oil practically coincided with the views that 
the committee had taken in regard to the inclusion of the Mosul vilayet in the 
territory to be acquired by us.'
99 
Oil was playing a part in Britain's war aims. Britain had interests in Mesopotamia 
and the Persian Gulf and wanted to protect the land route to India. 
Consequently, it would have wanted some form of control over the Basra vilayet 
even if there had been no oil in Persia or Mesopotamia. This could have been 
annexation, a protectorate or a sphere of influence. The Committee concluded 
that to control the Basra vilayet it was necessary to also control the Baghdad 
vilayet. Oil was a clear reason for Britain's interest in the Mosul vilayet. It cannot 
be said that oil was now a main determinant of British policy, and it is unclear 
how much impact the Committee's deliberations had on the Government; it is 
not mentioned at all in Hankey's diary and there are only a couple of passing 
references to it in his Supreme Command.
100 However, the first attempt to 
devise British war aims in the Middle East had concluded that oil was one of 
Britain's interests in the region. 
1.4.3 The Sykes-Picot Agreement 
In May 1916 Britain and France signed an agreement, with Russian consent, to 
partition much of the Ottoman Empire into five areas. It was named after the 
chief negotiators, Sir Mark Sykes, who had been a member of the de Bunsen 
Committee, and François Georges Picot. Each country would have a zone that it 
directly controlled and another that would be within its sphere of influence but 
ruled by the Arabs. Palestine was to be under international rule. Britain's 
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directly controlled area included the vilayets of Basra and Baghdad. The town of 
Mosul was in the French sphere of influence; this has led to a historiography that 
says that Sykes-Picot gave France the potential oil of Mesopotamia. Kent argues 
that this was because Britain did not have a clear oil policy in 1916
101, whilst 
Mejcher says relatively little about Sykes-Picot but implies that it gave France all 
of Mosul.
102 Jones accepts that Sykes-Picot gave France the oil of Mosul; this is 
less of a problem for him since he does not believe that Britain had a coherent 
oil policy in this period. He does point out that Sykes-Picot stated that previous 
British rights to oil in the French zones would be respected] but questions 
whether the Grand Vizier's letter of 28 June 1914 really gave the British oil 
exploration rights.
103 Yergin considers it to be a careless error that was opposed 
by many British officials who subsequently expended much time and effort to 
correct it.
104 David Fromkin argues that Britain surrendered the oil of Mosul.
105 
Most other Middle Eastern historians tend not to regard the oil of Mosul as an 
issue until after the war. 
Edward Fitzgerald has shown that Sykes-Picot gave only about half of the Mosul 
vilayet to France.
106 France was allocated the northern part of the vilayet, 
including the city of Mosul, and Britain the southern section, including Kirkuk. 
The talks were initiated by Britain after it had made promises to Sharif Hussein 
of Mecca in order to persuade him to launch an Arab revolt against Ottoman 
rule. Sir Edward Grey proposed bilateral negotiations to forestall the risk that 
the French would suspect that there was a threat to their interests in Syria 
behind the promises made to Hussein.
107 Pre-war reports meant that the French 
Foreign Ministry was well aware of the potential oil of Mosul.
108 Control of the 
region did not become a French aim until the British invitation to talks made the 
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French realise that they were in a position to demand more territory.
109 They 
were partly successful because Britain wanted the French to have the northern 
part of Mosul vilayet but insisted on the area round Kirkuk being in the British 
zone. It was expected that eastern Anatolia would be Russian controlled after 
the war and Britain wanted a buffer zone between its zone and the Russian 
one.
110 By 1919 Mosul's oil had become a major issue. Balfour, then Foreign 
Secretary, commented that it was Kitchener, by then dead, who had wanted a 
French buffer zone between British and Russian territory for reasons of security. 
Balfour, who was First Lord of the Admiralty at the time of Sykes-Picot, said that 
it could now be seen that this was a mistake, but that he had agreed with the 
decision at the time.
111 
Figure 1-2: Sykes-Picot Agreement 
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1.5 Oil and the Mesopotamian Campaign 
In 1914 responsibility for military intelligence and planning in Asia was divided 
between the War Office in London and the Indian Army in India. Persia, the 
Persian Gulf and Basra were Indian responsibilities. The rest of Mesopotamia was 
within the War Office zone but was not given great attention. The presence of a 
military department at the India Office in London increased the confusion.
112 
There were no pre-war plans for a war in Mesopotamia, although in 1911-12 poor 
relations with the Ottomans led to the formation of a committee of senior 
officers to consider what recommendations the Indian government might make 
for protection of the British position in the Persian Gulf. Relations with the 
Ottomans improved so the issue was left until January 1914 when the question of 
the defence of the APOC oilfields arose. In July the India Office asked for the 
Indian government's opinion on the subject. It had not replied by the outbreak of 
war. As it became likely that the Ottoman Empire would enter the war on the 
German side operations against it were considered. The General Staff argued 
that Russia would be able to cope with any Ottoman offensive. At this stage 
concentrating forces in the West was favoured and operations against the 
Dardanelles were at first ruled out. The main issues in Mesopotamia were an 
indirect threat to Egypt and the Suez Canal by an Arab rising against Britain; 
disruption to the Persian oil supplies; protection of the existing British position 
in the Persian Gulf; and the risk of a Jihad leading to a rising on the North West 
Frontier of India and perhaps within India itself.
113 
1.5.1 The Despatch of IEF D 
In August 1914 rising tension with the Ottoman Empire meant that measures to 
protect British interests in the Persian Gulf were contemplated. Slade, a former 
C.-in-C. East Indies, was at the Admiralty and represented its views on the 
subject. He argued that the current situation was unsatisfactory but that prompt 
action would remove the threat to British interests, including the oil refinery at 
Abadan. He wanted an expeditionary force to be readied at Karachi in order to 
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be despatched to the Gulf at short notice. Part of it should be moved to a 
position in the Persian Gulf where it could move to the Shatt-al-Arab and protect 
the refinery within 48 hours. Two gunboats should move to the Shatt al Arab in 
order to stop any attempt at blocking it and prevent the Ottomans using it for 
military transport.
114 These proposals were made on 23 August 1914 and sent to 
the India Office two days later. On 30 August Slade wrote another memo arguing 
that there was a need for 'prompt action.'
115 The Foreign Office had accepted his 
proposal but General Sir Edmund Barrow and Sir Arthur Hirtzel of the India 
Office had told him that they could not do anything without a Cabinet order 
because so many troops had been sent abroad from India. Slade insisted that 
troops must be sent: 
 It is...of urgent importance that the troops indicated should be sent 
at once in order to safeguard our supply of oil...This question of 
defence has nothing to do with the investment of Government capital 
in the Company...It is necessary in order to ensure the due supply of 
oil required for the Fleet. 
I might also emphasis the political importance of acting strongly in 
this region. Turkey is very vital here and it is considered that a 
settlement of many outstanding differences may thus be arrived at. 
Mesopotamia is a very rich oil field over which we ought to obtain 
unquestioned control.'
116 
Churchill disagreed with Slade, writing on this minute that: 
There is little likelihood of any troops being available for this purpose. 
Indian forces must be used at the decisive point. We shall have to buy 
our oil from elsewhere.
117 
Churchill's reluctance to protect the Persian oil installations appears surprising 
given his role in the government's purchase of shares in APOC, but it is consistent 
with his pre-war opinion. In a 1913 Cabinet memorandum on naval oil supplies 
he assumed 'that in time of war money would be no object.'
118 The objective of 
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the APOC contract was to build up an oil reserve of six months' wartime naval oil 
consumption relatively cheaply in peacetime. 
Sir Louis Mallet, the Ambassador to Constantinople, argued in favour of co-
operation with an Arab movement led by friendly chiefs, such as Ibn Saud and 
the Sheikh of Kuwait. The capture of Baghdad should be the initial move and 
would be much better than attacking the Dardanelles.
119 Slade agreed, claiming 
that Ibn Saud and the Sheikh of Kuwait were very pro-British and would revolt 
against the Ottomans at the merest suggestion of British support. This would, 
without much difficulty give Britain control of Mesopotamia with its 'enormous 
grain growing lands...besides extremely valuable oilfields.'
120 The loss of 
Mesopotamia would be a major blow to both to the Ottoman Empire and 
Germany. Germany had substantial interests in the area and had been trying to 
supplant Britain and India there. Barrow, the Military Secretary to the India 
Office, also favoured co-operation with the Arabs, which he thought would end 
any risk of a Jihad and thus protect India, Egypt and Mesopotamia. He saw oil as 
an excuse for this operation, an intriguing reversal of the now widely held belief 
that everything in the Middle East is about oil. On 26 September he wrote on a 
memo arguing in favour of a landing: 
at Mohammerah or at Abadan Island, ostensibly to protect the oil 
installation, but in reality to notify the Turks that we mean business 
and to the Arabs that we were ready to support them.
121 
1.5.2 Early Manoeuvres by IEF D 
Three Indian Expeditionary Forces had been organised; A to France and Egypt 
and two to East Africa, B to act defensively and C offensively. The increasing 
tension with the Ottoman Empire meant that IEF D was formed by detaching part 
of IEF A. This initially consisted of a brigade of the Sixth (Poona) Division of the 
Indian Army, later to be followed by the rest of the division. On 5 October Lord 
Crewe, the Secretary of State for India, gave the following instructions to the 
Indian Government:  
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The intention is to occupy Abadan, with the Force under orders, 
protect the oil-tanks and pipe-line, cover the landing of 
reinforcements, in the event of such being necessary, and show the 
Arabs that our intention is to support then against the Turks.
122 
The force reached Bahrain on 23 October. Its commander, General Delamain, 
was ordered to carry out the objectives above. He was to land at Abadan Island, 
which was Persian and contained APOC's refinery, but not to take any hostile 
action against the Ottomans before the outbreak of war.
123 On 31 October 
Delamain was warned that war was imminent. His force landed at Fao on 6 
November, the day after the formal commencement of hostilities. By 10 
November he had carried out his instructions.
124 Four days later the rest of the 
Sixth Division arrived. Its commander, General Sir Arthur Barrett, had 
instructions to take Basra. This was achieved by 22 November with relatively 
light casualties. Sir Percy Cox, the Political Agent on the scene, wanted to 
announce that the British occupation would be permanent. He was over-ruled on 
the grounds that it would contradict the agreement between the Allies that such 
arrangements should not be finalised until the end of the war. Barrow proposed 
taking Qurna. This gave a strong military position, control of the navigable 
waterway to the Gulf, possession of all the agricultural lands, completely 
protected Persian Arabistan, had a moral effect on the Arabs and enabled 
control of the telegraph. Crewe agreed, but was against further advances. Qurna 
was taken on 9 December.
125 
In early 1915 it was found that further advances were required in order to secure 
the existing position. Ottoman forces attacked from Amara on the Tigris towards 
the oil pipe-line and from Nasiriyah on the Euphrates towards Basra. The former 
force was believed to be heading for Ahwaz in Persia on the Karun River and the 
oil pipeline was cut by saboteurs.
126 The oilfields were protected by the local 
Bakhtiari tribesmen, but the Sheikh of Mohammerah was concerned that his Arab 
tribesmen might join the Ottomans if British reinforcements were not sent. The 
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British forces present were too weak to defend the 130 mile pipeline.
127 The 
Indian Government was initially reluctant to reduce the garrison of India but 
built the forces in Mesopotamia up to two infantry divisions and a cavalry 
brigade. Sir John Nixon took command on 9 April 1915. His force was designated 
as a corps by the Government of India but did not have all the equipment, 
especially transport and medical services, of a corps.
128 His main objective was 
to control the Basra vilayet. He was to protect APOC's facilities and to prepare a 
plan to capture Baghdad. He should respect the neutrality of Persia subject to 
pressing political or military reasons.
129 Throughout the war both sides found that 
pressing military and political reasons justified breaches of Persian neutrality.
130  
On 12 April the Ottoman attack towards Basra was defeated at Barjisiya.
131 IEF D 
had completed the assignment given to it by the British Government except that 
the oil pipeline was not yet secure. This was the main concern in London. On 19 
April Crewe cabled Hardinge urging operations to protect the pipeline as 
'Admiralty most anxious for early repair pipeline as oil question becoming 
serious.'
132 On the same day Nixon requested more cavalry. Hardinge rejected 
this plea. Crewe informed Hardinge on 24 April that the British Government 
would not authorise any further advances and that throughout 'the summer we 
must confine ourselves to the defence of oil interests in Arabistan and of the 
Basra vilayet.'
133 An advance to Amara might be allowed if it increased the 
security of the oilfields but reinforcements would not be sent. In London Crewe 
did not appear to realise that Nixon's orders from India were to plan for the 
occupation of all of the Basra vilayet, including both Amara and Nasiriyah. 'In 
Mesopotamia a safe game must be played'
134 was Crewe's conclusion. 
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Figure 1-3: The Mesopotamian Campaign, 1914-1915 
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1.5.3 The 1915-16 Offensive 
Nixon intended to attack Ahwaz to secure the pipeline and Amara to stop the 
enemy threatening Ahwaz.
135 The offensives towards Ahwaz and Amara started 
on 31 May and succeeded by 3 June.
136 Austen Chamberlain, who replaced Crewe 
as Secretary of State for India when the Coalition Government was formed in 
May 1915, continued his predecessor's line of urging caution and simply 
defending the oilfields, pipeline and the Basra vilayet. No reinforcements would 
be sent. Nixon and Hardinge wanted to take Nasiriyah in order to protect Basra 
and then Kut-al-Amara in order to safeguard Nasiriyah and Amara.
137 The oilfields 
and pipelines were not threatened after Nasiriyah and Amara were captured.
138 
There are better explanations than oil for the attempt to take Baghdad; the 
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need for a victory somewhere after defeats elsewhere; over confidence by local 
commanders; and momentum created by a series of easy victories early in the 
campaign. Oil receives little mention in the reports of either an Inter-
Departmental Committee set up to consider whether or not to advance on 
Baghdad or the Mesopotamia Commission, set up later to analyse the reasons for 
the failure.
139 General Sir Charles Townshend, who commanded the Sixth Division 
in its offensive towards Baghdad, argued in his memoirs that this operation 
should not have taken place. Basra vilayet and the oilfields should have been 
defended by a force based at Basra, with outposts at Qurna, Nasiriyah and 
Ahwaz.
140 He protested to Nixon about the decision to attack Baghdad on the 
grounds that his force was too weak to do so. Even if it succeeded the Ottoman 
success at Gallipoli meant that they could send reinforcements and retake 
Baghdad. Townshend blamed the decision to go ahead on the politicians.
141 
Heavy casualties at the Battle of Ctesiphon in late November and the poor 
supply situation meant that IEF D had to withdraw.
142 
Barrow successfully argued after the Battle of Ctesiphon in favour of a retreat to 
Kut-al-Amara. It was a strong defensive position and had 'the further political 
advantage that it covers the whole of the Basra vilayet and indirectly protects 
the Anglo-Persian oilfield from Turkish attack.'
143 General Sir William Robertson, 
the CIGS, argued that remaining at Kut was better than falling back on Amara. A 
withdrawal from Kut would risk a Turkish attack on Persia and Afghanistan. Loss 
of the oilfields was one possible negative consequence, but the threat to India of 
a Jihad was a greater one.
144 The Persian oilfields were a factor in British 
military strategy, but other considerations were more important. The Admiralty 
remained concerned over the security of the oilfields. Negotiations between 
APOC and the Bakhtiari tribes in December meant that defence of the oilfields 
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was ensured without the need to send more British troops.
 145 Kut fell on 29 April 
1916.  
1.5.4 The Capture of Baghdad 
The mismanagement of the campaign meant that the Mesopotamian theatre was 
now under the control of Robertson and the War Office in London. On 22 August 
1916 he informed the War Committee that it was necessary to keep the 
unsuccessful relief force opposite Kut as a withdrawal would enable the 
Ottomans to follow up their success against Russian forces in Persia.
146 The same 
month British reinforcements had to be sent to Ahwaz as some of the Bakhtiaris 
had turned hostile. Protection of the oilfields, which the Admiralty had often 
urged, had become even more significant because of the need for oil by the 
local forces.
147 The next month Robertson argued for a withdrawal from the 
positions opposite Kut. British forces in Mesopotamia were too weak to take 
Baghdad and were unnecessarily strong for defensive operations. Falling back 
would release troops to deal with the Bakhtiaris and other troublesome tribes. 
Objectors to this proposal included General Sir Frederick Maude, the new 
theatre commander. General Sir Charles Monro, the C.-in-C. India, was asked for 
his views. Monro visited Basra and reported that Robertson's proposed positions 
would not command the rivers or the oilfields as well as the current ones. There 
would be no saving in troop numbers because unrest amongst Mesopotamian and 
south Persian tribes would increase, thus requiring more troops.
148 On 30 
September, Maude had been ordered: 
'to protect the Oil Fields and Pipe Lines in the vicinity of the Karun 
River, to maintain our occupation and control of the Basra Vilayet, 
and to deny hostile access to the Persian Gulf and Southern Persia.
149 
Maude argued that to do nothing would be a poor strategy. He reorganised his 
force and greatly improved the supply and medical services that had proved 
entirely inadequate in the earlier offensive. He was permitted to launch an 
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offensive. It began on 13 December. He adopted a slow and methodical 
approach.
150 Baghdad was taken on 11 March 1917; General Baratov's Russian 
offensive from the north left Mosul in an exposed position, but the Allies had not 
yet taken all of Mesopotamia.
151 The General Staff argued that the capture of 
Baghdad had ended the risk of an Ottoman attack in Persia and any threat to 
India. The defeat of their army on the Tigris had required the Ottomans to 
withdraw from Persia and the Russians had, at British request, taken the 
offensive against the retreating enemy. The British objectives in Mesopotamia 
were to set up adequate administration and supply arrangements around 
Baghdad, to defeat enemy forces from the lower Euphrates and to co-operate 
with the Russians in removing Ottoman forces from Mesopotamia.
152  
Over the next six months Maude consolidated the British position. The loss of 
Baghdad was a severe blow to German ambitions in the Middle East and an 
offensive by a joint German-Ottoman force called Yilderim was intended to 
retake it and threaten Persia. It did not because British successes in Palestine 
resulted in Yilderim being employed there instead.
153 Maude died of cholera on 
18 November and Robertson gave cautious instructions to his successor General 
Sir William Marshall. These were mostly the same as those given to Maude: 
Marshall was to protect the oilfields and pipelines, maintain British influence in 
the Baghdad vilayet, co-operate with the Arabs and Baratov but conduct no 
aggressive offensives. A new order was that Marshall should contemplate how 
reduce his force. The Mesopotamian campaign had succeeded in all its 
objectives, which did not then include the capture of the Mosul vilayet. The 
main campaign against the Ottoman Empire would now be in Palestine.
154 
Protection of the oilfields was always a consideration in the Mesopotamian 
campaign. It became a less significant issue when offensive operations towards 
Baghdad rather than defensive ones around Basra were being undertaken. 
Mesopotamia was now a quiet theatre. Offensive operations would resume near 
the end of the war. Oil would be the major factor behind them. 
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1.6 The National Oil Company 
In 1916 long term oil policy focused more on attempts to establish a large, 
British controlled company than on plans to obtain control over oil bearing 
territory. The first government memorandum to deal explicitly with oil policy 
was written by the Board of Trade in August 1916. It was responded to by a 
series of Admiralty memoranda, mostly from Slade. 
1.6.1 The 1916 Oil Company Merger Proposals 
In August 1916 Lewis Harcourt, the First Commissioner of Works and temporarily 
in charge of the Board of Trade, stated that: 
The war has made clear that it is imperatively necessary for His 
Majesty's Government to take immediate and effective action to 
safeguard the future oil supplies of the British Empire...The problem 
of supply is...no longer merely a commercial question; it is an 
Imperial question of the first magnitude.'
155  
Ronald Ferrier's history of BP argues that this 'is an important document for it 
recognised for the first time the importance of the national oil supply 
situation.'
156 It insisted that oilfields in the British Empire should be British 
controlled. Foreign owners might delay development of these in favour of their 
interests elsewhere in the world. Since these could supply only a fraction of 
Britain's needs, Britain had to get control of as much foreign oil as possible. It 
would be some time before Persian and Mesopotamian oil could make a 
difference; the only effective way to solve the current problem was to bring RDS 
under British control. An Imperial Oil Company should be formed by merging 
Anglo-Saxon, a subsidiary of RDS, with Burmah. The new company would own all 
RDS's interests except those in Dutch territory and Romania; its shareholding 
would split 51 per cent British, 49 per cent Dutch. Shell and Royal Dutch would 
each have three directors and Burmah two; the Shell and Burmah directors 
would have to be British subjects. This would establish a British company that 
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controlled both substantial oil production and a major distribution network. 
Measures would be taken to safeguard the British consumer.
157  
The idea of a Shell-Burmah merger to create a large oil company with a British 
majority had been proposed by Shell in 1915. It suggested including APOC, but 
APOC's chairman, Charles Greenway, favoured an amalgamation with Lord 
Cowdray's Mexican Eagle. Cowdray thought that a large national oil company 
would be good for Britain but was reluctant to be involved himself. He thought 
that government capital and directors brought problems and that people with 
significant shareholdings in them ran companies better than hired managers. The 
government was reluctant to include Mexican Eagle in any national oil company 
because of potential diplomatic problems with the USA. Civil servants foresaw 
problems working with Cowdray.
158  
Slade produced three memoranda in reply to the one from the Board of Trade, 
all dated 24 August 1916 but circulated to the Cabinet by Balfour, then First 
Lord of the Admiralty, on 6 September.
159 Balfour referred to Slade's papers in 
his Cabinet memorandum of 18 August. He argued that the Admiralty could get 
as much oil as it required 'provided..[t]hey can carry it; and...[t]hey can pay for 
it. The shortage in the present war is one not of oil but of tonnage.'
160 He raised 
a number of questions, mostly dealing with the risk of a monopoly raising prices 
and the government's potential role. He asked: '[c]an we afford to be responsible 
for the policy of a huge combine dealing with a prime necessity of modern life? 
Can we afford to seem responsible if in fact we are powerless [Balfour's 
italics]?'
161 
Slade's memoranda were circulated by the Admiralty but did not reflect the 
Balfour's sceptical opinions. Slade was a government director of APOC at the 
time. He became Vice-Chairman on 15 December; on 8 January 1917 he resigned 
                                         
157 ADM 1/8537/240. 
158 Jones, State, pp. 189-95. 
159 CAB 37/154/16, 1916. Slade's memoranda on 'Strategic Importance of the Control of Petroleum' 
and 'Petroleum Supplies and Distribution', but not his 'Observations on the Board of Trade 
Memorandum on Oil', are also in CAB 23/6, 'War Cabinet Papers 379-437', 1 April - 28 June 
1918. 
160 CAB 37/154/3, 1916. 'Admiralty Interests', A. J. Balfour, 18 August 1918. 
161 Ibid. 59 
as a government director but was immediately re-appointed to the board.
162 
Although representing the government on the board, he supported the company's 
growth plans and lobbied on its behalf. He had access to government information 
about RDS's activities.
163 According to Ferrier the initial two government 
directors received no formal instructions from the government on their 
responsibilities and concentrated on their areas of interest and expertise; 
defence and security for Slade and business for Lord Inchcape.
164 
Geoffrey Jones points out the ambiguities in Slade's position after 1914. He was 
supposed to represent the government on APOC's board but lobbied on its behalf 
whilst still holding positions on Admiralty committees.
165 Nicholas Lambert, 
commenting on Slade's earlier time as DNI, argues that he had a straightforward 
and simplistic view of life that led him to object to political machinations; he 
could not see why the army and navy should be rivals when competing for 
budgets.
166 If this analysis, based on a study of his diary, is accurate then it may 
be that Slade thought that what was good for APOC was good for the country and 
did not understand how controversial his views were. His dual role at the 
Admiralty and at APOC did mean that APOC found it easier than Shell to have its 
views heard in government circles. 
Slade agreed with the Board of Trade that oil was of great importance and that 
foreign interests must not be allowed to control British supplies. He disagreed 
with their proposal. Much of RDS's oil was unsuitable for British needs. Russia 
and California were badly located to supply the RN. Mexican oil was of too poor 
quality to be used as naval fuel. The combined network of all the wholly British 
oil companies was superior to that of RDS in the British Empire. The Shell 
directors of the Imperial Oil Company would probably vote with the Royal Dutch 
ones, creating a six to two majority against Burmah and reducing, not 
increasing, British control of oil supplies. The British Empire could become self-
sufficient in oil if the Persian field was considered to be British. The proposal 
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would help RDS towards what Slade regarded as its goal of dividing up the world 
oil market with Standard (NJ). He suggested that his: 
'very grave objections can be overcome, and at the same time much 
greater advantages in the direction of petroleum for the nation can be 
attained, by forming a National Oil Company...with the Anglo-Persian, 
Burmah, and other purely British companies as a nucleus.'
167  
Slade explained how the move from coal to oil as the principal fuel of ships 
altered Britain's strategic position: 
It is evident that in the present war the control we have been able to 
exercise on neutral shipping and the check that has thereby been 
placed in free imports into countries adjacent to the enemy of goods 
required by him, has been in a great measure due to the power of 
limiting the supply of bunker fuel in case of necessity. It is therefore 
of vital importance to the country that we should retain as large a 
measure of control in the future as possible. 
... 
It is therefore necessary to see that the geographical distribution of 
our oil resources is such that we retain as large an amount of control 
as possible. It is also of prime importance that no foreign interests, 
whether for monopolistic trade or political reasons, shall have any 
power of hampering either the development of our own resources or 
shall control in any way the distribution of oil.
168 
He argued that the Admiralty proposal of a merger between APOC, Burmah and 
perhaps other British companies would produce a company with a greater and 
wider spread of oil production than the Board of Trade's suggestion of an 
amalgamation of Shell and Burmah. Table 1-1 shows his figures: 
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Table 1-1 British oil production under merger schemes, tons 
   Eastern Hemisphere  Western Hemisphere  Total 
Board of Trade Scheme  1,030,000  900,000  1,930,000 
Possible later additions  1,400,000  40,000  1,440,000 
Total  2,430,000  940,000  3,370,000 
Admiralty scheme  2,400,000  1,600,000  4,000,000 
Possible later additions  100,000     100,000 
Total  2,500,000  1,600,000  4,100,000 
Source: CAB 37/154/16., 'Strategic Importance of the Control of Petroleum', E. J. W. Slade, 
24 August 1916, p. 3. 
Slade's third memorandum, 'Petroleum Supplies and Distribution'
169, argued that 
British control of distribution as well as production was needed. The government 
had sequestered British Petroleum, a German controlled company that 
distributed oil in Britain for RDS and various German owned companies. A new 
board should be appointed; BP should become the distribution company 
throughout the British Empire for both British and foreign controlled oil. It would 
be state owned until a public share issue could be arranged. The new BP would 
have 4,740,000 tons of oil compared with a current demand of 5,000,000 in the 
British Empire, half of it in Britain; Standard (NJ) provided nearly half of the 
Empire's supplies and 800,000 tons to Britain.
170 His scheme would mean that 
British demand was met from British controlled supplies and was distributed by a 
British company. This would remove the threat of a monopoly forcing up prices. 
He did not consider the counter-balancing market power of a very large 
consumer such as the RN. 
By October the Admiralty had withdrawn its objections to the merger of Burmah 
and Shell subject to a number of conditions; existing contracts between APOC 
and RDS should be re-drawn; a new deal should be agreed between them for oil 
bunkering in Asia; the Burmah shareholding in APOC should be transferred to 
trustees; and BP should be sold to APOC. The Board of Trade had accepted all 
these except for the last, claiming that it would result in the government being 
involved in the commercial distribution of oil. The Admiralty now argued that 
APOC could survive and prosper on its own provided that it was free from foreign 
interference and had the necessary refineries and transport and distribution 
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networks.
171 A Cabinet meeting on 1 November 1916 approved the Board of Trade 
proposal, subject to the Admiralty's caveat.
172 The next day Slade wrote to 
Pretyman, who was now at the Board of Trade, indicating that APOC was 
satisfied with this. The wording of this letter implied that Slade was 
representing APOC rather than the Admiralty in it.
173 The proposals were 
unattractive to RDS and Burmah, and no merger took place. The one corporate 
transaction that did occur was the one objected to by the Board of Trade; the 
acquisition of BP by APOC.
174 This gave it a distribution company and, many years 
later, a new corporate name. 
1.6.2 Royal Dutch Shell and the British Government 
APOC had a commercial rivalry with RDS. Many, including Slade, clearly 
distrusted the latter because it was partially foreign even though its actions did 
little to justify this. In January 1915 it dismantled its Rotterdam toluol 
extraction plant and re-erected it in Somerset, later building another in Britain. 
Toluol was a vital ingredient of explosives. Before the war Britain had extracted 
it from coal, but output was insufficient for wartime needs. The two RDS plants 
provided 80 per cent of Britain's requirements.
175 During the war RDS chartered 
its tankers to the British Government at favourable rates.
176 Its wartime actions 
favoured the Allies. Shell's British management acted patriotically; one of the 
sons of its founder, Marcus Samuel, was killed in action.
177 Both parts of the 
group put their national interests first, but the Dutch favoured the Allies for 
rational and pragmatic business reasons.
178 Initially some Dutch executives 
wanted to be strictly neutral. Henri Deterding, the President of Royal Dutch, 
preferred the Allies; his colleagues realised that this was in the company's 
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interests. Some oil did reach the Central Powers from RDS's Swedish and 
Romanian subsidiaries, whose managements ignored the wishes of the centre. 
Over the war the size of its contribution to the Allied cause meant that official 
suspicion of it diminished, albeit more slowly at the Admiralty than at other 
departments. The War Office appointed Robert Waley Cohen, a senior Shell 
executive, as its Petroleum Adviser in April 1917.
179 
1.7 Chapter Summary 
In 1914 British oil policy was to buy oil cheaply on long term contracts in order 
to provide reserves. These would be needed early in a war; it was assumed that 
further supplies could be bought on the market during wartime, a point made by 
two First Lords, Churchill and Balfour. Since 1900 the RN had moved from being 
behind several European navies in the adoption of oil to being ahead of even the 
USN, which had access to the world's largest oil industry.
180 Other navies had 
mostly confined the use of oil to torpedo craft and as an auxiliary in cruisers and 
battleships. The importance of the control of oil bearing territory rather than oil 
companies had not yet been realised; efforts were made to bring RDS, wrongly 
feared to be pro-German, under British control. The potential of Mosul's oil was 
known, but in 1914 Britain had no war aims in the Middle East beyond 
preservation of its existing position. Corbett pointed out in 1915 that the war 
had given Britain an unexpected opportunity to obtain control of Mosul's oil. The 
entry of the Ottoman Empire into the war required Britain to consider its 
position and the de Bunsen Committee was the first step in this process. It put 
forward the Mosul's oil as a British interest, albeit just one of several. The Sykes-
Picot Agreement then gave part, but not all, of Mosul and its oil to France. The 
desire to control all of Mosul would influence post war British policy and military 
strategy in the final month of the war. Britain had an oil policy in 1916. It did 
not touch many other aspects of strategy and was too focused on the ownership 
of companies rather than control of oilfields. 
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2  Wartime Oil Supplies 
Throughout the war the oil position of the Allies was stronger than that of the 
Central Powers. Austria-Hungary produced oil in Galicia, but Germany imported 
90 per cent of its 1913 consumption of 1.4 million tons, mostly from the USA, 
Dutch East Indies, Romania and Russia.
181 In 1914 the only large producer on the 
Allied side was Russia whose production peaked at over 10 million tons in 1916 
but collapsed after the revolution. Closure of the Dardanelles prevented exports 
from Russia and Romania after September 1914
182, but the Allies were still in a 
stronger position than their enemies. They were able to import oil because the 
USA was willing to sell oil to anybody who could pay for and transport it. British 
control of the seas enabled the Allies to import American oil, although the 
efforts of the U-boats meant that this was in doubt for a while. The Allies, unlike 
the Central Powers, were able to increase their use of oil during the war. 
Importing and distributing oil did create problems for the Allies from 1917 
onwards. Britain and France both had oil crises in 1917. These were overcome 
but made both countries realise that they needed secure oil supplies. 
During the war Germany and Austria-Hungary never had available more than the 
2 million tons that they jointly consumed in 1913. Germany's wartime oil 
supplies were only 85 per cent of peacetime consumption and only two-thirds of 
lube requirements were met. About a third of German oil consumption came 
from substitutes by 1918 and Germany may have produced over 2 million tons of 
synthetic oil during the war. French analysis of German aviation fuel in 1917 
concluded that it was superior to that of Allies, possibly because of the addition 
of benzene.
183 About 60 per cent of the Central Powers' oil came from Galicia.
184 
Their other source was Romania. 
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2.1 Oil and Land and Air Warfare 
Many of the technological advances during the war involved oil fuelled weapons 
such as tanks and aircraft. The Allies' oil supplies gave them an increasing 
advantage. In 1914 troops moved by train to railheads and then marched to the 
front line. Supplies generally travelled from the railheads to the front lines by 
horse transport. Moving a German Corps required 240 trains. Transporting only 
the combat elements needed 120 trains and would have required 18,000 motor 
vehicles. The German Army had only 4,000 motor vehicles in 1914.
185 Half of 
them carried beer in peacetime; civilian ownership had been subsidised since 
1907.
186 The German motor industry was only the third largest in Europe in 1914, 
behind those of France and Britain.
187 German horse drawn ammunition columns 
could not keep the right wing of the 1914 Western offensive supplied, leaving its 
ammunition supply dependent on the small number of lorries available. These 
had to be driven hard, meaning that 60 per cent were unserviceable by the 
Battle of the Marne in September; petrol was in short supply.
188 The most famous 
contribution of the internal combustion engine to the 1914 campaign came when 
French reinforcements were rushed to the Battle of the Marne by 600 Parisian 
taxis.
189 The Paris taxi fleet could not carry enough men to make a difference to 
a battle of the scale of the Marne; the importance of this event is in its 
symbolism, both of French determination to resist the invader and of the future 
use of motor transport in war. The British also used public transport for military 
purposes in 1914, commandeering a number of London buses. The trench 
warfare that developed soon after the Marne had little role for measures such as 
the improvised use of taxis and buses for military transport. 
Set piece trench warfare required the movement of huge amounts of supplies. 
These were normally moved by train to railheads about 10-12 miles from the 
trenches. Horse drawn transports were used for the last five miles because of 
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the poor state of roads that were under constant enemy shelling, but motor 
vehicles or light railways were used for the distance in between.
190 The quantity 
of supplies needed rose greatly over the war and motor vehicles could be built 
more quickly than horses could be bred. A British Army division required 20 
wagon loads of food and horse fodder and 7 of other items per day in 1914. In 
1916 it needed 50 wagons in total, 30 carrying non-food supplies. Verdun had to 
be supplied by motor vehicles because the narrow Voie Sacrée could not have 
coped with the same volume of supplies carried in horse wagons. There were 
1,230 British, 2,750 French and 600 US aircraft on the Western Front by the end 
of the war, using 31,000 tons of fuel per month. The 2,600 British and 3,800 
French tanks consumed 42,000 tons of fuel each month.
191 In 1914 the British 
Army possessed 807 lorries, 20 cars and vans and 15 motor cycles. Only 80 of the 
lorries were directly owned; the others were peacetime civilian vehicles 
subsidised by the War Office. By the end of the war the British military had 
57,000 lorries, 23,000 cars and vans, 7,000 motor ambulances and 35,000 motor 
cycles.
192 The French Army had 54,000 trucks on the Western Front, the French 
Air Force 14,000 motor vehicles and the US Army 33,000 trucks plus 13,000 cars 
and ambulances. Italy was well provided with motor transport; Fiat was the 
world's largest truck manufacturer, enabling Italy to supply 17,000 trucks to its 
Allies.
193  
Germany had only 45 tanks and 40,000 trucks in 1918; use of the latter was 
heavily restricted because of shortages of oil. In 1917 it had 2,270 aircraft in 
France with 11,000 tons of oil per month to fuel them. The number of aircraft 
had risen to 3,600 aircraft by the start of the March 1918 offensive, but monthly 
fuel supplies had fallen to 7,000 tons and were less than 5,000 tons by June. 
Allied air superiority was greater than the numbers of aircraft suggested since 
Allied aircraft could fly more sorties. Shortage of lubricating oil meant that the 
Germans had to take radial engined aircraft, including the Fokker Triplane, out 
of service. Germany had to make more use of horses and railways; pressure on 
                                         
190 J. Singleton, 'Britain's Military Use of Horses 1914-1918', Past and Present 139, no. 1 (1993), p. 
190. 
191 Jonker et al, History. vol. i, pp. 163-65 
192 Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire During the Great War, 1914-1920 (Uckfield: 
Naval and Military Press, 1999), p. 877. 
193 Laux, 'Trucks', p. 67. Other sources differ because of different date and definitions of the type of 
vehicle. 67 
the railways led to restrictions on German ability to transport their large coal 
reserves.
194 The German navy switched to oil for their torpedo boats in 1908 but 
did not build any larger all oil warship. Oil was used as a supplementary to coal 
in light from 1907 and dreadnoughts from 1909. Technical problems prevented 
the fitting of diesel cruising engines to dreadnoughts.
195 German ship designers 
thought that side coal bunkers offered extra protection, but the lack of 
guaranteed oil supplies was a significant factor.
196 An oil fired ship could be more 
heavily armoured than an otherwise identical coal burning vessel; coal bunkers 
only offered protection when full.  
General Erich Ludendorff admitted in The Nation at War
197 that shortages of oil 
were a major problem for him. Obtaining oil, as well as food supplies, was a 
reason for the German invasion of Romania, but the Allies successfully sabotaged 
the Romanian oilfields. By 1918 the growth in demand for oil and German 
shortages forced Ludendorff to turn to Transcaucasia for supplies. 
2.2 U-Boats and Oil 
The submarine was one of the war weapons made possible by oil. There had 
previously been man powered submarines. The Turtle unsuccessfully attacked 
HMS Eagle in 1776 during the American War of Independence. The CSS Hunley 
sank the USS Housatonic in 1864 during the American Civil War. The submarine 
did not become a viable weapon until the invention of the internal combustion 
engine. Submarines used these on the surface and battery powered engines 
when submerged; the limited range of the latter meant that they spent most of 
their time on the surface, and were really submersible torpedo boats. Early 
submarines used petrol engines, but diesel ones were more suitable. Fisher was 
quick to realise the submarine's potential, and in 1913 wrote a paper titled 'The 
Oil Engine and the Submarine.'
198 It stated several times that '[t]he submarine is 
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the coming type of war vessel for sea fighting.'
199 He argued that it would not be 
possible for submarines to capture merchantmen: they had no men to spare for 
prize crews or space to take prisoners on board the submarine. They would have 
to sink merchantmen without warning. Submarines could defend a coastline, 
making it much hard to launch amphibious invasions, but they would make it 
easier to cut an enemy's seaborne trade. This meant that starvation rather than 
invasion was now the main threat to Britain. The navy's oil supplies could be cut 
off as well as the nation's food imports.
 200 Adoption of the submarine was to 
Britain's advantage, since its geographical position meant: 
that while the development of submarine warfare will render us 
absolutely safe from overseas attack, it cannot possibly cripple our 
trade to anything like the extent to which it can be made to cripple 
that of our enemy.
201 
Churchill and Admiral Battenberg, the First Sea Lord, both thought that Fisher's 
arguments were weakened by the suggestion, which proved to be correct, that 
the enemy would use submarines to sink merchant ships without warning.
202 
The U-boat became the German Navy's main weapon in both the World Wars of 
the twentieth century, and Rudolf Diesel was German, but Germany was initially 
slow to adopt the submarine. Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, the architect of the 
German Navy, favoured battleships and had little time for either cruiser warfare 
or submarines. The first U-boat was not completed until late 1906. Diesel 
engines were not introduced until 1910. French submarines had used diesel 
engines from 1904. The switch to the diesel engine meant that the U-boat was 
considered a potentially decisive weapon for the first time, but against the 
enemy battle fleet, not merchant shipping.
203 
In 1914 Germany possessed only 24 operational boats. Four were used for 
training and 16 were under construction. Only 10 of the operational boats had 
diesel engines; the others used Körting heavy fuel oil engines that produced a 
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great deal of smoke and sparks. This made them very visible on the surface and 
required ventilation pipes; stowing these slowed diving.
204 Before the war 
Kapitänleutnant Blum of the German Navy had estimated that 222 U-boats would 
be needed to successfully carry out a war against British commerce under 
international law. On 8 October 1914 the commander of Germany's U-boats, 
Korvettenkapitän Bauer, urged that German U-boats should attack British 
commerce. Germany did not announce unrestricted submarine warfare in the 
waters around the British Isles until 4 February 1915. It had only 37 U-boats. A 
maximum of 25 were available at any one time, with only a third of them in the 
operational area. This campaign lasted until 18 September; losses were low as a 
proportion of British shipping, but rose after June despite some restrictions 
introduced to placate the USA after the sinking of the Lusitania on 7 May. By the 
end of the campaign, which came as a relief to the British, losses were greater 
than new construction.
205 The Germans did not have enough U-boats at this stage 
and were concerned about neutral opinion.  
On 1 February 1917 they had 105 available and more under construction; their 
strength rose to 129 by the start of June and did not fall below 120 for the 
remainder of the year. Admiral Henning von Holtzendorff, the Chief of the 
Admiralty Staff of the Imperial German Navy, believed that this was enough to 
defeat Britain in five months by a campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare; 
the time scale was crucial because the German calculations depended on victory 
before the next harvest. His arguments were based mostly on the opportunity to 
starve Britain by cutting off its food supplies; he mentioned blocking imports of 
wood, which would cut coal output because it was used for pit props, and of iron 
ore, which would reduce the production of steel and thus munitions. He said 
nothing about oil. He accepted that the USA would probably join the Allies, but 
believed that Britain would have to sue for peace before the Americans could 
make a significant contribution.
 206 
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2.3 Efforts to Deny Oil to the Enemy 
Romania entered the war on the Allied side in August 1916. It was invaded by 
German and Austrian troops the next month. In late October a British report 
stated that the Central Powers' oil supply was restricted, but their oil problems 
would be almost completely solved if they obtained the Romanian oilfields.
207 By 
then the Germans had captured a large amount of oil stocks and were close to 
capturing the oilfields and refineries. When the Romanians appeared reluctant 
to destroy their most important industry the British sent a small group to destroy 
both it and Romania's grain stock.
208 It was led by Colonel John Norton-Griffiths, 
a mining engineer who had pioneered mine warfare on the Western Front.
209 He 
arrived in Romania in mid November 1916, soon realising that the Romanian 
Army was too weak to stop the enemy from taking the oilfields or the grain 
growing region. He decided that to be certain of destroying the oil he must 
supervise the action in person and delegate destruction of corn. He thought that 
this had to be done ahead of the advancing enemy, running the risk that 
facilities would be destroyed unnecessarily. The Romanians, more optimistic 
than him about the course of the campaign, at first hesitated to carry out any 
destruction and then wanted only to burn stocks and remove key parts from 
refineries and wells.  
Norton-Griffiths recruited a small number of British oil engineers and some locals 
and wrecked oil refineries and wells at 14 locations over ten days. His team 
claimed to have destroyed 210 million gallons of oil, over 800,000 tons.
210 The 
enemy was deprived of Romanian oil for five months and 1917 output was less 
than 30 per cent of the 1915 level. Concentrating on the most productive wells 
meant that by November 1918 less than half the wells operating in July 1916 
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were back in production but 75 per cent of output had been restored.
211 The 
Central Powers never had quite enough oil. 
One potential source of oil for them was the oilfields of Grozny and Baku in the 
Caucasus. On 25 June 1918 Curzon, a member of the War Cabinet and Chairman 
of the Eastern Committee, told the Imperial War Cabinet that the Treaty of 
Brest-Litovsk had been followed by a treaty with the Ukrainian government that 
had given the Germans large supplies of cereal. The Germans could next gain 
control of the Black Sea and access to the great natural resources of the 
Caucasus. These included the Baku and Grozny oilfields that produced 20 per 
cent of global oil, more than enough to supply German needs. A rivalry between 
Germany and the Ottoman Empire was developing since both wanted the oil of 
Baku for themselves. If either took Baku then it would probably also capture the 
Caspian Fleet, enabling it to control the Caspian and threaten Turkestan and 
Northern Persia.
212 Two days later the Foreign Office PID wrote that it was highly 
important to prevent the enemy from occupying Baku. The oil wells were 
believed to be intact and Baku was important for communications; it was a port 
on the Caspian Sea and was linked to the Trans-Caspian Railway.
213 A month 
earlier the PID had published a memorandum putting forward similar views to 
those of Curzon and arguing that the significance of the oilfields of Grozny and 
Baku 'could hardly be overestimated.'
214 As well as the oil, capture of Baku and 
the Trans-Caspian Railway would give a direct route towards the borders of 
Afghanistan.  
A small British Military Mission under General Lionel Dunsterville, initially 
comprising only a dozen officers, had already been sent to the Caucasus. It left 
Baghdad on 27 January 1918 and arrived in Enzeli on 17 February but was unable 
to move onto Baku and its final destination of Tiflis. Dunsterville's force, named 
Dunsterforce, was reinforced by several infantry companies and some armoured 
cars and light artillery. In late July he was ordered to help the Centro-Caspian 
Government defend Baku against the Ottomans. The first British elements 
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reached Baku on 4 August; the rest of Dunsterforce and its commander arrived 
13 days later. It was not strong enough to hold Baku and was forced to withdraw 
on 14 September, without destroying the oil facilities. Dunsterville blamed the 
locals for the fall of Baku because they did not give Dunsterforce enough help. 
Artin Arslanian argues that Dunsterville was to blame. He had lobbied his 
superiors to send his force to Baku, although it was inadequate for the purpose. 
He promised the locals British reinforcements that were never going to be 
sent.
215 Baku was occupied by the British for only 42 days but Yergin argues that 
this made a difference at a vital stage of the war.
216 This is doubtful. Having the 
oil of Baku much earlier could have made a difference to the cause of the 
Central Powers. Taking it in early August rather than mid September could not 
have prevented the signing of armistices by Ottoman Empire on 30 October and 
Germany on 11 November. 
2.4 Oil and Diversions into Sideshows 
Britain deployed a large number of troops away from the Western Front. Most of 
the General Staff wanted to concentrate on the main theatre of operations, 
namely the Western Front. Others, such as Hankey and Lloyd George, argued 
that operations elsewhere would use Britain's naval strength and avoid the heavy 
casualties of the Western Front. 
On 1 November 1918, the total strength of the British Empire Expeditionary 
Forces was 3,226,879, of which 408,138 were in Mesopotamia. This appears to 
be a very large proportion for a secondary theatre, but the supply problems of 
Mesopotamia meant that labour units and native followers comprised a large 
proportion of the force there. Excluding these, Mesopotamia accounted for 
222,399 out of 2,668,737 soldiers in overseas Expeditionary Forces.
217 Sir George 
Buchanan, an engineer who was recruited to help solve the supply and logistics 
problems of the campaign, argued that the initial objectives of protecting the 
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existing oilfields and the Shatt-el-Arab River could have been achieved at a 
lower cost in both lives and money.
218 This is true, but the expansion of the 
campaign from its origins was largely not because of oil. A smaller and more 
defensive campaign would not have resulted in Britain occupying Mosul and its 
potential oil at the end of the war. 
2.5 The 1917 Oil Crisis 
British oil stocks fell to crisis levels in the Spring of 1917. On 31 January 1917, 
Germany announced that it would carry out unrestricted submarine warfare. 
Significant numbers of tankers were sunk, reducing oil imports at a time when 
the rising number of oil fired warships and greater use of motor vehicle, tanks 
and aircraft was increasing demand for oil. Anti-U-boat warfare placed extra 
demands on oil burning escort vessels. Britain had some home production of oil, 
mostly from the Scottish shale industry, but this accounted for only a small 
proportion of the total demand, as shown in Table 2-1 below. Demand rose 
sharply in 1916 and 1917. 
Table 2-1 British oil production, imports and consumption, tons 
Year 
Output of 
oil shale 
Crude oil 
produced  Imports  Total  Exports  Consumption 
1911  3,206,576  293,660             
1912  3,284,956  294,699  1,653,333  1,948,032  26,846  1,921,186 
1913  3,369,321  289,683  1,952,427  2,242,110  16,505  2,225,605 
1914  3,388,869  285,464  2,586,850  2,872,314  20,444  2,851,870 
1915  3,187,592  263,083  2,354,079  2,617,162  46,079  2,571,083 
1916  3,102,036  247,471  3,159,195  3,406,666  27,907  3,378,759 
1917  3,200,883  249,598  4,187,569  4,437,167  20,800  4,416,367 
Source: POWE 33/13 ' Negotiations regarding petroleum policy of His Majesty's Government 
Vol. 1 reports and proceedings of Petroleum Imperial Policy Committee', pp. 109, 111. 
The first measures to control the demand for petroleum products were taken in 
early 1916. Until the middle of 1917 there was no process to co-ordinate the 
work of several committees whose responsibilities overlapped responsibilities. 
Walter Long, the Colonial Secretary, was then given overall authority over the 
supply and demand of petroleum products. 
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2.6 Early Administrative Arrangements 
An Inter-Departmental Oil Committee met at the Colonial Office to consider oil 
exploration within the Empire, mostly in the Crown Colonies, but until 1917 
there was no body with overall responsibility for oil policy. On 29 February 1916 
representatives of the Admiralty, Board of Trade, Munitions Ministry and the War 
Office met to consider petrol supply. A further meeting on 25 March agreed that 
measures should be taken to ensure that petrol supplies for vital purposes were 
adequate. In late April a Petrol Control Committee was established under 
President of Board of Trade. It issued two reports in 1916 and was re-organised 
in June 1917 when the Petrol Control Department of the Board of Trade was set 
up with Sir Evan Jones as Controller.
219 
A Committee for the Regulation of Petroleum Supplies was established in the 
summer of 1916 by the Munitions Ministry. It set up an Advisory Committee of 
importers. The supply issue related almost totally to tanker tonnage. Co-
operation with the Petrol Control Committee was deemed to be vital, but it was 
unwilling to give information that might result in the Admiralty removing tankers 
from petrol supply. By 11 January 1917 the shortage of tankers was becoming 
more significant and the Committee for the Regulation of Petroleum Supplies 
proposed various measures. Their recommendations were partly implemented by 
the formation of a number of committees. The Munitions Petroleum Supplies 
Department was set up in February 1917 to ensure that munitions manufacturers 
and other vital industrial companies received sufficient supplies of petroleum 
products. It included a Petroleum Research Department under Sir Boverton 
Redwood, charged with developing oil supplies within Britain. It was for a while 
transferred to Admiralty control.
220 
On 18 February Hankey informed the War Cabinet of the seriousness of the 
situation.
221 Earlier in the month Sir Albert Stanley, the President of the Board of 
Trade, had pointed out that UK petrol stocks were declining because demand 
exceeded imports. Shortages of shipping meant that imports in 1917 were likely 
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to be lower than in 1916. Civilian consumption of 10,000,000 gallons per month 
could be reduced to 8,000,000. Any further cuts would severely disrupt the life 
and commerce of the country. Military use at home had to be restricted; the 
War Office and the Admiralty were both taking measures to economise on the 
use of petrol. A meeting of representatives of the Admiralty, Board of Trade, 
War Office and Munitions Ministry had taken place at the Admiralty on 15 
February. It decided that all the departments and committees dealing with oil 
needed to co-operate. The intention was to prevent over-lapping work; 
departments would not have to have the approval of the proposed committee 
before taking action. Pretyman, the Civil Lord of the Admiralty, was proposed as 
chairman. The Board of Trade did not want the committee to deal with post war 
issues, but Pretyman thought that it would be impossible for it to ignore them. 
The Admiralty, Board of Trade, Munitions Ministry, War Office, Colonial Office 
and Controller of Shipping were to be represented permanently, with 
representatives of the India Office and Foreign Office attending when 
required.
222 Cadman and Redwood were appointed as technical advisers.
223 The 
committee was established with the following terms of references: 
To consider all questions of petroleum products and make such 
arrangements as will secure the best means of providing the necessary 
supplies and their allocation for military, naval and civil 
requirements, and to co-ordinate and determine the policy of 
departmental and other Committees dealing with various sections of 
the subject, subject to the usual procedure in regard to obtaining the 
sanction of the Treasury and Cabinet to important matters of 
expenditure or policy.
224 
The committee set up a Pool Board, consisting of representatives of the six main 
oil distributors. The government would purchase its petroleum products from the 
Pool Board rather individual companies. The details of the organisation and 
management of the supply, import and distribution of petroleum products would 
be left to the Pool Board under the supervision of the Board of Trade.
225 
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The establishment of various committees with overlapping responsibilities 
created confusion; nobody had overall responsibility for oil matters. On 8 May 
Stanley wrote to the Cabinet warning that sinkings of tank steamers by U-boats 
and rising demand by the Army in France had led to a fall in stocks of motor 
spirits, which were now less than a month's supply. He urged that 'some member 
of the War Cabinet should be appointed to take the matter in hand.'
226 Three 
days later Pretyman followed up Stanley's memo by suggesting that the 
Interdepartmental Petroleum Committee might present its views on the situation 
to a Cabinet Minister. It had some problems in dealing with the current position 
because petrol distribution was the responsibility of the Petrol Control 
Committee of the Board of Trade; the Pool Board could not limit petrol supplies 
without its consent.
227 
2.7 Walter Long and the Petroleum Committee 
Long was told by the Prime Minister to look into the issue. Geoffrey Jones 
describes Long as being 'a depressing choice, indicative of the low priority given 
to oil.'
228 Long admitted to knowing nothing about oil, but as Colonial Secretary 
he was impartial on the subject, unlike the ministers for the oil consuming 
departments.
229 Cadman was the Colonial Office's petroleum adviser and Long 
relied on his great knowledge of the oil industry.
230 Long produced a report on 11 
June in which he wrote that: 'I find everything in great confusion, and there can 
be no doubt that the situation must be full of anxiety for some time.'
231 His 
solution was to replace the existing arrangements with the following structure: 
1.  Four bodies would be set up: 
1.  An inter-departmental committee, now including the Board of Agriculture, 
which would collect information and co-ordinate action but have no 
executive functions. 
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2.  The Petrol Committee under the Board of Trade to regulate civil and 
industrial use of petrol. 
3.  The Pool Board, a voluntary body of oil companies under a government 
appointed chairman, intended to economise man-power and material. It 
would be under the Board of Trade instead of the Munitions Ministry. 
4.  A Production Department, under the Munitions Ministry, to encourage 
home production. 
2.  A Committee of the Chairmen of these four bodies, chaired by the Colonial 
Secretary, would discuss and sort out problems. 
3.  The Colonial Secretary would have the final say in all matters, apart from 
interference with the requirements of the fighting departments, which he 
would refer to the War Cabinet.
232 
On 13 June, the War Cabinet approved his recommendations.
233 A Petrol 
Committee was established and met for the first time on 3 July. The attendees 
at the first meeting were: 
Walter H. Long (Chairman); 
E. G. Pretyman (Chairman of the Inter-departmental Petroleum Committee); 
Sir Evan Jones (Petrol Controller); 
Sir Walter Egerton (Chairman of the Pool Board); 
Rear Admiral H. Tothill (Fourth Sea Lord); 
Mr Kemball Cook (Shipping Control Dept); 
Mr M. Waller (Director of Naval Stores, the Admiralty); 
G. B. A. Grindle (Colonial Office); 
Professor J. Cadman. 
 
Others, most frequently Sir Frederick Black, Director of Contracts at the 
Admiralty, attended meetings as appropriate.
 234 
In August 1917 a Petroleum Executive was set up in order to make certain that 
all services had adequate supplies of oil, to look after issues of general policy 
and to co-ordinate the various Government departments interested in oil. 
Cadman was appointed its Director, reporting to Long.
235 They hoped to develop 
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it into a Ministry of Petroleum, but doing so would require other departments to 
surrender control over their interests in oil.
236 
2.7.1 Stocks and Demand 
Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, the First Sea Lord, informed the War Cabinet on 24 
May that naval oil stocks amounted to less than three month's supply. Five large 
tankers had been sunk during the last month. The cruising of the Grand Fleet 
had consequently been restricted.
237 In early June Tothill said in a memorandum 
that: '[t]he situation as regards oil is critical. Under present circumstances, 
oilers must be considered the most valuable vessels afloat. They should be 
convoyed.'
238 On 30 June he warned the War Cabinet that stocks of naval oil fuel 
had fallen because of delays in the completion of tankers, losses of tankers, 
greater activity by oil burning vessels and an increase in the number of warships 
burning oil. Further supplies of oil had been requested from the USA, but had 
not yet been received. Long was in contact with Lord Northcliffe, Head of the 
British War Mission to the USA, over this issue. In Britain the construction and 
repair of tankers had been speeded up. The speed of oil-burning warships had 
been restricted, 'except in the gravest emergency and except in the Southern 
part of the North Sea.'
239 Fleet movements were to be as restricted as much as 
possible. Tankers were to be convoyed both on route to and from Britain and on 
coastal passage and to be escorted in the submarine area. The number of 
tankers with the Fleet was to be reduced to the minimum possible number. Oil 
fuel was being imported from America in the double bottoms of cargo ships. 
Home production was being increased; this could have only a small impact in the 
immediate future.
240 
Three tables were attached. Statement A showed that at the current rates of 
loss and oil use naval stocks would run out in January 1918. Statement B 
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assumed a 30,000 ton per month fall in consumption; stocks would be run down, 
but would last past June 1918. Statement C made the same demand forecast as 
B along with higher supply because of a fall in tanker losses; stocks would fall 
until the end of 1917 and then be rebuilt. Table 2-2 shows Tothill's three 
scenarios and the actual outcome. A memorandum from Sir Joseph Maclay, the 
Shipping Controller, in late May stated that naval oil stocks were 747,000 tons on 
1 May so they had fallen by over 20 per cent in May and June. Maclay pointed 
out that stocks of other petroleum products were also low. The increase in 
demand for petrol by the BEF had required the number of tankers engaged 
transporting petrol to France to be increased from two to six since the start of 
the year. This had resulted in a fall in stocks at home from six weeks' supply 
(60,000 tons) to around a month since the start of May. Reserves of kerosene and 
gas oil were equal to about only one month's supply. The decision that heavy 
fuel stocks should be six months' consumption was taken whilst the USA was 
neutral. Maclay suggested that, since the USA was in the war, Admiralty stocks 
should not be increased above four months until commercial ones had reached 
two months. Even then it would take some time to re-build stocks. Admiralty 
reserves of four months' supply meant 1,000,000 tons, 250,000 more than the 
total on 1 May; increasing commercial stocks to two months would require an 
extra 150,000 tons. Building reserves up to this level would take five months for 
the Admiralty stocks and four months for the commercial ones assuming that the 
Americans agreed to a British request for more tankers. They probably would not 
because the US Government did not have the ability to requisition tankers; US 
companies were reluctant to transfer their tankers to a risky route.
 241 
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Table 2-2 Forecast and actual month end naval oil reserves, tons. 
Month  Statement A  Statement B  Statement C:  Actual 
Jun-17  593,000  593,000  593,000  593,000 
Jul-17  472,000  502,000  512,000  614,000 
Aug-17  358,000  418,000  528,000  655,000 
Sep-17  275,000  365,000  665,000  700,000 
Oct-17  189,000  309,000  889,000  839,000 
Nov-17  104,000  254,000  1,204,000    
Dec-17  33,000  213,000  1,605,000    
Jan-18     175,000  2,081,000    
Feb-18     145,000  2,631,000    
Mar-18     110,000  3,242,000    
Apr-18     102,000  3,946,000    
May-18     92,000  4,714,000    
Jun-18     78,000  5,544,000    
Sources: CAB 24/18 G.T. 1233 'Oil Fuel Situation', Fourth Sea Lord, 30/6/1917, 
  CAB 24/28 G.T. 2246, 'Naval Oil Fuel Situation', M. P. A. Hankey, 10/10/1917, 
  CAB 24/30 G.T. 2455, 'Oil Fuel Situation', M. P. A. Hankey, 30/10/1917. 
Stocks never fell to the level of even Statement C because action was taken to 
alleviate the situation. Until the end of October, when the position had 
improved, Tothill kept the War Cabinet informed of the level of naval oil stocks. 
The target level of naval oil stocks was disputed. After the war Churchill wrote 
that Fisher's Royal Commission had advocated a reserve of four years' war 
consumption, which was far more than could be afforded, and that Jellicoe, 
then Second Sea Lord, wanted substantial increases in stocks.
242 The Royal 
Commission actually recommended four years' peace consumption. The 
Pakenham Committee used war consumption but proposed stocks of only one 
year. The 1913 standard was four month's war consumption for ships burning 
only oil and three months' oil for those using both oil and coal. This was 
increased to having storage in Britain for six month' war consumption; Churchill 
admitted that this was less than proposed by either the Pakenham Committee or 
the Royal Commission, and was 'the minimum compatible with safety.'
243 He 
argued that Britain would have to control the seas in order to import food, so 
would also be able to import oil, and that cost did not matter in wartime.
244 He 
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later wrote that the 'conclusions stood the test of war.'
245 Jellicoe's papers 
contain a document in which he criticises the refusal of Churchill and the rest of 
the Cabinet to accept the level of reserves proposed by the Sea Lords in 1913. In 
1917, following tanker losses, this culminated in the need to restrict the speed 
of oil fired warships except in emergency.
246 Jellicoe later wrote that in 1917 
reserves fell to only 8 weeks.
247  
In August Long reported to the Cabinet that he had adopted a policy of having a 
minimum of two months' supply for all departments, which was not really 
enough for national security. The Admiralty was always prioritised. Total 
demand for all petroleum products for the Admiralty, War Office and civil use 
was just under 500,000 tons per months. Stock should be at least three times 
this level, but were currently just under two months' demand. Stocks of some 
commodities were even lower; there was only enough kerosene for a month and 
petrol for six weeks. Kerosene was very important because it was heavily used 
by the working classes for cooking. Measures were being taken to raise these 
stocks. He explained that: 
[t]he task of evolving order out of chaos and of increasing the supplies 
[had] been an extremely anxious and difficult one and [he was] deeply 
indebted to Professor Cadman...for invaluable assistance. [He 
was]...greatly indebted to all the Departments for their ready and 
cordial acceptance of the new conditions and for their loyal co-
operation.''
248  
A number of measures had improved the position. Shipping oil in the double 
bottoms of cargo ships and liners and in barrels meant that ships other than 
tankers could transport oil. Conditions in the USA had been improved. The 
handling of tankers had been re-arranged in order to make more available for 
use in the Atlantic. Attempts were being made to increase domestic output from 
existing sources, including the Scottish shale industry, gas works and tar oil. New 
sources were being developed, including distillation of cannel coal, developing 
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new shale deposits, low temperature distillation of coal and exploration for 
oilfields.
249 
These measures had alleviated the situation, but British oil reserves were still 
too low for comfort. In late September a request from the Admiralty that four 
American dreadnoughts be sent to reinforce the Grand Fleet specified that they 
should be coal-burners.
250 In October Long wrote that '[t]he oil position has 
materially improved, although it is not yet in a condition to relieve me of 
anxiety.'
251 Much of the improvement was because of the use of double bottoms 
of cargo ships to carry fuel oil. Imports by this method had now reached 85,000 
tons per month. It allowed ships other than tankers to carry oil, but at the 
expense of other cargoes. Long argued that it was necessary to continue to use 
this method until stocks had reached a satisfactory level. 
2.7.2 Tanker Construction 
The main problem was transporting oil from the USA. In May Maclay's Cabinet 
memorandum said that tanker losses were responsible for the low level of oil 
stocks. Even with US help it would take a long time to re-build stocks. Only 20 
tankers were under construction in British shipyards; all of these would be 
completed by the end of the year. A policy for the construction of Standard 
cargo ships had already been adopted; a similar one was required for tankers. As 
well as trade tankers to import oil, the Admiralty required more tankers to work 
with the fleet. Specialist tankers, designed to safely carry light oil of a very low 
flash point, could carry only oil. If oil demand and losses later fell, building a 
large number of these instead of cargo ships might result in there being too 
many tankers and too few cargo ships. Cargo ships could be converted to carry 
heavy fuel oil in two to four months. The flash point of heavy fuel oil was over 
175° so a ship that was to carry only this type of fuel did not need to take such 
major safety precautions as one that was capable of transporting light oils of a 
very low flash point. If various small changes were made early in their 
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construction the decision on whether a ship was to be a tanker or a cargo ship 
could be delayed until two months before completion. Construction of such a 
vessel would take only eight months versus 12 for a specialist tanker. It could 
later be converted back into a cargo ship. The advantages of building the 
Standard type of cargo ship were retained, and the ship would not look like a 
tanker. Using converted cargo ship to carry heavy fuel oil for the RN would 
enable Admiralty tankers to be used instead for the conveyance of light oils. 
Eighteen Standard ships should be converted, by November at the latest, to 
replace the expected losses of three tankers per month. Additionally 12 of the 
ships under construction in the USA and Japan should be converted, and the 
preliminary work to ease conversion to a tanker should take place on six of the 
standard ships being built each month.
252 
2.7.3 Bread or Oil? 
Restrictions on oil imports affected food supplies in two ways. The first was that 
importing oil in double bottoms of cargo ships meant that ships not designed to 
carry oil could transport it. It did not increase the cargo capacity of the ship so 
there was a trade off between oil and other goods such as food. On 13 August 
Maclay told the First Lord of the Admiralty and Hankey that imports from the 
USA and Canada had fallen by about 1,250,000 tons per annum because of the 
need to carry oil in the double bottoms of liners and cargo ships. To replace 
losses 480,000 tons of tankers were being constructed annually, a fifth of the 
total merchant ship construction programme. The absence of the cargo ships 
that otherwise would have been built meant a fall of 1,750,000 tons of imports 
over twelve months. These figures were for naval oil only: another 250,000 of 
capacity must be allocated to double bottom imports to maintain commercial 
stocks and 240,000 tons of construction used to replace sunk commercial 
tankers.
253 
The shortage of oil also impacted domestic food production because of attempts 
to increase output by replacing farm animals with motorised tractors. On 17 July 
Rowland Prothero, the President of the Board of Agriculture, wrote to Long 
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regarding a letter sent by Cadman to the Board of Agriculture asking it to 
consider cutting its demands for petrol for tractors. Prothero wanted to help as 
much as possible but could not do so without reducing a ploughing programme 
that had been approved by the Cabinet. If insufficient petrol was available to 
carry out this out then he felt that it was up to the Cabinet rather than himself 
to reconsider the situation.
254 Long explained that Cadman was acting on his 
authority; he was responsible to the Cabinet for all issues regarding oil.
255  
In November Prothero warned the War Cabinet that insufficient fuel had 
allocated to the motor tractors ordered as part of a programme to increase 
agricultural output in England and Wales. He argued that food production should 
be given the same status as the armed forces and munitions output, giving it 
priority over other civilian and industrial uses. The Cabinet should make sure 
that more oil was imported and that enough of it was allocated to food 
production. Otherwise the part of the ploughing programme to be carried out by 
motor tractors would have to be abandoned. In that case the Cabinet must give 
the order or the Board of Agriculture would lose all credibility with farmers.
256 
Long explained that oil stocks still were dangerously low despite the importation 
of 100,000 tons per month in double bottoms. Doing so reduced the imports of 
food and other essentials so all new tankers would have to be used to replace 
the use of double bottoms. The Ministry of Shipping estimated that overall 
imports must be reduced by 8,000,000 tons per annum (666,000 tons per month), 
showing that the use of double bottoms must end as soon as a safety margin of 
oil stocks was secured. Demand for petroleum products from the Armed Forces 
was rising; almost all new warships burnt oil. The required level of naval stocks 
was rising each month. Prothero's requests placed demands on tanker tonnage 
that Long would do his 'utmost to meet, but which it is impossible to guarantee 
in the existing conditions of the Admiralty and War Office stocks.'
257 Adoption of 
Prothero's proposal to treat agriculture the same as the armed forces would 
contradict the Cabinet's ruling, and would return to the situation that the 
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current structure was intended to avoid. Shipping resources were already 
operating at maximum effort. 
In December Maclay told the Petroleum Committee that Britain was 'faced with a 
very serious deficit in the tonnage now required to be allotted to Government 
services. The wheat position is particularly grave.'
258 By the end of January, 
wheat stocks would be only 15-16 weeks demand, a very low level since half was 
held by the farmers. Wheat was available in the USA; the problem was finding 
ships to transport it. Maclay said there was a shortage of 40 ships, and it was 'of 
the utmost importance that every possible step be taken to reduce this 
deficit.'
259 He suggested that half the deficit could be covered by abandoning the 
use of double bottoms for oil for a month. J. A. Salter, the Director of Shipping 
Requisition, attended the 12th meeting of the committee on 12 December 1917. 
He explained that the main problem was the failure of the French and Italian 
harvests, meaning that imports had to be diverted from Britain to those 
countries. The meeting concluded that a telegram should be sent to Sir 
Frederick Black in New York urging that the Americans release more tonnage for 
the North Atlantic route. Stopping use of double bottoms was discussed. Long 
insisted that naval fuel had to be prioritised. At the 17 December meeting of his 
committee, attended by Commander Paul Foley and L. I. Thomas of the US 
Mission, Long stated that: 
A shortage of food meant probably a further measure of self-denial on 
the part of the inhabitants of this country but a shortage of fuel 
involved the inability of the Navy to protect our shores, and to protect 
the shipping of ourselves and our allies.
260 
On 20 February 1918 he told the committee: 
 'that in the event of a bread shortage we could substitute potatoes 
and other articles of food but in the event of a serious oil shortage 
there was no other substitute which we could successfully employ.'
261 
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Tanker shortages continued to the end of the war. In October 1918 Long told the 
War Cabinet that in the first half of 1918 tanker capacity had been 155,788 tons 
short of the required level. This figure had been reduced to 116,387 tons by 31 
July 1918. This meant that it was impossible to build stocks in Europe to the 
agreed minimum safety level. The only source of additional tankers was the USA. 
The Allied Maritime Transport Council had proposed that, if the USA supplied 
enough tanker tonnage to allow the ending of the use of double bottoms, the 
USA would be given all the tonnage made available for other supplies. The US 
had allocated a further 102,000 tons during the final four months of 1918; the 
dates of arrival of tankers meant that this was equivalent to a monthly average 
of only 45,498 tons over the second half of the year. There was still a deficit of 
70,889 tons carrying capacity; this meant that reserves could not be build to the 
minimum level and double bottoms had to be used to carry oil, limiting other 
imports from the USA.
262 Table 2-3 shows that total British stocks of all 
petroleum products did not exceed Long's minimum safe levels until September 
1918: 
Table 2-3 Stock and consumption of all petroleum products including British Army in 
France, tons. 
Month  Consumption  Minimum safe stocks  Actual stocks  Deficiency  Surplus 
Jun-17       397,055           951,575        
Jul-17       382,693           937,328        
Aug-17       391,748           974,149        
Sep-17       397,887           974,441        
Oct-17       418,829         1,150,044        
Nov-17       419,427         1,175,571        
Dec-17       394,147         1,284,839        
Jan-18       424,734      1,608,050      1,448,820        159,230     
Feb-18       415,793      1,573,550      1,500,943         72,607     
Mar-18       435,270      1,624,550      1,421,031        203,519     
Apr-18       463,468      1,675,550      1,463,532        212,018     
May-18       438,436      1,681,550      1,521,568        159,982     
Jun-18       478,177      1,720,550      1,539,121        181,429     
Jul-18       469,530      1,750,550      1,619,983        130,567     
Aug-18       507,579      1,729,550      1,590,000        139,550     
Sep-18       441,251      1,726,550      1,760,707            34,157  
Oct-18       487,191      1,729,550      1,813,711            84,161  
Source: POWE 33/150: Petroleum Executive: report on policy and activities 1918. 
                                         
262 CAB 24/66, G.T. 5916 'Allied Petroleum Tank Tonnage Position. Memorandum by the 
Petroleum Executive', W. H. Long, 5 October 1918. 87 
Long's refusal to give up the use of double bottoms in favour of food supplies was 
justified by the failure of the U-boat campaign to starve Britain out. Grain 
imports were prioritised over other shipments; grain stocks held by the 
government and millers, but excluding those of bakers and retailers, rose from 
five and a half weeks supply at the end of March to fourteen weeks four months 
later. The Germans emphasised tonnage losses, but the U-boat campaign did not 
inflict enough damage on the grain supply, and it brought the USA into the 
war.
263 The Germans had anticipated the latter but greatly under-estimated its 
impact. The British were able to have adequate supplies of both oil and bread. 
2.7.4 Re-consideration of Coal Fired Warships 
The RN remained the most important user of oil. Reversion to coal as a fuel for 
warships was considered. Maclay's 13 August memorandum urged that building 
either coal fired ships or ones that could burn either oil or coal should be 
considered. Sir Eustace D'Eyncourt, the DNC, had looked into this in June and 
concluded that it would be very difficult to convert existing oil burning ships to 
coal. Oil boilers were much bigger than coal ones. Oil bunkers were in the wrong 
parts of the ship to be used for coal. One of the advantages of oil was that, 
unlike coal, it could be stored in parts of the ship that were awkward to for 
sailors to access. Oil was often carried low down, so there would be stability 
issues if the position of the fuel storage was changed. Ships that had been 
designed from the outset as oil burners would have to be completely rebuilt. 
Those completed as entirely oil fired, but designed to burn both coal and oil, 
would be difficult to convert to use coal and would have their fuel storage 
significantly reduced. New ships would have to be either slower or larger if they 
reverted to coal and would have bigger crews and shorter ranges than oil 
burners. D'Eyncourt thought that it was feasible to build a coal burning 22 knot 
destroyer for anti-submarine work, but it would be too slow to work with the 
Grand Fleet. Converting enough ships to burn coal to make a significant 
difference to oil usage would take the country's entire warship construction 
capacity for a year. He suggested that a substantial saving could instead be 
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made by ordering oil burning warships to use reduced power except when it was 
crucial to achieve maximum speed.
264 
The RN did construct small coal fired warships, such as convoy sloops, gunboats 
and minesweepers, during the war; several monitors, slow ships intended for 
coastal bombardment, used coal. Some of the battleships and cruisers that were 
under construction in British shipyards for foreign navies, and were taken over 
by the RN, burnt a mixture of oil and coal. All destroyers, battle cruisers and 
battleships ordered for the RN during the war burnt exclusively oil, as did all 
cruisers with the exception of the five ships of the Hawkins class. They were 
designed to hunt down commerce raiders, probably operating in remote areas 
where oil might not be available. One of the class was lost accidentally and the 
others converted to oil in the 1920s.
265 
2.7.5 Home Production 
British dependence on oil imports could be reduced by raising home production. 
Potential ways of achieving this included increasing the amount of oil that was 
produced from shale and cannel coal, using creosote produced from coal tar as a 
substitute for oil and encouraging domestic drilling. Cannel coal contains a high 
proportion of hydrogen. James Young patented a method to extract paraffin, 
also known as kerosene, from it in 1850. Oil shale is a form of rock, from which 
kerogen can be extracted; it can be converted into crude oil by heating it in a 
large retort, but the process is more elaborate and costly than conventional oil 
drilling. Creosote produced from coal tar can substitute for heavy fuel oil. 
In October 1917 Redwood's Petroleum Research Department produced a report 
recommending that production of oil from cannel coal should be increased. The 
Munitions Ministry thought that this was impracticable because of shortages of 
labour, materials and suitable minerals, and the time that it would take to 
construct the necessary retorts and supporting infrastructure.
266 In March 1918 
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the Ministry appointed a committee under Lord Crewe to look into the domestic 
production of oil. It reported in July that the Petroleum Research Department's 
recommendation that oil be produced by the carbonisation of cannel coal and 
similar substances was impracticable; it was based on over-optimistic 
assumptions. The alternative of producing fuel oil from cannel coal and similar 
substances at gasworks should be pursued. There were a number of other 
potential sources of supply; drilling for oil in Britain; developing the Scottish 
shale oil industry; using dehydrated tar by employing suitable solvents; 
increasing the amount of coal carbonised into oil, which might transform 
20,000,000 tons of coal into 1,000,000 to 1,250,000 tons of fuel oil; development 
of the Kimmeridge shale of England, which had not yet been exploited 
successfully; using Britain's extensive deposits of peat, which was being 
considered by the Fuel Research Board; and increasing oil storage capacity in the 
UK, which could only be provided in peacetime.
267 
The Scottish shale industry's output was almost at its maximum possible level by 
the middle of 1917. A new refining process, called Scheme G, was proposed; it 
would increase the output of fuel oil but would reduce that of some other 
products.
268 In November Long's committee considered this issue. The shale 
companies were very cautious, and were reluctant to carry out Scheme G 
because they would risk losing their existing markets in lubricating and batching 
oils. The possible solutions were to give them a 10 year contract to supply the 
Admiralty, or to take their operations under Government control. The 
committee preferred the former.
269 The proposed price was too high for the 
Admiralty. It suggested that the Munitions Ministry take control of the industry; 
it was reluctant to do so. Scheme G would add only 40,000 tons of fuel oil to the 
existing output of 55,000 tons per annum; the Admiralty took 35,000 tons. In 
April 1918 it was decided that this was too little to justify the cost and 
disruption of Scheme G, including the loss of domestic supplies of batching oil to 
the jute industry. The Scottish shale industry was important enough that in May 
Long ordered that no men should be removed from it if this would cut 
production. Efforts to use deposits in England came to nothing because English 
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shale was less suitable than that in Scotland, and there was a shortage of 
manpower and machinery.
270 
Another domestic source of oil was the use of creosote produced from coal tar. 
In June 1917 the export of tar oil was restricted, mainly to save on shipping 
tonnage. The Admiralty and Munitions Ministry agreed to buy the former exports. 
The agreed price was less than commercial customers were prepared to pay; use 
of creosote as an industrial fuel increased. The Admiralty received only the 
equivalent of 80,000 tons per annum rather than an expected 150,000 tons. A 
series of Orders restricted the uses of tar oils, increasing the supply for the 
Admiralty. The substitution of tar oil for petroleum by other users also released 
50,000 tons of the latter for the Admiralty.
271 
Table 2-4 Production and consumption of creosote, tons 
   1913  July 1917, annualised  1918 
Production      330,000       360,000       396,000  
Reduction in stocks             29,000  
           
Exports      172,000        40,000         9,117  
Civil consumption      158,000       240,000       216,565  
Admiralty consumption          80,000       199,340  
Source: History of the Ministry of Munitions, 12 vols. (London: HMSO, 1920), vol vii, part iii, 
p. 151. 
The Crewe Committee suggested that carbonisation of coal might produce 
1,000,000 to 1,250,000 tons of fuel oil per annum. Around the same time, 
another committee chaired by R. W. Barnett MP, with Slade as Vice Chairman, 
was set up to look into the production of oil from cannel coal and allied 
minerals. It detailed the technical aspects of the process, concluding that 
400,000 tons of fuel oil could be produced from cannel coal. Much of the raw 
material would be waste that had either not been brought to the surface or else 
thrown onto spoil heaps.
272 Britain did not make any major attempts to convert 
its substantial coal reserves into oil. In the early 1920s it was cheaper to import 
oil than to carbonise coal into oil.  
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Attempts were made to encourage conventional oil exploration in the British 
Isles. A system of drilling licences was regarded as being less wasteful than one 
of linking ownership of land and the oil under it. In 1917 a Petroleum Production 
Bill was presented to Parliament; it proposed that, rather than owning any oil 
under his land, a landowner would receive royalties. Sir Eric Geddes, the First 
Lord of the Admiralty and a businessman before the war, pointed out to Long 
that there were a number of difficulties with this. Landowners would regard it as 
a loss of their property. Labour objected to the principle of landowners receiving 
anything at all. Oil companies would not invest unless they knew what the 
royalties were for longer than the duration of the war.
273 The last point was also 
made by Sir Alfred Mond, the First Commissioner of Works, another minister with 
pre-war business experience.
274 The Government lost a vote on an amendment 
on the bill in October 1917. Since attempting to pass it might be a lengthy and 
controversial process, it was proposed instead to make a regulation under the 
Defence of the Realm Act.
275 As DORA regulations applied only to wartime this 
did not address the problem that the companies were unwilling to drill unless 
they knew what the situation would be after the war. A new bill was presented 
in July 1918, allowing landowners to receive compensation for use of their land. 
Oil companies would act as contractors for the Government, and the costs and 
proceeds of oil would be paid into a Petroleum Account; Parliament would 
decide on its distribution after the war.
276 The bill was passed by the House of 
Commons but was still with the Lords at the end of the war.
277 The inescapable 
problem with attempts to encourage domestic oil exploration was that the 
British Isles does not have much onshore oil. North Sea oil could not have been 
discovered or exploited with the technology of the first half of the twentieth 
century. 
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2.8 Chapter Summary 
During the war the Allies had more oil than the Central Powers. The USA was the 
world's dominant oil producer. Before its entry into the war it was willing to 
supply oil to anybody who could pay for and transport it. British financial 
resources and control of the seas meant that the Allies met these criteria. 
Austria-Hungary had oil but not enough to make up the imports that Germany 
lost as a result of the war and the British naval blockade. The Central Powers 
had to make decisions about oil allocation. They were never able to make as 
much use as the British and Americans of oil fuel for warships, despite its clear 
advantages. They were unable to make as much use of motor vehicles as the 
Allies, and their aircraft could fly fewer sorties than Allies ones in 1918. 
As the war progressed the belligerents became more dependent on oil. In 1914 
Britain sent troops to Mesopotamia to defend its Persian oilfields. Germany, 
short of oil, tried to obtain control of the oilfields of Romania and the Caucasus. 
Britain attempted to deny Germany these supplies. The Allied assumption that 
oil could be bought in the market, mostly from the USA, led to an oil crisis for 
Britain in April 1917 because of rising demand for oil and increased sinkings of 
tankers by U-boats. Later in the year France found itself in a similar crisis. 
Long was not an obvious choice to sort the situation out, but he had the political 
strength to insist on tough but necessary measures, such as favouring the navy 
over other users. He had the sense to rely on Cadman for technical issues. Long 
has received relatively little attention from historians; those who have written 
about him have not paid much attention to his role in overcoming the oil crisis. 
The most recent work on Long's political career is Richard Murphy's unpublished 
1984 doctoral thesis.
 278 It points out the lack of previous works on Long's career 
and their limitations; his own memoirs were largely based on often incorrect 
memories; the 1936 biography by Sir Charles Petre is uncritical; and Roderick 
Clifford's 1970 doctoral thesis was written from the papers of Long's rivals since 
most of his papers were then unavailable to researchers.
279 These works say little 
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about oil. Long's memoirs devote more space to his role in eradicating rabies 
when President of the Board of Agriculture in the 1890s than to oil. Petrie and 
Murphy give oil only brief coverage.
280 Murphy's comments are based largely on a 
journal article by Geoffrey Jones that argues that Long, although not clever, was 
able to work well with professional advisers, in this case Cadman.
281 Jones's later 
book argues that the appointment of Long indicated that that oil was being given 
a low priority but credits Long and Cadman with successfully re-organising the 
administration of oil matters.
282 
Long deserves great credit for his role in overcoming the oil crisis. His initial 
report to Lloyd George identified the urgent need for action and to have one 
person in charge. Once given those powers he used them effectively to ensure 
that oil supplies were directed to the most important users. He recognised that 
naval supplies had to be given the highest priority; without oil, the RN could not 
escort other supplies, including food, to the British Isles. Long relied on 
professional advisers, notably Cadman, but should be praised for appointing the 
right men and backing them. Cadman had the technical knowledge, but it 
required Long's political expertise and authority to insist that oil was more 
important than food and munitions. Britain was never in a comfortable oil 
position but came through the crisis. It showed that the policy of buying oil on 
the market in wartime was not viable and it was now realised that secure 
supplies were needed. The war made Britain more aware of the importance of 
oil and required the introduction of special administrative arrangements to 
allocate supplies. The increasing importance of oil meant that it was affecting 
relations between the Allies. 
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3  Oil and Inter-Allied Relations, 1917-18 
Oil impacted Anglo-American relations because most British oil came from the 
USA. The US was willing to supply oil to whoever could pay for and transport it, 
but increasing demand rose led to a shortage of tanker capacity. Both countries 
were suspicious that the other was putting its post-war interests ahead of the 
Allied
283 cause when constructing and allocating tankers. Britain dominated the 
Allied effort in the naval war, meaning that it required far more oil than either 
France or Italy, and was largely responsible for transporting their oil supplies. All 
three countries needed increasing quantities of oil as the war progressed. All 
found themselves in crisis in 1917; an Inter-Allied Petroleum Conference was set 
up to co-ordinate supplies. 
3.1 Oil and Anglo-American Relations 
Early in the war it became apparent that Britain could not equip its vastly 
expanded army solely from its own industries. The USA, the world's leading 
industrial power, was the obvious place to buy the necessary supplies. In early 
1915 J. P. Morgan was appointed sole purchasing agent for the Admiralty and the 
War Office. A British mission led by Balfour, now Foreign Secretary, was sent to 
the USA soon after the US entry into the war in April 1917. A British War Mission 
headed by the newspaper magnate Lord Northcliffe was then established, but 
this led to conflict between Northcliffe and the British Ambassador to 
Washington, Sir Cecil Spring-Rice. This was not resolved until both men were 
recalled in February 1918; Lord Reading was appointed to both positions.
284  
The Americans did not initially realise the severity of various problems facing 
Britain. On 29 June 1917, Walter Page, the US Ambassador to London, wrote to 
President Wilson on this subject. He thought that British pride prevented them 
from accepting the seriousness of their situation until they had no choice but to 
do so. A financial crisis meant that Britain would not have been able to continue 
to pay for its imports from the USA without US help. France and Italy would have 
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been affected as Britain had been lending to them. Page did not think that this 
would necessarily have caused the Allies to lose the war without US entry but, 
coupled with the U-boat crisis, it might have forced an early peace.
285 A few days 
later the President wrote to Josephus Daniels, the Secretary of the Navy, 
enclosing a memorandum for Admiral William Sims, the commander of US naval 
forces in Europe. Wilson said that he could 'not see how the necessary military 
supplies and supplies of food and fuel oil are to be delivered at British ports in 
any other way than under convoy.'
286 Significantly Wilson mentioned oil along 
with food and military supplies. The Admiralty decided in late April to introduce 
convoys; it took until late July to fully organise Atlantic convoys.
287 
3.1.1 The US Oil Industry 
The USA was the world's leading oil producer in 1914. During the next four years, 
its output increased and its share of world production rose even more, partly but 
not entirely thanks to falling Russian production. Table 3-1 shows the output of 
the world's leading producing countries. Appendix 1 gives an expanded version of 
this table, including all producers. 
Table 3-1 Output of the leading global oil producers, tons, 1913-18 
Country  1913  1914  1915  1916  1917  1918 
United States   35,492,319    37,966,076    42,966,737    47,902,229    50,848,817    53,959,857  
Mexico    3,670,899     3,747,915     4,701,501     5,792,245     7,898,967     9,118,332  
Russia    8,976,337     9,574,360     9,792,580    10,400,159     8,362,903     3,143,960  
Dutch East Indies    1,509,566     1,543,998     1,617,032     1,702,374     1,660,272     1,679,246  
Romania    1,854,927     1,755,276     1,646,255     1,224,099        56,567     1,194,705  
India    1,110,211     1,037,371     1,148,374     1,188,759     1,131,038     1,146,340  
Persia      243,621       381,890       474,553       587,502       937,902     1,131,489  
British Empire 
 ex India      431,223       571,496       536,808       557,184       726,628       932,350  
Galicia    1,095,506       645,077       666,063       912,535       887,415       667,733  
Rest of World      712,919       808,011       993,042     1,043,244     1,076,869     1,093,945  
World Total   55,097,528    58,031,470    64,542,945    71,310,330    73,587,378    74,067,957  
US as per cent of total  64%  65%  67%  67%  69%  73% 
Source: Marian Kent, Oil and Empire: British Policy and Mesopotamian Oil 1900-1920 
(London: MacMillan, 1976), pp. 203-4. 
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Table 3-2 shows that the USA supplied over 75 per cent of oil used by Britain, 
France and Italy in 1918. Italy had a lower share because it made geographic 
sense to supply it from British controlled oilfields in Egypt and the East. 
Table 3-2 Expected sources of Allied oil supplies, 1918, tons (French converted from metric 
tonnes in original) 
Sources of Supply  Britain 
Per  
Cent  Italy 
Per  
Cent  France 
Per  
Cent  Total 
Per  
cent 
Home production  216,000  3.3%  0  0.0%  0  0.0%  216,000  2.4% 
USA  5,261,600  79.4%  400,200  47.8%  1,257,600  75.4%  6,919,400  75.8% 
Mexico  496,500  7.5%  0  0.0%  0  0.0%  496,500  5.4% 
Trinidad  161,000  2.4%  0  0.0%  0  0.0%  161,000  1.8% 
Egypt  0  0.0%  400,200  47.8%  0  0.0%  400,200  4.4% 
Persia  540,000  8.1%  0  0.0%  48,700  2.9%  588,700  6.4% 
Burmah  7,000  0.1%  0  0.0%  0  0.0%  7,000  0.1% 
Sumatra  77,000  1.2%  36,000  4.3%  30,400  1.8%  143,400  1.6% 
Borneo  144,000  2.2%  0  0.0%  54,800  3.3%  198,800  2.2% 
Supplied by UK 
to France  -277,100  -4.2%     0.0%  277,100  16.6%  -0  0.0% 
Total  6,626,000  100.0%  836,400  100.0%  1,668,600  100.0%  9,131,000  100.0% 
Source: NA, POWE 33/8: Inter-Allied Petroleum Conference: minutes of meetings, 1918. 
Fourth Informal Meeting, 27 February 1918, Appendix 4. 
Table 3-3 shows the growth in US oil exports between 1914 and 1917. The 
categories that rose were those where demand from the Allies was increasing; 
the US Department of Commerce attributed the fall in exports of illuminating oil 
to the war.
288 
Table 3-3 US oil exports, 1914 and 1917 
   1917  1914  Percent change  Change 
Exports  Tons  $m  Tons  $m  Volume  Price/ton  Tons 
Crude oil     575,000   $7.16     478,000   $6.81  20.3%  -12.6%      97,000  
Gas and fuel oil   3,394,000   $32.47   1,550,000   $13.75  119.0%  7.9%   1,844,000  
Illuminating oil   2,724,000   $54.66   3,775,000   $74.50  -27.8%  1.7%   -1,051,000  
Lubricating oil     884,000   $48.65     642,000   $27.85  37.7%  26.8%     242,000  
Gasoline     738,000   $46.94     494,000   $21.70  49.4%  44.8%     244,000  
Naptha     651,000   $41.03     133,000   $5.65  389.5%  48.3%     518,000  
Residue       2,000   $0.03     370,000   $1.91  -99.5%  227.9%    -368,000  
Total Exports   8,968,000   $230.95   7,442,000   $152.17  20.5%  25.9%   1,526,000  
Source: NA, FO 115/2297: Foreign Office: Embassies and Consulates, United States of 
America: General Correspondence. Oil. Nos. 126-191. - Palm Oil. 1917. 
The USA did not have unlimited quantities of oil to spare. Administrative 
arrangements had to be introduced in order to regulate the oil industry. In April 
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1916 Congress had, on President Wilson's initiative, set up the Council of 
National Defense; one of its members, Bernard Baruch, established a number of 
advisory committees representing different industries. The oil one was headed 
by A.C. Bedford, the chairman of Standard Oil. Its activities included advising on 
how to supply the oil needs of the US armed forces and how to balance the 
needs of the Allies with those of domestic oil industries. In July 1917 Wilson 
replaced the Council of National Defense with the War Industries Board; 
Bedford's committee continued in existence. Wilson also requested the US 
Chamber of Commerce to help in establishing trade bodies that would ensure 
close co-operation between federal agencies and war industries. Representatives 
of trade associations were added to the petroleum industry advisory committee, 
now renamed the National Petroleum War Service Committee. In early 1918 it 
launched a publicity campaign to persuade the industry of the merits of self-
regulation. The industry was keen on co-operation because it offered 
opportunities for greater efficiency. Wilson was aware that some federal 
oversight was required and in August 1917 set up the United States Fuel 
Administration under Harry Garfield. Initially its responsibilities were confined to 
coal. In January 1918 Garfield persuaded Wilson to add an Oil Division, headed 
by Mark Requa, a petroleum engineer. He believed in co-operation within the 
industry and between it and government.
289 The war brought the US oil industry, 
which had been a target of Anti-Trust action before the war, closer to the 
government. 
The US entry into the war brought many benefits to the Allies, but the expanded 
US armed forces and war industries required greater quantities of oil. Civilian 
demand was rising, with the number of cars nearly doubling between 1916 and 
1918. An already tight market position was worsened by a cold winter in 1917-
18; a coal shortage developed leading to substitution of oil.
290 The average US oil 
price per barrel rose from $0.81 in 1914 to $1.98 in 1918.
291 Requa persuaded the 
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industry to limit prices by the threat of government action if they did not do so 
voluntarily. An appeal was made to private car users not to drive on Sundays.
292 
3.1.2 Mexico 
Table 3-1 shows that Mexican output rose from about 3,750,000 tons in 1914 to 
over 9,000,000 in 1918. This growth, coupled with declining Russian production, 
made Mexico the world's second largest producer of oil by 1918, albeit a long 
way behind the USA. Less than 500,000 tons was supplied by Mexico to Britain in 
1918 and none to France or Italy, but Mexico was significant to the Allies. The 
USA imported around 3,500,000 tons of oil in 1917, an increase of nearly 
1,000,000 since 1914; most of this was unrefined crude.
293 US imports from 
Mexico helped balance US supply and demand and enabled US refined products 
to be exported.
294 Mexican crude was refined in the USA. The availability of 
Mexican oil released more US oil for export. All Mexican oil was produced by 
American or British owned firms.
295 The correspondence of the British Embassy in 
Washington records concerns over civil unrest and potential German influence in 
Mexico; British support for the Monroe Doctrine and desire to maintain good 
relations with the USA meant that Britain took no action independent of the USA 
in Mexico.
296 
The first and one of the largest oil companies in Mexico was Mexican Eagle, a 
subsidiary of S. Pearson & Sons, the British group built and controlled by Lord 
Cowdray.
297 Pearson wanted to exit Mexico because of the unrest in the country; 
Standard (NJ) was a willing buyer. As well as the strategic aspects, the issue was 
complicated by Cowdray being President of the Air Board until November 1917, 
when he resigned after not being appointed to head the newly formed Air 
Ministry. Pretyman's committee was asked to look into the situation. It reported 
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in April 1917 that the transaction would give US companies complete control of 
the US and Mexican oilfields. It would be impossible for Britain to import any oil 
from these if the USA was hostile in a future war; if it was neutral, even if 
unfriendly, it might be possible to get oil from British owned Mexican fields. 
Pearson wanted to reduce its exposure to Mexico as soon as possible. The 
company had proposed a scheme for the British government to buy its Mexican 
oil interests for £9,250,000, half their value, with Pearson retaining profits over 
5 per cent. After the war the government would have the option to buy Pearson 
out entirely for a further £9,250,000; if it did not Pearson could re-purchase its 
interests for the same sum. Pretyman thought that these terms were 
unattractive to the government. The US entry into the war had made Britain less 
dependent on Mexican supplies, and the worsening political situation in Mexico 
made the investment of government funds there less appealing. The committee 
proposed that if the Standard (NJ) deal went ahead it should be required to 
purchase the shares via one of its British subsidiaries.
298 The government agreed 
to neither the sale to Standard (NJ) nor the scheme for it to invest in Pearson's 
Mexican interests. Cowdray argued that it did not have the right to prevent him 
selling them, but Standard (NJ) would not buy because of the uncertainty.
299 In 
1919 he sold to RDS; three years later the main well was damaged by an influx of 
salt water.
300 
3.1.3 Tanker Shortages 
Finding enough tankers to transport US oil to Europe and getting them there 
safely were major issues. In September and October 1917 the British Embassy in 
Washington made a series of requests to the Americans for the allocation of 
more tankers to the trans-Atlantic route.
301 In March 1918 Long telegrammed 
Reading with his concerns over fuel oil. The RN might need to carry out 
extended operations at a time when the safety margin of oil stocks was too low. 
All safe measures to reduce consumption had been taken. It was essential for all 
the Allies that RN oil reserves be increased above the danger level. The 
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Admiralty did not believe that it was possible to achieve the reduced minimum 
oil stocks by the end of August, even with continued use of the US commercial 
tankers and of double bottoms. The Admiralty had agreed to end the use of 
double bottoms in March very reluctantly. The US Government did not seem to 
appreciate that every three tons of oil delivered in double bottoms reduced 
cereal imports by four tons because tonnage was wasted in distributing the oil 
carried in this way. The RN‟s oil stocks would return to the dangerous situation 
of the summer of 1917 if it had to do without the oil so carried.
302 
The Inter Allied Petroleum Conference calculated oil demand by Britain, France, 
Italy and US forces in Europe in the second half of 1918. Lubricating oil, which 
was to be imported in barrels and so could be carried by any cargo ship, and 
British domestic production were deducted in order to arrive at total oil imports. 
This was translated into the number of days that tankers would have to spend at 
sea to transport this quantity of oil from the USA to Europe. Each tanker was 
assumed to be unavailable for 55 days per annum because of repairs and docking 
time, and would spend half the remaining time returning to the USA. The 
required tanker tonnage was the number of tanker days divided by 155. An 
adjustment was made for the use of double bottoms; 50,000 tons were expected 
to be carried by this method in July, August and September, and 10,000 in each 
of the last three months of the year. Table 3-4 gives the results. 
Table 3-4 Tanker requirements, 1 July to 31 December 1918, tons 
Country 
Domestic 
Production 
Lubricating 
Oil 
Oil 
Imports,  Tanker Days 
Tanker 
Capacity 
Great Britain  108,000  210,000  2,843,100  181,598,350  1,171,602 
France     81,000  462,000  36,660,000  236,516 
Italy     30,000  407,125  29,808,925  192,316 
USA     11,234  435,063  28,536,750  184,108 
Total without any use 
of double bottoms     332,234  4,147,288  276,604,025  1,784,542 
Savings from use of 
double bottoms        180,000     81,290 
Estimate of tanker 
requirements        3,967,288     1,703,252 
Source: NA, POWE 33/8: Inter-Allied Petroleum Conference: minutes of meetings, 1918. 
Fourth Formal Session, 14 September 1918, p. 3. 
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No allowance was made for the savings in tanker journey time that were 
expected to result from the completion of the Clyde-Forth Pipeline. This was 
first proposed in May 1917 but not approved until May 1918; the first oil flowed 
on 10 November.
303 
The number of tankers available was then calculated. A loss rate of 1 per cent 
per month averaged out as six tankers fewer over the whole period. Fuel oil 
carried in double bottoms had to be transferred to small, coastal tankers that 
would take it from ports to the fleet. Reduction in the use of double bottoms 
would release two of these for the Atlantic route, but they would not be able to 
carry as much oil as had been transported in double bottoms. If all new British 
and US construction was made available for the Atlantic route there would be a 
very small surplus of capacity. 
Table 3-5 Tanker availability 
Source  Tankers 
Tanker Capacity, 
tons 
Great Britain  158  1,134,482 
USA  55  392,634 
France  1  5,059 
Italy  6  33,494 
Total now available  220  1,565,669 
Allowance for sinkings  6  38,366 
British construction, average over period  14  101,450 
Coastal tankers released by reduction in use of double 
bottoms  2  12,500 
Total for period  230  1,641,253 
Required     1,703,252 
Shortfall     61,999 
US construction, average over period  13  64,988 
Surplus if new US tankers all allocated     2,989 
Source: NA, POWE 33/8: Inter-Allied Petroleum Conference: minutes of meetings, 1918. 
Fourth Formal Session, 14 September 1918, p. 4. 
A major shortage in general cargo tonnage meant that the Allied Maritime 
Council wanted to end, or at least reduce, the use of double bottoms. The 
calculations above assumed that it would be cut to 10,000 tons per month. A 
decision on this could not be made without knowing whether US tankers 
currently allocated to the Atlantic route would remain on it and how much of 
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new US construction would be allocated to the Atlantic route.
304 The figures for 
tanker construction given in Table 3-5 give the average availability over the 
whole six months for vessels completing throughout the period. Table 3-6 gives 
the full construction programme. 
Table 3-6 Tanker construction 
Month of 
Completion 
British 
Tankers 
British Tanker 
Capacity, 
tons 
US 
Tankers 
US Tanker 
Capacity, 
tons 
Total 
Tankers 
Total Tanker 
Capacity, tons 
Jul-18  2  16,000  2  25,000          4       41,000  
Aug-18  3  21,000  4  31,000          7       52,000  
Sep-18  8  58,000                8       58,000  
Oct-18  10  72,000  4  33,000         14      105,000  
Nov-18  6  42,000  2  18,500          8       60,500  
Total  29  209,000  12  107,500         41      316,500  
Source: NA, POWE 33/8: Inter-Allied Petroleum Conference: minutes of meetings, 1918. 
Fourth Formal Session, 14 September 1918, p. 4. 
This figures show that the situation was still very tight. The Allies had just 
enough tanker capacity if all new construction was allocated to the Atlantic 
route and monthly losses were no worse than 1 per cent. During the war the 
number of tankers available to the Allies increased. Britain's tanker fleet rose 
slightly although it fell as a proportion of the global total; see Table 3-7. 
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Table 3-7 World oil tankers, 1914-18 
Flag  30/06/1914  30/06/1917  30/06/1918 
   Ships 
Displacement, 
1000 metric 
tonnes  Ships 
Displacement, 
1000 metric 
tonnes  Ships 
Displacement, 
1000 metric 
tonnes 
British  200  883  198  809  204  930 
US  83  259  111  492  144  732 
German  46  215  13  54  14  59 
Dutch  29  80  35  75  35  75 
Norwegian  10  49  20  74  21  79 
Belgian  11  29  6  13  5  16 
Italian  3  15  6  28  7  42 
French  4  16  5  14  5  19 
Russian  4  9  40  49  40  49 
Mexican  4  13  4  13  4  13 
Spanish  1  1             
Romanian  2  8             
Danish  1  1             
Japanese  5  22  4  13  4  13 
Greek  1  2             
Other        8  7  10  7 
Total  404  1,602  450  1,641  493  2,034 
Source: Ferdinand Friedensburg, Das Erdol in Weltkreig (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke, 1939). 
3.1.4 Anglo-American Shipbuilding and the Post-War World. 
Britain and the USA were both concerned that the other was biasing its wartime 
construction and allocation of merchant ships in order to strengthen its post-war 
position. In April 1917 the British War Trade Intelligence Department stated that 
it feared that the United States Shipping Board wanted to expand the US 
merchant marine at the expense of Britain.
305 The Chairman of the US Shipping 
Board, William Denman, thought that it was Britain that was trying to 
manipulate the situation to its post-war advantage. He rejected British requests 
that more US merchant ships be used to supply France and Russia because he 
suspected that the British wanted to use US ones on the riskier routes. More US 
and fewer British ships would then be sunk, helping to maintain Britain's 
dominance of the world trade post-war.
306 In October the War Cabinet discussed 
the American requisition of merchant ships building in the USA for Britain. 
Maclay said that '[t]here was evidence...that the United State were out for post 
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bellum development, of which they have always suspected us.'
307 It was decided 
to point out to the Americans that the loss of these ships caused Britain 
problems. 
In August 1918 Sir Eric Geddes, the First Lord of the Admiralty, told the War 
Cabinet that the British were taking on most of the naval effort in the war. 
British warships were responsible for an estimated 1,250,000 out of 1,500,000 
miles of escort work per month and 6,000,000 miles of anti-submarine patrolling 
per month, compared with very little by the others. In the first five months of 
1918 the USA had completed 11 warships, excluding small submarine chasers, 
and the British 203. The British Merchant Marine had declined over the war; the 
US one had grown. In the last three months 52 per cent of US troops heading for 
Europe had travelled in British ships. Nearly half of French and Italian imports 
were carried in British ships. In the first six months of 1918 British yards had 
constructed 763,000 tons of merchant ships and US ones 838,000 tons. When the 
USA entered the war it took over 621,000 tons of merchant shipping under 
construction in the USA for Britain. Britain was building warships and repairing 
warships and merchant ships, including Allied ones, at the cost of not fully 
replacing sunk merchant ships. This created a post-war as well as a wartime 
problem. In the first six months of 1918 6,014 British and 106 Allied warships and 
auxiliaries were refitted in British yards. Over 13 million tons of merchant ships 
were repaired, requiring 50 per cent more labour than the warships; 10-12 per 
cent of these ships were Allied. On 1 April 1918 150,000 tons of merchant ships 
were under repair in US yards and 1,317,183 in British ones. As more US 
merchant ships were constructed Britain would have to devote even more effort 
to repairing US ships instead of building British ones. Britain should receive US 
merchant tonnage equivalent to the excess labour that it had devoted to warship 
construction and to the repair of Allied ships. Geddes argued that '[u]nless some 
arrangement of this character is come to the position of Great Britain as the 
Carrier of the World is seriously threatened as well as her position as premier 
Shipbuilding Country.'
308 Table 3-7 shows that the British merchant fleet, along 
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with most of those in the world, had declined during the war. The US merchant 
and Japanese ones had increased. 
Maclay had written to Geddes a few days earlier. He agreed with Geddes but 
suggested that he alter some of his numbers, which were inconsistent. Geddes 
originally claimed that the US had 8,250,000 tons of merchant shipping, but this 
included vessels confined to the Great Lakes, ships launched but not completed 
and 850,000 tons of sailing ships; his total for British shipping counted only 
completed ships and excluded sailing ships. Maclay said that the US merchant 
fleet totalled 4,750,000 tons on a comparable basis to Geddes's figure of 
15,100,000 for Britain.
309 Geddes gave US tonnage as 6,663,000 tons in the final 
draft of his memorandum, presumably excluding the sailing ships and the 
incomplete vessels; he left the Lakes ships in as he claimed that these could be 
and were being used for ocean transport. Maclay claimed a higher growth rate 
for the US merchant fleet since the start of the war than Geddes, but its size 
was more significant as a measure of its post-war threat to British interests. 
Table 3-8 Overseas tonnage of leading maritime powers, excluding enemy countries, tons 
   Aug-14  Gains  Losses  Jun-18 
Per cent 
change 
UK and Colonies  18,393,000  5,847,000  -9,140,000  15,100,000  -17.9% 
USA including Lakes  3,284,000  4,088,000  -709,000  6,663,000  102.9% 
France  2,120,000  460,000  -982,000  1,598,000  -24.6% 
Japan  1,023,000  843,000  -293,000  1,573,000  53.8% 
Italy  1,589,000  368,000  -883,000  1,074,000  -32.4% 
Russia  670,000  163,000  -376,000  457,000  -31.8% 
Greece  564,000  44,000  -377,000  231,000  -59.0% 
Norway  2,595,000  243,000  -1,448,000  1,390,000  -46.4% 
Holland  976,000  537,000  -720,000  793,000  -18.8% 
Sweden  899,000  110,000  -247,000  762,000  -15.2% 
Spain  806,000  40,000  -193,000  653,000  -19.0% 
Denmark  761,000  136,000  -317,000  580,000  -23.8% 
Others  1,207,000  674,000  -381,000  1,500,000  24.3% 
Total  34,887,000  11,436,000  13,949,000  32,374,000  -7.2% 
USA ex Lakes as per 
Maclay  2,000,000        4,750,000  137.5% 
Source: NA, CAB 24/60 GT 5307 'Naval Effort - Great Britain & United States of America', 
Eric Geddes, 2 August 1918, p. 7, NA, ADM 116/1809, Eric Geddes Papers, A329-2, Maclay to 
Geddes, 30 July 1918. 
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Maclay said that tankers were now around 16 per cent of the US fleet, compared 
with 20 per cent before the war. The comparable numbers for Britain were 
approximately 5 per cent and 7 per cent. The American reluctance to supply 
Britain with as much aid with tankers as it had requested meant that Britain was 
having to devote a substantial amount of its new build to tankers. Maclay feared 
that this would result in Britain having too many tankers after the war when 
there would be less demand for imported oil.
310 He broadly supported Geddes, 
with his disagreement being over the presentation. Geddes's views were also 
backed by Albert Stanley, the President of the Board of Trade.
311  
The issue was debated by the War Cabinet on 9 August. Geddes had by then met 
the US Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Franklin Roosevelt. The USN was willing 
to build more destroyers and escort vessels, resulting in it taking on a greater 
share of the naval effort. This left the question of merchant shipping where 
Britain had suffered heavy losses and was devoting a substantial proportion of its 
shipbuilding capacity to repairs of US ships. Ships on order for Britain from US 
yards had been requisitioned. The War Cabinet decided to suggest that it would 
be appropriate if the British received a share of the new US merchant ships. Sir 
Chiozza Money of the Ministry of Shipping thought that the US Merchant Marine 
might overtake the British one by 1920 or 1921. He pointed out that US ships 
were 50 per cent more expensive than British ones; it might be worth paying this 
premium to buy US ships now but not after the war.
312 
The issue was referred to a meeting chaired by Balfour and attended by Reading, 
Maclay and the Third Sea Lord. It decided not to ask the USA to help replace lost 
British merchant tonnage. Maclay argued that the price would be too high, and it 
was thought that the US Government would not agree. It was agreed to request 
the US to alter their ratio of merchant to warship construction to be the same as 
that of Britain; repairs would be regarded equivalent to construction. The 
Admiralty requested that five American tankers be transferred to Britain in 
compensation for the labour used in refitting US destroyers; these would be part 
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of the British order for eight previously taken over by the US government. The 
Americans were unable to comply because the US was short of tonnage and 
could transport its troops and their supplies to Europe only with British help. The 
refitting of US destroyers in British yards continued because it made sense; they 
returned to active duty in two weeks compared with six or eight if they had to 
go to the US yards.
313  
Geddes stated that the USN completed very few ships in the first five months of 
1918.
314 The US was building a large number of destroyers and other auxiliary 
craft. Many more would come into service in the rest of 1918 and beyond. It was 
able to construct more of both these and merchant ships than Britain. In 1932 
the USN had 251 destroyers and 81 submarines, most of them part of the 
wartime programme, compared with 150 and 56 respectively for the RN.
315 Until 
the USS Farragut was laid down in that year no US destroyer had been 
constructed for over 10 years. Far from not including enough auxiliary ships, the 
USN's wartime programme had taken it from having too few destroyers relative 
to its battle fleet to possessing the most destroyers of any navy in the world.
316  
Geddes wrote on 24 August that Edward Hurley, then Chairman of the US 
Shipping Board, had made a speech in which he made it clear that the USA 
intended to have the world's biggest merchant marine after the war.
317 A 
fortnight later Hurley wrote to President Wilson outlining his concerns over 
British shipping policy. He had always argued that the US merchant fleet was 
intended to benefit the whole world. It might have sounded better domestically 
if he had claimed that it would operate principally in American interests, but he 
did not want to make misleading and potentially harmful statements. He did not 
believe that the British really thought some of their complaints about the US 
shipbuilding programme were true. The British would be able to build ships at 
home after the war at half the cost of the ones commandeered by the US 
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Government and would always have a cost advantage over the US shipping 
industry. Hurley argued that: 
The British business men are literally dominating the policy of the 
British government towards us...The figures they furnished us with 
regard to the ships they could spare were the figures their own 
shipping interests wanted them to put forward. These figures were 
quickly revised when the call came for a larger American force in 
France. The same was true with respect to coal and oil.
318 
This was an early indication that the wartime mistrust over shipbuilding would 
be followed by peacetime mistrust over oil. Wilson had also received reports 
from Admiral William Benson, the Chief of Naval Operations, arguing that the 
British were determined to maintain their naval supremacy. Geddes was sent to 
the USA in the autumn of 1918. He tried and failed to persuade the Americans to 
alter their construction programme. His efforts, coupled with his comments on 
the US naval effort, inadvertently helped to persuade President Wilson of the 
accuracy of Benson and Hurley's warnings.
319  
The USA did not achieve its ambition of having the world's largest merchant 
marine. Its fleet was bigger after the war than before, but the British one 
remained much larger. In 1939, the Britain Empire had 21,000,000 tons of 
merchant shipping, more than in 1914, albeit a smaller share of the global total. 
The USA was second with 9,000,000 tons, around 17 per cent of the world 
aggregate; this excludes the Great Lakes fleet so the comparable figures are 
2,000,000 in 1914 and 4,750,000 in 1918.
320 
The two countries co-operated to win the war, but each were suspicious of the 
other's post-war intentions. This theme of the countries working together but 
not entirely trusting each other would continue into the post-war era.  
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3.2 The Inter Allied Petroleum Conference 
In early 1918 Long's committee discussed forming an Inter Allied Petroleum 
Conference look at each of the Allies' oil needs and to advise on how best to 
achieve the required stocks. It would consider how to make the most economical 
use of tanker tonnage and to what extent the specifications of petroleum 
products could be standardised for all the Allies. Britain, France, Italy and the 
USA would all be represented. At the 18 January 1918 meeting of his committee 
Long expressed the fear that Britain could be out voted and suggested that it 
should have more delegates than the other countries.
321 At the next meeting it 
was proposed that the French and Italian delegates should attend only when 
their needs were being discussed. These were very low compared with the 
British requirement for oil, and a substantial proportion of them were 
transported in British ships and financed by Britain. It was proposed that there 
should be five British delegates and two from each of the other three 
countries.
322 Differing numbers of delegates actually attended each meeting. The 
Conference's main roles were the collation of data and the co-ordination of 
efforts; it was an advisory rather than executive body. Five informal meetings 
were held in February, mainly concerned with process and method.
323 
3.2.1 France and Oil 
Georges Clemenceau, who became Prime Minister of France on 16 November 
1917, allegedly said that he would go to his grocer if he needed oil; there does 
not appear to be a primary source for this.
324 In English this might appear to 
suggest that Clemenceau had so little interest in petroleum that he was 
referring to cooking oil, but this is wrong. Eric Melby gives the quote in French, 
and the word used for oil is 'pétrole.'
325 The oil industry was not as vertically 
integrated in France as in other countries, and petroleum products were often 
                                         
321 POWE 33/5. 16th Meeting, 18 January 1918, p. 3. 
322 Ibid. 17th Meeting, 30 January 1918, pp. 2-8. 
323 POWE 33/8. 
324 Frank, Oil, p. 173, describes the quote as 'apocryphal' and sources Yergin, Prize, p. 189, who 
sources E. D. K. Melby, Oil and the International System: The Case of France, 1918-1969 (New 
York, NY: Arno Press, 1981), p. 22. He gives no source. Neither do Gruen, 'Oil', p. 116 or 
MacMillan, Peacemakers, p. 408. 
325 Melby, France, p. 22. 110 
sold by grocers.
326 The comment, if Clemenceau ever made it, does not mean 
that he was dismissing the significance of oil. He was arguing that he would 
always be able to purchase it for his own use and for France. 
France did not experience any great problems with oil supplies until early 1917. 
Henry Bérenger, a member of the Senate Army Committee and a supporter of 
increased use of oil by the French Navy, warned in March and again in May that 
there was an oil crisis. On 14 July he was appointed Chairman of the newly 
established Comité Général du Pétrole with a wide ranging but advisory remit. 
Measures were introduced to reduce civilian use, but increased military demand 
meant that by the end of November stocks were expected to run out within 
three months. Clemenceau increased Bérenger's powers after becoming Prime 
Minister. On 11 December Bérenger reported that France was dependent on its 
Allies for supplies and transport of oil. Three days later Clemenceau attended a 
meeting of the Comité Général du Pétrole.
327 The immediate need was for tanker 
tonnage to bring oil to France; the next day Clemenceau issued a plea to 
President Wilson for extra tanker tonnage. There was a risk that a 'shortage of 
gasoline would cause the sudden paralysis of our armies and drive us all into an 
unacceptable peace.'
328 French stocks of gasoline were currently 28,000 tons, 
compared with a target minimum of 44,000 and consumption of 30,000 tons per 
month. Wilson must get the US oil companies to allocate an additional 100,000 
tons of tankers to France. These could come from the Pacific and from new 
construction. Clemenceau's final lines to Wilson were: 
There is for the Allies a question of public salvation. If they are 
determined not to lose the war, the fighting French must, by the hour 
of supreme Germanic blow, have large supplies of gasoline which is, in 
the battle of tomorrow, as necessary as blood.
329 
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In January 1918, the US Ambassador to Paris, William Sharp, wrote to the 
Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, urging the US to act on the French request. 
Petrol was vital to the war effort; the French had only half the tanker tonnage 
needed to import the required quantities. Only the US could supply the 
necessary ships.
330 They were provided, but Bérenger was concerned that the 
problem had not been permanently solved. On 27 February he told the Inter-
Allied Petroleum Conference that 'a drop of petrol is equal to a drop of blood.'
331 
France had used only 42,000 tons of oil per month before the war. By the start 
of 1918 this had more than trebled to 130,000 tons. Oil was required for aircraft, 
trucks and war industries. Anti-submarine warfare meant greater use of small, 
oil fired warships. More tractors were being used because farm workers were in 
the armed forces. Civilians were having to use kerosene instead of electricity 
and gas for heating and lighting because of the needs of the munitions industry. 
Oil reserves might have fallen to zero had Wilson not responded to Clemenceau's 
appeal for extra tankers. France had not been able to construct tankers or to 
develop its limited home supplies of oil because of the war effort. Bérenger said 
that it was vital that France was permanently provided with the necessary 
tankers. This was 'not...a question more or less of agreeable utility or of money. 
It is a question of life or death, the victory or the defeat of all the Allies.'
332 
3.2.2 Italy and Oil 
At the 27 February meeting the Italians said that their requirements were less 
than those of France and well below British ones, but they were concerned that 
their stocks 'except for the liquid fuel, which is most required by the navy, who 
must have a strategical reserve...are very low.'
333 Italy was expected to need 
836,400 tons of oil in 1918 before building stocks. The army's demand for meat 
had reduced the cattle stock, requiring cattle previously used for labour to be 
replaced by motor tractors. 
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Table 3-9 Italian oil requirements 
  
Per 
month 
Stocks at 1 
February 
1918 
Month's 
stocks 
Liquid fuel  29,700  94,200  3.2 
Kerosene  17,000  2,761  0.2 
Aviation spirit  3,000  Not given    
Other spirits  15,500  22,820  1.5 
Lubricating oil  4,500  6,000  1.3 
Total  69,700       
Source: NA, POWE 33/8: Inter-Allied Petroleum Conference: minutes of meetings, 1918. 
Fourth Informal Meeting, 27 February 1918, Appendix 4. 
3.2.3 Allied Oil Requirements 
On 28 February the Conference discussed Allied sources of supply (see Table 3-2) 
and needs (see Table 3-10). Needs were based on the requirements to increase 
stocks to a minimum or 'danger line'
334 level. For Britain these were two months 
for civilian and army stocks and three months plus 225,000 for naval fuel. The 
level for aviation spirit had not yet been determined. The French needed two 
months civilian reserves but three months for their army and air service. This 
was because of the length of the front line and the inferiority of the French 
railway network to that of the enemy, who controlled the railways of Northern 
France and Belgium. This required the French to make more use of motor 
vehicles. All French naval fuel was supplied by the British and was allowed for in 
the British naval reserves so the French had no need of naval fuel reserves. The 
Italians too had a long and irregular front line and an inadequate rail network; 
this necessitated substantial petrol reserves, but they did not quantify these. 
The breakdown of oil needs shows that the RN was easily the largest consumer of 
oil. Britain was the biggest user even excluding navies. The British did not 
separate out agriculture from other civilian uses, and the French included toluol 
as a category in its own right. Air forces were not differentiated from the navy 
and the army; aviation spirit demand has been quoted to show the relative 
importance of the oil needs of aircraft. 
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Table 3-10 Oil needs of different Allied services, 1918, tons (French converted from metric 
tons in original) 
Service  UK  Italy  France  Total 
Army  511,600  266,400  455,700  1,233,700 
Navy  3,806,500  276,000  268,000  4,350,500 
Fabrications de Guerre        161,900  161,900 
Agriculture     132,000  71,600  203,600 
Other civil uses  1,279,900  162,000  555,200  1,997,100 
Local Allied requirements  474,000        474,000 
Additions to reserves  554,000     141,100  695,100 
Toluol 
   
15,200  15,200 
Total   6,626,000  836,400  1,653,500  9,115,900 
Aviation Spirit  130,500  36,000  151,700  318,200 
Source: NA, POWE 33/8: Inter-Allied Petroleum Conference: minutes of meetings, 1918. 
Fourth Informal Meeting, 27 February 1918, Appendix 4. The British figures for the RN and 
other civil uses have been reduced by 94,400 and 182,700 tons respectively to avoid double 
counting with liquid fuel supplied to France. 
On 6 and 7 May the Conference held a formal session at which all the delegates 
had the full authority of their governments. A further six formal sessions took 
place, the last on 16 December 1918. The first agreed that it was vital to 
produce statistics for the oil needs, supply sources and required tonnage of the 
Allies. Later meetings also covered administrative arrangements, storage and 
petroleum product specifications. It was an information gathering body rather 
than an executive one.
335 Yergin points out that it did a good job of distributing 
the available oil supplies to the Allies but that the dominance of the oil industry 
by Standard (NJ) and RDS meant that it depended on their networks of to do 
so.
336 
3.3 Chapter Summary 
The Allies depended on the USA to supply much of their large and increasing 
demand for oil during the war. It had enough oil to do so; sufficient tankers to 
transport it had to be found and got through the U-boats to Europe. In 1917-18 a 
number of themes emerged that would become more significant at the peace 
conferences and later. Britain and the USA co-operated to win the war, but were 
suspicious of each other's future intentions; this would continue after the war. 
The British feared that the Americans were planning to usurp their existing 
position in world trade. The Americans thought that the British were plotting to 
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shut them out of post-war commerce. During the war the claims and counter-
claims mostly revolved round the size of the two countries' merchant fleets. The 
British thought that, as an island with a global empire, their wealth and 
prosperity depended on dominating world trade and having a big enough navy to 
protect their position. Global trade was not so important to the USA so the 
British could not see why it required such a large merchant fleet and navy. The 
Americans did not want to be dependent on the merchant ships and goodwill of 
another power. Similar disputes would emerge over oil; the British did not see 
why the USA, by far the biggest producer in the world, needed access to 
overseas oil. Britain had to have foreign oil because it had little at home. The 
Americans were concerned that their oil might soon run out; they were the 
world's biggest consumer as well as its largest producer and needed foreign 
production to replace the expected domestic decline. Britain's control of the 
oceans depended in part on its dominance of world coal bunkering. It wanted to 
maintain its position as the main fuel of the global shipping industry changed 
from coal to oil; the Americans did not want to become dependent on British 
goodwill for oil supplies abroad. 
France and Italy were slower than Britain and the USA to see the need for oil, 
partly because they had smaller navies and thus lower demand for oil. Both 
initially depended on Britain to transport their oil. The French were determined 
to prevent a repetition of their 1917 oil crisis. They had no major oil company 
and little oil in their empire. They did have some scope to negotiate with Britain 
over a share of the potential oil of Mosul, part of which had been allocated to 
them by Sykes-Picot. Pipeline routes from the oilfields to the Mediterranean 
would cross French territory. French consent would be needed for a Middle 
Eastern peace settlement; the French intended that it should give them a share 
of the oil. This would affect Anglo-French post-war relations, and there would 
be a series of attempts at concluding an Anglo-French oil settlement. The 
Italians eventually realised that they needed oil; they would try to obtain a 
share in Middle Eastern oil, but came to the table later than the French and with 
fewer cards to play. Despite the difficulties in importing oil the Allies did have 
far more of it than the Central Powers did. The need to secure oil supplies would 
affect relations between the Allies after the war and in 1918 impacted British 
war aims. 115 
4  Oil and British War Aims 
Britain started with no war aims in the Middle East, but over the course of the 
conflict it developed a series of goals in which oil played an increasing role. 
British planners and strategists wanted secure future supplies of oil to avoid 
dependence on US support. Mosul was the most likely potential source of British 
controlled oil; obtaining control over it required the consent of France. In 
December 1918 Clemenceau agreed that Britain should have Mosul. Other 
disputes delayed the signing of the necessary Anglo-French oil agreement. 
Attempts to create a British national oil company continued. 
4.1 The Oil of Mosul 
On 29 July 1918 Slade produced an Admiralty paper on the 'Petroleum Situation 
in the British Empire'.
337 The same day he met Hankey, who was impressed with 
his arguments. Slade had gained an important ally since Hankey, as Cabinet 
Secretary, had a significant influence over British strategy.
338 Hankey then wrote 
to Sir Eric Geddes suggesting that the Admiralty should look at the question of 
oil in the context of war aims and of future military operations. It should 
consider whether its oil justified continuing with operations in Mesopotamia 
even though the General Staff considered it to be a minor theatre: 
I have been told privately by people with knowledge of oil production 
that the oil situation of the future is rather uncertain...It 
was...suggested that the largest potential oilfields at present known 
are in Persia and Mesopotamia...there are some as far up as Mosul...if 
this information is correct, the retention of the oil-bearing regions in 
Mesopotamia and Persia...would appear to be a first class British war 
aim. I do not remember, however, that it has appeared as such.
339  
On 30 July Hankey met Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss, the First Sea Lord, and 
persuaded him to circulate Slade's paper to the Imperial War Cabinet along with 
a covering memorandum that Wemyss dictated in Hankey's presence. Hankey 
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requested that Wemyss tell Slade to write another paper giving more details on 
the Mosul oilfields.
340 Wemyss's memorandum stated that the Admiralty wanted: 
to endorse in the strongest manner possible, the general principles 
and general conclusions set forth [by Slade]...the holding in our hands 
of the motive power of sea-borne traffic - coal...has proved of 
inestimable value in that Maintenance of sea power on which the 
whole edifice of the Empire rests...it is hoped that...the extreme 
importance of [Mesopotamia] in regard to the Petroleum situation will 
not be lost sight of.
341  
On 1 August Hankey wrote to Lloyd George suggesting Slade's paper should be 
considered at the next day's Cabinet meeting along with one by the Allied War 
Council at Versailles on Palestine and Mesopotamia. Hankey argued that: 
'there is no military [Hankey's emphasis] advantage in pushing forward 
in Mesopotamia...there may be reasons other than purely military for 
pushing on. Would it not be an advantage before the end of the war, 
to secure the valuable oil wells in Mesopotamia?'
342  
Slade argued that there were two issues regarding oil supply; the strategic 
position and supply. They were closely linked, but it was possible to obtain 
sufficient supplies without solving the more vital strategic question. He repeated 
the argument on bunker fuel that he had put forward in 1916. During the war, 
Britain had controlled the world's shipping because it controlled the world's 
supplies of bunker fuel. The future of the British Empire was mostly reliant on 
this control. Oil was replacing coal as the world's principal bunker fuel, meaning 
that Britain needed to control as much oil as possible. Loss of control of the 
world's bunker fuel meant that 'half our sea power is gone and our position 
becomes a most precarious one.'
343 OiI fired ships had a longer range than coal 
burners so did not have to refuel as often, further complicating the situation. Oil 
supplies had to be under entirely British control as foreign concerns would use 
'every means at their disposal, honestly or dishonestly, openly or secretly, to 
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hamper the development of British interests.'
344 He alleged that foreign oil 
companies were making £20-25 million per annum from the British market.
  
Table 4-1 shows that the USA supplied over 60 per cent of UK imports in 1913. 
Romanian and Russian supplies had been cut off since 1914, increasing the 
importance of US oil to Britain. US reserves were expected to last only 20-25 
years at the current rate of consumption, which was rising. Expected increases 
in Mexican output would be taken by the USA. Britain would not be able to 
obtain significantly more oil from its other pre-war suppliers, including Russia, 
Romania, Burma or the Dutch East Indies. Slade commented that what mattered 
was not a country's oil output but its exportable surplus, shown in Table 4-2. The 
figures shown are for Britain only. Canada took 9 per cent of the USA's 
exportable surplus and the rest of the British Empire 5 per cent, giving a total of 
30 per cent for the Empire. Slight discrepancies between the two tables are 
because of rounding errors. 
Table 4-1 UK oil imports, 1913 
USA  62.3% 
Romania  11.6% 
Russia  7.7% 
Dutch East Indies  7.7% 
Mexico  4.1% 
Other  6.5% 
Source: 'CAB 24/59, G.T. 5267', Slade, p. 1. 
Table 4-2 Exportable surplus of leading oil producers, 1913 
1913 
Total 
output, 
tons 
Exportable 
surplus, 
tons 
Exportable 
surplus, 
per cent 
of total 
output 
UK 
imports, 
tons 
UK 
imports, 
per cent 
of 
exportable 
surplus 
USA  33,150,000  7,120,000  21%  1100000  16% 
Romania  1,880,000  940,000  50%  230000  19% 
Russia  8,370,000  670,000  8%  130000  19% 
Mexico  3,480,000  1,740,000  50%  70000  4% 
Dutch East Indies  1,500,000        125000  8% 
Source: 'CAB 24/59, G.T. 5267', Slade, p. 2. 
British demand would not return to pre-war levels after the war. Naval use 
would fall, but demand from the Mercantile Marine would rise. Civilian use of 
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motor vehicles would increase because fewer horses would be available, and a 
large number of military surplus vehicles would be sold cheaply after the war. 
Slade expected demand to stay at the current 6,000,000 tons per annum, at 
least while naval stocks were being built up; see Tables 4-3 and 4-4. These 
figures differ slightly from those in Table 3-10 because they were prepared at 
different times. Demand from other countries would also rise; the USA and 
Germany both planned to have large merchant fleets. The Germans had suffered 
from British control of coal for shipping and did not intend to allow the same to 
happen with oil. 
Table 4-3 UK imports as of 7/18, tons 
Fuel oil  4,300,000 
Motor spirit  750,000 
Kerosene  600,000 
Lubricating oil  350,000 
Total  6,000,000 
Source: 'CAB 24/59, G.T. 5267', Slade, p. 4. 
Table 4-4 Expected UK post war oil demand, tons 
RN and Mercantile Marine  3,500,000 
Build up of Naval stocks  1,000,000 
Other uses  1,500,000 
Total  6,000,000 
Source: 'CAB 24/59, G.T. 5267', Slade, p. 4. 
The most important potential oilfields in the world were those of Persia and 
Mesopotamia. There were other undeveloped oilfields in the world but exports 
from those in the Americas were likely to go to the USA and others, including 
those of Papua, Nigeria, the Gold Coast, New Brunswick, Argentina, Portuguese 
West Africa, Timor, Madagascar and Algeria, were relatively small. Control of 
the oilfields of Persia and Mesopotamia was vital: 
In Persia and Mesopotamian lie the largest undeveloped resources at 
present known in the world... 
 It is not too much to estimate that the oil lands of Persia and 
Mesopotamia which will extend over an area of 360,000 square miles, 
or more than twice the size of the oil land of Russia, should not in the 
future provide a supply equal to that now given by the United States. 
If this estimate is anywhere near the truth, then it is evident that the 
Power that controls the oil lands of Persia and Mesopotamia will 
control the source of supply of the majority of the liquid fuel of the 119 
future. It this control is combined with that of coal, then that Power 
will hold the control of bunker fuel and will be in a position to dictate 
its own terms to all shipping in case of war.
345 
Britain had to be wary of German penetration of the oil market. If Germany 
could not control the world oil market by winning the war, it would try to do so 
by peaceful means afterwards. Slade, Vice Chairman of APOC, launched an 
attack on RDS, which he claimed was 'inimical to British control [and]...in 
intimate relations with and trading with Germany so far as it can without danger 
of being black-listed.'
346 Slade concluded by calling on the Admiralty to 'urge'
347 
the government to: 
1.  Defend the Persian oilfields that were vital to victory. 
2.  Expedite development of the Persian and Mesopotamian oilfields by 
entirely British interests. 
3.  Ensure explorations for and development of oil in the British Empire by 
entirely British interests. 
4.  Encourage and help British companies to take control of as many foreign 
oilfields as feasible. The output should be distributed by British 
companies. 
5.  Exclude foreign interests from the British oil industry. 
Slade's second paper was based on reports made by German geologists before 
the war and by APOC geologists on behalf of the British military. It gave details 
of the areas of oil seepage and argued that there were substantial indications of 
oil over an area of around 50,000 square miles. A German paper, presumably 
captured or decoded although Slade gave no provenance for it, said that the oil 
provinces of Mesopotamia and Persia had the 'greatest importance after that of 
the Suez Canal'
348 as German objectives. The Cabinet did not immediately act 
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upon Slade's papers but passed them onto the Cadman's Petroleum Executive on 
the proposal of Long. On 3 August Slade visited Hankey to complain about this 
because he 'doubted the discretion of Cadman'
 349 and feared that he was too 
close to RDS. 
Hankey continued to press the case for British control over the oilfields of 
Mesopotamia and Persia. On 3 August his attempt to enlist Balfour's support had 
elicited the reply that this 'was a frankly imperialistic war aim.'
350 Hankey could 
not understand 'allowing such humbug to stand in the way of our vital national 
needs!'
351 Later in the month Hankey tried a slightly different tack, writing to 
Balfour arguing that nobody, including President Wilson, would want to return 
Lower Mesopotamia to Turkish rule. He contended that the only alternative was 
for them to be under some form of British rule. The water supply of Lower 
Mesopotamia was dependent on territory allocated to France under Sykes-Picot 
but it guaranteed the water supply of the British territory. Hankey argued that 
Britain would be justified in advancing until it controlled enough territory to 
secure the water supply. He then added that '[i]ncidentally this would give us 
most of the oil-bearing regions.'
352 Slade received support from General Sir 
Frederick Sykes, the Chief of the Air Staff, who wished 'to endorse with all 
possible emphasis the views set forth [and]...also the recommendations made 
by...Slade.'
353 Sykes thought that the survival of the Empire depended on air 
power. The vital importance of oil for both the RAF and the RN meant that 
measures had to be taken to secure oil supplies and a large buffer zone was 
needed between the oilfields and hostile powers. Others were critical of Slade. 
Long had a number of objections to Slade's paper, several of which he recorded 
in the margin of his copy. Warwick Brown accurately describes them as being 
'caustic.'
354 Long wondered who the foreign interests that Slade believed were 
acting against British interests were and whether they were really making £20-25 
million per annum in Britain. He questioned Slade's assumptions about rising oil 
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consumption post war and argued that his conclusions were a matter for the 
Petroleum Executive, not the Admiralty.
355 Cadman reported to Long that Slade's 
paper had not been seen by either Tothill, who as Fourth Sea Lord was 
responsible for naval supply, transport and logistics and was 'very upset'
356 by the 
affair, or Pretyman, the Civil Lord. Cadman had met Slade who commented that 
he had previously put a paper to the War Cabinet in order to block a proposal by 
the Board of Trade. Cadman regarded Slade's paper as putting forward the views 
of APOC and found it 'extraordinary'
357 that a company should be able to 
approach the War Cabinet in this manner. Slade and Greenway thought the 
company's relationship with the government meant that it should consult them 
more often. Cadman told them that the government wanted the help of all, but 
Standard (NJ) and RDS were Britain's main oil suppliers. The government did not 
want to give the erroneous idea that it favoured APOC. Slade alleged that Shell 
had obtained confidential APOC documents but does not appear to have 
repeated his claim that Cadman was the source.
358 A correspondence between 
Slade and Long then ensued. Slade claimed that Shell was trading with Germany. 
He did not directly accuse the Petroleum Executive of being responsible for the 
alleged leaks to Shell but did comment that they went back to the time that it 
was set up.
359 Long wanted evidence of Slade's allegations against the Petroleum 
Executive. He would investigate the claim that Shell was trading with the enemy 
but this was a separate issue from the alleged leaks.
360 Slade and Long eventually 
agreed that further correspondence on the issue would serve no purpose.
361 
The controversy over Slade's paper led to some back-tracking by the Admiralty. 
Pretyman said that: 
The paper appears to be an exparte statement by the Anglo Persian 
Oil Company who are in bitter rivalry with the Royal Dutch Shell. Many 
of the statements made are to my knowledge inaccurate or 
exaggerated, and the whole of the questions raised are now under 
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consideration by the Committee appointed by Mr Walter Long of which 
Lord Harcourt is Chairman and on which I represent the Admiralty.
362 
He and Tothill took their objections to Wemyss, who explained in a memo to 
Geddes that in future papers on oil would be forwarded to them. Wemyss 
claimed that he was aware of his 'ignorance of oil politics and [his] principal 
concern in the subject is strategical.'
363 Geddes submitted a memo to the War 
Cabinet explaining that: 
On reperusal of the Memorandum I find that there are passages in it 
which deal with contentious questions of oil company politics...The 
endorsement, however, of the Memorandum by the First Sea Lord and 
myself refers only to the contention that the oil bearing districts of 
Mesopotamia and Persia are of very great national importance to us.
364 
Matters of oil company politics would be left to the Petroleum Imperial Policy 
Committee chaired by Lord Harcourt. 
A War Cabinet meeting on 13 August 1918, with the Dominion Prime Ministers 
present, discussed war aims. Balfour said that at the start of the war he had 
thought that it was unfortunate that Britain had to go to Mesopotamia since the 
territory occupied would be at risk from attack by the Russian or Turkish 
Empires. The situation had now changed. Britain had promised to hand it over to 
an Arab state but 'must be the guiding spirit there.'
365 A further issue that had 
recently emerged was oil. Mesopotamia contained what were claimed to be very 
large oilfields. Balfour said that: 
With every desire not to acquire more territory than we can help out 
of this war - in that I believe I differ from some of my colleagues ; I 
am anxious to keep down the extension of the British Empire as much 
as possible—I am very reluctant to see anything done which would 
endanger our obtaining oil from this region. I do not care under what 
system we keep the oil, whether it is by a perpetual lease or whatever 
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it may be, but I am quite clear that it is all-important for us that this 
oil should be available.
366 
Curzon stated that if Britain lost Baku then these were the only other significant 
ones available. Balfour replied that he understood that the Mesopotamian ones 
were superior to those of Baku. A map of the Mesopotamian oilfields was 
consulted and Lloyd George said that he was 'in favour of going up as far as 
Mosul before the war is over.'
367 Long missed this meeting because of illness but 
submitted a memorandum that discussed only the future of German colonies. 
Britain must not return any that could be used by Germany as submarine bases, 
wireless stations or coal and oil depots to support attacks on British commerce in 
a future war.
368 Long made no reference to Mosul or Slade's paper; the 
correspondence indicates that his objections to that document were to the 
process by which it was circulated and to the oil company politics involved. 
Slade's paper had, via its influence on Hankey, put Mosul onto the agenda for the 
discussion of British War Aims. Lloyd George, Curzon and Balfour had all agreed 
Mosul's oil was vital for Britain. Curzon could be relied upon to back the 
expansion of the British Empire. Later in 1918, Edwin Montagu, the Secretary of 
State for India, complained to Balfour that: 
And then there is the rounded Lord Curzon, who for historical reasons 
of which he alone is master, geographical considerations which he has 
peculiarly studied, finds, reluctantly, much against his will, with very 
grave doubts, that it would be dangerous if any country in the world 
was left to itself, if any country in the world was left to the control of 
any other country but ourselves, and we must go there, as I have 
heard him say, “for diplomatic, economic, strategic, and telegraphic 
reasons.”
369 
Curzon may have seen oil as simply another reason to advocate expansion, but 
the arguments over oil had influenced Lloyd George and Balfour. The Prime 
Minister had not previously commented on this issue, but now favoured the 
acquisition of Mosul. In 1916, Balfour had argued that the oil problem was one of 
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transport as it could be bought on the world market.
370 After a further two years 
of war and an oil crisis, he accepted the vital need for British access to Mosul's 
oil. His concern was to obtain it in a manner that did not expand the British 
Empire unnecessarily. 
4.1.1 The Seizure of Mosul. 
By the time that Mosul became a British war aim the forces in Mesopotamia had 
been reduced in size. In April 1918 two Indian Divisions were transferred to 
Palestine in order to partially replace British troops who were being sent to 
France because of the German offensive there.
371 General Sir Edmund Allenby's 
offensive in Palestine was delayed by these changes. By early October Damascus 
had fallen and the Ottoman Army was in full retreat. General Marshall was 
ordered on 7 October to deliver the final blow to the enemy.
372 He wrote in his 
memoirs that these orders created significant transport problems. His force had 
been required to keep open the lines of communication to Persia across poor 
roads, leading to a high rate of unserviceability amongst its motor vehicles.
373 
The transport difficulties were overcome, and the bulk of the Ottoman Sixth 
Army had been destroyed by 30 October.
374 Sir Arnold Wilson, the Acting Civil 
Commissioner of the British occupied part of Mesopotamia and the Political 
Resident in the Persian Gulf, wrote in his memoirs that he had for some time 
been communicating with the British Government over the need to occupy Mosul 
vilayet. He argued that, whether Mosul was to be British or French, it must be 
occupied by the time that hostilities ended. The vilayets of Basra, Baghdad and 
Mosul should be under the same government.
375 
Ottoman forces remained in occupation of the city of Mosul and Marshall ordered 
a column under General Fanshawe to capture it. Marshall was informed of the 
armistice with the Ottoman Empire on 1 November but did not pass this 
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information onto Fanshawe. The next day the Ottomans informed Fanshawe of 
the armistice and asked him to withdraw his force to the point that it had 
reached when the armistice was signed. Marshall ordered him to press on and 
take the city of Mosul. The Ottoman commander, Ali Ihsan, protested but 
eventually signed terms of surrender with Marshall. The latter thought that the 
problem was that archaic military terms had been used in the armistice with the 
Ottoman Empire. Marshall admitted in his memoirs that he was not certain that 
he was in the right.
376 According to Wilson the problem was that the armistice 
said that all garrisons in Mesopotamia should surrender but did not define either 
Mesopotamia, a term not used in the Ottoman Empire, or garrison.
377 Britain was 
now in possession of all of the Mosul vilayet and its potential oil. Later there 
would be disputes with Turkey over whether or not this territory should be part 
of the new state of Iraq. The Turks would have had a greater chance of winning 
this argument if they had retained control of all of Mosul in 1918. 
4.1.2 Persia 
Persia remained neutral throughout the war, but neither side respected its 
neutrality. Britain's main objective in Persia was to protect its existing positions, 
which were concentrated in the south. The Russians in the north adopted a more 
aggressive approach than the British, defeating the enemy but causing great 
resentment amongst the local population.
 378 The main British interests in Persia 
were oil, the Gulf and the protection of India. In June 1917 the Viceroy of India 
sent a telegram warning of the risk that Persia would either descend into 
anarchy or else an anti-British government would come to power. In either case 
the South Persia Rifles, a locally recruited but British officered and controlled 
force, would fall apart taking Britain's military position in South Persia with 
them. Shiraz would have to be evacuated and action taken to protect the Gulf 
ports. The route to Herat would be open to the Ottomans who could then take 
the war to Afghanistan and the Indian border. The oilfields and Arabistan would 
be threatened along with the communications of the British forces in 
Mesopotamia. The Viceroy argued that the best solution was to placate the 
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democratic politicians, if necessary by payment.
379 The British concentrated on 
holding the south, ruling through local leaders described as 'puppets'
380 by an 
Iranian historian. 
In June 1918 Curzon explained to the Imperial War Cabinet that Persia was weak 
and was a major problem for Britain, which wanted to maintain Persia's 
autonomy and integrity. The collapse of Russia had opened the north to the 
enemy, but the British, in co-operation with the remaining Russian forces, had so 
far kept them out. There was a lot of trouble in the south. The South Persian 
Rifles was unpopular with the Persian government and the British government 
was trying to come up with a better solution. A cordon of Persian and Indian 
troops protected Afghanistan. Having Persia as a friend would be a positive, but 
having it as an ally would create difficult obligations.  
[The] main object is to deny Persia to the enemy, to have a friendly 
Government there, and to prevent her from becoming a focus of 
German intrigue in her own territories, or a danger to Afghanistan.
381 
In the same meeting Curzon argued that Germany had won so much in the east 
that it could afford to make great concessions in the west. The Germans wanted 
to destroy the British Empire and could do so in the east. Britain must retain 
Palestine and Mesopotamia to protect Egypt and the Persian Gulf respectively. 
There was no disagreement with Curzon's views.
382 
4.2 The Petroleum Imperial Policy Committee 
On 29 May 1918 Long set up the PIPCO „[t]o enquire into and advise His Majesty's 
Government as to the policy to be followed in order to ensure adequate supplies 
of oil for the Naval, Military and Industrial purposes of the British Empire.‟
383 It 
was chaired by Harcourt who had left office when Asquith was replaced as Prime 
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Minister at the end of 1916 and been created a Viscount in 1917. Its members 
were: 
Viscount Harcourt (Chairman); 
Viscount Inchcape (Treasury); 
E. G. Pretyman (Civil Lord of the Admiralty); 
Sir Frederick Black (Director of Contracts, Admiralty); 
Professor Sir John Cadman (Director, Petroleum Executive); 
Alwyn Parker (Foreign Office); 
Lancelot Smith (Board of Trade); 
B. A. Kemball Cook (Ministry of Shipping); 
Sir Harry MacGowan; 
Sir John Ferguson; 
Colonel Sir Robert Horne; 
Colonel R. S. Williamson; 
J. C. Clarke (Deputy Director, Petroleum Executive); 
Secretary: Captain A. S. Jelf, Malay States Civil Service. 
Kemball Cook joined the committee on 30 September 1918 and Black on 31 
October 1918. Parker was succeeded as Foreign Office representative by the 
Hon. C. H. Tufton on 24 October 1918. He was replaced by E. Weakley on 21 
December 1918. Inchcape was a government director of APOC, and Black was 
appointed one on 4 February; he ceased to be a government representative on 
30 June but remained on the board until 27 March 1923.
384 Unlike most previous 
oil committees no serving naval officers were members. Horne had worked under 
Eric Geddes on organisation of the railways of the Western Front and then 
followed him to the Admiralty, but his presence was probably due to his legal 
expertise; he was an advocate specialising in commercial and shipping law. 
Cadman had argued that the committee should include a corporate lawyer and 
businessmen.
385 Inchcape was a shipping tycoon, MacGowan an industrialist, and 
Ferguson a banker. 
The PIPCO's report was published in February 1919. Long, who set it up, had 
objected to much of Slade's July 1918 paper. Harcourt, its Chairman, and 
Cadman, a member, had both been previously criticised by Slade, who was only 
a witness and not a member. Its introduction repeated Slade's arguments, less 
the oil company politics. Oil, which Britain lacked, was replacing coal, which it 
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had in abundance. The control of bunker fuel was vital to the future of the 
British Empire. Britain was dependent on the USA for oil supplies; rising demand 
and potentially declining output in the USA meant that the Americans might not 
be able to meet British needs even if they remained friendly. This shows that 
these views had been widely accepted.
386 The committee decided that the way 
to ensure Britain's oil supplies was to have a large oil company under British 
control. It reopened the 1916 debate on how to moving RDS from Dutch to 
British control. Most of its time was taken up with discussions and negotiations 
on how to achieve this. The witnesses who appeared before the PIPCO were all 
men whose could advise on this course of action; directors of APOC, Burmah, 
Mexican Eagle and RDS and corporate lawyers.
 387 No debate on why this was the 
solution was recorded. It seemed to be decided from the start that it was; the 
question was how to achieve it. 
Harcourt and Deterding came to an agreement. The British registered 
subsidiaries of RDS would remain British in perpetuity. A majority of their 
directors must be British born British subjects. A British Government nominee 
would have to agree to changes in Shell's board of directors and Articles of 
Association and to asset disposals. The shareholding split of 60 per cent Royal 
Dutch and 40 per cent Shell would remain. RDS‟s British companies and its 
operations in Romania, Mexico, Venezuela and part of Russia would be British 
controlled. Its operations in the Dutch Empire would have remained Dutch 
controlled as this was required by Dutch law. RDS, via Anglo-Saxon or another of 
its British subsidiaries, would obtain a stake in the TPC equal to that of APOC. 
Anglo-Saxon and APOC would each have 34 per cent and the British Government 
2 per cent. If other parties, presumably meaning the French, did not take up all 
of the remaining 30 per cent, then any balance would be divided evenly between 
Anglo-Saxon and APOC. The shares of these two companies and the British 
Government would be put into a voting trust, with a majority of the three 
members deciding how the full block was voted. The Deutsche Bank's stake in 
TPC had been seized by the British Treasury because it was an enemy owned 
shareholding in a British registered company. This offered an opportunity to re-
allocate the capital of TPC. Sir Frederick Black dissented from a number of 
                                         
386 POWE 33/13, pp. 5-6. 
387 Ibid., pp. 8-9. 129 
points in the Agreement. He was concerned that Britain had given up too much 
in Mesopotamia in return for British control over Shell. He worried that the 
Mesopotamian oil production would be controlled by RDS and the French. APOC 
should have been consulted over the marketing arrangements for the 
Mesopotamian Oil. Insufficient attention had been paid to the Romanian 
oilfields.
388 Deterding was motivated by a desire to obtain a share of the TPC and 
a need for British Government support in Romania and Russia.
389 The deal was 
approved by the Cabinet on 5 May 1919. It lacked the political will to push it 
through, and the companies found that they had enough other opportunities. It 
was not completed.
390 
The report included as appendices a number of reports on British oil policy. 
Themes that came out of them were the need to develop the oil resources of the 
British Empire and to keep these under British control, and the significance of 
distribution and transport networks. The first of them was the 1916 Board of 
Trade Memorandum that was considered earlier.
391 The next gave figures for the 
oil production and consumption of the British Empire; these showed that the 
British Empire needed very substantial oil imports and that even India, which 
contributed most of the Imperial production from the Burmese oilfields, was a 
net importer. The figures are summarised in Table 4-5: 
Table 4-5 British Empire oil output and demand, tons 
   1913  1914  1915  1916  1917 
Indian output  1,110,211  1,037,371  1,148,374  1,188,759  1,131,038 
Rest of Empire 
output  243,621  381,890  474,553  587,502  937,902 
Empire output  431,223  571,496  536,808  557,184  726,628 
Indian demand  1,398,679  1,359,691  1,419,759  1,440,601  1,297,792 
Rest of Empire 
demand  3,321,506  4,114,285  3,770,707  4,694,357  6,195,288 
Empire demand  4,720,185  5,473,976  5,190,466  6,134,958  7,493,080 
Empire imports  4,288,962  4,902,480  4,653,658  5,577,774  6,766,452 
Persian output  243,621  381,890  474,553  587,502  937,902 
Sources: POWE 33/13, Negotiations regarding petroleum policy of His Majesty's 
Government, Vol. 1 reports and proceedings of Petroleum Imperial Policy Committee, pp. 
108-11 for demand. Some of its output figures were only estimates, so these have been 
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taken from Marian Kent, Oil and Empire: British Policy and Mesopotamian Oil 1900-1920 
(London: MacMillan, 1976), Appendix VIII, pp. 203-4. 
Appendix C comprised a memorandum on 'The Petroleum Position of the British 
Empire'
392, written by Harcourt for the Imperial War Conference, and the 
subsequent discussion on the subject by the Conference that took place on 22 
July 1918.
393 Long chaired the meeting, which was attended by Cabinet ministers 
from Australia, Canada, Newfoundland, New Zealand and South Africa, including 
the Prime Ministers of all but South Africa. The Indian delegation included 
Montagu, but the only other British Cabinet Minister present was the Home 
Secretary, Sir George Cave. Various civil servants, military officers and advisers, 
including Cadman, attended. The main purpose of the meeting was for Harcourt 
to acquaint the representatives of the Dominions with the oil situation, 
especially the need to end Britain's reliance on imports from the USA. He stated 
in his memorandum that: 
every effort must be made now, and in the future, not only to develop 
existing oilfields in British territories or spheres of influence, but to 
acquire new fields that will be from the outset in British commercial 
hands and under British control. It seems clearly to be of first rate 
importance that no foreign influence under any guise, shall be 
permitted in British territories.
394 
An open ban on foreigners could lead to retaliation against British oil prospectors 
outside the Empire. A possible solution was to refuse to award licences for oil 
exploration, development and transport on Crown Land to foreigners. A pipeline 
to the coast would almost always have to pass over some Crown Land. A 
resolution was passed unanimously that: 
The Conference takes note of the Memorandum on the question of 
petroleum, and, having regard to the great and growing importance of 
petroleum and its products for naval, military, and industrial 
purposes, desires to commend the suggestions contained in the 
Memorandum to the serious consideration of the Governments 
concerned.
395 
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A shortened version of Slade's July memorandum was included. The comments 
directly critical of RDS were removed, but he still claimed that foreigners were 
making £20,000,000 to £25,000,000 profit from supplying oil to Britain.
396 In 
reply to questions, he said that he was concerned that pre-war negotiations 
between Royal Dutch and Germany would be renewed after the war. Britain did 
not need to control all of RDS; its transport and distribution business would be 
enough. If feasible, he would have British control over it all, but it depended on 
the price; RDS would be more likely to participate in a purely transport and 
distribution company than to give up control of its oilfields.
397 
The opinions of Burmah, Mexican Eagle and APOC, the main British oil companies 
other than Shell, were given in Appendices E, F and G. Greenway of APOC 
argued that Standard (NJ) and RDS dominated the world oil market. This meant 
strategic risks and higher prices for Britain. He repeated Slade's claim, which 
Slade had insisted was not made on behalf of APOC, that these groups were 
taking annual profits of £20,000,000 to £25,000,000 out of the British Empire. 
Greenway once again put forward the idea of an all British distribution company 
comprised of APOC, Burmah and Mexican Eagle, completely excluding Shell. He 
claimed that such a group would have a good enough network to distribute what 
he claimed would be a combined output of 4,000,000 tons of oil per annum, 
potentially rising to 9,000,000 tons. The Empire would need 5,000,000 to 
6,000,000 tons in peacetime. He claimed that this scheme was proposed in the 
national interest, whilst proposals from RDS was motivated by profit.
398 
J. T. Cargill, the Chairman of Burmah, thought that the first thing that had to be 
done was to ensure that all potential oilfields in the British Empire were 
thoroughly explored; Burmah had in the past been hampered by local 
regulations. British companies had been harmed by unfair price competition 
from foreign rivals; this should be banned. He emphasised the importance of 
refining and distribution facilities, and of an Imperial bunkering network.
399 On 8 
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October 1918 he told the PIPCO that RDS and Standard (NJ)'s main advantages 
were their distribution and transport facilities, which would be very expensive to 
replicate. Pretyman was concerned that Greenway's scheme would result in a 
monopoly, which would be unpopular with the public. Cargill agreed but thought 
that this risk was less than that of not developing fully the oil resources of the 
Empire.
400 Lord Cowdray's submission concentrated mainly on the need to find 
new sources of oil in the Empire. It was more important that he helped to do so 
than that he held onto his share of Mexican Eagle. He believed that there was oil 
in Britain and intended to find it.
401 His efforts produced only a small field found 
at Hardstoft near Mansfield in Derbyshire in 1919. The ending of government 
support in 1922 curtailed drilling in Britain until the late 1930s.
402  
The final appendix was a memorandum written by Long in February 1919, 
arguing that there was a vital need for a permanent petroleum department. The 
importance of oil meant that it should not be attached to another department; 
Long argued that the Petroleum Executive could not have carried out its tasks as 
efficiently if this had been the case. He stated that: 
Such a Department must be in charge of a Minister of the Crown, who 
would be responsible to His Majesty's Government for petroleum 
policy. 
The need for a clearly defined and settled oil policy in daily becoming 
more apparent.
403 
The independent Petroleum Executive would be retained for a few years, but in 
1922 it would be taken over by the Board of Trade as a cost cutting measure.
404 
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4.3 The Versailles Peace Conference 
It did not take long after the signing of the Versailles Treaty for it to be heavily 
criticised; John Maynard Keynes, a member of the British delegation, published 
his famous attack soon after it was signed.
405 A modern view from Alan Sharp is 
that a 'fairer assessment would be that the settlement was not perfect, it 
contained the potential seeds of future conflict, but also the potential for a 
more hopeful future.'
406 The introduction to the book of papers presented at an 
international scholarly conference in 1994 argued that most academic specialists 
would agree; this view has not percolated down to the popular view. The Treaty 
did undergo revision in the 1920s; this process might have continued had the 
Great Depression not occurred.
 407 Zara Steiner argues that popular histories and 
statesmen still criticise the Peace Treaty, but academic specialists agree that it 
was the best compromise that could have been achieved. It might have 
succeeded if the USA had joined the League of Nations, Britain and France had 
worked together, or the Germans had accepted it.
408 One popular history that 
tries to put forward a more positive view of Versailles is Margaret MacMillan's 
Peacemakers.
409 It rates four stars on Amazon.com; it is noticeable that most of 
the negative reviewers focus their criticism on its revisionism.
410  
4.4 The Paris Peace Conference: Aims and Structure 
The most important countries at Versailles were Britain, France and the USA; the 
actions of each were driven by its leader; Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Wilson 
respectively. The focus on this trio became even stronger once the Council of 
                                         
405 J. M. Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (London,: 1919). vol. xi, p. 130. 
406 Sharp, Versailles, p. 213. 
407 Boemeke et al, The Treaty of Versailles : A Reassessment after 75 Years, pp. 3-4. 
408 Z. S. Steiner, The Lights That Failed : European International History, 1919-1933 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 15-70; 'The Treaty of Versailles Revisited,' in The Paris 
Peace Conference 1919 : Peace without Victory?, ed. M. L. Dockrill, J. Fisher (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2001), pp. 13-33. 
409 MacMillan, Peacemakers. 
410 "Reviews of Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World by Margaret Macmillan", Amazon 
<<http://www.amazon.com/Paris-1919-Months-Changed-
World/dp/0375760520/ref=sr_1_3?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1281368112&sr=1-3>> (accessed 9 
August 2010). These reviews are of the US edition. Other references to this book are to the UK 
edition. 134 
Four was established in March 1919. The fourth member was Vittorio Orlando, 
the Italian Prime Minister, who absented himself for a period after Italian claims 
to Fiume were rejected in early April. The Council of Four replaced the Council 
of Ten, which had added the foreign ministers of these four countries and two 
Japanese representatives; it was too unwieldy. 
The three had different objectives. Clemenceau wanted security for France 
against future aggression from Germany, which had a much larger population. 
Ideally he would have liked to restore France's 1814 frontier or more realistically 
to have established an independent Rhineland Republic. He settled for Allied 
occupation of the left bank for 15 years and a demilitarised zone on the right 
bank. Germany handed over its fleet and evacuated Belgium as part of the 
armistice and had lost its colonies during the war. This meant that Germany 
appeared to be less of a threat to Britain than it was to France; Lloyd George 
regarded it as a potential trading partner. The 1918 General Election did 
produce demands for large reparation payments; it left Lloyd George as the 
Liberal Prime Minister of a Conservative dominated Coalition Government. 
Wilson was motivated primarily by his desire to establish the League of Nations 
and by the principle of self-determination; this was not uniformly applied, with 
many non-European peoples being deemed to need some form of guidance. This 
took the form of mandates, which were allocated to Western countries over 
former German colonies and those parts of the Ottoman Empire populated by 
non-Turkish peoples. Different types of mandate reflected the assumption that 
Arabs were closer to being capable of self government than were Africans or 
Pacific Islanders, requiring less supervision and guidance. 
4.5 Aims in the Middle East 
Versailles and the subsequent treaties with the former Ottoman Empire created 
the current shape of the Middle East and are frequently blamed for the 
instability of the region. There was a general feeling that the Ottoman Empire 
should be stripped of its non-Turkish territories, restricting the Turks to Turkey. 
Anatolia was clearly Turkish, but there were disputes about whether or not 
Turkey should include Constantinople, the Straits, Smyrna (now Izmir), Kurdistan 
and Armenia. The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire was motivated by a desire 135 
to punish it for entering the war, a belief that it had ruled its non-Turkish 
peoples badly and the principle of self-determination. It would provide an 
example of the uneven application of self-determination; Arabs, unlike 
Europeans, were not deemed to be ready for full independence and would be 
guided and supervised by Western mandatory powers. 
4.5.1 British Aims in the Middle East 
In November 1918 the Foreign Office's Political Intelligence Department argued 
for a Turkish state, with safeguards for minorities in Anatolia and European 
Turkey; there was some doubt over the inclusion of Constantinople, but the 
Black Sea Straits should be under international control. The Dodecanese Islands 
should go to Greece via a friendly agreement with Italy. Armenia should be 
independent, but under the guidance of a power friendly to Britain. Existing 
trucial relations between Britain and Arab rulers should be maintained; it was 
hoped that a similar one would be signed with the Hedjaz. The development of 
Mesopotamia needed the aid of a major power for an unknown period; this 
should be Britain. Because Kurdistan controlled Mesopotamia's water supplies it 
had also to be under a British mandate. Syria would not need as much guidance 
as Mesopotamia but would need help from a Western power for a short time. 
Britain had fewer interests than in the rest of the Arab world so was happy for 
this to be somebody else provided that it was friendly to Britain. The main 
British interests in Syria were its relations with Mesopotamia and the Hedjaz, 
access to Damascus and Alexandretta and the route of a Mesopotamia to Haifa 
railway. Britain had a number of interests in Palestine; strategic ones were its 
proximity to the Sinai Peninsula, the Suez Canal and Aqaba and the route of the 
Mesopotamia to Haifa railway. If a single power were to oversee Palestine it 
should be Britain or possibly the USA. An international administration had some 
advantages over even a friendly foreign one, but it would not achieve Britain's 
political aims. These were to reconcile the different religious communities, 
prevent disorder and encourage Jewish immigration without antagonising the 
Arabs.
 411 
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On 4 February 1919 Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith, the Permanent Secretary at the 
Board of Trade and Head of the Economic Section of the British Delegation, sent 
Lloyd George a paper on British economic aims in the Alexandretta area. He 
argued that the issue of the pipeline across French territory would not create 
difficulties with the French, because the French would benefit from their 
minority stake in Mesopotamian oil. Negotiations with RDS must be completed 
before any proposals were made to the French. The issue of British participation 
in Algerian oilfields had also to be resolved.
412 Britain had always had far more 
trade than France in the Alexandretta area. British trade interests in 
Mesopotamia meant that Britain had to have free access to Alexandretta; it was 
the best port between Smyrna and Port Said and could become the main port for 
the Baghdad Railway and its connections. The oil pipeline from Mesopotamia to 
the Mediterranean was expected to terminate there.
413 The Admiralty disagreed 
on the destination of the pipeline; it must terminate at a British controlled port. 
Ideally no great power should control any of the Syrian or Anatolian ports. If 
France or Italy were granted concessions on the coast Britain should ask for 
Tripoli in modern Lebanon. It was not as good a port as Alexandretta, but 
suitable harbour facilities could be constructed. The cost would be justified by 
the oil pipeline and the need to counter any development of Beirut and 
Alexandretta into French naval bases.
414 
The Admiralty expanded on and slightly modified its views on a meeting on the 
Baghdad Railway held by the British Delegation in Paris on 15 February. Its 
principal interest was oil pipeline, which must be safe in wartime, completed 
quickly and terminate at a British controlled port. If Beirut and Alexandretta 
were French controlled the outlet should be Tripoli or Haifa; the latter was now 
preferred. The RAF agreed with these points; the pipeline was important to it as 
Egyptian oil was unsuitable for aircraft. The General Staff wanted a railway 
route from Baghdad to the Mediterranean that was as far from the frontier as 
possible. The Armed Forces argued that the border of British controlled territory 
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must be significantly to the north of that proposed in the Sykes-Picot Agreement 
in order to allow a safe route for the pipeline and railway.
415 
Three days later the British Delegation produced a memorandum on the Middle 
East. It broadly agreed with the November memorandum, but argued that the 
new Turkish state needed foreign advisers. There were some caveats to the 
principle of self-determination. There was no clear majority in some areas, such 
as Thrace, Armenia and Constantinople. The historic treatment of the Armenians 
and the future potential for Jewish emigration meant that these groups deserved 
a greater say than was justified by their numbers. There were instances, such as 
the opening of the Straits and access to the Holy Places in Palestine, where 
global interests outweighed those of the local population. The Arabs should 
eventually decide if they wanted to join together in a single federations; poor 
communications plus economic, social and historic differences between the 
different Arab countries ruled this out for now. The independent Kingdom of the 
Hedjaz was now regarded as an independent state, since it had been recognised 
as an Allied belligerent by the Britain, France and Italy. Mesopotamia, including 
Mosul, and Syria were both clear and viable sub-divisions of the Arab lands. A 
single Kurdish state could not be established without violating the integrity of 
Persia; southern Kurdistan should become part of Mesopotamia because it 
controlled its water and needed its markets. Mesopotamia and Syria would both 
need the guidance and assistance of a mandatory power. The people of Lebanon, 
defined as far as possible as the Christian inhabited area, could choose whether 
to join Syria or to be independent. In the latter case they would need a 
mandatory power. In Palestine international interest in the Holy Places and the 
desires of potential Jewish immigrants out-weighed self-determination of the 
current inhabitants. A mandatory power should be appointed in order to ensure 
that the Arabs and Jews were treated equally and learnt to work together, and 
that people of all religions could access their holy places. No comment was 
made on who each mandate should be allocated to.
 416 
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In February 1919 the Intelligence Department of the Naval Staff produced a 
report on Middle Eastern oil, arguing that control of Mosul and its oil should be a 
British objective. The Naval Section of the British Delegation forwarded it to the 
Political, Economic and Military Sections of the Delegation, Sir Louis Mallet of 
the Foreign Office and Sir Arthur Hirtzel of the India Office on 20 March.
 417 The 
report repeated Slade's view that it was vital that Britain to controlled its own 
oil supplies; Persia and Mesopotamia were the best available options. A detailed 
description of the prospects of finding oil in this region was given. Most of it had 
yet to be surveyed, but there were good reasons to think that it was a single 
oilfield, split by the Turkish-Persian frontier. There was thought to be oil close 
to Baghdad as well as around Mosul. As the Persian and Mesopotamian oilfield 
was a single structure it should be developed as such. In Persia British rights 
were well established; the situation in Iraq was less clear-cut. Political stability 
in Mesopotamia was required with a government that was friendly, or at least 
neutral, towards Britain.
 418 
4.5.2 Britain, France and Mosul 
The oil of Mosul was significant in determining the borders of Iraq and Syria, and 
the allocation of mandates. Historic British interests meant that it would have 
the Mesopotamian mandate. Britain wanted the oilfields to be part of its 
mandate territory. Protection of the oil pipeline and control of the 
Mediterranean port that it terminated at required Britain to have the mandate 
for Palestine. There were other reasons, including its proximity to Egypt, naval 
control of the eastern Mediterranean and promises previously made to Zionists in 
the Balfour Declaration. Britain's desire for Mosul's oil meant that Britain had to 
be the mandatory for both Mesopotamia and Palestine.  
Clemenceau had little interest in colonies, although others in France were 
determined to obtain Syria. In December 1918 he came to London. During his 
visit he had a private conversation with Lloyd George; no official record was 
kept, but Lloyd George described the conversation to Hankey, who wrote the 
following in his diary: 
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All went well and they all had a magnificent reception. Afterwards I 
saw LLG at 10 Downing St. He said Clemenceau had been really 
affected by his welcome. LLG had seized the opportunity to demand 
first Mosul and then Jerusalem [Hankey originally wrote Palestine and 
Mesopotamia but scored it out] in the peace terms. Clemenceau, in 
his malleable state, had agreed, but had said "But Pichon will make 
difficulties about Mosul.
419 
Lloyd George's version, given in his memoirs, was similar, except that he said 
that he made his requests in reply to a specific question from Clemenceau. 
Britain wanted at least two changes to Sykes-Picot: 
Deprived of the grain and oil supplies of [Mosul], Irak would have been 
seriously crippled financially and economically. The second was the 
partition of Palestine into three separate areas under different 
administrations. 
When Clemenceau came to London after the War I drove with him to 
the French Embassy through cheering crowds who acclaimed him with 
enthusiasm. After we reached the Embassy he asked me what it was I 
specially wanted from the French. I instantly replied that I wanted 
Mosul attached to Irak, and Palestine from Dan to Beersheba under 
British control. Without any hesitation he agreed. Although that 
agreement was not reduced into writing, he adhered to it honourably 
in subsequent negotiations.
420 
The British claimed that these offers came without conditions. Clemenceau said 
that France needed something in compensation for its concessions. He stated at 
the Council of Four meeting on 21 May 1919 that Britain had broken various 
promises. In Autumn 1918 he had seen how Britain was acting in Syria and asked 
Lloyd George what Britain wanted. He was told Mosul and Palestine. Relations 
had not improved. The British had not acted on a promise to help Clemenceau 
with Faisal, the leader of the Arab delegation to Paris, who was arguing in favour 
of independent Arab Emirates. Clemenceau had given up more Syrian territory 
for a British railway. Britain would not discuss the withdrawal of their troops 
from Syria until its borders had been set. The day before a French mandate over 
Anatolia had been proposed, but now Lloyd George wanted to give it to the USA. 
Clemenceau blamed Curzon for this. Clemenceau had to consider French public 
opinion. France had the largest financial involvement of any country in Turkey, 
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and should not be excluded because of the Muslim or Italian issues. Lloyd George 
said that he had agreed to give Syria to France in return for Mosul; Clemenceau 
replied that an agreement to give Syria to France had already been signed. Lloyd 
George responded that it had been accepted in London that France should have 
Syria, but Mosul should be part of Mesopotamia; it was part of the same 
watershed. The railway was needed to transport Mesopotamian oil, in which 
France had a half share, so its construction was in French interests. Lloyd 
George claimed that there had been no mention of French interest in Asia Minor 
until the day before.
421  
In mid May 1919 it had been provisionally decided that the USA would receive 
the mandates for Constantinople, Greece that for Smyrna, France south Anatolia 
and Italy north Anatolia. Lloyd George then changed his mind and decided that, 
apart from Smyrna going to Greece, the Turkish lands should not be divided up. 
He was influenced by warnings from Montagu about the impact on Muslim 
sentiment in India if the Caliphate lost Constantinople and Balfour's opinion that 
the Turks were entitled to have a single state.
422 This change of heart was one of 
the British actions that provoked Clemenceau's anger at the 21 May meeting of 
the Council of Four. 
Christopher Andrews and A. S. Kanya-Forstner say that evidence in French 
archives on this point is limited; what there is tends to support the French 
position that Mosul and Palestine were given up in return for British acceptance 
of the French claim to the remainder of Syria. André Tardieu, one of 
Clemenceau's chief aides, claimed that the British had promised to support the 
French position on the Rhineland.
423 Edward Fitzgerald notes that Clemenceau 
did not give up all of Mosul's oil; Sykes-Picot gave France only about half the 
areas of oil seepage, and it was likely to be developed by a British firm. Etienne 
Clémentel, the French trade and industry minister, was arguing in favour of 
continuing Allied control of raw materials in peace time. US opposition 
prevented this happening, but Clemenceau supported him at the time. Bérenger, 
the French oil expert, thought that the solution to France's oil problems was co-
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operation with Britain, whose oil companies possessed expertise that France's 
small ones did not.
424 Alan Sharp argues that Clemenceau must have wanted 
something in return, suggesting that this was British support over the 
Rhineland.
425 Paul Helmreich quotes Victor Berard as telling the French Senate in 
June 1920 that this was part of the reason. Helmreich comments that 
Clemenceau later claimed that Mosul was given up in return of guarantees that 
other French aims in the Middle East would be achieved.
426 Michael Dockrill and 
Douglas Goold suggest that the British promised France the rest of the territory 
granted to it by Sykes-Picot, half of Mosul's oil and support in the event of an 
unprovoked German attack on France.
427 Britain did offer France a guarantee 
against German attack. At the last minute Lloyd George made it conditional on 
Congress approving a similar US offer, which it did not.
428 
4.6 Chapter Summary. 
The war showed the need for oil; it was not certain that Britain would be in as 
good a situation in a later conflict unless it took action to strengthen its 
position. The Allies depended on US supplies and Britain could not guarantee 
that these would be available in the future. Even if the USA remained friendly it 
might be unable to provide enough oil since its own demand was rising, and it 
was feared that its supply would shortly peak. Action had to be taken to secure 
oil reserves for Britain.  
One possible method of guaranteeing Britain's oil supplies was to establish a 
large British controlled oil company. Many mistrusted RDS because it was 60 per 
cent foreign owned. Some wanted to re-organise it in order to provide a British 
majority, whilst others, such as Slade, wanted to exclude it. RDS's critics never 
explained why a global oil company would want to act against the interests of 
Britain, whose navy controlled the oceans and was the world's largest consumer 
of oil. Shell, the British part of the group supported the Allies because it was a 
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British company. Royal Dutch, its Dutch partner, agreed because it was in its 
interests to do so. The wartime attempts to form a British national oil company 
failed, but the idea would be resurrected in the early 1920s. The war had shown 
the importance of oil; it was starting to influence international relations. Policy 
makers had to decide whether it was to better to secure future supplies by 
control of companies or of oil bearing territories. The most obvious available oil 
territory was Mosul. 
Britain, France and Italy all wanted their own sources of supply. The USA, 
worried that its oil might run out, did not want to be cut out of overseas 
oilfields. This affected British relations with France, Italy and the USA and 
strategy towards the Middle East. Britain wanted Mosul and its oil. France agreed 
to this request but in return expected British support elsewhere, notably in its 
efforts to prevent a future threat from Germany and in its aims in Syria. The 
Allies had united to defeat the Central Powers but now had different objectives, 
which led to disputes at Versailles. France did not receive the support that it 
expected from Britain, which now regarded Germany more as a trading partner 
than as a potential enemy. It was not yet realised that the control of oil bearing 
territory was more important than the nationality of the companies that 
exploited it. This damaged Anglo-American relations since it made the US oil 
companies fear that they were being excluded from the Middle East. 143 
5  Oil and the Middle East in Allied Diplomacy, 
1919-22 
The Treaty of Versailles with Germany was signed on 28 June 1919, but separate 
treaties had to be negotiated with the other Central Powers. The Paris Peace 
Conference continued until January 1920 and was followed by other 
conferences. The San Remo Conference of April 1920 determined the terms of 
the Treaty of Sèvres that was signed with the Ottoman Empire on 20 August 
1920. This did not produce a lasting settlement and had to be re-negotiated at 
Lausanne in 1923 following Turkey's victory in the Greco-Turkish War. 
Throughout the negotiations it was clear that Britain would end up with a 
mandate over Iraq. The question was whether Mosul, and its oil, would be 
included. In December 1918 Clemenceau had agreed with Lloyd George that 
Britain could have Mosul. Disagreement over what France expected in return 
delayed the signing of an Anglo-French oil agreement. Two were signed and 
cancelled before a third was ratified. The similarities between them show that 
they were victims of other disputes rather than being cancelled because of 
disputes over oil. The Treaty of Sèvres appeared to have given Britain its 
objectives, but it could not be enforced. The San Remo Agreement angered the 
Americans because it seemed to exclude them from Middle Eastern oil. Turkey 
revived under General Mustafa Kemal and British relations with France and Italy 
worsened. A revolt in Iraq might have led to Britain leaving but for the oil.  
5.1 The Long-Bérenger Agreement 
On 8 April 1919 Walter Long and Henry Bérenger, the politicians responsible for 
oil in Britain and France respectively, signed an Anglo-French oil agreement. In 
Britain it created controversy between the Foreign Office and the Petroleum 
Executive and Lloyd George cancelled it. Curzon was informed by telephone on 
13 June that Lloyd George had only recently found out about the agreement, 
which Clemenceau had also not known about, and now wanted to know the 
extent of the talks.
 429 Curzon said that they started with a letter of 6 January 
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from the French Ambassador to the Foreign Office proposing an Anglo-French oil 
agreement. Curzon thought that oil should not be discussed until the peace 
conferences had resolved all the territorial issues. A meeting took place at the 
Admiralty on 15 January. Ernest Weakley, representing the Foreign Office, 
argued Curzon's view. The meeting decided that Britain should indicate its 
willingness to co-operate with France before France obtained US help with oil 
and the Peace Conference forced Britain into adopting such a policy.  
On 1 February another French note indicated that talks between Bérenger and 
Cadman had been positive. A British Inter-Departmental Conference in Paris 
discussed the issue. Two days later Cadman asked Balfour's permission to inform 
Bérenger that Britain was willing to offer France 20 to 30 per cent of the TPC in 
return for their facilitation of the construction of a pipeline to the 
Mediterranean and British access to Algerian oil development. Balfour initialled a 
minute written by Sir Louis Mallet of the Foreign Office Paris delegation making 
this request. On 6 February Curzon asked Balfour to discover the nature of 
Cadman's discussions with Bérenger and argued against any talks on an Anglo-
French oil agreement. A fortnight later Curzon sent Balfour a statement setting 
out the differences between the views of the Foreign Office and the Petroleum 
Executive. On 20 February Cadman told Weakley that he had not given the 
French any details during their talks. The next day Curzon reiterated to Balfour 
his objections to the oil agreement.  
The Foreign Office heard no more until 15 March when it received a copy of a 
provisional agreement between Long and Bérenger. Two days later a despatch 
from Balfour said that it was inadvisable to continue negotiations until the 
territorial settlement was clearer. This was subject to consultation with 
Cadman, and Bérenger being informed that Britain would allow France a stake in 
the TPC. On 1 and 11 April Sir George Clerk, Curzon's private secretary, received 
private letters from Charles Tufton of the Foreign Office Paris delegation. The 
first implied that Mallet thought that the Cabinet and the relevant departments 
in London were being consulted over discussions. The second included a revised 
draft agreement. Curzon was unclear about the authorisation of this and called a 
meeting of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Eastern Affairs. Long said that 
Balfour had given approval in Paris. The Long- Bérenger Agreement was part of 
the more significant negotiations between the British Government and RDS. The 145 
meeting concluded that the Government should approve the Long-Bérenger 
Agreement subject to it being accepted by the Foreign Office and the RDS 
agreement by the War Cabinet.
430 
Long gave his version in November in a memorandum urging that the decision to 
cancel the oil agreement should be reconsidered. His timetable of events was 
similar, except that there had been a meeting between Bérenger, Cadman and 
other oil experts on 17 December 1918, before the French Ambassador wrote to 
the Foreign Office; his interpretation was different. He stated that the Foreign 
Office had been kept fully informed of events, had been represented at 
meetings to discuss the issue and had been invited to comment on drafts. Mallet, 
Tufton and Malkin of the Foreign Office had attended a meeting in Paris on 1 
February 1919. It had agreed that the French should have a 25 per cent stake in 
Mesopotamian oil. Hirtzel of the Indian Office had suggested that the Arabs 
should receive a share. Mallet had met Cadman before writing his memorandum 
of 3 February that set out the case for co-operation with France and was 
initialled by Balfour. Cadman suggested that the Foreign Office should carry out 
the negotiations. Mallet replied that Cadman should do so because of their 
technical nature; Cadman was authorised to offer the French up to 30 per cent. 
The draft agreement was shown to the Foreign Office, India Office, Colonial 
Office, Board of Trade and Admiralty. The first two suggested changes that were 
accepted by France. Long argued that this showed that any lack of 
communication was not the fault of the Petroleum Executive. He was kept fully 
informed and attended most meeting with French Ministers; there was no doubt 
that they were authorised by their Prime Minister and government to act for 
France. Long had been given full authority over all oil issues by the Cabinet. He 
insisted that other departments be kept fully informed and that their consent be 
obtained prior to the drawing up of any agreements.
431 
The problem was a lack of communication between the Foreign Office delegates 
in Paris and the Foreign Office in London. Cadman consulted closely with the 
former, and they were influenced by him. The British in Paris thought that the 
oil issue should be resolved before the mandates were allocated. The Foreign 
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Office in London wanted to leave the oil problem until after the mandates had 
been dealt. The situation was compounded by slow communications; 
correspondence took too long to get first from Paris to London and then to reach 
the senior men at the Foreign Office. Weakley received documents from Cadman 
on 6 February and forwarded them immediately to Curzon, who did not receive 
them until 17 February.
432 
The agreement that was signed by Long and Bérenger on 8 April said that:  
France and Great Britain...have...agreed on the basis of a common 
policy to be followed in the near East and in the countries adjacent to 
the Mediterranean for the exploitation of various oilfields. 
The principles of this policy are those of cordial co-operation and 
reciprocity in all those countries where the oil interests of the two 
nations can usefully unite.
433 
It stated that, if Britain received the Mesopotamian mandate, it would 
endeavour to obtain for the TPC the rights that it had received from the 
Ottoman government in 1914. The TPC would be British controlled; its capital 
would be divided 70 per cent British, 20 per cent French and 10 per cent the 
Mesopotamian government. Should the latter not want to take part its stake 
would be divided evenly between Britain and France. The French government 
would do everything in its power to enable the construction of two oil pipelines 
from Mesopotamia and Persia to a port or ports on the Mediterranean and of the 
necessary facilities at the ports. The two countries would together choose the 
routes of the pipelines and the ports to be used. They would act together in 
Romania. Nationals of both were given access to oil concessions in the other's 
colonies, subject to compliance with local laws. Provision was made for the 
agreement to be extended to apply in Galicia and Russia.
434 The agreement 
between the British government and RDS allocated the British share as RDS 34 
per cent, APOC 34 per cent and the government 2 per cent; it provided for 
others to receive 30 per cent.  
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The agreement was cancelled by Lloyd George on 21 May in a letter to 
Clemenceau. It confirmed a statement made by the Prime Minister at the 
meeting of the Council of Four held earlier that day that:  
as you regard the British proposal for railway and pipe-line for the 
Mosul area to Tripoli as a departure from the Agreement which we 
entered into in London in December last, I do not propose to proceed 
further with the proposed arrangement which I hereby withdraw.
435 
At the meeting Lloyd George admitted that half the oil of Mesopotamia belonged 
to France, but he tore up an agreement splitting it 70 per cent to Britain, 30 per 
cent to France. This suggests that it was not the oil agreement itself that he 
objected to and that he cancelled it for other reasons. 
Lloyd George was concerned that the oil agreement was signed while he was 
negotiating with France over the borders of Syria. The former affected the 
latter, so he should have been informed of the oil agreement, which he found 
out about only by chance. He thought that the oil should not be discussed until 
the boundaries had been set; Britain access to the Mediterranean had to be 
settled before it could negotiate about oil. He also believed that policy 
considerations should not be confused by negotiations that involved private oil 
companies.
436 
As well as arguments with France over Syria, the oil agreement had the potential 
to affect Anglo-American relations. On 13 May Leland Summers of the American 
Commission to Negotiate Peace had written to Llewellyn Smith asking for 
information about a rumoured Anglo-French oil agreement; he was particularly 
interested in Romania.
437 He was informed that the plans for co-operation had 
ended, or at least been suspended. They were not intended in any way to keep 
the USA out of Romania.
438 
The Cabinet were not told of the agreement or its cancellation until 20 August. 
It decided that Curzon should discuss the future of Turkey and of Syria with 
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Balfour and that the War Office should look at and report on the significance of 
the oasis of Tadmor (Palmyra) to the Mosul to Mediterranean railway and 
pipeline.
439 Curzon wrote to Balfour on the same day. There had been three 
Cabinet meetings over the previous 30 hours. He noted that the ministers 
keenest on British expansion were the radicals such as Lloyd George, Montagu 
and Barnes, whilst Conservatives like Milner, Chamberlain and himself wanted to 
limit British involvement;
440 Montagu had complained to Balfour in 1918 that 
Curzon could always find reasons to expand the British Empire.
441 Curzon told 
Balfour that: 
I am so convinced that Palestine will be a rankling thorn in the flesh 
of whoever is charged with its Mandate that I would withdraw from 
this responsibility while we yet can…The Prime Minister clings to 
Palestine for its sentimental and traditional value…Others (of whom 
you would probably be one) think that, irksome as will be the burden, 
we cannot now refuse it without incensing the Zionist world… 
As a “sine qua non” of course Mesopotamia, including Mosul, must be 
entrusted to us. A boundary must be found between Syria and 
Mesopotamia; and at this point the Prime Minister attached and 
importance, which I should be inclined to think excessive, to the 
necessity of having a railway and a pipeline exclusively from 
Mesopotamia to a Mediterranean port.
442 
The cancellation of the Long-Bérenger Agreement did not end plans for an Anglo-
French oil agreement. Britain and France both needed Mosul's oil. France needed 
oil industry expertise that its companies did not possess. Britain required a 
railway and a pipeline from the oilfields, including the Persian ones, to a port on 
the Mediterranean. The French had to agree to either the use of French territory 
or to British mandates including a suitable route and pipeline. France needed 
British support in Europe and may have tried to use the oil to gain this, but it 
was in a weak bargaining position. Sykes-Picot gave it only half the potential 
oilfields. It had no large oil company to exploit them. France required British or 
American help over oil, and it was Britain that cancelled the oil agreement. 
Signing such a deal before the treaties were signed and mandates allocated 
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would have antagonised the Americans. Lloyd George objected to signing an oil 
agreement before territorial questions were settled, not to the idea of having 
one. 
5.2 Greenwood-Bérenger Agreement 
Long wanted an Anglo-French oil agreement. He concluded his November 
memorandum by stating that: 
I would earnestly beg the Cabinet to re-consider the matter in the 
light of the facts disclosed in this Memorandum, which show how 
greatly we are committed to the French Government, and also in face 
of the great overwhelming fact that oil is becoming every day more 
vital to our national life; and that if we lose the opportunities which 
have grown out of the war, we shall probably never be able to regain 
our position, and shall undoubtedly suffer once again from a shortness 
of supplies which will greatly hamper our national action.
443 
5.2.1 Anglo-French Middle Eastern Disputes 
The arguments at the 21 May meeting of the Council of Four meant Britain 
continued to occupy Syria. A commission that was to be sent to the Middle East 
to report upon the wishes of the locals became a solely US one, the King-Crane 
Commission. In July it reported that a French mandate over Syria would result in 
a war between France and the Arabs. The Arabs wanted the USA with Britain as 
second choice. They opposed separating Syria and Palestine and Zionist plans 
and Jewish immigration.
444 The Americans were favoured by the Mesopotamians; 
there was no second choice, but the Commission thought that Britain might be 
acceptable despite complaints about its military occupation. Britain was the 
best qualified candidate. The risk that the mandatory power might exploit 
Mesopotamia's agriculture, oil and other resources had to be guarded against, as 
did the possibility of Indian immigration; the locals feared this as threat to their 
culture.
445 On 15 September Lloyd George handed the leaders of the American, 
French, Italian and Japanese delegations an aide-memoire setting out British 
                                         
443 CAB 24/92 C.P. 59, Long, p. 2. 
444 "FRUS". vol. xii, Mr C. R. Crane and Mr H. C. King to the Commission to Negotiate Peace, 10 
July 1918. pp. 749-50. 
445 Ibid. pp. 799-802. 150 
plans to withdraw from Syria by 1 November. British troops would then occupy 
Mesopotamia, including Mosul, and Palestine, defined by its ancient borders. In 
accordance with the principles of Sykes-Picot, France should permit the Arab 
State to give Britain the right to build a railway and an oil pipeline from 
Mesopotamia to Haifa. The British were prepared to submit any dispute over the 
route to an arbitrator appointed by Wilson. Clemenceau said that France would 
replace the British troops, but would not comment on the remainder of the aide-
memoire. The Syrian question had to be considered along with the fate of the 
rest of Turkey.
446  
Earlier in September Balfour had pointed out some inconsistencies in the British 
position. Britain talked as if oil in its sphere belonged to it, but all nations were 
supposed to be treated equally in mandated territories. France had agreed to 
give Britain Mosul. Britain was now asking that France must give it territory to 
construct a British railway and pipeline in order to exploit Mesopotamia's oil and 
wheat. The French would argue that there should be no problem in sending its 
products along a partly French railway to an international port in French 
territory or even by sea via the Suez Canal. Britain should not have given France 
Mosul in Sykes-Picot. It did because Kitchener did not want Britain's sphere to 
border Russian territory. These factors had to be considered when negotiating 
with the French.
447 
5.2.2 Syria and France 
French objectives in Syria conflicted with the goals of the Arab nationalists. In 
September 1915 Admiral Wemyss visited Cairo. Senior British officials told him 
that possession of Homs, Hama, Damascus and Aleppo, the four largest cities in 
modern Syria, was vital to the Arabs, whose support Britain needed. Agreeing to 
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this would require substantial concessions by the French, who would have to be 
compensated elsewhere.
448  
By the end of the war, a British army under General Allenby had conquered 
Palestine and Syria. Allenby's forces included an Arab army, commanded by 
Faisal, the eldest son of Sharif Hussein of Mecca, who was helped by British 
advisers, most famously Colonel T. E. Lawrence. In November 1918 Lawrence 
wrote a series of anonymous articles in The Times, exaggerating the contribution 
of the Arab army to the campaign. He claimed that the Arabs had been the first 
Allied troops to enter Damascus. It had been planned that they would be the 
only ones to enter the city, but the Australian Light Horse moved through it in an 
attempt to cut off the retreating Ottomans; they were welcomed by the locals, 
who had already raised the Arab flag.
 449 Syria was supposed to become French 
territory but was occupied by the British who allowed Faisal to administer it. He 
had to delegate the work to others since he spent much of 1919 at the Paris 
Peace Conference. He agreed with Clemenceau that he would become King of 
Syria with France exercising a loose trusteeship. This was unacceptable to the 
Arab nationalists who wanted full independence. Faisal followed rather than led 
his supporters. In March 1920 the Syrian National Congress proclaimed him as 
King of Syria. A month later France was allocated the mandate over Syria at San 
Remo. Alexandre Millerand had replaced Clemenceau as French Prime Minister in 
January. His government wanted to govern Syria in its own way, which had no 
place for the Arab nationalists. A short war followed, resulting in defeat for the 
Arabs. On 28 July 1920 Faisal went into exile. Britain managed to offend both 
the French, by initially supporting Faisal and the Arab nationalists, and Faisal 
and the Arab nationalists, by withdrawing its support.
450 
5.2.3 Anglo-French Rapprochement 
In December 1919 the British and French met in an effort to settle their 
differences in the Middle East. Wilson had been incapacitated by a stroke since 
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October. In November the US Senate had voted against ratifying the Treaty of 
Versailles. On 12 December Berthelot sent a note to Curzon, who had replaced 
Balfour as Foreign Secretary in October. Uncertainty over the future involvement 
of the USA in resolving European and Eastern issues had led Lloyd George and 
Clemenceau to decide that Britain and France should settle their differences. A 
meeting the day before had shown that this could be achieved with some 
compromises on both sides.
451 The French were prepared to allow passage of the 
British railway across their territory from Haifa to Damascus and Mosul. In return 
for Mosul they wanted half of the oil of Mesopotamia and Kurdistan.
452 E. G. 
Forbes Adam and Robert Vansittart of the Foreign Office, commenting on 
Berthelot's memorandum, noted that this was a significant increase from the 20 
or 25 per cent given to France by the Long-Bérenger Agreement. The French now 
appeared to want a share of the oil rather than a stake in the operating 
company. Adam and Vansittart were inclined to be generous to France for 
political reasons; the success of the League of Nations and British policy 
depended on Anglo-French friendship. They did not feel able to comment on the 
oil requirements of the two countries but suggested that adjustments of Middle 
Eastern frontiers in favour of France might be made if British needs made it 
impossible to give France half the oil. This would make it impossible to have the 
railway and pipeline entirely in British territory or to maintain Britain's monopoly 
of political influence in the Arabian Peninsula.
453 
The French position on oil was given in a note prepared by Bérenger for 
Clemenceau in early December.
454 According to a British summary of it written 
by Weakley, it began by detailing the major efforts undertaken by Britain to 
obtain control of oil and to rid itself of reliance on American oil. Bérenger 
thought that British policy in the Caucasus, India, Persia and Mesopotamia was 
mainly based on oil rather than territorial considerations. France had a great 
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need for oil and should insist on obtaining a fair share of the oil of south Russia, 
Mesopotamia, especially at Mosul and Kirkuk, Romania and Persia. Bérenger 
appeared to Weakley to be arguing for a restoration of the Long-Bérenger 
Agreement. Weakley wrote that there could be no question of allowing France a 
share of Persian oil. Sir Hamar Greenwood, who had recently succeeded Long as 
Minister in Charge of Petroleum Affairs, suggested reviving Long-Bérenger. He 
thought that the French share might be 18 per cent rather than 20 per cent. 
Weakley thought that the French would ask for up to half. He regarded Long-
Bérenger as being a fair deal.
455 On 21 December Greenwood and Bérenger 
signed an agreement very similar to the Long-Bérenger. It included two railways 
instead of one; there were still two pipelines.
456 A series of Anglo-French 
meetings in late December and January decided to abandon the concept of 
mandates in Anatolia; it would remain officially Turkish with Italian and French 
spheres of influence. The Greeks would receive territory in Thrace and would 
control Smyrna for five years after when its sovereignty would be determined by 
a plebiscite; the Greeks had been authorised by the Council of Four to land 
troops at Smyrna in May. The Straits would be under international 
administration.
457 
5.3 The San Remo Agreement 
The Greenwood-Bérenger Agreement quickly ran into problems. On 23 January 
1920 a Conference of Ministers decided that the profits from Mesopotamian 
should go to the State rather than to private companies. The only ministers 
present were Lloyd George, Bonar Law, Churchill and Montagu; Greenwood, the 
Minister in Charge of Petroleum, and Long, his predecessor, were absent. 
Nobody from the Petroleum Executive gave evidence.
458 The decision was 
contrary to the agreement signed with RDS that gave it 50 per cent of the TPC. 
The French then demanded 50 per cent of the oil as they had accepted 25 per 
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cent only because of the RDS stake.
459 On 18 March Long urged that the 
agreements made with RDS and the French Government should be ratified. He 
was very worried about future oil supplies, believing that it was vital to obtain 
British control over Shell. This would diversify British supplies, reducing the 
dependence on the USA. RDS might now come to an agreement with the big US 
oil companies or the French.
460 Robert Horne, the President of the Board of 
Trade, backed Long's views in a memorandum of 16 April.
461 Further support 
came six days later from Frederick Kellaway, who had recently succeeded 
Greenwood as Minister in Charge of Petroleum. The Petroleum Executive thought 
that it would be a mistake to exclude private companies from the venture; 
development of the oilfields was a risky and expensive enterprise that required 
expertise not possessed by the government. France was being offered 25 per 
cent of the oil on the grounds that it was inheriting Deutsche Bank's stake in 
TPC. Excluding RDS would suggest that the pre-war TPC concession was invalid; 
France would then expect 50 per cent and other oil companies would be 
reluctant to deal with the British Government.
462  
Four days before Kellaway produced his memorandum, Lloyd George told 
Millerand that he was happy to deal with the French government but not with 
the oil companies. They were unpopular; giving them Mesopotamian oil would 
create problems with Parliament. Britain was willing to give France 25 per cent 
of the oil on the same terms as Britain received its oil. meaning after charging 
the costs of administration of Mosul. He invited Millerand to submit the French 
oil proposals in writing.
 463 Marian Kent describes this 'giving the Frenchman a 
face-saving way out'
464 The San Remo Agreement, sometimes called the Cadman-
Berthelot Agreement, was being negotiated and was signed by the Prime 
Ministers on 18 April. This was very similar to the previous agreements; the 
French would now receive 25 per cent of the oil if the British Government 
developed it, or a 25 per cent stake in a private company formed to carry out 
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the work. Native interests would be allowed up to 20 per cent; half of the first 
10 per cent would come from the French share and the balance from all pro-rata 
to their stakes. The British Government would support any agreement France 
made to buy up to 25 per cent of any of APOC's Persian oil sent through French 
mandated territory by pipeline.
465 The agreement was published on 24 July 1920. 
It was attacked by the Americans who were angry at being excluded from the 
Mosul oilfields.
466 
5.4 Treaty of Sèvres 
The April 18 meeting between Lloyd George and Millerand was part of the San 
Remo Conference between the Allies, lasting from 18 to 26 April. It followed on 
from the First London Conference, which ran from 12 February to 10 April. The 
USA did not attend London and participated only as an observer at San Remo. 
These determined the terms that would be offered to the Ottoman Empire, with 
the decisions being taken by Britain and France.
467 They were largely those that 
the two countries had discussed at their meeting in December and January. 
Britain would have the mandates for Mesopotamia and Palestine, and France 
those for Syria and Lebanon. The League of Nations, which was supposed to 
allocate mandates, would be left to agree to what had already been decided.
468 
The Greeks would receive territory in Thrace and would control Smyrna for five 
years; a plebiscite on its future would then be held. Anatolia and Constantinople 
remained Turkish, but the Straits would be controlled by an international 
commission. Another commission would ensure close supervision of Turkey's 
finances by Britain, France and Italy. Partition of Anatolia would have angered 
the Americans and broken the Covenant of the League of Nations, so the three 
agreed that they would prioritise French interests in Cilicia and Italian ones in 
Adalia. The Armenians received independence but no help to maintain it. The 
Allies occupied Constantinople in March in order to force Turkish acceptance of 
the Treaty. Turkey signed it on 10 August. It was destined not to last. The Allies 
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lacked the will and resources to enforce an old style treaty that ignored Arab 
and Turkish nationalism.
469 
5.5 Iraq 
In August 1919 Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, the CIGS, told Churchill, then the 
War Secretary, that Britain's strategic position had changed since 1914. There 
would be no threat of a European war or an invasion of Britain for years. The 
potential risks faced in Egypt, Iraq and India were far higher than any threats to 
the Empire before 1914. He feared that a crisis in one of these, or Ireland, might 
spread to the others. He wanted an expeditionary force to be available to be 
sent to the Empire.
470 In November Churchill circulated four papers on Iraq to the 
Cabinet. The General Staff argued that costs could be saved by reducing the 
Iraqi garrison if Britain withdrew from either Mosul or Northern Persia. It 
opposed the first option because the potential oil would justify the cost, both 
human and financial, of obtaining control of Iraq, which was important for 
imperial communications. The threat was now from local disturbances in remote 
areas, rather than from Turkey. A railway from Basra to Baghdad to Kirkuk, and 
eventually to Mosul, was necessary. Further extensions were not in British 
interests, which were better served by a Haifa to Baghdad line.
471 In February 
1920 General Radcliffe, the DMO, wrote to Wilson saying that a proposal by 
Churchill to reduce the garrison of Iraq to 4,000 British and 16,000 Indian troops 
would meant that it would be impossible to hold more than Basra and the 
Persian oilfields. He argued that; 
In Mesopotamia, or especially in the Mosul Vilayet, is the one 
potential asset which has come to us from the war. It is surely worth 
some sacrifice in the present to reap its unbounded possibilities in the 
future.
472 
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G. H. Bennett points out that Lloyd George agreed and said so publicly.
473 During 
a debate on Foreign Affairs in the House of Commons H. H. Asquith, the Leader 
of the Opposition, argued that Britain was maintaining an expensive garrison in 
Iraq, which had no natural frontiers; Britain should withdraw to Basra.
474 Lloyd 
George responded by saying that he could see why somebody might advocate a 
complete evacuation of Iraq but not why Asquith wanted to stay in Basra whilst: 
withdrawing from the more important and the more promising part of 
Mesopotamia. Mosul is a country with great possibilities. It has rich oil 
deposits.
475 
He added that Britain had an obligation to the people of Iraq. When the peace 
treaty with Turkey was signed Britain would claim the mandate for Iraq, 
including Mosul; this would mean helping and advising an Arab government.
476 
Churchill was concerned by the costs of staying; the budget and the 
responsibility for policy had to be made clear. On 1 May he argued that Iraq was 
garrisoned by 60,000 British and Indian troops at an annual cost of £18,000,000 
to the War Office; it had no responsibility for policy, which was driven by the 
Foreign Office. The Colonial Office possessed the expertise to run a country like 
Iraq; it should decide policy subject to financial constraints determined by the 
Treasury. Churchill suggested annual expenditure of a maximum of £7,000,000, 
£5,000,000 of which would be on the military. The military must be entitled to 
decide what they could do within the budget available. He argued that Iraq 
could be defended more cheaply if the responsibility for doing so was 
transferred from the War Office to the Air Ministry; he was Secretary State for 
the Air as well as for War. He concluded by saying that: 
In considering the future profit which may be drawn from the 
Mesopotamian oilfields, it is necessary always to bear in mind the 
capital charges which are accruing. Every year we go on at the 
present rate of expenditure adds £1,000,000 a year at 5 per cent, to 
what Mesopotamia will ultimately have to produce in order to yield a 
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profit. Even if the oilfields bear out our most sanguine hopes, we are 
burdening them to an intolerable extent with capital charges, and 
what would be a thoroughly good business for the British Empire, if 
developed gradually and thriftily is being daily deteriorated by the 
sterile charges which are mounting up.
477 
In January 1920 a meeting of ministers had argued that the oil could pay for the 
entire administration of Iraq.
478 Churchill pointed out that this would not be the 
case if the costs of staying were too high. British policy in Iraq over the next few 
years was driven by a desire to stay there because of promises made to the 
Arabs, the oil and protection of the route to India versus a need to do so 
cheaply. 
5.5.1 Revolt 
In the summer 1920 a revolt against British rule broke out in Iraq. It was largely 
suppressed by the end of the year but raised questions over the cost of the 
British presence and how Iraq could best be governed.
479 The cost of occupation 
might have been justified by oil but, as Peter Sluglett points out, this was an 
argument that might have satisfied the British press but would have outraged 
foreign powers.
480 During the revolt, Arnold Wilson, the British Civil 
Commissioner, reported to the Secretary of State for India that Standard (NJ)'s 
local representative, W. H. Gallagher, was in contact with the rebels. Gallagher 
appeared to have had talks with them, but Wilson produced no evidence that 
Standard (NJ) was actively aiding them.
481  
For a while it appeared that Britain might have to evacuate Mosul. In June 1920 
Churchill told Lloyd George that the costs of garrisoning Iraq could not be cut 
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unless Britain's responsibilities there were reduced.
482 In December Churchill 
informed General Sir Aylmer Haldane, the GOC Iraq, that Sir Percy Cox, recently 
appointed High Commissioner in Baghdad, had said that garrisoning Iraq would 
cost £20,000,000 to £25,000,000 in each of the next two to three years. As this 
was too much to justify Britain remaining, Haldane was to prepare a plan for 
withdrawal. He should also give his view of the General Staff's view that the 
Basra vilayet could be held by a single division. This would give Britain a 
foothold and would protect the Persian oilfields.
483 There were two separate oil 
issues affecting Britain's presence in Iraq; Basra covered the existing Persian 
oilfields and the Abadan refinery, but the potential oilfields were in Mosul. 
The Cabinet considered the issues of Iraq, the Middle East and Palestine on 31 
December 1920. Churchill said that the revolt in Iraq had been put down, and 
the military position was now secure. The troops from Persia were to be 
withdrawn once the passes opened in the spring. The Mosul vilayet could not be 
evacuated before then; withdrawing from it in the summer would probably to 
lead to attacks from the Arabs, Turks and possibly Bolsheviks. Any decision to 
withdraw to the Basra vilayet could not be implemented until March 1922, 
meaning military expenditure in Iraq of £20-22,000,000; it would be hard to 
persuade Parliament to grant this sum on the Army Vote. The alternatives were 
to withdraw rapidly to Basra, leaving anarchy and chaos behind, or to establish a 
department to be responsible for the policy in Iraq and the budget to implement 
it. In the subsequent discussion it was argued that withdrawing to Basra would 
be a major political error. Britain could not take Iraq's only port and ignore the 
rest of the country. Military commitments could be cut in two years' time after a 
new Arab government had been established and a lasting peace negotiated with 
Turkey. Cox had suggested that Faisal would be acceptable as King to the Iraq 
Arabs; the trouble in Iraq was mostly external. If Faisal became King, supported 
by the Arabs, then the garrison could be reduced to one division in Baghdad and 
Mosul and a brigade in Basra. Curzon pointed out that France had said that it 
would consider British support for Faisal in Iraq as an unfriendly act. The Cabinet 
decided to further consider the idea of making Faisal King of Iraq. The discussion 
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then turned to Churchill's proposal for a Department for Middle Eastern Affairs. 
The question was whether it should be part of the Colonial or the Foreign Office; 
Parliamentary objections ruled out a new department with its own minister. The 
Foreign Office was already responsible for affairs much of the region, but the 
Cabinet decided that the new department should be part of the Colonial Office; 
it already did similar work elsewhere and the Foreign Office had no experience 
of administration.
484 
5.5.2 The Cairo Conference 
At the start of 1921 Lloyd George invited Churchill to became Colonial Secretary 
in place of Lord Milner, who wanted to leave the government. Churchill agreed, 
provided that the Middle East Department would be set up immediately, the 
Colonial Office would be responsible for the Palestinian and Iraqi mandates, and 
he would have full powers to cut British expenditure in the Middle East. He 
decided that British expenditure in Iraq could be limited if it were run by an 
Arab government. Security would be provided by British police, Indian troops and 
the RAF. Making Faisal king was one option; another was to give the throne to his 
brother Abdullah. Some form of election would be required, but local customs 
meant that this need not be conducted under Western methods.
485 
Churchill formally took office as Colonial Secretary on 15 February, although he 
had been preparing for the job since the start of the year. The method of 
governing Britain's middle eastern territories would be decided by a conference 
at Cairo in March. He was keen to ensure that the Arabs did not do anything that 
would damage Anglo-French relations; he ordered T.E. Lawrence to tell Faisal 
that Britain could support him only if his supporters ceased their anti-French 
agitation. Churchill favoured reconciling Turkey, but Lloyd George's pro-Greek 
policy meant that he had to allow for the risk of conflict with Turkey.
486 Before 
departing for Cairo Churchill told Sir George Ritchie, the President of the Liberal 
Association in Dundee, his constituency, that Britain could not continue to spend 
large amounts of money in Iraq. Britain's African colonies offered far greater 
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opportunities for development. He made no mention of oil. Britain would have 
to leave Iraq unless a cheaper way of staying could be devised. This would 
damage Britain's reputation, since Britain had invaded Mesopotamia, evicted the 
Ottoman government, accepted the mandate and promised to introduce a better 
form of government than had previously existed. He hoped that the problem 
could be solved by installing an Arab government and ruler, needing the backing 
of only a small British military force.
487 
On 14 March, the third day of the conference, Churchill informed Lloyd George 
that he expected unanimous agreement that Faisal was the best option. Talks 
had been taking place between Britain and Turkey and he wanted to know 
whether he could assume that there would be no trouble with Turkey in Mosul; it 
would be easier to reduce the garrison if this was the case. He intended to 
withdraw troops as quickly as possible.
488 Two days later Churchill informed the 
Prime Minister that unanimous agreement had been reached. Faisal would rule 
Iraq, with Kurdistan being ruled separately under a High Commissioner until the 
Kurds decided to join Iraq. The scheme would save £5,500,000 in 1921-22 and 
reduce the cost of the garrison to £5-6,000,000 in each of the next three years. 
The whole country, including Mosul and Kirkuk, could be held until local levies 
were ready.
489 The same day Churchill received a reply from Lloyd George to his 
initial telegram; appointing Faisal would cause problems with France unless the 
first move came from the Iraqis. Britain could not assume that fighting between 
Greece and Turkey would not lead to Turkish action in Mosul. It had warned the 
Turks that Britain would supply munitions to Greece if they did move against 
Iraq. He was happy with the intention to rapidly cut costs in Iraq.
490 Churchill 
reported back that he had spoken to Bekir Samir, the Turkish Foreign Minister, 
who had said that they had no interest in Iraq as they wanted to leave the Arabs 
alone.
491 It would emerge that, while the Turks had no interest in Arab territory, 
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they regarded Mosul as being Turkish. The remainder of the Cairo Conference 
dealt with other issues in the Middle East, including Palestine and Transjordan. 
On 22 March the Cabinet decided to offer the throne of Iraq to Faisal. To avoid 
problems with the French Faisal should be told informally that the throne of Iraq 
was vacant; Britain would be happy if the Iraqi people offered it to him, 
provided that he accepted the conditions of the mandate and agreed not to take 
any action against the French. If he accepted it should be suggested to him that 
he should return to Mecca; from there he should put himself forward as a 
candidate at the appropriate moment. Churchill's recommendations on Kurdistan 
and on cuts in the garrison of Iraq were accepted.
492 
5.5.3 From the Cairo Conference to the End of the Coalition 
In December 1920 Faisal met Philip Kerr, Lloyd George's private secretary. Faisal 
said that in order to establish an Arab government in Iraq, reducing British 
commitments and expenditure in the country, Britain had to regain the 
confidence of the people, which it had lost. A strong Arab government was 
needed, but it would have to have British help and support. Without it, the 
country might descend into anarchy, or be re-conquered by Turkey. Kerr was left 
with little doubt that Faisal would like to head such a government.
493 
The British appointed Iraqi Council of State unanimously elected Faisal as king on 
11 July 1921.The majority of Iraqi Arabs were Shias, but Faisal and most of the 
Council were Sunnis; he was not an Iraqi. There had been some co-operation 
between Sunnis and Shias before and during the Iraqi Revolt; this did not last. 
His leadership of the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire during the war did 
give him support from Arab nationalists, especially Iraqis who had joined his 
army. The British organised a referendum in which 96 per cent of the votes were 
cast in favour of Faisal becoming king. There was little opposition and no other 
candidate; the British had deported Sayyid Talib, the most likely local 
contender. The Kurds and supporters of Turkey, who opposed Arab rule, and 
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southern Shias, who wanted a theocracy, did not vote. Faisal was crowned on 23 
August.
494 
Churchill was concerned that costs were not being reduced enough in Iraq. The 
Cairo Conference had decided that it could be garrisoned by 12 battalions, 2 of 
them British. The War Office now wanted 7 of the battalions to be British, 
increasing the cost from £4,500,000 to £10,000,000. British troops needed 
greater staff and administrative support than local or Indian troops. This was too 
much for Iraq to support. The alternatives were to give up the mandate or to 
adopt a proposal by Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Trenchard, the Chief of the Air 
Staff, to control the country from the air by RAF bombers. Britain's intention had 
been to rule through a government and monarch accepted by the people rather 
than to hold the country by force. Faisal could govern supported by the RAF, 
four Imperial battalions and native levies. Eventually, Iraq should be 
independent, friendly to Britain and beneficial to British commercial interests 
with hardly any call on the British Exchequer. This would not happen if an 
expensive British garrison had to be financed.
495 The proposal for air control was 
accepted; the military commander in Iraq would come from the RAF, and would 
be responsible to the Colonial Office.
496 
The resurgence of Turkey meant that it posed a threat to Iraq; the War Office 
feared that air control would mean that the garrison was too small to hold more 
than the Basra vilayet. In November 1921 Laming Worthington-Evans, the War 
Secretary, told the Cabinet that if Kemal wanted to attack Britain he would do 
so in Mosul and that there was nothing that Britain could do militarily to stop 
him.
497 The next month Churchill warned the Cabinet that pro-Turkish and anti-
Faisal propaganda had taken place; a small Turkish incursion had led to the 
capture of Rowanduz, a Kurdish town to the south of the Iraqi frontier. 
Capturing Mosul would increase Turkish prestige, allow them to hold southern 
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Kurdistan and give them a base to later attack Baghdad, and give them the 
oilfields. They could obtain much needed revenue by offering the concessions to 
France and the USA. French problems in Syria might be eased if Iraq were 
Turkish as the French would appear relatively liberal and pro-Arab in 
comparison. There were fears that Standard (NJ) was encouraging a Turkish 
attack on Iraq in the hope of winning the oil concession, It was not known if the 
US Government was aware of this, but its attitude to mandates, the north Persia 
oil concessions and Persian railways suggested that it would not be unhappy to 
see the Turks retake Iraq if it meant US companies getting a stake in the oil.
498 
Turkish agitation continued throughout 1922. In early February Worthington-
Evans was concerned that Churchill's plan to rely on air power to control Iraq 
meant that Britain could not hold Baghdad and should withdraw to Basra in order 
to defend the port, the Persian oilfield and the Persian Gulf.
499 By early October 
he was arguing that the Iraqi levies could not be relied upon; Imperial troops 
should not be stationed in Mosul unless reinforced, which was impossible. The 
General Staff had agreed to keep them there only subject to the conditions 
agreed at the Cairo Conference, which had not been implemented. Troops were 
to remain in Mosul for now, but in the event of a major uprising in Kurdistan, 
there would be no alternative but to withdraw them.
500 The air control policy 
worked; Cox reported later in the month that the Turks were withdrawing thanks 
to the actions of the RAF.
501  
Faisal did not prove to be as compliant as the British had hoped.
502 He wanted to 
replace the mandate with a treaty setting out Britain's rights and obligations 
towards Iraq. This was not agreed until October 1922 and not ratified by the 
Iraqi Chamber of Deputies until June 1924.
503 Faisal confronted Britain during the 
negotiations; Helmut Mejcher, Peter Sluglett and Charles Tripp agree that this 
could have lost him his throne had he not been removed from the scene by 
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appendicitis in the summer of 1922. This gave Cox the chance to close opposition 
newspapers and political parties and to order the bombing of insurgents. This 
show of British intent persuaded Faisal to come to an agreement when he 
recovered.
504 Air control of Iraq worked for Britain. 
The difficulties in coming to an agreement with Faisal made Churchill wonder if 
it was worthwhile for Britain to stay in Iraq. He told Lloyd-George in September 
1922 that the threat from Turkey meant that extra troops had had to be kept at 
Mosul, meaning that expenditure was greater than planned. Problems with the 
USA had prevented development of the oil. He suggested that Britain should give 
Faisal an ultimatum that it would leave unless he agreed to Britain's terms. 
Whether Britain left entirely or held onto Basra was less important.
505 Lloyd 
George wanted to stay, putting Mosul's oil forward as a reason to do so. He 
claimed not to have been closely involved in the decision to invade Mesopotamia 
in 1914, which he thought was a mistake. Having done so, Britain could not go 
back on its obligations to the Arabs. He concluded by saying that: 
I was anxious that the Anglo-Persian should bore to ascertain the 
value of the oil deposits. We have, however, done practically nothing 
in that respect. If we leave, we may find a year or two after we have 
departed that we have handed over to the French and the Americans 
some of the richest oilfields in the world...On general principles, I am 
against a policy of scuttle, in Iraq as elsewhere, and should like you to 
put all the alternatives, as you see them, before the Cabinet on 
Thursday.
506 
The Lloyd George Coalition lost office before the issue could be considered. 
5.6 Anglo-Italian Relations and Oil 
In September 1920 the Italian government wrote to the British government 
suggesting that Britain and France might alter the San Remo Agreement in order 
to accommodate Italian interests. Curzon told the Italian Ambassador that San 
Remo was based on co-operation in regions where Britain and France already had 
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major interests, including Mosul. The pipeline across the French mandate in 
Syria would bring oil to Europe, benefitting Italy and other countries.
507 The 
Italians tried again during the 1922 Genoa Conference. On 19 April Carlo 
Schanzer, the Italian Foreign Minister, wrote to Lloyd George asking that Britain 
and France state that the San Remo Agreement did not discriminate in any way 
against Italian oil interests. Italians should have the same rights as Frenchmen to 
be awarded concessions in the British Empire. Italy should receive a share of any 
oil concessions obtained by Britain and France in former enemy countries.
508 The 
Foreign Office argued that there was no need to go beyond a Note of 22 July 
1921, stating that the San Remo Agreement did not stop Italians from co-
operating with British or French oil interests.
509 It was not prepared to give any 
preference to Italians, but was happy to stay that there was no discrimination 
against them. They had the same rights as any other nationality in British 
colonies.
510 This did not satisfy Schanzer, who was facing criticism on this issue in 
the Italian parliament.
511 His problem was that Italy, unlike France, had nothing 
to offer Britain in exchange for a share of the oil.  
5.7 Mustafa Kemal Rejects Sèvres 
In January 1920, the newly elected Turkish Chamber of Deputies voted in favour 
of the National Pact, which had been issued by Kemal in Angora, now Ankara. It 
called for the establishment of an independent Turkey comprising the parts of 
the Ottoman Empire inhabited by ethnic Turks. A British led Allied force 
occupied Constantinople in March and dissolved the Chamber of Deputies. Many 
of its members fled to Angora, where a Turkish National Assembly was set up, 
with Kemal as its president. It declared that the Sultan was a prisoner without 
freedom of action; his decisions should be ignored.
512 This left the Allies with the 
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problem of how to enforce the Treaty of Sèvres. One possibility was that Greece 
could launch an offensive from Smyrna. 
5.7.1 Britain and Greece 
Britain had traditionally backed the Ottoman Empire to protect its interests in 
the Middle East, most crucially the route to India. Russia was the main threat so 
the need for a British proxy in the region diminished after the 1907 Anglo-
Russian Agreement. The Ottomans moved closer to Germany and entered the 
war against the Allies. Greece was divided during the First World War: King 
Constantine, Kaiser Wilhelm's brother-in-law, was personally pro-German but 
thought that neutrality was the best policy for Greece. The pro-Allied Prime 
Minister, Eleftherios Venizelos, was forced to resign. In June 1917 an Allied 
ultimatum led to the abdication of Constantine in favour of his son Alexander; 
Venizelos returned to power and took Greece into the war on the Allied side. 
Greek policy was based on the Megali Idea, that all Greeks should be part of the 
Greek State.
513 Lloyd George, who was close to Venizelos, believed that Greece 
could replace the Ottoman Empire as Britain's proxy in the Middle East. He had 
some, but not universal, support within the British government for this view. The 
Foreign Office's PID backed him. Curzon, while happy to see the Turks removed 
from Europe, did not want to see the Greeks installed in Asia Minor. The War 
Office, especially Henry Wilson, favoured a return to supporting Turkey, albeit a 
reduced Turkish state.
514 The India Office were concerned over the reaction of 
India's large Muslim population if the Ottoman Empire was treated harshly at the 
peace conference.
515 
Venizelos appeared to have achieved Greece's aims at Sèvres; an offensive to 
defeat the Kemalists was required in order to hold them. Venizelos hoped for 
British financial and military support; this was not forthcoming. The War Office 
was concerned that Kemal would be forced into an alliance with the Russian 
Bolsheviks. The India Office also had reservations about the pro-Greek policy. In 
October 1920 King Alexander died. Venizelos lost an election the next month. 
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The new government organised a plebiscite that returned Constantine to the 
throne. Most British Conservatives had accepted Lloyd George's policy of 
supporting Greece whilst Venizelos, a strong supporter of the Allies, was in 
power; now that he was gone many backbenchers favoured a return to the old 
policy of using Turkey as Britain's Middle Eastern proxy.
 516 The French had 
accepted with the Greek policy only because of Venizelos.
517 In January 1921 
Aristide Briand became Prime Minister of France. He wanted to withdraw the 
French garrison from Cilicia, which was both expensive and in a strategically 
dangerous position between the Kemalists and Syria. He sent Henri Franklin-
Bouillon on two diplomatic missions to Angora. In the autumn France and Turkey 
signed a peace agreement, meaning that France recognised Kemal's government 
as being that of Turkey. France gave Kemal significant quantities of military 
equipment.
518 Italy, which regarded Greece as a rival, had already come to terms 
with Kemal.
519 
In March 1921 the Greeks launched an offensive in Turkey. It was unsuccessful; 
the Greek government, believing that it was politically impossible to stop now, 
renewed the attack in July. It was initially successful, but in late August and 
early September the Greek forces were routed by Kemal. Greece appealed to its 
erstwhile allies for help but received no aid and only sympathy from Lloyd 
George. By September 1922 the Greek Army had been evacuated from Asia 
Minor, many Greek civilians had fled to Greece and Smyrna was in flames. Kemal 
now turned his attention to Constantinople and Eastern Thrace. It appeared that 
Britain and Turkey might go to war. Churchill had argued for reconciliation with 
Kemal, but now agreed with Lloyd George that Britain must fight for the 
Gallipoli Peninsula. British and Turkish forces faced each other at Chanak. 
British public opinion was against the war; Canada and Australia refused to send 
troops. The French and Italian ones on the spot stayed in their camps. The crisis 
was averted by negotiations between Kemal and the local British commander, 
General Sir Charles Harrington, who did not carry out his orders to deliver an 
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ultimatum that might have meant war. Kemal had achieved the National Pact 
but agreed to delay his occupation of European Turkey.
520  
5.7.2 The End of the Lloyd George Coalition 
The Greek-Turkish War brought down the Lloyd George Coalition. In March 1921 
Andrew Bonar Law had resigned from the government and the leadership of the 
Conservative Party on the grounds of ill health. He now returned to politics. On 
7 October 1922 The Times published a letter in which he argued that Britain 
could not act alone. It had been right to stand up to the Turks at Constantinople 
but needed help from other countries in such circumstances. Account had to be 
taken of Muslim feelings. The main issue was that Lloyd George had ignored the 
wishes of the Conservatives who made up the majority of his Coalition. On 19 
October 1922 a meeting of Conservative MPs decided to withdraw their support 
from the Coalition. Bonar Law became Prime Minister the same day and called 
an election for 15 November, which his party won.
521 Many of the Conservative 
members of Lloyd George's Cabinet refused to join the new administration, but 
Curzon remained Foreign Secretary and Stanley Baldwin became Chancellor of 
the Exchequer. His former post of President of the Board of Trade went to Sir 
Philip Lloyd-Greame, who had been responsible for oil as Secretary for Overseas 
Trade. The change of government meant that all policies, including those on oil 
and Iraq, would be reconsidered. The new government would have to 
renegotiate the peace treaty with Turkey. 
5.8 Chapter Summary 
Britain wanted the Mesopotamian mandate, which would give it control of 
Mosul's oil. It had other interests there, but only the oil required Mosul to be 
part of Mesopotamia. Protection of the pipeline to the Mediterranean and 
control over the port at which it terminated required Britain to have the 
Palestinian mandate. There were other reasons, such as protection of Egypt and 
the Suez Canal and fulfilment of promises to the Zionists, but the oil strategy 
needed a friendly mandatory. The USA was considered, but Britain preferred to 
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take on the task itself even before the USA decided not to take on a mandate. 
The San Remo Agreement and the Treaty of Sèvres appeared to give Britain all 
that it wanted but did not last. San Remo angered the Americans because it shut 
them out of Mosul's oil, with consequences for Anglo-American relations. The 
similarity between it and the previous attempts at an Anglo-French oil 
agreement shows that the earlier ones were not ratified because of other 
disputes rather than oil. Clemenceau had agreed to allow Britain Mosul but 
expected a share of the oil and British support elsewhere. The French soon 
decided that Sèvres had been rather better for Britain than it was for 
themselves. The decision by the Council of Four to allow the Greeks to land at 
Smyrna had severe consequences. Turkish resistance under Mustafa Kemal was 
galvanised; the dictated Treaty of Sèvres had to be re-negotiated at Lausanne in 
1923. 
The revolt in Iraq led to a re-examination of Britain's position there. The garrison 
was too expensive, but many policy makers were reluctant to leave; the oil was 
a factor in their deliberations. A cheap solution, which was to govern via Faisal 
with most of the military support coming from the RAF, allowed Britain to stay. 
Italy's attempts to obtain a share of Mosul's oil were rebuffed; it could offer 
nothing in return. The Chanak Crisis that followed Turkey's victory over Greece 
brought down the Lloyd George Coalition. Britain's oil strategy was now to obtain 
secure supplies from Iraq. This affected its Middle Eastern policy and its 
relations with other countries, including France, the USA, Italy and Turkey. The 
new Conservative Government under Andrew Bonar Law would have to consider 
this strategy and whether to stay in Iraq. This would affect the new peace treaty 
that had to be negotiated with Turkey. This came at a time when the RN's plans 
required greater oil reserves. 171 
6  Post War Oil Planning for the Royal Navy 
Civilian oil use was increasing, but the largest user remained the RN. Oil was 
soon to completely replace coal as a naval fuel in an era where the balance of 
naval power had changed. The defeat of Germany and the inability of France 
and Russia to finance large navies after years of conflict meant that the RN had 
no rivals in Europe. It had two globally; the USN and the IJN. The strength of the 
RN had been informally based on a two power standard for many years, although 
it was not adopted officially until 1889, when the powers were France and 
Russia. Germany became the main rival in the early twentieth century. In 1908 
the Asquith Government defined the two power standard as being the strength 
of the second and third largest powers plus 10 per cent. This was replaced in 
1912 by a new measure of a 60 per cent margin over the second largest navy. 
The abandonment of the two power standard is often regarded as a sign of the 
decline of the RN, but Phillips O'Brien points that it meant different things at 
different times and to different governments.
522 Eric Grove notes that the size of 
other navies meant that the RN in practice still had a two power standard.
523 In 
1919 the Cabinet proposed to return to a 60 per cent margin over the biggest 
fleet other than the USN. The RN successfully argued for a one power standard 
including the USN; this was the only standard that might allow the construction 
of battleships.
524  
6.1 The One and Two Power Standards 
After the First World War Britain's only naval rivals were the USA and Japan. 
They were not likely to combine. Britain had been allied to Japan since 1902. 
This did not prevent the Admiralty for planning for a war with it. It was doubtful 
if the alliance would be renewed because its existence increased Anglo-
American tension.
 525 The USN was sometimes included in calculations of the two 
power standard and sometimes omitted.
526 Beatty's papers include a draft 
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memorandum by the Admiralty Board stating that the USN had been excluded 
from two power standard calculations because these were based on possible 
combinations against Britain; it would be very difficult for the USN to co-operate 
effectively with a European navy against Britain. The Monroe Doctrine and the 
US reluctance to become involved in European affairs were also factors. The 
paper admitted that these views were disputed by some. Since the USA was now 
involved in Europe and had realised that it needed a navy at least as big as the 
RN these arguments were no longer valid. The paper is undated, but is in a file 
containing correspondence between Beatty and Long from February 1919 to June 
1922.
527 It ignored the plans drawn up in 1907-8 to fight a possible alliance 
between the USA and Germany.
528 Some of the comments in it suggest that it 
may have been a draft of a Cabinet memorandum written by Long on 12 August 
1919; he had been First Lord since January. This did not include any mention of 
the history of the two power standard, or the USN's inclusion in or exclusion from 
it.
529 
Long wrote that the only navy that needed to be considered was the USN; the RN 
would be only slightly bigger than it by 1923-24 if the US 1916 programme was 
completed; some of the US battleships would superior to any British ones. He did 
not think that the USA would 'become an aggressive power'
530, but Britain's policy 
had always been that no power should be superior to it at sea. The USA would 
gain supremacy unless Britain persuaded to reduce its construction programme 
or embarked upon one of its own. Long wanted to know for how long it should be 
assumed that there would not be a war with a major power or a combination of 
smaller powers jointly possessing the strength of a great power. Five years was 
easier for planning, as the planned strengths of the IJN and USN in five years 
time were known. A 10 year period would enable greater cuts in naval 
expenditure.
531 On 15 August 1919 a Cabinet meeting decided that the armed 
forces should plan on the basis that the British Empire would not be involved in a 
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major war for 10 years. The pre-war standard on the size of the RN should not 
be altered without Cabinet authority.
532  
On 13 February 1920 Long wrote a memorandum arguing that Britain had two 
options for its naval policy; persuade the US Government to limit the USN to 
equality with the RN; or carry out a construction programme that would make 
the RN equal to the currently planned size of the USN. His preference was for 
the former since '[a]n Alliance or an Entente with the United States based on 
equality in Naval Material is, in fact, required to reach the ideals we each aim 
at.'
533 If agreement could not be reached the RN had to be built up to a one 
power standard. In November he pointed out that it had been agreed that the 
RN would maintain a one power standard. The USN's construction programme 
meant that it would be larger than the RN by the end of 1923. Like many people 
he thought that war between Britain and the USA was impossible. This did not 
mean that Britain could afford to have a smaller navy than the USA. Britain's 
prestige and power were based on its naval supremacy. It was only because war 
with the USA was thought to be highly unlikely that the Admiralty was prepared 
to accept equality with the USN. Without new construction the RN would fall 
behind the IJN in quality of ships; comparing the strengths of navies involved 
more than just counting the number of ships.
534 
The August 1919 Cabinet meeting was the first occasion on which what came to 
be known as the 10 year rule was mentioned. Stephen Roskill argued that it 
dominated British naval policy until it was abandoned in 1932.
535 John Ferris has 
shown that it was not until 1925 that the Treasury and the 10 year rule became 
the key shapers of British defence policy. In August 1919 the 10 year rule was 
just a component of defence planning.
536 It gave a timescale for defence 
planning, including the period over which naval oil reserves could be 
established. War between the UK and the USA might seem unlikely but could not 
be ignored by naval planners whilst tensions, including a naval building race, 
                                         
532 CAB 23/15, 'War Cabinet Papers "A" Minutes 531a - 634a', 12 February - 24 October 1919. War 
Cabinet Meeting, 15 August 1919. 
533 CAB 24/98, C.P. 645 'Naval Estimates and Naval Policy', W. H. Long, 13 February 1920, p. 3. 
534 CAB 24/115, C.P. 2176 'Naval Policy and Construction', 22 November 1920. 
535 Roskill, Naval, pp. 214-15. 
536 J. R. Ferris, The Evolution of British Strategic Policy, 1919-26 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989), 
p. xii. 174 
remained between the two countries. Plans for war with the USA were drawn 
up, but the RN was less confident about fighting the USA than Japan. Plans 
produced in January 1921 said that a war with the USA would be very unpopular 
and should be ended as soon as it was shown that the British Empire could resist; 
a long conflict would favour the Americans.
537 The one power standard had 
implications of its own for the RN's oil policy. Oil reserves had to be built up 
round the world in order to give the reduced fleet the mobility to protect British 
interests around the world. Oil had to be stored at home, in the Mediterranean, 
in the Far East and on the routes to the Far East. 
6.2 Oil and Naval Plans in 1918-19. 
On 18 September 1918 Geddes, then First Lord, requested the views of the 
Admiralty on oil. On 1 December these were brought together in a number of 
memoranda.
538 Tothill, the Fourth Sea Lord, analysed the availability of oil. He 
concluded that global oil supplies should remain adequate to meet world 
demand; many potential fields had not been fully exploited; better oilfield 
practices should reduce the high level of waste of oil; coal could be converted 
into oil; and the introduction of internal combustion engines should cut oil 
demand. His view of the future of oil supplies was right, although for the first 
two reasons rather than the last two. He did wonder if it was correct for Britain, 
with its large coal deposits, to lead the way in using oil. He wanted Britain to 
develop oil production in the UK or easily accessible places and coal conversion 
plants.
539 Pretyman, the Civil Lord, stressed the need to avoid dependence on US 
oil; these supplies would be cut off if the USA was hostile and even if it 
remained friendly its exports were likely to decline because of rising domestic 
demand.
540 Creating a single British oil company would mean having a monopoly 
in the Empire, leading to criticism in Parliament. US oil was of better quality 
than Mexican and in a more suitable location than RDS's fields in Dutch East 
Indies. His view was that: 
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The Admiralty has therefore, I think, less to expect from the 
formation of an All British Oil Combine than from the development of 
supplies in Egypt, Mesopotamia, Persia and any other British 
possession within 4,000 miles of the UK and we should press the 
Foreign Office to bear this in mind when peace conditions are 
considered.
541 
Tothill thought that exploitation of oilfields in British territory required either 
the formation of a state controlled oil company or else ensuring that there were 
big, British controlled companies. He wanted APOC to operate only in Persia and 
Mesopotamia and RDS to be brought under British control.
542 Wemyss, the First 
Sea Lord, dealt with the strategic aspects of oil. His paper was largely a 
summary of the views out forward by Slade in his memorandum of 29 July 1918, 
with Slade's controversial views on RDS omitted. Britain had to continue to 
control the world's supply of bunker fuel, whether this was oil or coal. Future 
control of oil depended on control of the Persian and Mesopotamian oilfields. 
These had to be entirely British; any foreign interests, however small, would be 
working against Britain. Wemyss argued that 'absolute security is required.'
543  
The first sentence of Wemyss's memorandum was that [i]t is no exaggeration to 
say that our life as an Empire is largely dependent upon our ability to maintain 
the control of bunker fuel.'
544 This sentence was copied from Slade's July 
paper.
545 In October 1918 the Board of the Admiralty considered a memorandum 
on the likely oil bunkering needs of the RN and the Mercantile Marine after the 
war.
546 The authors were the Directors of Operations Division (F), Trade Division 
and Stores.
547 It was impossible at this stage to estimate accurately post war 
requirements, but where coal was now required increasing amounts of oil would 
be needed in the future. The governments of Canada, South Africa, Australia and 
New Zealand would control oil stocks in their countries and should keep them up 
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to an agreed level. Commercial supplies might be counted if it could be certain 
that the required level of naval oil would always be available. In Crown Colonies 
the government should set up storage at naval bases and in locations where 
commercial facilities would be uneconomic. British companies should be 
encouraged to provide storage at foreign ports and might be subsidised for doing 
so where it was otherwise uneconomic. Where possible, such as in South 
America, facilities should be established in several different countries in case 
political problems prevented British warships from using some ports.
548 
In calculating the oil needs of each station the size of force that might be sent 
there in an emergency was estimated. Sufficient oil should be provided to supply 
this force for three months at a monthly war expenditure of 5,000 tons for 
battleships and battle cruisers, 2,000 tons for light cruisers and 1,000 tons for 
destroyers. The potential force to be provided for in the south Atlantic, Cape, 
East Indies or Pacific was two battle cruisers and six light cruisers; requirements 
for this were rounded to 70,000 tons. British firms owned storage for 76,000 tons 
in south east America, but these could not be relied upon as all were in foreign 
countries. Facilities at Ascension, St Helena, the Falklands and Sierra Leone 
would have to be developed; only the last had any chance of being commercially 
viable, so the others would have to be financed by the government. New storage 
facilities would have to be developed in East Africa and the Cape. More than 
enough was available from commercial sources in the East Indies. The shortfall 
in the Pacific would be made up in Canada and by signing contracts with 
suppliers in French (Tahiti), Peruvian (Callao) and Chilean (Valparaiso) territory. 
It was possible that battleships might have to be sent to China so 120,000 tons 
should be provided for a force of four battleships, six light cruisers and eight 
destroyers. Commercial supplies on British territory totalled 117,000 tons; the 
balance would be provided at Hong Kong if necessary. Larger supplies were 
needed for the Mediterranean Fleet and for Canada, where battleships might 
have to be sent. A list of Australian and New Zealand ports where supply might 
be provided was given; the quantities to be available at each should be 
discussed with the local governments.
549 The Board accepted these conclusions 
and recommendations. It passed part of it to Harcourt's PIPCO as an expression 
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of the Admiralty's views on oil bunkering. The Admiralty did not want to take any 
action that would speed up the change from coal to oil, but all measures should 
be taken to ensure that Britain continued to control world fuel bunkering when 
this did occur.
550 
On 28 December Tothill told the Admiralty Board that RN oil reserves in home 
waters should equal 12 months' war expenditure. This meant 4,500,000 tons, 
requiring an additional 2,750,000 tons of storage to be provided at a cost of 
about £1 per ton. It was agreed to explain to the War Cabinet that these 
reserves were needed to reduce dependence on the USA. The only other 
potential sources were Persia, Mesopotamia and carbonisation of coal; none of 
them would be realised for many years and might never fully provide for the 
navy.
551 Long, still Colonial Secretary and with responsibility for oil, agreed.
552 On 
17 January 1919 the Cabinet accepted that home oil reserves should be built up 
to 4,500,000 tons. Curzon suggested that Baku might be an alternative source of 
supply. Wemyss was tasked with writing a report on this option.
553 He concluded 
that, even on optimistic assumptions, Russia and Romania might together supply 
350,000 tons of fuel oil per annum; these would have to come through the 
Dardanelles. At most 200,000 tons of this would come from Russia; it had not 
supplied the RN before the war. The majority of Russia's oil was used 
domestically; exports were mostly lubricating and lighting oil. Romania was 
expected to be able to export 700,000 tons per annum once all its wells were 
repaired; a quarter would be fuel oil.
554 
In October 1919 G. H. Ashdown, the Director of Stores, wrote that: 
The provision of additional tankage is likely to be a difficult matter 
owing to the present financial situation. It is, however, a question 
which should be dealt with at the earliest possible moment in view of 
the growing requirements for supply of oil, not only to H.M. Ships, but 
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to increasing numbers of oil burning merchant ships. For the time 
being, the demand for oil has out grown the means of supply.
555 
Captain Barry Domvile, the Director of Plans, wrote to the Deputy Chief of the 
Naval Staff and the Fourth Sea Lord arguing that Ashdown had raised two 
questions that had to be considered. How much reliance could be placed on 
commercial stocks? How should oil reserves be divided between onshore storage 
and mobile supplies in tankers? In answering these a number of points had to be 
born in mind. Oil, unlike coal, did not deteriorate in storage. War in the Pacific 
would require oil to be provided for the fleet both on transit to the east and at 
its bases once it arrived. It must be decided whether money was better spent on 
tankers or on permanent storage. The safety of oilfields and refineries and the 
threat from submarines had to be considered. The Petroleum Executive had 
taken action to try to get control over as much oil as possible. Domvile repeated 
the argument already made by Slade and Wemyss that Britain had to control the 
world's oil bunkering. He wrote that 'it will be as necessary for us to control the 
oil bunkering facilities in the next war, as it was for us to control the coal 
bunkering facilities on the late war.'
556 He recommended that the issue be 
reviewed by the Naval Staff; this was accepted. 
6.3 Oil Reserves for Merchant Shipping 
In December 1919 Long, now First Lord, requested that the Admiralty and the 
Petroleum Executive prepare a memorandum for the Cabinet on the need to 
have an oil reserve for British merchant ships. The final draft was submitted in 
February. It argued that most British merchant shipping companies were 
converting some of their vessels to oil and using oil for new ships. Even if the 
maximum effort was devoted to producing creosote from coal, it would take 
40,000,000 tons of coal to produce 2,000,000 tons of oil. This would cover only a 
third of British merchant shipping and naval demand. The lack of storage and 
tankers meant that Britain had to take action if it wanted to control oil 
bunkering in the same way as it controlled coal supplies; the vital need to do so 
was reiterated. The Admiralty had to provide oil stocks for commercial use; 
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private owners of oil storage facilities were unlikely to be willing to maintain 
sufficiently large reserves. Allowing merchant ships to use naval stocks should be 
avoided as it would restrict naval movements. The Admiralty should build up a 
war reserve of 12 months consumption for commercial use as well as naval 
stocks. On the basis of demand during the war, and assuming that 75% of large 
merchant ships were oil-burners in 10 years time, 1,500,000 tons of oil were 
needed to give a reserve of 12 months' commercial use. The memorandum, 
signed by Long and Greenwood, concluded that: 
(a) That a twelve months' war reserve shall be laid down at home and 
at each important bunkering station abroad as a national necessity in 
war for commercial purposes. This reserve to be in addition to the 
approved reserve for Naval purposes; 
(b) That the commercial war reserve stock be provided and 
maintained by the State.
557 
Commercial shipping did not adopt oil as quickly as the authors of this paper 
expected; in 1930, over 60 per cent of the world's merchant shipping burnt 
coal.
558  
6.4 Oil and War Plans in 1920-21 
The Cabinet had approved an oil reserve of 12 month's war consumption for the 
RN, to be built up over 10 years. In February 1920 Domvile argued that the need 
for economy and the strategic aspects of oil reserves had not been properly 
considered in late 1918, when it was decided to establish stocks of 4,500,000 
tons at home and 336,000 overseas. Expenditure on storage in location that 
could not be defended or had little value in wartime was a waste. 
In a conflict with the USA all oil supplies from the Americas and the Caribbean 
would be cut off. The main operational theatre would be the North Atlantic, 
meaning that substantial oil stocks would be need in the UK, at least until Middle 
Eastern supplies significantly increased. Until then one year's reserves might be 
too little. Stocks would also be needed in Canada or Newfoundland and in 
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Bermuda. Home reserves could not be used in a war with Japan; it would require 
more tankers than had been available in the recent war to transport the 
difference between demand and the production of Persia, Burma and British 
North Borneo from home to the western Pacific and Indian Ocean. Reserves 
should at least cover this balance for 12 months. Singapore would be the main 
base; the risk of raids meant that not all the oil reserve should be put there. The 
1,500,000 tons needed should be split Singapore 685,000 tons, Hong Kong 
15,000, Australia 400,000 and Burma 400,000. France and Italy were then the 
only possible European opponents. Neither was likely to be able to equal the 
threat to British sea communications, including oil imports, that Germany had 
posed in the last war. Unrestricted submarine warfare was unlikely and had 
reached its zenith in 1918. Six months' supply would be enough, divided UK 
2,250,000 tons, Malta 200,000 and Gibraltar 100,000. Malta could be supplied 
from the east and Gibraltar from the UK and the USA. The location for storage of 
oil reserves should be based entirely on war needs. Supplies had to be mobile so 
a number of tankers should be kept overseas in wartime. Reserves built up by 
commercial companies to supply merchant ships should not be included when 
calculating naval reserves. Oil reserves were needed in all the possible main 
theatres of war; the North Atlantic, Mediterranean and western Pacific. Half the 
necessary storage should be built up in five years. Oil for a fleet transiting to the 
East had to be stored on the Suez and Cape routes. There should be oil reserves 
for escort vessels at key trade ports.
 559 
On 26 May 1921 the Board of the Admiralty noted that the Cabinet had not 
replied to its arguments that oil reserves for commercial use were needed. Naval 
reserves of 4,500,000 tons at home had been approved, but another 3,500,000 
tons were needed overseas.
560 Vice Admiral Sir Osmond de Brock, the Deputy 
Chief of the Naval Staff, put forward the reasoning behind this request. The RN 
could not keep a fleet big enough to deal with a Japanese threat in the Far East 
and maintain a force at home capable of facing a hostile USA or a combination 
of European powers. The mobility of the fleet was key; fuel had to be stationed 
in the main potential theatres of operation and on the routes to them. Home 
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storage was being built up, but more was required on the route to and in the Far 
East. Japan ought to be deterred from acting against British interests if the RN 
was able to move quickly to the Far East. If the USA and Japan were to go to war 
with each other with Britain neutral a strong British fleet would be needed in 
the Far East in order to protect British interests. Britain had not needed 
substantial fuel reserves overseas before 1914 because most warships burnt coal; 
the most likely theatre of operations was in home waters where coal was readily 
available. An oil fired fleet that might have to operate outside of European 
waters needed oil reserves overseas and tankers to transport oil from the 
storage facilities to the fleet. De Brock gave the size of fleets required against 
each of the USA and Japan in 1930 and their annual oil consumption. The main 
bases would be Bermuda in a war with the USA and Singapore if the opponent 
was Japan. Storage would be located at a number of bases; the total reserves 
required exceeded the annual consumption because of the need to transport oil 
from the storage base to the operating one. The oil needs of a war in Europe 
would be met mostly by home reserves and Persian output with 300,000 tons of 
storage being required in the Mediterranean. Table 6-1 on the next page gives 
his figures for wars with the USA or Japan, assuming that: 
1.  The figures for Persia, Trinidad and Burma, which were all British 
controlled oilfields, were based on oil production rather than storage. 
2.  Allowance was made for quantities consumed by the fleet en passage to 
the Far East and requirements for secondary operations. 
3.  Australian stock was assumed to be positioned so as to be approximately 
equivalent to Singapore in respect of distance from any advanced Naval 
anchorage. 
4.  An additional 460,000 tons oil fuel at Singapore and another 48 oilers 
would be required to maintain supply at a base 2,500 miles beyond 
Singapore. No immediate provision was made for this, which would be 
considered along with the issue of separate commercial reserves abroad; 
these could only be properly considered when merchant shipping 
requirements could be more clearly defined. An output of about 480,000 
tons from Dutch Borneo might possibly be available. 
5.  All commercial requirements in the Far East were to be met from Naval 
reserves provided in that area. 
6.  The Mediterranean figure was calculated after allowing for requirements 
for secondary operations.
561 
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Table 6-1 Oil requirements and proposed supply arrangements 
   WAR IN THE EAST  (Base Singapore)       
Class of 
Ship  No. 
Estimated annual 
consumption oil 
fuel Tons  Source or Base 
Quantity 
Tons 
Equivalent 
at 
Singapore 
Tons 
Requiring 
Oilers 
Battleships  12     Singapore  1,200,000  1,200,000    
Battle 
Cruisers  8  480,000  Rangoon  400,000       
               468,000  3 
Light 
Cruisers  26  624,000  Burmah  100,000       
Flotilla 
Leaders, 
T.B.D.s  80  960,000  Persia  1,530,000  1,224,000  30 
Submarines  30  36,000  Aden  100,000       
               123,000  2 
Various  10  240,000  Colombo  225,000 
 
  
Attendant 
Oilers  58  370,000  Hong Kong  15,000  15,000    
         Australia  400,000  400,000    
         Add for repairs    
 
7 
TOTAL  224  3,430,000     3,970,000  3,430,000  42 
   WAR IN THE WEST 
(Base 
Bermuda)          
Class of 
Ship  No. 
Estimated annual 
consumption oil 
fuel Tons  Source or Base 
Quantity 
Tons 
Equivalent 
at 
Bermuda 
Tons 
Requiring 
Oilers 
Battleships  22  1,320,000  U.K.  4,500,000  3,779,000  66 
Battle 
Cruisers  7  420,000  Trinidad  72,000  72,000    
              
 
  
Light 
Cruisers  28  672,000  Persia  720,000  525,000  21 
Flotilla 
Leaders, 
T.B.D.s  126  1,512,000    
 
     
Submarines  30  36,000  Halifax  100,000  100,000    
         Bermuda  500,000  500,000    
Various  18  648,000  Mediterranean  170,000  170,000  3 
Attendant 
Oilers  59  504,000    
 
 
  
         Add for repairs        18 
TOTAL  290  5,112,000     6,062,000     108 
Source: ADM 1/8607/102, 'Oil Fuel Reserves', O. de B. Brock, 24 May 1921. Enclosure 2 to 
Board Minutes, 26 May 1921. 183 
From the aggregate requirements for wars with the USA and Japan de Brock 
subtracted the home reserve and the annual output of the Persian, Burmese and 
Trinidadian oilfields. He added the extra reserves needed in the Mediterranean 
for a European war, the requirements for storage in New Zealand, Africa, the 
Falklands and the Pacific coast of Canada and working stock. This gave a total of 
3,500,000 tons of reserves needed in the Empire outside of the UK. Substantial 
investment in oil storage facilities was required if this was to be achieved 
storage by 1930. He hoped that the Dominions could be encouraged to help.
562 
His breakdown is given in Table 6-2: 
Table 6-2 Proposed naval oil storage overseas 
Station 
Proposed 
fuel 
reserve, 
tons  Base  Quantity, tons 
Existing 
21/3/21, 
tons 
Expected 
total 
21/3/22, 
tons 
Mediterranean   300,000  Gibraltar  80,000  11,200  11,200 
      Malta  180,000  22,400  47,400 
      Port Said  20,000     16,000 
      Suez  20,000       
East Indies  730,000  Aden  100,000       
      Colombo  225,000       
      Kilindini  5,000       
      Rangoon  400,000       
Africa  48,000  Cape  24,000       
      Sierra Leone  24,000       
North America  660,000  Bermuda  500,000  16,000  16,000 
& West Indies     Halifax  100,000       
      Jamaica  10,000     16,000 
      Canada (Pacific)  50,000       
South America  24,000  Falkland Is.  24,000       
China  1,215,000  Singapore  1,200,000       
      Hong Kong  15,000          32,000  
Australia  400,000 
To be decided 
later  400,000       
New Zealand  26,000  Wellington  10,000       
      Fiji  16,000       
Working Stock  97,000  Bases abroad  97,000       
TOTAL  3,500,000        49,600  138,600 
Source: ADM 1/8607/102, 'Oil Fuel Reserves', O. de B. Brock, 24 May 1921. Enclosure 1 to 
Board Minutes, 26 May 1921. 
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De Brock's list of oil depots did not include any of three Pacific Island that in 
1919 had been surveyed as potential fleet oiling bases. These were Fanning, one 
of the Line Islands, and two of the Cook Islands, Penrhyn and Suvarov. A report 
recommended building oil storage and airfields on them and considered how to 
defend them. The Admiralty decided that it was impracticable to develop 
them.
563 
The 26 May Board meeting led to the preparation of a memorandum, which the 
Board discussed on 17 June. It sent it to the CID, recommending that the oil 
reserves be increased by at least 500,000 tons of oil each year with more being 
added when allowed by economic circumstances.
564 It was very similar to de 
Brock's paper of the month before. Oil was so superior to coal as a fuel for ships 
that the switch to oil was necessary. This meant that the British Empire had lost 
control of global fuel supplies. Britain had to build up both oil reserves and 
tankers to transport them. Oil had to be drawn from either oilfields or storage 
facilities near fleet bases. Until these could be developed in other parts of the 
world the RN could not operate effectively outside home waters and the 
Mediterranean. There had to be a year's reserve of oil at for the fleet at its main 
bases and supplies on its route to the Far East. Oil stocks needed to be provided 
for detached squadrons in areas where these might be expected to operate. The 
recommendations for the distribution of reserves were similar to de Brock's a 
month previously. The Dominions and India should provide 1,000,000 tons of the 
3,500,000 tons of storage required overseas; their defence depended on the 
mobility of the fleet. The need for a separate 12 month reserve for merchant 
ships was needed was repeated; the RN would not have spare tankers or oil in 
wartime, and commercial companies would not maintain reserves of more than 
three months. The Admiralty suggested 1,000,000 tons, admitting that it was 
hard to estimate the amount needed.
565 The final draft was sent to the CID under 
the name of Lord Lee, First Lord since February. Nothing should be done that 
might encourage British merchant ship owners to speed up the change from coal 
to oil. The commercial reserve would be additional to naval stocks, held at naval 
bases but to be allocated to merchant ships in wartime. The total reserves 
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remained 4,500,000 tons at home, 3,500,000 overseas and 1,000,000 for 
merchant ships. By March 1922 2,000,000 would have been completed.
566 
The CID asked for some changes to be made in view of the economic climate.
567 
The Naval Staff's response requested total reserves of 2,713,000 tons in the Far 
East and on the route to Singapore. Table 6-3 shows that there were a few 
reductions compared with de Brock's figures, but most of the difference between 
this number and the previous 3,500,000 tons was because this paper did not 
consider stocks other than in the Far East and on the route there. Commercial 
reserves were excluded. The time taken to establish these reserves would 
depend on tanker availability and the production of Eastern oilfields. The 
Admiralty expected that a 12 month supply would be available in seven or eight 
years time.
568 The CID noted that this was the minimum acceptable to the 
Admiralty. The cost would be £2,000,000 in the first year, with later expenditure 
still to be determined. The CID agreed generally with the Admiralty's view, 
wanting the project to go ahead. The Chancellor of the Exchequer missed the 
meeting, and his views had to be heard. He had stated previously that 
£1,500,000 could probably be found in the first year.
569 
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Table 6-3 Planned naval oil fuel reserves, 1921 
Base 
Naval Staff, 
July 
De Brock, 
May 
Australia  400,000  400,000 
New Zealand - Wellington  10,000  10,000 
New Zealand - Fiji  16,000  16,000 
South Africa - Simonstown  24,000  24,000 
Gibraltar  69,000  80,000 
Malta  124,000  180,000 
Port Said  4,000  20,000 
Suez  20,000  20,000 
Aden  100,000  100,000 
Ceylon  225,000  225,000 
Hong Kong     15,000 
Kilindini     5,000 
Rangoon  400,000  400,000 
Sierra Leone  24,000  24,000 
Singapore  1,200,000  1,200,000 
Unallocated  97,000  97,000 
Americas and West Indies     684,000 
Total  2,713,000  3,500,000 
Source: ROSK 7/188, 'Naval Oil Fuel Reserves', Note by the Naval Staff, 26 July 1921, 
original reference CID 147-C, ADM 1/8607/102, 'Oil Fuel Reserves', O. de B. Brock, 24 May 
1921. 
6.5 Post War Domestic Oil Policy 
The RN was by far Britain's largest user of oil, but there was also growing civilian 
demand. The Petroleum Executive was established in wartime because of a crisis 
over Britain's oil supplies; in peacetime, the government had to decided whether 
or not to retain a separate body to co-ordinate oil policy. The idea of oil 
company mergers aimed at bringing RDS under British control returned in the 
early 1920s. 
6.5.1 Domestic Demand 
Before the war the oil industry had tried to replace coal with oil as the principal 
fuel of Britain's ships, railways and factories. This effort mostly failed except for 
the RN. The Admiralty put the technical advantages of oil first. Commercial 187 
companies emphasised the cheapness and ready availability of British coal.
570 
Table 6-4 shows that British imports of oil rose significantly from 1900 to 1914. 
The growth was mostly in petrol for internal combustion engines and fuel oil for 
the RN. 
Table 6-4 British imports of petroleum products, tons 
Year  Total  Kerosene  Fuel Oil  Petrol  Lubricating 
Oil 
Gas oil  Crude & 
other 
spirits 
1885     288,000                    
1890     410,000                    
1895     691,000                    
1900     995,000      840,000            155,000        
1905 
 
1,171,000      614,000       48,000       73,000      185,000      249,000        2,000  
1910 
 
1,348,000      541,000      134,000      215,000      229,000      224,000        5,000  
1913 
 
1,904,000      613,000      371,000      394,000      265,000      257,000        4,000  
Source: G. Jones, The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry (London: 
Macmillan, 1981), p. 32. Converted from imperial gallons in original. Not split before 1900. 
After the war British railways, merchant shipping and industry continued to 
favour coal, which was still providing 90 per cent of the country's primary fuel 
needs in 1950. Industry did not switch to oil until its real price fell in the late 
1950s.
571 This meant that for many years the main British user of oil remained 
the RN; petrol for internal combustion engines was the other source of growth. 
In 1919 two reports on motor fuel prices were produced by a sub-committee of 
the Standing Committee on the Investigation of Prices. It included 
representatives of the Petroleum Executive, the Automobile Association, 
commercial vehicle users and motor vehicle workers' trade unions.
572 They 
argued that the solution to high prices was to increase supply rather than to 
control prices. The consuming countries should act jointly under the auspices of 
the League of Nations. The manufacture of substitutes should be encouraged; it 
was vital that these should not be controlled by monopolies. A minority on the 
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committee further argued that it was necessary for there to be some 
government control over the production and distribution of substitutes. J. C. 
Clarke of the Petroleum Exchange dissented from the idea of any government 
control of prices, output or transport of oil products. This would discourage the 
rise in production that was the only way to bring down prices. The current 
situation resulted from temporary shortages of fuel and transport.
573  
The government made some efforts to encourage the production of oil from 
coal; these come to little. In 1925 the Department of Scientific and Industrial 
Research argued that a million coal miners and processing plant operators would 
be needed in order to meet Britain's war oil demand by low temperature 
carbonisation of coal. The development of the Bergius hydrogenation process, 
first patented in 1913, followed by the Fischer-Tropsch process in the 1920s, led 
to the idea being re-considered in the 1930s. Germany, with ample coal but 
little oil and vulnerable to naval blockade, built plants of both types, but Britain 
constructed only one. The 1937 Falmouth Committee calculated that a 
hydrogenation plant with an annual production of 150,000 tons of oil would cost 
the same as a fleet of tankers capable of importing 1,800,000 tons per annum. It 
would be easier for the enemy to bomb the plant than to sink all those tankers. 
Coal to oil plants were suggested as a means of alleviating unemployment. The 
Committee argued they were a very expensive means of doing so. The main 
advantage of hydrogenation was that it produced high quality petrol.
574 
6.6 Administrative Arrangements 
In November 1919 Long argued that the vital nature and complexity of oil 
supplies meant that the Petroleum Executive should continue to exist. A Cabinet 
Committee had recommended giving the Board of Trade responsibility for oil. 
Long thought that this was a mistake; the Petroleum Executive could not have 
carried out its work as effectively had it been part of another department. He 
wanted it to be put under the auspices of a minister who could give it significant 
attention, and who was not responsible to a consuming department. He 
suggested the Chancellor of the Exchequer or a Cabinet minister without major 
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departmental duties such as the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.
575 The 
Cabinet decided that it would be put under the Secretary for Overseas Trade, a 
junior minister at the Board of Trade who was not a member of the Cabinet. This 
was then Greenwood, followed by Kellaway and then Lloyd-Greame. It would not 
become part of the Department of Overseas Trade.
576 The Petroleum 
Department, as the Executive became, remained independent until October 
1922 when it was merged into the Board of Trade.
577 This was done on the 
recommendation of the Geddes Committee and was motivated by cost cutting. 
The Petroleum Department argued that its work was more complex than the 
Geddes Committee realised, and it needed to retain its independence; its 
arguments were ignored.
578 The cost saving was small, but this may have been 
due to an attitude that every penny counted rather than a downgrading of the 
importance of oil. The 19 staff of the separate Petroleum Department cost 
£9,000 per annum; the Board of Trade retained five staff, at an annual expense 
of £2,500.
579 
6.7 Renewed Oil Merger Proposals 
The deal negotiated by Harcourt and Deterding to bring Shell under British 
control was never ratified, but further attempts were made in the early 1920s to 
merge APOC, Burmah and Shell into a single company. These were initiated by 
the companies rather than the government. Its holding in APOC meant that 
government consent was required. The proposal started in July 1921 with a plan 
by APOC and RDS to save money by rationalising and merging their British 
distribution networks. The industry was switching from selling petrol in cans to 
the use of roadside petrol pumps; a joint venture would reduce the cost of this 
modernisation programme. Burmah was keen on a full merger because it was 
concerned that its oil supplies might last no more than 20 years, and it wanted 
to diversify geographically away from India. RDS would also be short of oil if its 
supply contract with APOC was not renewed when it expired in 1922. Geoffrey 
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Jones quotes internal RDS memoranda that show that it was dismissive of the 
idea that British oil supplies depended on British control of oil companies; 
Britain could obtain as much oil as it needed whilst it controlled the world's 
oceans. RDS was interested in profits and needed British diplomatic support in 
its attempts to recover its Russian oil interests that had been sequestrated by 
the Bolsheviks.
580 
In January 1922 Lloyd-Greame, the Secretary for Overseas Trade, wrote a 
Cabinet memorandum on the merger proposal. It would put all RDS oilfields 
except those in Dutch colonies under British control. Burmah would buy the 
government's holding in APOC. Royal Dutch, Shell and Burmah would continue to 
be independent holding companies; each would take stakes in the operating 
companies, giving a British majority in all except those operating in Dutch 
colonies. Under the current arrangements RDS could move control of all its 
operations, including its 500,000 tons of British registered tankers, to The 
Hague. It was unlikely that this would happen whilst Deterding remained in 
charge, but things could change after his retirement. The management of RDS 
was clearly superior to those of the solely British companies. The transaction 
would result in the group being 51 per cent British owned. Lloyd-Greame's 
recommendation that a Cabinet Committee should report on the issue was 
accepted. He suggested that the decision should not be announced until after 
the completion of the Washington Conference, which was then in progress, since 
it might be controversial and make other issues harder to resolve.
581 
The committee, chaired by Baldwin, the President of the Board of Trade, 
recommended that the government should retain its holding in APOC, which 
should not be allowed to participate in the merger. It would be in the interests 
of all three companies, which would reduce both capital and operating costs, 
but it was difficult to come up with any method by which consumers could be 
sure of benefitting from these savings. The concept of bringing Shell under 
British control was appealing, but it was unclear exactly what this meant. The 
proposal would not give definite and lasting British control of the foreign 
oilfields. The only way to be certain of controlling an oilfield in wartime was to 
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control the territory where it was located. The merged group would be 
controlled by its most talented executive regardless of his nationality. The 
Committee agreed with the Admiralty's contention that the merger would put it 
in a worse position than its current long term contract with APOC. The new 
group could supply oil of the Admiralty's specification only from Persia, Borneo 
and Sarawak. The Admiralty would be faced with a monopoly supplier in the 
East, which might artificially limit output. This could not happen with APOC, 
which had financial and contractual obligations to the government. The merger 
would have a negative impact on the Empire, especially India. The new group 
would want to restrict output in expensive fields such as those in Burma. Small 
companies in Trinidad and India would find it hard to compete. The existing 
government holding in APOC created political problems for Britain, especially in 
the USA; it would have to be sold if the merger went through. Even then it was 
likely that the merger would produce diplomatic problems for Britain, which 
would be accused of creating a rival to Standard (NJ). Lord Inchcape and the 
chairman of APOC both argued that the government would receive a better price 
in the future.
582 
Baldwin told Cowdray in May 1923 that it was wrong for the government to hold 
shares in APOC because a state controlled company would never be as well 
managed as a privately owned one. Baldwin was by then Chancellor of the 
Exchequer; the Treasury was opposed to the government investment in APOC. 
Baldwin became Prime Minister just afterwards; in October Neville Chamberlain, 
the new Chancellor, argued that APOC should merge with other oil companies 
because it was poorly managed and would soon need new capital.
583 In January 
1924 Leo Amery, the First Lord of the Admiralty, argued against disposal of the 
government's APOC stake. The share holding in APOC was acquired in order to 
provide secure oil supplies at a reasonable price. It succeeded in doing so since 
it supplied 40 per cent of the RN's oil at advantageous prices; the certainty of 
this supply put the Admiralty in a strong bargaining position when buying the 
balance of its needs. It had been argued that it was risky to place such reliance 
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on a single oilfield; the high price that another company was willing to pay to 
obtain this field suggested that these fears were misplaced. Whilst the 
government remained the main shareholder in APOC, and thus the Persian 
oilfields, it possessed full knowledge and control of the depletion rate. Under 
the proposed transaction the new group would make up any shortfall in supplies 
from Persia from its other developments but at the market price. It would be in 
its interests to increase production in Persia so that this field was exhausted 
before the end of the Admiralty contract. The RN would continue to receive its 
oil but would have to pay a higher price for it. The new group's only other 
sources of oil of Admiralty specification were Borneo and Sarawak. The former 
was Dutch territory, and the Dutch Navy had preference over its supplies; 
neither was as well located for the RN as was Persia. The proposed merger 
would be acceptable to the Admiralty only if it provided all of the RN's oil, 
instead of the current 40 per cent, at a fixed price. 
The scheme was claimed to have the following benefits: 
1.  Reduced costs as a result of the end of competition between the companies. 
This was in the interests of the companies, but might not benefit the public 
or the government. 
2.  Removal of the state interest in a commercial company. This was a benefit, 
unless there were special reasons otherwise; in this case, there were such 
reasons; the RN's oil supplies. 
3.  Removal of government support for a company that was claimed to be poorly 
managed and financed. These accusations were unjustified; APOC had short 
term problems, but a good future. 
4.  Ending state control over APOC would please foreign, especially US opinion. 
It was likely that the US would object even more to the government helping 
to form a rival to Standard Oil (NJ). 
5.  Bringing Shell under British control. This was desirable, but it was unlikely 
that the proposed scheme would achieve genuine British control of the group. 
There were also a number of objections: 
1.  The oil price, and thus the price being obtained for the state's APOC shares, 
was depressed. 193 
2.  The merger was likely to lead to higher prices for oil products, which would 
be unpopular. 
3.  It would be bad for the domestic refining and shale oil industries. 
The Labour Party, motorists and the Australian government had all objected to 
the transaction. The uncertainty had created problems for the management of 
APOC. The proposal should be blocked, and it should be made clear that, as far 
as possible, this decision was final.
584 The Conservative government could take 
no action since it fell within a few days. The new Labour Chancellor, Philip 
Snowden, quickly produced a report, which recommended that the proposal be 
rejected. He accepted the reasons put forward by Amery and added that the 
transaction would be likely to cause redundancies in the British refinery, shale 
oil and oil distribution industries.
585 The Conservatives were returned to power in 
the autumn 1924; in November they announced that the state holding in APOC 
would be retained.
586 Problems with the management of APOC were dealt with 
by changes in both its structure and personnel. In 1923, Slade, now APOC's vice 
chairman, produced a plan to re-organise it into a holding company structure. 
Cadman left government service to became an adviser to APOC in 1921; the 
government persuaded the company that they should promote him because of 
his knowledge of both government oil policy and the oil industry. He became a 
managing director in 1923, deputy chairman in 1925 and chairman in 1927.
587 The 
government continued to be the largest shareholder in British Petroleum, as 
APOC became, until 1987. 
6.8 Chapter Summary 
Civilian demand for oil rose, but not by as much as some forecast. The Admiralty 
had to put the technical advantages of oil over coal first; businesses had to 
compare this with the cost advantages of coal to a British consumer. This meant 
that most boilers and furnaces continued to be fired by coal, with civilian use of 
oil largely confined to internal combustion engines. Attempts to create a large, 
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British controlled oil company failed. No scheme that guaranteed that the 
merged group would always act in British interests could be worked out. British 
control of the seas and of oil bearing territories was what mattered, not the 
shareholding structure of companies. The RN was able to buy oil cheaply 
because of the its long term contract with APOC. RDS and APOC obtained their 
objectives of maximising profit and shareholder value by co-operating with each 
other and with their American rivals.
588  
After the First World War Japan was seen as Britain's most likely opponent 
despite the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The possibility of war with the USA was 
much less likely but could not be completely excluded because of tensions 
between the two countries. Britain could not afford to maintain a Far Eastern 
fleet large enough to defeat the IJN and keep the necessary force in home 
waters. The Admiralty saw mobility as the solution to this problem; this required 
large oil reserves, which were themselves expensive. Iraqi oil was well 
positioned to supply a fleet in the Far East and on transit there. Budgetary 
considerations were the main obstacle to the Admiralty's plans. A committee 
under Sir Eric Geddes had been established in August to look at ways of cutting 
government spending. In November the Washington Conference began. Its 
decisions would affect the Admiralty's plans significantly. At the same time 
moves would be towards allowing US oil companies a share of Iraqi oil. This 
would remove an obstruction to good Anglo-American relations, and was possible 
because of the realisation that control of oil bearing territory was more 
important than ownership of companies. 
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7  Anglo-American Disputes over Oil and the 
Washington Naval Conference 
Oil was a factor in the poor Anglo-American relations in the years immediately 
following the First World War, but there were other reasons for antagonism 
between the two countries. The USN's 1916 building programme meant that it 
might soon overtake the RN as the world's largest navy. The Americans were 
suspicious of Japanese intentions and did not want Britain to renew its alliance 
with Japan when it expired in 1922. The USA feared that its oil would soon run 
out and that Britain was attempting to corner the market in the rest of the 
world. Britain argued that it had very little oil, whilst the USA dominated the 
global industry. 
The importance of oil to US relations with Britain is shown by the high proportion 
of the documents on Anglo-American Relations published in the 1920-23 volumes 
of Foreign Relations of the United States that deal with either oil or the related 
issue of economic rights in British mandated territories.
589 Geoffrey Jones points 
out that the government shareholding in APOC gave that company problems in 
South America, where the USA encouraged countries to refuse concessions to 
companies controlled by foreign governments. Foreign Office concern that the 
establishment of a big, entirely British oil company would worsen relations with 
the USA was one reason for the rejection of such plans; this applied even if the 
state was not a shareholder in the group.
590  
John DeNovo argues that in 1917 few Americans thought that overseas oil was of 
any significance to their country; US oil companies produced oil in only two 
foreign countries, Mexico and Romania. The lessons of the war, coupled with 
concerns that US oil would run out and that the British were taking control of 
the world‟s oil, meant that by 1920 obtaining overseas oil was one of the aims of 
US foreign policy. Later in the decade new discoveries in the USA reduced the 
need for overseas oil and an aggressive foreign oil policy; a number of US 
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companies had by then established themselves in the Middle East.
591 Subsequent 
historians of the US oil industry who broadly agree with this analysis include 
Gerald Nash, Stephen Randall and Daniel Yergin.
592 Randall points out that not all 
supporters of a more aggressive overseas US oil policy were close to the 
industry. Some were, including Requa and Van H. Manning, director of research 
at the American Petroleum Institute. Others, such as Daniels, were more 
suspicious of oil companies. In 1920 the American Institute of Mining and 
Metallurgical Engineering called on the government to make strenuous efforts, 
including the use of reciprocal agreements, to gain access to foreign mineral 
resources, Its president, Herbert Hoover, became Secretary of Commerce when 
the Republican President Warren Harding took office in March 1921.
593 
7.1 US Suspicions of Britain 
The USA became suspicious of British intentions towards oil as early as January 
1916. During a House of Commons debate on economic warfare on 10 January, 
Walter Runciman, the President of the Board of Trade, commented that: 
we must carry further our investigation into the control of oil. We 
never seem to get to the bottom of that fact. We must see to it that 
the control of coal within this country, or within the Dominions, does 
not pass out of British hands.
594 
On 11 January, the New York Times reported the debate under the title 'British 
Planning World Oil Control.'
595 It quoted Runciman as saying that 'we must keep 
control of the world's coal; we must secure control of the supply of oil';
596 the 
first part was an accurate paraphrase of his comments on coal, but he did not 
make the comments on oil attributed to him by the newspaper. In 1920 David 
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White of the US Geological Survey published an article on 'The Petroleum 
Resources of the World'
597. It included lengthy quotes from a 1919 article by Sir 
Edward Edgar Mackay in Sperling's Journal. Mackay claimed that US oil reserves 
would soon be exhausted, leaving the USA dependent on British oil. White 
thought that some allowances had to be made for bias towards Britain and 
hyperbole in Mackay's opinions, but they backed White's case that the USA would 
soon be dependent on foreign oil. White cited an editorial from the 24 February 
1920 edition of the London Financial News, which claimed that Britain by then 
controlled at least 56 per cent of the world's oil, and perhaps 75 per cent if 
British owned fields in South America were added; this compared with only 2 per 
cent in 1914.
598 
In 1926 a book by John Ise, Professor of Economics at the University of Kansas, 
repeated the allegation that Runciman had in 1916 claimed that Britain planned 
to control the world's oil supplies, quoting the views of Mackay and of the 
Financial News. Mackay had repeated his views in 1923. Ise emphasised that 
Mackay stated that Britain had an intentional strategy of obtaining as much oil as 
possible, and then waiting until US supplies ran out. Ise cited Beeby Thompson, a 
pioneer of the Trinidad oil industry, as saying that this was the British policy. 
Thompson, unlike Mackay, opposed this strategy, as it was likely to lead to 
retaliation.
599 Ludwell Denny, writing in 1930, reported Mackay's views, which he 
said had been frequently quoted in the USA. He produced a statement allegedly 
made by Pretyman to The Times in May 1919, asserting that Britain by then 
controlled nearly half of the world's oil, compared with 2 per cent in 1914;
600 no 
such claim can be found in The Times' extensive digital archive.
601 Not only 
Americans re-produced Mackay's views; the French author Pierre L'Espagnol de la 
Tramerye and the Danish Professor Anton Mohr both quoted them.
602 Mohr 
pointed out that Sperling's Journal was the house publication of Sperling & Co., 
a bank of which Mackay was a director, but added that they had been re-printed 
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in the Philadelphia Public Ledger, making them well known in the USA. What 
none of the contemporary commentators mentioned was that Mackay was a 
private citizen expressing his personal opinion. He had no official position, and 
had not been participated in any of the several official British committees on oil 
policy as either a member or a witness. The wide circulation of his views 
encouraged American mistrust of Britain. 
Walter Long did have an official and senior position; in March 1920 he made a 
speech to the British Institute of Petroleum Technologists that raised US fears 
about British oil policy. According to Stephen Roskill, Long's comments were 
little reported in the UK but were repeated in American newspapers, including 
the New York Times.
603 It pointed out that the day after Long's speech a Senate 
Foreign Relations sub-committee had called on the President to send a US 
warship and marines to Batum to protect US citizens and property there and 
along the railway to Baku. Long had claimed that Britain had an opportunity to 
take control of the world's oil supplies. Doing so would give it complete freedom 
of action. The British government would be heavily criticised if it failed to take 
advantage of this chance. The newspaper stated that oil was as important to the 
USA as it was to Britain.
604 
In March 1920 Sir Auckland Geddes, Eric's brother, was appointed British 
Ambassador to Washington. In June he wrote to the Prime Minister setting out 
his thoughts on the USA. There was a lot of agitation against Britain; it was most 
strongly supported by Irish-Americans and, via them, most Catholics. Britain had 
a significant number of friends, but the majority of the country was just to the 
anti-British side of indifference. Most felt somehow slighted by Britain's 
possession of a bigger navy than the USN but admired Britain. There was a belief 
that the League of Nations was a British plan to enlist the US armed forces in 
support of British aims. Oil had been causing particular problems with the US 
public's attitude towards Britain. Geddes claimed that a recent speech of his had 
calmed things: 
The real thing that has been angering them was the idea sedulously 
propagated by the Press that Great Britain had obtained a monopoly 
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of the Oil of the world and was proposing to hold them to ransom. 
Since my New York speech last week in which I dealt with oil fairly 
fully, this particular symptom has disappeared and the disappearance 
has undoubtedly been extremely helpful in getting the people to think 
more sanely.
605 
In November Geddes telegrammed the Foreign Office about US attitudes towards 
Japan and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Throughout the USA there was suspicion 
of Japan; the problems that it faced because of its growing population, 
restricted territory and shortages of raw materials were acknowledged. The US 
did not desire a conflict with Japan but wanted to stop Japanese immigration to 
the USA. Most Americans would like to see an end to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance 
and the USA, Japan and Britain agree to an open door policy in China. The 
Senate was unlikely to agree to an alliance between Britain and the USA. An 
agreement with the President that the two countries would maintain sufficient 
naval strength in the Pacific to outnumber Japan could be concluded; it would 
last for the balance of his term in office. Despite opposition to renewal of the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, extending it would not strengthen the oil, Irish and 
other anti-British lobbies. It restrained the more extreme of the anti-British 
factions; deciding now not to renew it would be correct only if British policy was 
to avoid any disputes with the USA. He wanted it renewed but modified to 
comply with the League of Nations Charter.
606 
7.2 The USA and Overseas Oil 
The USA was concerned that it was being shut out of international markets. It 
was the world's largest oil producer, but Mexico was the only other country in 
which its oil companies had significant producing interests.
607 Rising demand and 
declining output were expected to soon make it a net importer. US plans for 
expansion of its merchant navy required international sources of oil. On 31 July 
1919, his last day as Chairman of the US Shipping Board, Edward Nash wrote to 
President Wilson urging the establishment of a worldwide bunker network to 
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supply US ships with fuel; this increasingly meant oil. Nash claimed that Britain 
had control over a wide range of oilfields throughout the world, with great 
future potential. These were mostly held by RDS but included APOC's Persian 
reserves. US merchant ships might not return to US ports for several years so 
would be dependent on foreign bunkering depots in two thirds of the world. 
Nash wanted the USA to set up its own chain of bunkering facilities to give its 
merchant fleet oil supplies around the world.
608 
In March 1920 US Senate Resolution 331 requested that the President inform it of 
any restrictions in foreign countries on oil development by US citizens and 
indicate what measures were being taken to guarantee equal treatment for US 
citizens. It singled out France, Britain, the Netherlands, Japan and Mexico.
609 A 
month later the State Department replied; US diplomats were well aware of the 
significance of oil, and produced timely reports on this issue, which were 
circulated to all relevant departments. They had been told to give all legitimate 
help to reputable US citizens and businesses attempting to obtain mineral 
concessions. They had been warned to be wary of US citizens acting for foreign 
interests and of US registered but foreign controlled companies. The State 
department had no means of encouraging overseas activity by US oil companies 
or restricting the actions of foreign ones.
610 A significant proportion of its report 
was devoted to restrictions on oil development by foreigners in British 
territory.
611 
Each territory of the British Empire had its own legislation on the oil industry. 
British strategy was to prevent foreigners from controlling any of the Empire's oil 
and to obtain oil supplies in other countries.
612 US citizens were kept out of the 
Persian oil industry by APOC's exclusive rights. In British occupied territories such 
as German East Africa and parts of the Ottoman Empire British policy appeared 
to be to prevent development of oilfields by maintaining the pre-war 
regulations. Palestine, then expected to be a rich oil province, was singled out. 
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Mesopotamia did not rate a separate mention, possibly because of the uncertain 
situation in the Ottoman Empire. Throughout the world restrictions on foreign 
involvement in the oil industry generally applied to all and did not single out 
Americans. The State Department regarded this as being inimical to good 
international relations but not illegal under international law. Foreigners were 
mostly excluded by governments and colonial administrations acting under 
discretionary powers. The use of these to discriminate against Americans was 
the soundest basis for US protests; the State Department was trying to obtain 
detailed information on specific cases of loss suffered by US oil interests 
overseas from the discriminatory application of executive powers. Future 
prospects for US investment in the overseas oil industry depended on reciprocal 
agreements with foreign governments.
613 
There was some confusion in the USA over the British government's relationship 
with RDS On 12 April 1921 Senator Henry Cabot Lodge claimed in a Senate 
speech that Austen Chamberlain had told Parliament that the British government 
controlled it. Avery Andrews wrote to Lodge on behalf of RDS explaining that 
this was not the case. Chamberlain, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, had stated 
that the British government retained its shareholding in APOC. A question was 
asked about this in the House of Commons about RDS' contract to buy oil from 
APOC. Greenwood declined to give any details as the government had agreed not 
to become involved in APOC's commercial activities. In April 1920 the 
government had been asked if it was in negotiations to purchase a controlling 
stake in RDS; it had replied that it was not.
614 Talks did take place over bringing 
Shell under British control; these did not involve the government buying a stake 
in it and could have resulted in the sale of the government shareholding in 
APOC. 
Claims in the overseas press that foreign oil companies were excluded from the 
British Empire led to the Petroleum Department preparing a memorandum 
putting forward the British point of view, which was presented to Parliament 
and published. A covering note from Curzon to the Ambassador to the USA, 
inviting him to use it when dealing with enquiries on the subject, made it clear 
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that it was the views of the US press that concerned the Foreign Office. Apart 
from Russia, whose demand had been reduced by the effects of the revolution 
on its economy, only the USA used more oil than Britain. World oil output in 
1920 totalled 67,000,000 tons; the solitary well in Britain produced only one ton, 
with Scottish shale oil contributing another 165,000 tons. Britain imported 
3,368,000 tons of oil; its annual imports had reached 5,160,000 tons during the 
war. British use per head of population was only a sixth of that of the USA, but 
British needs were high and had mostly to be imported. There was no policy to 
exclude foreign oil interests from the British Empire, but Britain's shortage of oil 
meant that such measure could be justifiable.
615 Table 7-1 shows that most 
British oil came from the USA: 
Table 7-1 Sources of British oil, 1920 
 Source  Quantity  Value 
USA  61%  68% 
Other foreign  37%  30% 
British Empire  2%  2% 
Source: PP, Miscellaneous No. 17 (1921). Despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at 
Washington Enclosing a Memorandum on the Petroleum Situation, 1921 [Cmd. 1351], p. 2. 
The restrictions on foreigners developing oilfields in the United Kingdom were 
wartime measures that had now been repealed; these restrictions were rather 
academic since little oil had been found in the United Kingdom, but their 
existence was criticised by the Americans. There was no general policy to 
exclude foreigners, but there were local restrictions in some parts of the 
Empire. The largest producer in the Empire was India, but it was a net importer 
of oil; leases had been given only to British subjects or to companies controlled 
by British subjects. This was normally the case on Crown land in Trinidad, the 
second largest producer, but an exception had been made for a US company. 
Egypt and Sarawak were other significant producers without nationality 
restrictions. There were no restrictions in Egypt. In Canada and parts of Australia 
leases could be granted only to British registered companies. This did not 
exclude foreigners since the largest oil company in Canada was Imperial Oil, a 
British registered subsidiary of Standard (NJ). The regulations in British Guiana, 
British Honduras, Nigeria, Kenya and Brunei were similar to those in Trinidad. 
There were no restrictions in South Africa, New Zealand, Newfoundland, 
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Jamaica, Barbados, Brunei or British North Borneo; little oil had been found in 
any of these places. The British Government had no say in the granting of an 
exclusive concession to APOC by Persia. Britain insisted that the claim 
sometimes made that it controlled half of the world's oil was based on poor data 
and assumptions. Britain had temporarily lost its investments in south Russia, 
and its stake in Romania was no greater than that of the USA, France or the 
Netherlands. The USA produced two thirds of the world's oil, held a large share 
of the Mexican oilfields and was well placed to participate in the development 
of South American oilfields. The questions of Iraq and Palestine had been dealt 
with in separate correspondence with the USA. Concessions granted before the 
war had to be considered.
616 
There were restrictions on foreign investment in parts of the British Empire, but 
Britain's main problem was that little oil had been found in its territory. There 
was a lot of oil in the British Empire, but most of it could not be developed with 
the technology of the 1920s. The British controlled oil province that mattered to 
both Britain and the US industry was Iraq. British control of Iraq, including the 
oil of Mosul, appeared to have been guaranteed by the Treaty of Sèvres and the 
Anglo-French San Remo Agreement. The resurgence of Turkey under Kemal and 
the Iraqi revolt meant that it was uncertain if Britain would retain control over 
Mosul. Before that was resolved, the Washington Conference would deal with 
some of the other issues affecting Anglo-American relation. 
7.3 The Washington Conference and Oil 
In July 1921 President Harding invited Britain, France, Italy and Japan to a 
conference in Washington to discuss both disarmament and Far Eastern matters. 
Britain was rumoured to be about to organise a conference on the Far East, and 
the US wanted to control the agenda. Harding's Secretary of State, Charles 
Hughes, desired parity between the USN and the RN but was happy if this could 
be achieved without completing the US 1916 programme. He saw Japan as the 
main threat to the USA and wanted to end the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The 
British had accepted the principle of naval parity with the USN but thought that 
they would have to build eight expensive capital ships to maintain it; the RN 
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would slip to third place if the USA and Japan completed their construction 
programmes and Britain did nothing. They realised that the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance was an impediment to good relations with the USA; it would have to be 
at least heavily modified and probably ended. 
Hughes opened the conference with an offer to scrap all the capital ships from 
the 1916 building programme. Other countries had to stop building capital ships 
and must scrap enough older ones to arrive at a ratio of 5 US, 5 British, 3 
Japanese, 1.67 French and 1.67 Italian. The USN had argued that it needed to be 
twice the size of the IJN but was over-ruled by Hughes. It was agreed that one of 
the Japanese battleships and two of the US ones then building could be 
completed. Britain, whose battleships were older, was allowed to build two, but 
to the new limits of 35,000 tons displacement and 16 inch guns rather than the 
larger vessels that had been planned. The greater age of Britain's ships also 
meant that the RN was initially allowed a greater tonnage of capital ships than 
the USN; equality would be achieved as ships were scrapped and replaced 
according to an agreed timetable. All types of ship were restricted in armament 
and displacement; only capital ships and aircraft carriers had a limit placed on 
their total tonnage. The French rejected a British attempt to ban submarines, 
leading Britain to block US proposals to introduce a tonnage limit for cruisers 
and destroyers. Some in Britain, including Churchill, thought that the RN could 
maintain an advantage over the USN by superiority in cruisers. This would create 
friction between the two countries later in the decade. The French refused to 
discuss land disarmament without American and British security guarantees, 
which were not forthcoming. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was replaced by a 
Four Power Treaty under which Britain, France, Japan and the USA agreed to 
respect each other's existing positions in the Pacific. The five naval powers plus 
Belgium, China, the Netherlands and Portugal signed the Nine Power Treaty, 
which was supposed to guarantee an open door policy in China but offered no 
means of enforcing it. The conference closed with the signing of the naval 
disarmament treaty on 6 February 1922. 
Britain went to Washington accepting parity with the USA in capital ships and 
wanting a 50 per cent margin over Japan, but expecting to have to spend heavily 
on new construction to maintain these standards. It came away with equality 
with the USA, a 67 per cent superiority over Japan and better than a two power 205 
standard in Europe. It was able to considerably reduce its construction budget. 
The Washington Treaty banned the development of naval bases within a 
specified zone of the Pacific. The Japanese asked for this in return for accepting 
a ratio of 60 per cent of the strength of the RN and USN rather than the 70 per 
cent that they desired. This prevented the USN from basing its main Pacific fleet 
at the Philippines or Guam; Japan was not so inconvenienced but did have 
potential bases within this area. Britain had already decided to develop 
Singapore, which was outside the prohibited zone, rather than Hong Kong, which 
was inside it. The Admiralty was unhappy with the impact of the 10 year 
construction holiday on the shipbuilding industry, but Britain could have few 
complaints with the Treaty; it was left in a relatively stronger position than it 
could have achieved by trying to compete with US naval construction.
617  
Lord Lee wrote in his diary that he was delighted by Hughes's initial proposal, 
which removed the risk of Britain having to enter an expensive naval race with 
the USA.
618 Eric Grove argues that the Treaty was better for Britain than for any 
of the other participants. The main negative was that Japan was now a possible 
opponent rather than an ally.
619 France appeared to be the big loser of the 
Treaty. It had been the world's second naval power for much of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries; it was now joint fourth with Italy, a potential enemy 
in the Mediterranean that did not have France's global empire. Joel Blatt 
contends that France came out of Washington better than is often argued, and 
that French access to Middle Eastern oil was a factor in this. Its naval strategy 
concentrated on the Mediterranean, where it had three missions; transporting 
colonial troops to France, protecting imperial communications and convoying 
Middle Eastern oil to France. The French were shocked that Hughes's proposals 
left them inferior to Japan but decided that capital ship equality with Italy was 
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acceptable as they could obtain overall superiority by outbuilding Italy in oil 
fuelled cruisers, destroyers and submarines.
620  
Washington discouraged the move towards diesel engined battleships that had 
been expected by Fisher and others because it limited the standard 
displacement of warships, which excluded fuel. Steam turbines used three times 
as much fuel as diesel engines but were lighter. A ship with oil fired steam 
turbines would have a lower standard displacement than an otherwise equal 
vessel with diesel engines. Few surface warships were ever fitted with diesels as 
their main engines; the most famous exceptions were the German Deutschland 
class, popularly known as pocket battleships. Diesels were more common in 
merchant ships, which emphasised fuel economy over displacement, but British 
ship owners were relatively slow to adopt them.
621 
7.3.1 Oil and the Conference 
The British did not want to discuss oil at the conference, but were afraid that 
the USA would bring it up. Long and Pretyman, both retired from office, wrote 
separately to Lloyd George on this subject. Long's letter of 29 September stated 
that he was worried that the US would attempt to add oil to the agenda. 
Standard (NJ) had realised that it needed oil supplies from outside the USA in 
order to protect its market position, but faced competition from British 
companies. Britain might then be forced to make a compromise on oil that was 
contrary to its interests in order to conclude an agreement on disarmament. If it 
was too late to exclude oil, Long recommended that Lloyd-Greame, the minister 
responsible for oil, be added to the British delegation.
622 Lloyd-George replied 
that oil was not relevant to the subject matter of the conference, and that he 
was not aware of it being added to the agenda. He would consider Long's views if 
this changed.
623  
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Pretyman brought an article published in The Times on 5 November 1921 to the 
Prime Minister's attention. It argued that the Anglo-American oil dispute was an 
obstacle to success at the conference. British oil policy was driven by the 
Admiralty, whilst Standard (NJ) had a major say in US foreign oil policy. The 
American oil industry thought that Britain was trying to control global oil 
supplies. The newspaper contended that this was untrue. It was understandable 
that the government stake in APOC, attempts to increase British influence over 
RDS and the San Remo Agreement with France concerned the Americans. The 
RN's need to ensure its oil supplies and the US industry's desire to maintain its 
profits and supplies created a conflict.  
The Times suggested that the solution was that the government should sell its 
stake in APOC and cut its links to RDS. In wartime oil supplies were secured by 
control of the oceans and of oilfields rather than by ownership of oil companies. 
Government ownership had forced APOC into poor commercial decisions, such as 
drilling on British territory rather than on foreign lands more likely to yield oil. 
Britain should agree to the US desire to open the door to oilfields on its 
territories; this would produce greater supplies and would not harm national 
security.
624 The Petroleum Department thought that its author was well 
informed. It might be Sydney Brooks who had links to US oil companies. It could 
not have come from RDS as it wrongly claimed that the British Government had a 
financial interest in that group.
625 The article provoked replies from both 
companies. Each wished to correct a single point but made no criticism of the 
article's overall argument. Walter Samuel of Shell refuted the claim that the 
government had any involvement with his group.
626 Charles Greenway of APOC 
denied that the government had forced his company to make decisions on non-
commercial grounds.
627  
Lloyd George replied to Pretyman thanking him for bringing the article to his 
attention; he had not seen it, suggesting that oil was not a high priority for him 
at that time. The Prime Minister stated that all involved worried that the USA 
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might bring up oil at Washington. There had been no suggestion that they would. 
They were very keen that the conference should succeed and would not want to 
risk failure by introducing a contentious issue. Balfour, the head of the British 
delegation, had been instructed that he should say that he had not been briefed 
on it and could not discuss it without consulting the government and bringing oil 
experts to Washington. Cadman would be in New York on APOC business, and 
could be called upon if necessary.
628 Pretyman told Lloyd-Greame that he was 
entirely satisfied with this reply.
629 Cadman's presence in the USA was very 
convenient, but there is nothing in Curzon's briefing letter to Balfour on the 
subject to suggest that it was anything other than a fortunate coincidence. 
Curzon wrote that: 
The possibility of the United States Government‟s adding “oil” as an 
item to the agenda of the Disarmament Conference has received the 
earnest consideration of His Majesty‟s Government, and as a result of 
discussions with the various Departments concerned it had been 
decided that the British Delegates should if possible resist any 
attempt to induce the Conference to deal with the question of oil. 
I should however state, for your information, that Sir John Cadman, 
K.C.M.G., late of the Petroleum Department and now a Director of the 
Anglo-Persian Oil Company, is proceeding on business of the Company 
to New York, where he will be available for consultation by the British 
Delegation in the event of a discussion of the oil question being forced 
upon the British Delegation to the Conference.
630 
The US oil industry press had anticipated that oil would be discussed at 
Washington. On 9 November the Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter argued that oil 
was certain to be discussed at the conference and claimed that the State 
Department had studied the issue in detail. It expected the US to propose that 
the nations represented agreed to treat each others' nationals equally when 
allocating oil concessions and to eliminate waste. A permanent international oil 
conference would be established.
631 The 5 December issue of the National 
Petroleum News argued that Hughes would not introduce it from the start but 
would do so at the appropriate moment. The State Department had gathered an 
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enormous amount of information on the issue.
632 These articles sounded well 
informed, but oil was not discussed at the conference. It may be that they were 
part of a lobbying campaign by the oil industry to put it on the agenda, and that 
Lloyd George was correct in thinking that the US government would not want to 
risk the conference failing by introducing a divisive issue. Another possibility is 
that they planned to do so but were dissuaded by the conciliatory interviews and 
speeches given by Cadman. 
In the 7 December issue of the National Petroleum News the article immediately 
preceding the one on the forthcoming Washington Conference was an interview 
with Cadman; the Cadman article had a larger headline. He insisted that Britain 
did not have a policy of excluding US oil companies and realised that it needed 
their expertise and capital. Misunderstandings had arisen between Britain and 
the USA because of differences in the ways that both businessmen and 
politicians expressed themselves in the two countries. This was compounded by 
propaganda from newspapers and individuals who wanted to stir up distrust 
between them.
633  
The next day he gave a speech to the Annual Meeting of the American Petroleum 
Institute, entitled 'As John Bull Views It.'
634 He was in the USA to visit refineries 
and oilfields to learn about current practices ahead of taking up his new post 
with APOC and wanted to take the opportunity to correct some 
misunderstanding over British oil policy. The British government had no say in 
the management of APOC, despite its shareholding, and owned no shares in RDS. 
He opposed political interference in commercial operations but urged co-
operation between governments and companies. Britain did not have a policy of 
excluding foreign oil companies from its Empire. Some restrictions had been 
introduced, for example in India when the industry was in its infancy; it was 
then necessary to encourage local companies and to prevent large ones from 
leaving fields undeveloped. The modern oil industry required so much capital 
and knowledge that it would be wrong to exclude any companies. Britain did not 
operate a closed door policy; the countries of the Empire made their own laws, 
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but he did not think that any of them would block foreign investment in their oil 
industries. The oil of Mesopotamia would be developed for the benefit of Iraq. 
The San Remo Agreement was not directed against any country.  
7.4 The Door Opens to the Americans 
The conciliatory speeches and interviews given by Cadman in 1921-22 laid the 
basis for the door to Iraq to open to the Americans. Britain was keen to remove 
areas of Anglo-American tension. Negotiations were left to the companies, but 
the governments were kept informed. At the start of February 1922 Churchill 
replied to a letter sent to him by Curzon late the previous year. He agreed that 
keeping the Americans out of Iraqi oil would give Britain continued problems in 
the Middle East. TPC's concession was not certain to be approved if it went to 
international arbitration, as the Americans had suggested. An official invitation 
could suggest that the British were concerned that the TPC claim was weak. It 
would be better if the first move came from Standard (NJ). A proposal for co-
operation between APOC and Standard (NJ) in north Persia might lead to the 
companies working together in Iraq.
635 The change of government did not affect 
the policy of opening the door to the Americans. In December 1922 the 
Admiralty wrote to the Colonial Office stressing the importance of British control 
of Mosul but indicating that the makeup of companies was less significant.
636 
7.4.1 North Persia 
A precedent for Anglo-American oil co-operation was set in north Persia. D'Arcy 
had declined oil rights in five northern provinces because he thought that 
competition from Russian oil would make them unprofitable. In November 1921 
Standard (NJ) was granted the concession in this area.
637  
On 12 January 1922 Lloyd-Graeme told Churchill that coming to an equitable 
deal with Standard (NJ) in Iraq was the only way to avoid continuing disputes 
with the USA there and in the rest of the world. Cadman had been negotiating 
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with Standard (NJ) on behalf of APOC over an equal shares of its north Persian 
concession. Lloyd-Graeme was hopeful that this would lead to a settlement in 
Iraq but believed that it was essential that the first move should come from 
Standard (NJ); it was vital not to show any uncertainty over the solidity of the 
British position.
638 Three days later Sir Auckland Geddes reported from 
Washington that the two companies had reached agreement.
639 The Foreign 
Office was in favour of the combination but opposed the proposal that Standard 
(NJ) alone should give Persia a loan; it feared that this would make the Persians 
think that their policy of playing the Americans off against the British had 
succeeded.
640 Lloyd-Graeme thought that the agreement was vital; arguing about 
the loan would jeopardise negotiations that the British government had 
instigated.
641 
 The loan issue was settled by financing it from the oil royalties, but the 
proposed alliance between Standard (NJ) and APOC in north Persia was never 
finalised. The Persians objected because Standard (NJ)'s concession was not 
transferable to foreigners. Standard (NJ) became concerned that oil might not 
be found and wanted to be able to exit within a year. The Persians offered the 
concession to Sinclair, another US company, but it withdrew after it was 
implicated in the bribery scandal over the US naval oil reserves at Teapot Dome 
in Wyoming. The significance of the abortive negotiations was that they brought 
Standard (NJ) and APOC closer together.
642 
7.4.2 Palestine 
Standard (NJ) had been granted a concession in Palestine by the Ottoman Empire 
before the war. In early 1920 it asked for permission to explore for oil. Britain 
refused on the grounds that it was unwilling to permit such activities in occupied 
enemy territory until its future had been settled. An application in May 1919 by 
the Zionist Organization of America to send two geologists to Palestine had been 
accepted on condition that they were visiting in a private capacity and not on 
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behalf of any company.
643 In September 1921 Standard (NJ) renewed its request 
via the US Ambassador to London; the Foreign Office forwarded it to the Colonial 
Office, pointing out that Curzon blamed the USA for the lack of progress in 
granting the mandate for Palestine.
644 Churchill agreed with Curzon over the 
delay to the mandate but did not want to use this to block the application 
unnecessarily or to miss a chance to remove a source of Anglo-American 
antagonism, however minor. It should be made clear that granting permission 
did not imply an acceptance of the validity of Standard (NJ)'s concession. The 
High Commissioner in Palestine should be consulted first.
645 Standard (NJ)'s 
request was accepted; the Foreign Office noted that the existence of the 
concession had been a factor in the decision but insisted that this did not 
prejudice its validity. Standard (NJ) would not be allowed to develop any 
discoveries until the terms of the mandate had been agreed and had to provide 
the Palestine government with full details of its discoveries.
646 Little oil was 
found in Palestine, but this shows the British desire to remove a relatively minor 
source of tension with the USA. 
7.4.3 TPC and the USA 
The British government wanted Iraqi oil to be developed by the TPC, with the 
revenue accruing to Iraq. Britain would have a secure source of supply and the 
oil rather than Britain would fund Iraq. In June 1921 Hankey asked Churchill on 
behalf of the prime minister whether Iraqi oil should be developed by the British 
government or a private company. Churchill replied out that the correspondence 
between the Foreign Office and the US Government said that the Anglo-French 
Petroleum Agreement was based on the TPC's claim. As other interests were to 
be excluded on the grounds that the TPC's claim was valid the oil could not be 
developed other than by private companies. If it were to be developed by a 
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government it would be the Iraqi, not the British one; it would be far better if 
the work was carried out by a British company.
647  
Two months later Churchill wrote that ministers had decided on 23 January 1920 
that Iraqi oil revenue should go to the state rather than to private companies. 
This did not rule out operation of the fields by a private company, which would 
pay royalties to the government. An Arab government was now being formed, 
making it inconsistent for Britain to own or develop the fields. Whilst arguing in 
favour of the TPC's claim to the concession Curzon had stated that neither this 
nor San Remo would prevent the Arab State from receiving the benefits of 
ownership or deciding the terms of development. Churchill thought that 
development of the oilfields should not be further delayed.
648 
In March 1922 he told the cabinet that work had yet not started. The High 
Commissioner for Iraq wanted to expedite the exploitation of Iraqi oil. This 
would solve political and financial problems. Iraq, despite its unexploited oil 
reserves, was suffering from high fuel prices. The railways were making a loss, 
largely because of fuel costs. It might be uneconomic to run the irrigation pumps 
of the Baghdad region, which were vital for agriculture, unless kerosene prices 
fell. Iraqis could not understand why the British, who would benefit from the 
prosperity of Iraq, were holding up development of Iraq's most significant natural 
resource. The reasons for the delay were that work could not proceed until the 
issues of mandates and the TPC concession had been settled with the USA. 
Britain could give up the TPC claim; the problem with this was the vigour with 
which Britain had publicly defended it. It could be submitted to arbitration, but 
it was not certain that Britain would win, as the claim was based on diplomatic 
rather than legal considerations.  
One option was that the TPC would carry out exploration across the country and 
choose a certain number of areas to develop. The Iraqi Government could then 
offer licences to other companies covering the rest of the country. The problem 
was that this would confirm the monopolistic nature of the TPC concession. An 
alternative was to offer Standard (NJ) a percentage of either the oil or the 
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shares of the TPC. The Colonial Office and the Foreign Office agreed that the 
best course of action was to allow US oil companies into the TPC; the Petroleum 
Department and APOC were understood to concur. An informal committee had 
decided that if Britain made the first move it might seem that it doubted the 
legality of the TPC claim. Initial negotiations should take place on a commercial 
basis with Standard (NJ) being manoeuvred into making the initial move. This 
had already happened following the successful negotiations between APOC and 
Standard (NJ) over the North Persian oil concessions.
649 
In April a meeting took place between Bedford of Standard (NJ), who was 
representing a consortium of US oil companies, and Greenway and Cadman of 
APOC. Bedford said that he wanted British and US oil companies to co-operate 
and would prefer it if discussions proceeded on a purely commercial basis, 
without political considerations. Greenway agreed but pointed out that the 
British government had been involved in the TPC. Bedford wanted US companies 
to be allowed to take a stake in the TPC and thought that he could persuade the 
US government to agree to this. Greenway said that, before talks could begin 
with the US companies, the US government would have to accept the validity of 
the TPC concession or at least that any discussions would not prejudice the TPC's 
claims.
650 The US consortium, the Near East Development Corporation, initially 
comprised Standard (NJ), Standard (NY), Gulf, Atlantic Refining, Texas, Mexican 
and Sinclair.
651 In June 1922 the State Department informed Bedford that it 
insisted on the principle of the open door and did not recognise that the TPC 
concession was valid. It did not want to stop US companies from exploiting 
commercial opportunities and had no objections to negotiations between US and 
British companies on two conditions. All US companies that wanted to 
participate should be allowed to do so, and the US government would not accept 
the legality of the TPC concession without an impartial investigation of the 
issue. The concession could be confirmed or a new one issued if US companies 
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reached agreement with the TPC. Bedford informed the State Department that 
the consortium comprised all the US companies interested in Iraq.
652 
Standard (NJ) took the lead. In July Walter Teagle, its President, came to 
London to negotiate a US stake in the TPC. The French and RDS had to be 
persuaded. Cadman told Clarke that the French regarded their stake in the TPC 
as an option, leaving them free to accept a better offer if one came along.
653 
According to Clarke Deterding of Royal Dutch would agree to bring the 
Americans into the TPC only if it was necessary in order to proceed with 
development of Iraqi oil.
654 The French had not yet formed a company to take up 
their stake, and their delegates had limited powers. They had no objection to 
including the Americans providing that it was not at the expense of their 
stake.
655 They tried to use the negotiations to alter the San Remo Agreement.
656 
Churchill thought that problems arose because the French were represented by 
government officials at what were supposed to be commercial negotiations. 
They asked for diplomatic concessions when only financial aspects were 
supposed to be discussed.
657 Most of their requests were rejected except that 
that the clause that France would contribute disproportionately to any Iraqi 
stake was changed to make it come proportionately from all shareholders.
658 By 
December APOC and RDS had agreed that each of them, the US consortium and 
the French would have 24 per cent of the TPC. Gulbenkian would have four per 
cent instead of the five per cent he had been given in 1914; his shares would be 
non-voting. This required agreement from the Americans and the French. 
Lancelot Oliphant of the Foreign Office feared that the slowness of the French in 
taking up their stake in the TPC suggested that they might see it as an option, 
and were awaiting a clear acceptance of the company's rights. He wanted future 
discussions with the French to be undertaken by the TPC on a commercial 
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basis.
659 It took several years to finalise everything, but the participants were 
moving slowly towards agreement. 
7.5 British Naval Strategy and Oil after Washington 
The result of the Conference required some adjustments be made to RN 
planning. In August 1921 the Committee on National Expenditure, normally 
called the Geddes Committee after its chairman, Sir Eric Geddes, was 
established. It produced three interim reports between December 1921 and 
February 1922; the armed forces were dealt with in the first of these.
660 The 
Navy Estimates for 1922-23 were approximately £81,000,000, of which 
£11,800,000 was for the construction, currently suspended, of four new capital 
ships. The committee made no recommendations on this or on any cost savings 
that might arise from the Washington Conference.
661 It thought that it might be 
feasible to make major savings on oil fuel for the fleet but did not consider this 
because it was 'a matter of high policy.'
662 It should be possible to reduce the 
Naval Estimates to £60,000,000 in 1922-23 and lower levels in later years.
663 
Substantial cuts were also proposed in the Army and Air Estimates; in neither 
case was oil and petrol mentioned as a separate item.
664 The third and final 
report concluded by saying that the specific cuts identified by the committee 
were £13,250,000 short of the £100,000,000 target. It was confident that the 
gap could be made up from three sources; reduced naval spending resulting from 
the Washington Conference; cuts in expenditure in naval oil stocks; and 
reduction in military garrisons abroad.
665 The Admiralty argued that it was not 
possible to make such drastic savings.
666 Beatty left the Washington Conference 
before it ended to defend the RN from Geddes. Eric Grove argues that he did a 
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good job.
667 The Cabinet established a committee, chaired by Churchill, to 
examine Geddes's recommendations for cuts in defence expenditure. the 
Washington Conference had concluded by the time that it reported.
668 
Churchill's Committee pointed out that Geddes had ignored inflation when 
comparing 1914 and current defence spending. Churchill agreed with his 
recommendation that an body to co-ordinate the three armed forces was 
needed. A Ministry of Defence might eventually fill this role; for now the CID 
should do so. Geddes had come up with specific savings of £14,500,000 in the 
Naval Estimates of £81,000,000, and claimed that a total of £21,000,000 could 
be saved, before any potential reductions resulting from the Washington 
Conference. Churchill's committee had considered only the post-Washington 
position but could not see how £21,000,000 could have been saved without a 
successful Washington Conference. Failure at Washington would have brought 
the world close to war in the Pacific. There would have been a naval building 
race between the USA and Japan requiring major construction by Britain unless 
it was prepared to allow the RN to fall to second or third place. Britain had now 
accepted a one power standard, giving it equal naval strength with the USA, but 
its situation was inferior to that of the USA; Britain, unlike the USA, was 
dependent on food imports. Good relations with the USA had to be maintained; 
it was hoped that US naval strength might decline during a long peace. The RN 
had to be kept up to the standard of the USN, which did not mean equality of all 
factors. If the RN was regarded as weaker than the USN, Britain's place and 
influence in the world would be diminished. The Dominions would think that the 
centre of the Anglo-Saxon world had moved to the USA.  
The most probable opponent was Japan; the CID should look at it as a matter of 
urgency. Before the introduction of oil the RN was far more mobile than any 
other fleet in the world because of Britain's network of global coaling stations. 
Beatty said that the USA could not oppose Japan across the Pacific. Britain could 
not hold Hong Kong against Japan, and could not hold Singapore unless it was 
adequately defended. A fleet able to fight Japan could not be based at 
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Singapore until oil stocks were established there and on the route to it. The oil 
fuelling depots and the Singapore base should be discreetly built up.
669  
Naval Estimates of £62,000,000 after the savings resulting from the Washington 
Conference were recommended. This was £2,000,000 more than Geddes had 
proposed without considering Washington. Table 7-2 shows that the Churchill 
Committee suggested cuts in defence expenditure that, whilst substantial, were 
not as much as the Geddes Committee had wanted. 
Table 7-2 Defence expenditure cuts: proposals of Geddes and Churchill Committees 
Service 
Estimates, 
1921-22 
Sketch 
Estimates, 
1922-23 
Geddes 
Committee, 
1922-23 
Churchill 
Committee, 
1922-23 
Savings 
proposed by 
Geddes 
Savings 
proposed by 
Churchill 
RN 
 £  
82,479,000  
 £  
81,183,800  
 £  
60,000,000  
 £  
61,883,800  
 £  
21,183,800  
 £  
19,300,000  
Army 
 £ 
118,000,000  
 £  
75,197,800  
 £  
55,000,000  
 £  
58,549,800  
 £  
20,197,800  
 £  
16,648,000  
RAF 
 £  
18,411,000  
 £  
12,957,000  
 £   
7,457,000  
 £  
10,750,000  
 £   
5,500,000  
 £   
2,207,000  
Iraq and 
Palestine 
(military)    
 £  
12,720,700     
 £   
8,000,000     
 £   
4,720,700  
Total 
 £ 
218,890,000  
 £ 
182,059,300  
 £ 
122,457,000  
 £ 
139,183,600  
 £  
46,881,600  
 £  
42,875,700  
Source: Source: CAB 24/132 CP 3692 'Report of Cabinet Committee appointed to examine 
Part I (Defence Departments) of the Report of the Geddes Committee on National 
Expenditure., Winston S. Churchill. 4 February 1922. 
The Admiralty said that the Washington Conference meant that it could accept a 
slower rate of build up of oil stocks. It had asked for £2,000,000 to be included 
in the 1922-23 Sketch Estimate for oil stocks on the route to Singapore. The 
Treasury had stated that no more than £1,500,000 could be spent on storage and 
reserves. This was originally unacceptable to the Admiralty. The intended Pacific 
agreement meant that it could now accept this for one year only. Other savings, 
detailed in Table 7-3, meant that a total of £2,321,000 could be saved on fuel 
costs. This was the second largest contributor to a saving of £19,300,100 on the 
Naval Estimates, which were reduced to £61,750,000. The biggest cut was 
£9,839,700 in the capital ship programme. The Admiralty insisted that it was 
impossible to cut fuel costs any further. The RN's mobility required adequate 
stocks of oil; Britain was dependent on US oil until reserves could be built up. 
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This was unacceptable as it gave the USA diplomatic power over Britain. It was 
suggested that global oil interests might combine, making Britain dependent on 
them. Building up a reserve by buying consistent amounts annually saved money 
because it allowed oil to be purchased on long term contracts and transport to 
be planned. British naval policy was to have a war reserve at home and abroad 
for both naval and commercial needs. The conversion of the fleet from coal to 
oil meant that oil bunkering facilities had to be set up at strategic ports. Coal 
bunkering had been easier to provide as coal could be stored in the open if 
necessary, and did not need specialist ships to transport it.
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Table 7-3 Fuel cost savings proposed by Admiralty to Churchill Committee 
Item  Saving  Total 
Fuel costs, 1921-22 Estimates      £ 10,044,000  
Fuel costs, 1922-23 Sketch Estimates      £  7,075,500  
Saving from slower build up of stock on route to Singapore   £  500,000     
Reduced sea time by Atlantic and Mediterranean Fleets   £  180,000     
Laying up of Royal Fleet Auxiliaries   £  285,000     
Abolition of 25,000 ton oil contingency reserve   £  100,000     
Reduction in overseas freighters resulting from items above   £  100,000     
Saving from lower prices   £ 1,156,000     
Savings in labour costs   £     1,500     
Total saving on fuel costs from Sketch Estimates 
 
 £  2,322,500  
Fuel costs, proposed 1922-23 Naval Estimates      £  4,753,000  
Source: CAB 24/132 CP 3692A 'Appendices to Report of Cabinet Committee appointed to 
examine Part I (Defence Departments) of the Report of the Geddes Committee on National 
Expenditure', Secretary, 4 February 1922, pp. 9-10. 
The most important part of the Admiralty's oil programme was establishing 
reserves in and on the route to the Far East; this would allow a large fleet to sail 
to Singapore to protect India, Australasia and Britain's Far East interests. The 
original plan was that it should have been possible to send a fleet to Singapore 
by 1925; the 10 year rule meant that oil stocks sufficient for a war with Japan 
would not have been built up until 1929. The reduction in capital ships and the 
Four Power Agreement agreed at the Washington Conference allowed savings to 
be made. Completion of the home and overseas oil reserves could be delayed 
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until 1929; the £500,000 reduction in expenditure on oil in 1922-23 assumed that 
subsequent estimates were adjusted upwards. The Admiralty insisted that these 
proposals should not prevent it from asking for greater storage and build up of 
reserves in the future if required by changes in the international political 
situation.
671 The eventual Naval Estimates for 1922-23 totalled £64,883,700, 
including £4,635,000 on fuel. The Admiralty had requested that the reduction in 
build up of stocks on the route to Singapore be delayed for only a year, but 
there was a further fall in fuel expenditure to £4,290,000 out of total Naval 
Estimates of £58,000,000 the next year.
672 
In July 1922 the naval staff submitted a paper on the impact of the Washington 
Conference on Imperial naval planning. It argued that the USN could not do 
anything to prevent Japanese aggression in the Western Pacific because of the 
prohibition on it developing any naval bases west of Hawaii. This would leave 
the British Empire to deal with such actions alone. The Four Power Treaty meant 
that a conference would be held in an attempt to resolve any disputes in the 
Pacific. This reduced the risk of war but would not allow much time for military 
preparation if diplomatic efforts failed. The chances of there being a war in the 
next 10 years were regarded as small but provision still had to be made for the 
defence of the Empire. The safety of the Empire, including the Dominions, 
depended on the maintenance of naval communications. The Admiralty 
continued to believe that the best solution was the formation of a single 
Imperial Navy, but this was opposed by the Dominions. The base at Singapore 
and global oil stocks were vital to the strategy to move the main fleet to Asia in 
the event of war. The Admiralty wanted the Dominions to contribute to the 
construction of Singapore, either financially or with materials. They, along with 
India and some colonies, should establish the oil reserves that had already been 
recommended.
673 
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Financial constraints prevented the Admiralty from building up its oil stocks as 
quickly as it would have wished. On 14 December 1922 Amery recorded in his 
diary that the Admiralty had agreed to postpone completion of the home oil 
reserve until 1937 provided that it could finish the Singapore one by 1931 and 
the stocks on the route to Singapore by 1935.
674 In August 1923 the Financial 
Secretary to the Treasury, William Joynson-Hicks, argued that the home reserve 
of 4,500,000 tons, equal to 12 months' consumption of the then planned fleet, 
was more than was needed. By March 1923 2,457,560 tons of storage had been 
completed. This was enough for more than six months' consumption at the rate 
assumed in 1919; the reduction in the size of the fleet after Washington should 
mean lower consumption. There would be no difficulty in buying oil except in 
the event of war with the USA, which Johnson-Hicks did not think was a feasible 
proposition. The existing home reserve should be enough for hostilities with any 
European Power or Turkey. Separate provision was being made for a conflict 
with Japan. The oil price would rise in wartime, but wartime purchases might 
still be cheaper than stock bought years before at peacetime prices once 
compound interest was factored in. When the stocks were complete, the annual 
interest bill on the cost of purchase would be £1,000,000. He wanted the home 
oil reserves to be set at six months.
675  
A flaw in his arguments was that the ships scrapped after Washington were older 
coal burners. The Washington Treaty required Britain to scrap 20 capital ships 
immediately, and another four once the two new battleships were completed; 
all burnt a mixture of coal and oil. Fifteen of the 20 to be retained would be 
entirely oil fired; two light battle cruisers would be converted into aircraft 
carriers, giving Britain five, all exclusively oil burning.
676 The Director of Plans 
wrote to the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff proposing that the Naval Staff 
should again consider the oil position. If the RN's current demands for oil stocks 
were reasonable extending the time taken to establish them or reducing the 
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amounts supplied would eventually create problems. If they were too great the 
country's economic position required that they were reduced.
677  
The paper reiterated that the reasons why the RN required large oil reserves. It 
depended on oil, very little of which was produced in the British Empire, making 
the mobility of the fleet and much of the Merchant Marine reliant upon foreign 
supplies. Special tankers and storage facilities were required. Britain had 
suffered an oil crisis in 1917; oil would be even more significant in a later war. 
The Admiralty concluded in 1919 that 12 months' war usage was the appropriate 
level of reserves. This was accepted by the Cabinet; the decision was reviewed 
and confirmed by the CID in 1921 and again in 1922. The latter review concluded 
that the oil reserves should total 8,139,000 tons. The Treasury now proposed 
home reserves of only six months' war expenditure. In the final year of the 
recent war, 24,000,000 tons of coal and 3,769,000 tons of oil had been used. 
This was for a war of relatively limited mobility. The fleet was now almost 
entirely oil burning, and the use of oil by merchant ships had risen since 1918. 
These factors suggested that the 1922 estimate was too low, especially for a war 
fought a long way from home waters. The new estimates are given in Table 7-4. 
These were thought to be conservative since they did not allow for losses of oil 
by attacks on tankers or storage facilities, any working margin or possible growth 
in oil usage by merchant ships; extrapolation of the growth rate of the last three 
years would take this to 4,000,000 tons, rather than the 2,000,000 estimated. 
Supplies from British controlled sources, such as Persia and Egypt were assumed 
to cover these risks, but these could be disrupted by enemy action or by 
technical or labour problems.
678 
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Table 7-4 Naval oil reserves required and adopted, 1923 
Usage  Tons 
Fleet including armed merchant 
cruisers      4,767,000  
Auxiliaries and transports directly 
concerned with operations      2,510,000  
Merchant Marine      2,000,000  
Total required      9,277,000  
Reserves    
Home      4,500,000  
Abroad      2,639,000  
Not determined      1,000,000  
Total currently adopted      8,139,000  
Source: NA, ADM 1/8673/234, 'Oil Fuel Reserves. Memorandum for the Committee of 
Imperial Defence', 1924. NS1086, pp. 4-5. 
The Treasury's desire to reduce the RN's planned oil reserves and the Admiralty's 
desire to increase them led to a lengthy correspondence between Amery and 
Neville Chamberlain.
679 The situation was still unresolved in February 1924 when 
a minority Labour Government took office. It was considered at two meetings of 
the CID that month. At the first the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord 
Chelmsford, pointed out that the Admiralty wanted to add 500,000 tons to its oil 
reserve each year but had been allowed only 200,000 in 1921, 400,000 in 1922 
and 220,000 in 1923 by the Treasury. Snowden agreed that an oil reserve was 
necessary and accepted that 12 months' supply might be the appropriate level. 
He could not see how the Admiralty had calculated its figures for its target 
reserve and pointed out the significance of public opinion; there were many 
other claims on government funds. He wanted to delay accumulation of the 
reserves and review the situation in two or three years time. He hoped for a 
second Washington Conference and perhaps better relations with Japan. He was 
unconvinced by the Admiralty's claim that it would be hard to obtain oil in 
wartime and pointed out that a war with Japan would probably not be global so 
would put less strain on British merchant shipping than the last one.
680  
At the second meeting Lord Haldane, the Chairman. pointed out that CID had 
decided in December 1922 to delay completion of the home reserve until 1937, 
subject to there being no worsening in the political situation; stocks on the 
route to the East had to be ready by 1931. The Admiralty had now been asked to 
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take their oil reserves as a whole, meaning neither the Home nor Eastern 
reserves would be completed until 1937. The Admiralty wanted 8,139,000 tons, 
the level agreed in 1922 rather than the higher one suggested in the 1923 
Admiralty memorandum referred to above. This included 1,000,000 for merchant 
shipping; it was intended to look at this separately. Current reserves totalled 
2,830,000 tons, leaving 4,309,000 to be provided. The CID confirmed the 1919 
decision that the minimum level of oil fuel reserves should be 12 months' war 
consumption.
681 
7.6 Chapter Summary 
Oil was one of a number of factors souring Anglo-American relations in the early 
1920s. The Washington Conference eased the other areas of tension, at least for 
a while. The end of the risk of a new naval race and the government's desire to 
cut spending meant that the build up of the RN's oil reserves were delayed. The 
fleet was reduced in size, but the ships scrapped almost all burnt a mixture of 
coal and oil so oil demand did not fall commensurately. Oil was not discussed at 
Washington, to Britain's relief, but the improvement in Anglo-American relations 
that resulted was significant for Britain's oil strategy. Instead of having to allow 
for the possibility of US hostility in oil planning, Britain could adjust its oil policy 
to help improve Anglo-American relations. Japan was now Britain's most likely 
enemy, affecting naval planning, including the RN's oil needs. At the same time 
as the Conference, Cadman was in the USA, trying to explain Britain's oil position 
to the Americans. His speeches and interviews helped with Anglo-American 
reconciliation.  
The British Empire had little oil so the main area of dispute concerned the 
potential oil of Mosul, where Britain claimed that the TPC had a valid 
concession. Britain realised that control of oil bearing territory was more 
important than ownership of companies, so giving US companies a stake in the 
TPC would not harm Britain's strategy of obtaining secure oil supplies from 
Mosul. This enabled Britain to attempt to remove this irritant to Anglo-American 
relations, but there were questions over the legality of the TPC's claim; a 
consortium led by Colby Chester, a retired American Admiral, was trying to 
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obtain a concession from the Turkish Republic. The US government insisted that 
it could not take sides between Chester and the US companies who were 
negotiating for a stake in the TPC. 226 
8  The Bonar Law Government and Oil 
The Bonar Law Government considered whether or not Britain should remain in 
Iraq. Turkey's revival under the leadership of Kemal Ataturk and its victory in the 
Greco-Turkish War required the peace treaty with it to be renegotiated at 
Lausanne. Mosul and its potential oil was a factor in both. The Turks argued that 
Mosul should be Turkish, while Britain wanted it to be part of Iraq. If Mosul was 
Iraqi the TPC could be confident of retaining its concession. US companies had 
been negotiating for a share in the TPC since the middle of 1922, but a US 
group, the Chester Concession, had been granted wide-ranging economic rights 
in Turkey by the new government. If Mosul became Turkish the concession could 
go to either Chester or the TPC. The TPC concession had not been formally 
ratified because of the outbreak of war in 1914, so it was not certain that it was 
legally binding on Turkey. At Lausanne the US observers insisted that the USA 
could not favour either Chester or the potential US shareholders in the TPC over 
the other. 
The Chester Concession was officially named the Ottoman-American Exploration 
Company, but it is usually called after its head, Colby Chester, a retired USN 
admiral. It had been trying to win the rights to construct railways in the 
Ottoman Empire since 1908; the terms would allow it to exploit all mineral 
resources 20 kilometres either side of the line. This was awarded in 1910, but 
was never ratified by the Ottoman parliament. On 10 April 1923 Turkey granted 
it a concession, but this was cancelled on 13 December.
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8.1 The Treaty of Lausanne 
The Lausanne Conference to negotiate a new peace treaty with Turkey started 
on 20 November 1922. The Turks were in a far stronger position than they had 
been at Sèvres; they were united and possessed the moral and actual advantages 
of recent military victories. Britain, France and Italy were disunited. Britain's 
main strength at the conference was the negotiating skill of Curzon, its chief 
delegate. He obtained the presidency of the conference and the chairmanship of 
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the Territorial and Military Commission, the most significant of its three 
commissions. The first question of major importance to Britain, freedom of the 
Straits, was resolved to Britain's satisfaction. The other main issue for Britain 
was whether Mosul would be part of Turkey or of Iraq; it was harder to settle.
683 
Before the conference, the War Office told the Foreign Office that it wanted 
Mosul and Kurdistan to be part of Iraq. The Turks would be further from Baghdad 
and would have to cross difficult territory to threaten it. Handing them over to 
Turkey would place the British garrison at Baghdad would be in a risky 
position.
684 The Admiralty opposed any change to the Iraqi frontier that would 
threaten the oilfields or pipeline.
685 During the conference the new British 
government was reviewing its Iraq policy. 
8.1.1 The Bonar Law Government's Iraq Policy 
On 16 November 1922, a month after Bonar Law became Prime Minister, the 
Duke of Devonshire, the Colonial Secretary, wrote a memorandum on Mosul. The 
Turks were going to demand its return; it was unclear if they meant the vilayet 
or just the town. The town was towards the north of the vilayet, so it would be 
possible to draw a frontier putting it into Turkey but leaving most of the vilayet 
in Iraq. This would be politically impracticable as Mosul town and the plains 
country were mostly Arab, whilst the hill country to the East was Kurdish; the 
towns of Erbil, Kirkuk and Kifri to the south were almost entirely Turcoman. If 
Mosul town became Turkish so would the vilayet; the Air Ministry believed that it 
would then be impossible to hold Baghdad. Cox argued that this would be a 
betrayal of Faisal. Devonshire thought that it was hard to disagree. Faisal's 
prestige would be destroyed, and the Iraqis would look to deal with the Turks 
whilst they could. The loss of Mosul vilayet would cost Iraq some of its most 
fertile land and the oilfields on which its future wealth depended. The 60,000 
Christian inhabitants would be likely to be massacred so would retreat with the 
British. They included 20,000 Assyrians who had already been expelled from 
their homes and moved to Iraq because they had backed the Allies in the war. 
Departing now would be a humiliating blow to Britain that would destroy its 
                                         
683 Dockrill, Goold, Peace, pp. 236-40. 
684 FO 141/722/12, 'Papers Leading up to the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 24 July 1923', 1923. War 
Office to Foreign Office, 19 October 1922. 
685 Ibid. Admiralty to Foreign Office, 20 October 1922. 228 
prestige in the East. The Foreign Office had suggested that Turkey might be 
compensated for giving up its claim. The Middle East Department argued that 
the claim was unjustified, and the Turks had no right to any compensation. Even 
if they were entitled to something there was a good argument that this should 
come from Iraq, not Britain, as Mosul was Iraqi, not British. One possibility was 
that Turkey might receive a share of Iraqi oil, but this would add more 
complexity to an already complex situation. Other options included economic 
rights for Turks in Iraq, Iraqi recognition of the spiritual suzerainty of the Caliph 
and reciprocal diplomatic representation.
686 
The Cabinet instructed Curzon that he should not discuss any Turkish proposal to 
include Mosul in Turkey since Mosul had already been allocated to Iraq. He 
should not do anything that would increase Britain's commitments to Iraq. A 
committee, chaired by Devonshire, was set up to consider Britain's position in 
Iraq.
687 Its starting point was a note prepared by the Colonial Office, stating that 
control of the oil was one of five advantages of staying; the others were the air 
route across the Middle East, grain and cotton, safety of Persian Gulf and 
maintenance of an Arab state between Turkey and Persia. Further reasons to 
stay were the various obligations to locals.
688 The Colonial Office expanded upon 
these points in another note. The protection of the Persian oilfields and pipeline 
was a separate issue from that of the oil of Mosul. Oil had yet to be found in 
Iraq, but it was certain that large quantities were present, especially in Mosul. 
Britain might receive the concession even if Mosul was returned to Turkey. What 
mattered was keeping one of the world's largest potential oilfields within the 
British sphere of influence. Britain had spent a huge amount of money in Iraq 
since 1914, but spending had now been reduced to a reasonable level. Leaving 
now would mean that the past expenditure had produced no returns, but staying 
a while longer could produce substantial rewards.
689 
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At the committee's first meeting on 8 December 1922 Amery, the First Lord, said 
that the Admiralty thought that it was vital to physically control the actual and 
potential oilfields and pipelines. The nature of the concessions was less 
important.
690 Four days later the majority of the committee agreed that 
commitments entered into during and after the war, and the acceptance of the 
mandate, meant that Britain should ratify a treaty that had been agreed with 
Faisal to implement the mandate. Lord Novar, the Secretary of State for 
Scotland, Lloyd-Greame, the President of the Board of Trade and Ronald 
McNeill, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, dissented. 
McNeill was representing the Foreign Office on the committee because Curzon 
was at the Lausanne Conference. He read out a letter stating that Curzon was in 
favour of the resolution.
691 Amery wrote in his diary that McNeill's view must be 
embarrassing for Curzon, who wanted Britain to remain in Iraq.
692 
Amery submitted a memorandum to the committee ahead of its next meeting, 
explaining that the Admiralty wanted to keep British influence over Iraq because 
of oil. If the Iraqi oilfields were proven control of them would significantly 
improve Britain's poor oil situation. Along with the Persian field they were well 
located to supply operations in the Far East. In the short term withdrawing from 
Iraq would put the Persian oilfield, which supplied over half the RN's needs, at 
risk.
693 Following a visit to Iraq Amery said that he hoped that the government 
would not succumb to press pressure to quit Iraq. Britain had spent a lot there, 
but costs had now been brought under control. The RAF could run it cheaply. 
Investment in irrigation would produce large quantities of cotton and grain. 
Faisal and his cabinet saw themselves as Iraqis and would fight for Mosul. They 
regarded the oil as a major Iraqi resource that should not be given away by 
Britain. They claimed that neither the Turks, the TPC nor Admiral Chester had a 
valid concession. Amery argued that 'this oil question is a very burning one in 
Iraq and should not be lightly settled over the head of the Arab government.'
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Novar and Lloyd Greame argued that Britain should leave Iraq because of the 
cost of staying. They did not think that the oil justified substantial expenditure 
by Britain and rejected the other reasons for remaining. In January Novar wrote 
that: 
'The one serious reason advanced for continued occupation is to guard 
existing and potential supplies of oil, and that not only for ourselves 
but for America and other countries. It is not apparent why we should 
bear the whole cost of protecting property in which so many other 
powers are interested, while if the safety of the wells can be secured 
by a trifling baksheesh to the tribes, it will be better to adopt these 
methods rather than those of costly occupation.
695 
The idea that Britain could rely on local tribes to defend the Mosul oilfields had 
been rejected by General Lord Cavan, the CIGS. He contended that British 
influence over these tribes would be limited if Britain withdrew from Mosul and 
Baghdad. Iraq would be a buffer between Turkey and Persia and Afghanistan.
696 
Lloyd-Greame did not agree that Iraq would prove to be an effective buffer 
against Turkey and Russia, requiring further British military expenditure to 
defend Iraq. The oil would be developed whether Britain stayed or not.
697 
In March 1923 Devonshire's report recommended that Britain should stay. The 
argument of leaving because of the cost of remaining was outweighed by the 
promises made by Britain, its obligations under the mandate, the interests of 
Iraq and its people and of Britain and its Empire. Since the Committee was 
established Curzon had argued at Lausanne that Mosul had to be part of Iraq. 
The issue had yet to be settled; even if Britain wanted to withdraw it could not 
do so until it was resolved. British evacuation of Iraq would lead to Turkey taking 
over Mosul at once and the collapse of the Arab Kingdom of Iraq. Withdrawal 
would take two years unless reinforcements were sent to cover the evacuation. 
It would break promises made to the Arabs and to the League of Nations. The 
Turks would be unlikely to stop at Mosul and would take over Baghdad and Basra 
as well. This would affect British interests in the Persian Gulf and would put the 
RN's oil supplies at risk. The Turks would want to regain control over Syria and 
                                         
695 Ibid. 19. Objections to be considered before confirming the Treaty with Iraq. Memorandum by 
the Secretary of State for Scotland. I.R.Q. 21, 10 January 1923. 
696 Ibid. 47. Committee on Iraq. Third Conclusions, 19 December 1922. 
697 Ibid. 33. Submission that the Committee should boldly face the broad issues of withdrawal from 
Iraq. Memorandum by the President of the Board of Trade. I.R.Q. 33, February 1923. 231 
Palestine. The result would be that Turkey would have be in a stronger position 
than before the war; Britain's position in the Middle East, and even in India, 
would be threatened. The Committee recommended that Britain should 
terminate its mandate within a maximum of four years from the conclusion of 
peace with Turkey. The mandate would in any case be ended when Iraq entered 
the League of Nations; this would require it to have secure frontiers and a stable 
government. During these four years Britain's only expenditure in Iraq should be 
military and air spending, which would be reduced over the period, and the 
costs of the High Commissioner and his staff.
698 
Devonshire's report was followed by another from Lord Salisbury, the Lord 
President of the Council, He agreed with its principal recommendations. Britain 
wanted to give up Iraq and the Iraqis wanted it to go. This could not be done 
until it was certain that the Turks would not take over Iraq once Britain left. He 
suggested agreeing to this policy but keeping it secret.
699 On 26 April the Cabinet 
approved the Committee's recommendations. A new agreement would be signed 
to look after British interests. This should be announced as soon as arrangement 
could be made for a simultaneous announcement in Iraq.
700 On 2 May it was 
decided to state the new policy to Parliament the next day.
701 
8.1.2 Mosul 
In December Curzon informed the Cabinet that the Turks would concede every 
other point, sign the treaty and end their friendship with Soviet Russia if Britain 
would give them Mosul vilayet. The Colonial Office had persuaded Curzon that 
surrendering Mosul would lead to the loss of Baghdad, the end of the Iraqi 
kingdom, the return of the Turks and a diplomatic defeat for Britain. He 
suspected that the Turks did not actually want Mosul but desired to be able to 
claim victory in Asia. They might want to claim, perhaps inspired by Russia, that 
they had been willing to concede everything except Mosul, but Britain had 
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prevented peace by insisting on having Mosul and its oil.
702 The press, notably 
the Daily Mail and the Daily Express, were campaigning for Britain to exit the 
Middle East on cost grounds. Robert Blake argues that the Prime Minister did not 
pay much attention to press criticism, but in this case it coincided with his 
views. He wanted to exit Iraq and did not want there to be the slightest 
suggestion that Britain might go to war for oil. On 8 January he reminded Curzon 
that Britain must not go to war for Mosul or try to enforce Sèvres without French 
support, which would not be forthcoming.
703 
On 23 January 1923 the Lausanne Conference turned to the Mosul question. 
Curzon had been in correspondence with Ismet Pasha, the chief Turkish 
delegate, on this issue for the last two months. Each insisted that his argument 
was backed by ethnic, political, historic, geographic, economic, military and 
strategic reasons. One key area of dispute was whether or not the Kurds, who 
comprised nearly 60 per cent of the population of Mosul, were ethnic Turks. 
Ismet thought that they were. Curzon disagreed. Ismet pointed out that the 
Kurdish delegates at Ankara wanted Mosul to be part of Turkey. Curzon claimed 
that they were not representative of the Kurdish population. Ismet said that a 
quarter of the population of Mosul were Arabs; the balance were Turkish. 
Another argument was over whether Mosul was economically linked more closely 
to Anatolia or to Baghdad. The Turks claimed that the British should have 
returned Mosul to them because they had no right to have occupied it in 1918 
after the armistice was signed.
704 Ismet made no mention of oil. Curzon said that 
he wanted to deny the claims made by the global press that Britain was 
motivated by oil in its desire to control Mosul. He said that: 
The question of the oil of the Mosul Vilayet has nothing to do with my 
argument. I have presented the British case on its own merits quite 
independently of any natural resources there may be in the country. I 
do not know how much oil there may be in the neighbourhood or 
Mosul, or whether it can be worked at a profit, or whether it may turn 
out after all to be a fraud. During the time I have been connected 
with the foreign affairs of my country I have never spoken to or 
interviewed an oil magnate. I have never spoken to or negotiated with 
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a single concessionaire or would-be concessionaire for the Mosul oil or 
any other oil.
705 
He went on to accuse the Turks of offering concessions in Mosul and Baghdad 
vilayets to British businessmen. Britain believed that the TPC had a valid 
concession but did not want there to be a monopoly. Negotiations were under 
way to bring other countries into the TPC. If oil was found and developed Iraq 
would be the main beneficiary, but the world, including Anatolia, would also 
benefit.
706 
Peter Sluglett notes that Curzon must have been aware of the high probability 
that Mosul contained large oil deposits.
707 He would had access to the report 
written by the naval staff ahead of the Paris Peace Conference arguing that the 
Britain needed oil and that Persia and Iraq were the best potential sources.
708 
Curzon had participated in discussions on Mesopotamian oil even before 1919. 
Balfour said at the 13 August 1918 meeting of the War Cabinet that Britain 
needed the Mesopotamian oilfields. Curzon was present and commented that if 
Britain lost Baku then these were the only other significant ones available.
709 
Curzon may have thought that Mosul should be part of Iraq regardless of the oil, 
and he may not have met any oil tycoons. His claim that he did not have any 
idea if there was oil in Mosul was false. 
Ismet insisted that the issue was one of territory, but he had to comment on oil. 
Once Mosul was returned to Turkey the oil would be developed for the benefit of 
the world. A judicial enquiry was needed to discover the validity of the 
concession said to have been granted to the TPC in 1914. The Turks had received 
approaches from several potential concessionaires and had sent experts to 
London in order to find out about the resources of these groups. He wanted a 
plebiscite to be held. Curzon argued that it would be impossible with a nomadic 
and largely illiterate population; nobody was willing to supply the troops that 
would be needed to keep order. Curzon said that the matter should be referred 
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to the League of Nations if agreement could not be reached; Ismet argued that 
Mosul was part of Turkey so Turkey could not consent to having its fate 
determined by arbitration.
710 Andrew Mango, Kemal's most recent English 
language biographer, believes that the principal Turkish motive was a desire to 
have all the Kurds in Turkey, not the oil. Dividing the Kurds between Turkey and 
Iraq would encourage separatists.
711 Mosul provided an issue on which the Turks 
could attempt to split the Allies.
712  
The USA had not been at war with the Ottoman Empire but argued successfully 
that its contribution to the Allied victory meant that it had an interest in the 
outcome and was represented by observers. Fiona Venn notes that they were 
particularly interested in obtaining access to oil.
713 On 23 January 1923 they said 
that they were pleased that Curzon had said that major natural resources should 
not be developed by monopolies, and that Britain would not link concessions to 
diplomatic interests or the continuance of its mandate over Iraq. They reiterated 
that the USA continued to insist on the principle of the open door. All US 
interest had to be treated equally with conflicts being determined by judicial 
review. This indicated that bringing US companies into the TPC would not mean 
the removal of US support from Chester.
714 
A draft treaty was put to the Turks on 31 January. Britain referred the Mosul 
question to the League of Nations for arbitration because the conference had 
been unable to solve it.
715 Ismet stated that Turkey had no claims on the 
territories of the Ottoman Empire where the majority of the population were 
Arabs. He wanted eight days to consider the treaty. Curzon stated that he had 
been summoned home and had to leave in two days time.
716 The British were 
already concerned that the conference would break down. The French had 
recently occupied the Ruhr in retaliation for German defaults on reparation 
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payments. Lord Derby, the War Secretary, thought that their reluctance to risk 
conflict with the Turks as well was understandable.
717 Michael Dockrill and 
Douglas Goold argue that the French view that the treaty was only a basis for 
talks encouraged the Turkish refusal to sign it. The conference was suspended 
after the British delegation left on 4 February. Dockrill and Goold contend that 
this benefitted the outcome since the treaty would have been ineffective if 
Turkey had been forced to sign it. The conference resumed in late April. The 
British delegation was headed by Sir Horace Rumbold, the Ambassador to 
Constantinople, and the treaty was finally signed on 24 July.
718 
The treaty did not included any specific mention of the TPC and its concession, 
but correspondence between Rumbold and the Foreign Office shows that this 
was an important issue for Britain. On 9 July he told the Foreign Office that the 
latest draft of the treaty would state that the pre-war TPC concession was valid 
and remains in existence. It was hoped that to avoid US objections by not 
making any statement of general principle.
719 Three days later Joseph Grew of 
the US delegation said that the USA would not agree to validating the 1914 TPC 
concession in the treaty because not all of its legal requirements had been 
fulfilled. He argued that the British, by trying to validate it, were attempting to 
obtain an unfair benefit from their military victory in the east, which would not 
have been possible without the US intervention in the west. He claimed that the 
US opposition to the concessions protocol was not directed against any one 
company; Rumbold replied that the US actions were aimed at the TPC.
720 By 17 
July all references to the TPC and its concession have been removed from the 
treaty; the British delegation told the Petroleum Department that this was 
mainly, if not wholly, due to co-operation between the USA and the Turks. The 
oil rights would go to the Iraqi government.
721 The Turks insisted that the TPC 
concession could not be included in the treaty because of their obligations 
towards the Chester Concessions. Ismet said that it had been granted when the 
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Turks had no communications with the rest of the world and had to give the 
concession to the first suitable applicant. Rumbold stated on 17 July that: 
I stated categorically that His Majesty's Government regarded all the 
obligations undertaken by the Ottoman Government in 1914 as binding 
on the Turkish Government in any territory which might remain to 
Turkey as a result of the Peace Treaty. They did not, I said, recognise 
any rights, whether within or without such territory, which might be 
alleged to have been granted by the Turkish Government to any third 
party and which would conflict the rights of the Turkish Petroleum 
Company. I affirmed the strong intentions of His Majesty's Government 
to hold the Turkish Government responsible for any failure to fulfil 
the obligations contracted in 1914.
722 
Ismet claimed that it was a legal issue that should be settled by arbitration. 
Grew said that the US opinion of the TPC remained unchanged. Rumbold argued 
that the British government had a responsibility towards the TPC. Turkey could 
not use arbitration to solve a conflict between two companies that had been 
created by its actions. He could not see how the USA had the right to intervene 
in a dispute over the rights of a British company in Turkey.
723 
The next day Curzon sent a very urgent telegram to Rumbold, showing that he 
was concerned about Britain's oil rights in Mosul: 
I am most uneasy at learning that you jettisoned case of Turkish 
Petroleum Company whose claim I repeatedly emphasised in 
discussion when at Lausanne regarding Mosul...it appears to me that 
mere unilateral reservation, however strongly couched by you cannot 
but prejudice materially our position in forthcoming negotiations 
about Mosul and will also weaken most seriously company's claims to 
rights under 1914 concession. 
Unless you are convinced that my apprehensions are not fully 
justified, you should insist on putting back the Turkish Petroleum 
Company into the protocol. 
I object very strongly to additional validity given to Chester 
Concession by our surrender.
724 
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It was not feasible to put the TPC clause back into the Lausanne Treaty. The 
company protested, but this was a matter of formality.
725 It entered into talks 
with the Iraqi government over a concession. Even if Mosul was granted to 
Turkey the TPC might still obtain the concession. In January 1925 the League of 
Nations Boundary Commission visited Iraq. Gertrude Bell, the Oriental Secretary 
to the High Commissioner, wrote that one of the Commissioners had told her 
that the Turks had informed them that the TPC would receive the concession 
regardless of the fate of Mosul. Another Commissioner had said the same thing 
to Sir Henry Dobbs, the British High Commissioner. Bell thought that this 
increased the chances of Mosul going to Iraq since it meant that Commission 
would not think that Britain was motivated by oil.
726 In late 1921 she had 
complained about the way in which the administration of Iraq was being 
hampered by the US refusal to recognise the mandate. She wrote that 'Oil is the 
trouble, of course - detestable stuff!'
727 
8.2 TPC - Final Structure and Concession 
It took six years from the first talks between the US consortium and the TPC 
before everything was finalised. Negotiations with the USA, France, Iraq and 
Gulbenkian had to be concluded. The League of Nations had to decide the fate 
of Mosul. The existence of the oil had to be confirmed. 
8.2.1 France and the TPC 
Pineau, the head of the French delegation to the 1922 negotiations, could not 
understand how the British government could claim that the talks were purely 
commercial when it held a large stake in APOC. He was unable to persuade the 
Americans and British to allow France into their oil projects outside Iraq or to 
negotiate at a government level. He persuaded Raymond Poincaré, the French 
prime minister, that France would do better if it had its own national oil 
company to deal with the Anglo-American companies. In 1924 the Compagnie 
Française des Pétroles was established to hold the French stake in the TPC. It 
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was owned by French companies and banks involved in the oil industry, including 
the French subsidiaries of foreign oil companies, but the government had a close 
involvement. It appointed two directors and could veto others, and had the right 
to purchase up to 80 per cent of its oil.
728 In 1929 the government took a 25 per 
cent stake.
729 
8.2.2 The USA and the TPC 
Gerald Nash says that Secretary of State Hughes gave unclear advice to the US 
mission at Lausanne. He stuck to the principle of the open door for all US 
interests, refusing a request by Standard (NJ) to treat it specially. The Turks 
were keen to work with the USA as they thought that the Americans, unlike the 
British and French, would not exploit economic concessions for political gains. 
Hughes missed this opportunity.
730 In December 1922 he reminded Teagle that 
the State Department believed that the TPC concession was invalid until 
confirmed by the government concerned. It could not favour one US group over 
another in the case of a dispute.
731  
By late 1923 Hughes had adopted a more pragmatic approach towards the TPC. 
Stephen Randall quotes him as telling President Calvin Coolidge that the 
agreement was the best that could be achieved to help US companies. It did not 
fully accord with the principles of the open door. Hughes thought that the US 
government should promote co-operation rather than competition between US 
and foreign companies; Coolidge agreed. Randall quotes Wesley Frost, the Acting 
Foreign Trade Adviser, as saying that the open door principle did not work in the 
case of oil. The first few companies would take all the oil, leaving nothing for 
later entrants.
732 
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8.2.3 Italy and the TPC 
At Lausanne, Benito Mussolini, the new Italian Prime Minister, renewed Italian 
efforts to obtain a share of Iraqi oil. Italy now had a bargaining chip; co-
operation at the conference. On 16 December 1922 Curzon told the Italians that 
they would receive a share of the oil, either shares in the TPC or guaranteed oil 
supplies, once the Mosul issue had been decided in Britain's favour.
 733 The 
company objected to this and a proposal to allow Turkey a stake in the TPC; 
introducing US companies created problems but brought in industry expertise. 
Italy and Turkey would bring difficulties without any benefits.
734 Delays over the 
resolution of the Mosul issue and the admission of US companies to the TPC 
meant that the question of Italian participation in Iraqi oil was not settled by the 
end of the Conference. The Italians ceased to press the issue, and Britain had 
less reason to offer them anything. Marian Kent argues that Britain treated Italy 
poorly, but the Italians created problems for themselves by the opportunistic 
manner in which they approached the issue of economic participation in the 
former Ottoman Empire.
735 Italy, unlike France and the USA, had nothing to offer 
Britain in return for a share of Iraqi oil so did not receive anything. 
8.2.4 Iraq and the TPC 
Negotiations between the TPC and the Iraqi government over a concession lasted 
from October 1923 until March 1925. The first meeting of the TPC with the CFP 
represented was held in London on 22 July 1924. Most issues regarding the 
concession were agreed, but Gulbenkian declined the shareholding that was 
offered to him. By the end of February 1925 agreement had been reached on all 
points except that the company was reluctant to allow the Iraqis the 
shareholding that they had been promised by the San Remo Agreement. On 4 
March the TPC admitted to the Colonial Office that it could not avoid giving the 
Iraqis a shareholding, but the Iraqis dropped their demand for a shareholding and 
the concession was granted on 14 March. Ronald Ferrier suggests a number of 
                                         
733 M. Kent, 'Guarding the Bandwagon: Great Britain, Italy, and Middle Eastern Oil, 1920-1923,' in 
National and International Politics in the Middle East: Essays in Honour of Elie Kedourie, ed. E. 
Ingram (London: Cass, 1986), pp. 157-58. 
734 POWE 33/201. H. A. Nichols, Managing Director, TPC, to Petroleum Department, 24 January 
1923. 
735 Kent, 'Guarding,' pp. 158-59. 240 
possible reasons for the Iraqis change of stance; a desire for royalties now rather 
than dividends later; pressure by the British government; internal political 
reasons; or concern that failure to agree might result in the League of Nations 
not awarding them Mosul.
736 The Iraqis did succeed in having their royalties paid 
in gold rather than sterling and on a sliding scale that increased their share as 
output rose.
737  
The League of Nations Boundary Commission reported on 17 July 1925 that Mosul 
should awarded to Iraq. The Turks tried to have the decision reversed, but all 
involved had accepted by it by 18 July 1926.
738 Whilst all the geological evidence 
persuaded everybody involved that there was oil in Mosul, commercial quantities 
were not found until a major discovery was made at Baba Gurgur, near Kirkuk, 
on 15 October 1927. Gulbenkian's stake was not settled until 31 July 1928. He 
insisted on his right to 5 per cent and to be paid in cash, not oil. He agreed to 
take oil, which he could sell immediately to the CFP. The TPC shares were 
divided 5 per cent to Gulbenkian and 23.75 per cent to each of APOC, RDS, the 
CFP and the Near East Development Corporation, the US consortium. The 
partners signed the self-denying ordinance, or Red Line Agreement, in which 
they agreed to co-operate in the former Ottoman Empire, meaning all the 
oilfields of the Middle East except Kuwait and Persia.
739 The other members of 
the Near East Development Corporation were bought out by Standard (NJ) and 
Standard (NY) in the 1930s.
740  
8.3 Chapter Summary 
Britain had a number of reasons to want to control Iraq. It wanted to protect its 
traditional position in the Persian Gulf, and the route to India. Both these could 
have been met by control of just the Basra vilayet. It wished to fulfil promises 
made to the local population and felt an obligation to install a new 
administration to replace the Ottoman one that it had removed. These required 
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at least the Baghdad vilayet to also be held and probably Mosul, because it 
provided a more defensible frontier. Oil came into the equation in two ways. 
Britain wanted secure supplies, and it provided revenue that would finance the 
administration of Iraq, which Britain was unwilling to subsidise. Without the oil 
and its revenue it is unlikely that Britain would have retained more than Basra, 
regardless of its any obligations to the population. The TPC might still have won 
the concession if Mosul had been awarded to Turkey, but Iraq would not then 
have had the oil revenue. A British controlled concession in Turkey was not as 
good for Britain as oil in Iraq. It was more important that oil should be in 
territory controlled by or friendly to Britain than that concessions should belong 
to British companies. Archival evidence shows that oil motivated Britain's desire 
that Mosul should remain part of Iraq. 
Other parties were treated according to their value to Britain. Faisal was 
expelled from Syria by the French because they thought that he was obstructing 
their plans for the country. Britain offered him the Iraqi throne and continued to 
support him because he could govern Iraq cheaply, with military support 
provided by the RAF. The French and the Americans both received stakes in the 
TPC because they had something to offer in return. The French had to agree to 
change the Sykes-Picot Agreement and to allow oil pipelines across their 
territory. Britain was keen to have good relations with the USA. The Americans 
accepted a deal that did not really fulfil the principles of the open door, but 
which benefitted US companies and was the best that could have been achieved. 
Italian attempts to obtain a share of Iraqi oil were initially unsuccessful as they 
had nothing to offer in return. At Lausanne it appeared that they would receive 
a share as Britain then needed their support. They did not as their interest had 
waned by the time that the TPC concession, its structure and the award of Mosul 
to Iraq had been concluded. The Kurds did not receive autonomy within Iraq as 
the Arab government, which Britain needed, did not want to give it to them. 
Turkey failed to obtain Mosul but was otherwise successful at Lausanne. Britain 
now controlled a potentially very large oil province. Obtaining this had affected 
its policy towards the Middle East and relations with France, Italy, Turkey and 
the USA. 242 
Conclusion 
Britain's oil strategy affected relations with France, Italy, Turkey and the USA, 
Middle Eastern policy, relations with oil companies and naval strategy during 
1914 to 1923. Previous analyses of British oil strategy have concentrated on one 
of these parts, so have not brought all the aspects together. By 1914 the RN's 
increasing use of oil meant that Britain had to consider oil's strategic 
significance. The Admiralty invested in APOC to enable it to develop its Persian 
oilfields and gave it a long term supply contract. Protection of the oilfields, the 
pipeline to the Persian Gulf and the refinery at Abadan were amongst the 
reasons why IEF D was sent to Basra in November 1914. Winston Churchill, who 
was responsible for the decision to put Admiralty funds into APOC, did not want 
troops to be sent to the Gulf; he argued that they should be used at a more 
decisive point. This shows that the motivation behind the APOC transaction was 
to provide regular and cheap oil supplies in peacetime; it was assumed that oil 
could be bought in the market during wartime, a point made by Arthur Balfour, 
Churchill's successor as First Lord. IEF D secured the oilfields, pipeline and 
refinery by early 1915. There are better explanations for the subsequent 
expansion of the Mesopotamian campaign than oil. These are over confidence 
after early victories, an insistence that a further advance was needed to secure 
each conquest and a desire for a victory somewhere. Britain had no war aims in 
the Ottoman Empire before the de Bunsen Committee was established in 1915. 
The de Bunsen Committee included protection of the existing oilfields in Persia 
and obtaining control of the potential ones in the Mosul vilayet of the Ottoman 
Empire in its list of British desiderata, but these were only part of a lengthy list 
of British interests in the region. In 1916 the Sykes-Picot Agreement gave France 
much, but not all, of the Mosul vilayet and its potential oil. The establishment of 
a French controlled buffer zone between British and Russian territory was then 
regarded as being more important than British control of all of the oil. 
The policy of business as usual continued until April 1917. Most Allied oil came 
from the USA even before it entered the war. It dominated the global oil 
industry and had adopted a policy of selling goods and materials to whoever 
could pay for and transport them. Rising demand for oil and tanker losses then 
meant that there was a risk that Britain would run out of oil. Walter Long was 243 
put in charge of oil matters. He had the necessary administrative skill and 
political stature to solve the problems and the sense to delegate technical 
matters to John Cadman. The Petroleum Executive was set up to manage 
Britain's oil requirements. Supplies were allocated and rationed with the armed 
forces being prioritised. Oil was deemed to be more important than food, as 
food could not be imported without control of the seas and protection of 
merchant ships from U-boat attack, which depended on oil fired warships. The 
1917 oil crisis affected all the Allies; they set up the Inter-Allied Petroleum 
Conference to co-ordinate their oil needs. They never had quite enough, but 
they always had more than the Central Powers who had fewer trucks and tanks 
and had to restrict sorties by their aircraft. The oil crisis made Britain, France 
and Italy realise the need to secure their future oil supplies. In the USA it 
brought the companies closer to the government. 
In July 1918 Admiral Sir Edmond Slade produced a paper arguing that Britain 
needed to secure reserves of oil and that the best place to do so was in Mosul. 
Slade was a director of APOC, and his paper led to a dispute with Long because 
it appeared to be written from APOC's point of view. It contained 
unsubstantiated allegations against the Petroleum Executive and RDS. The 
Admiralty had to retract the parts of it relating to oil company politics, but 
Slade's arguments on the strategic importance of oil in general and Mosul in 
particular were accepted. Subsequent papers by the Petroleum Executive and 
the Admiralty repeated his opinion that Britain needed to control its oil supplies 
and that Mosul was the best available source. He argued that Britain's control of 
the seas depended on its global dominance of coal bunkering. The world's 
merchant fleets were switching to oil, so Britain had to develop a similar 
position in oil bunkering in order to maintain its naval power. This view was 
accepted and reiterated in later papers. In October 1918 British forces in 
Mesopotamia, which had been a quiet theatre for some time, advanced to 
capture the town of Mosul. This was later controversial, as Britain at best bent 
the terms of the armistice with the Ottoman Empire to do so. In December 
Georges Clemenceau agreed with David Lloyd George's request that Britain 
should control all of the Mosul vilayet. The two prime ministers were not 
accompanied by any aides at the time; the only written record of what was 
discussed is a note made by Maurice Hankey in his diary relating Lloyd George's 244 
account of the meeting. Clemenceau was criticised in France for handing over 
Mosul, but Sykes-Picot gave France only about half of the potential oilfields. 
France had no company capable of exploiting them. Exchanging its part of Mosul 
for a share in British operated fields was an attractive option for France, 
especially if it could in return obtain British support for its other aims. Britain 
had objectives other than oil in Mesopotamia, but most of them could be met by 
control of the Basra vilayet. Only its oil, and perhaps irrigation schemes, 
required the Mosul vilayet. 
Despite the agreement between the two prime ministers it took some time until 
Britain and France concluded an oil agreement. Long and Henry Bérenger signed 
one in April 1919, but Lloyd George cancelled it. The very similar Greenwood-
Bérenger agreement of December 1919 was never ratified. An Anglo-French oil 
agreement was signed at San Remo in April 1920 and ratified. This was followed 
by the Treaty of Sèvres, which imposed very harsh terms on the Ottoman 
Empire. It appeared to give Britain all that it wanted in the Middle East, 
including the League of Nations mandate over Iraq, comprising the vilayets of 
Basra, Baghdad and Mosul. The similarity between the three oil agreements 
indicates that the first two were victims of other Anglo-French disputes during 
the peace conferences. Sèvres did not last thanks to the revival of Turkey under 
Mustafa Kemal, and disputes amongst the Allies. San Remo offended the 
Americans, who saw it as excluding them from the Iraqi oilfields of 
Mesopotamia. It was widely, albeit wrongly, believed that US oil production 
would soon peak. 
Oil was one of a number of factors souring Anglo-American relations; others 
included Ireland, and the risk of a naval race between Britain, the USA and 
Japan. By 1919 the Admiralty had accepted that the RN would have to be based 
on a one power standard versus the USN, but feared that it would have to 
embark on a major construction programme in order to maintain parity with the 
USN. The US proposals at the Washington Conference meant that the RN had to 
build only two new ships to maintain equality with the USN in battleships. Britain 
hoped that it could maintain naval supremacy via cruisers and smaller ships. It 
might have been unable to maintain even a one power standard with the USN in 
a building race. Washington avoided such a race and gave the RN better than a 
two power standard excluding the USN. Some planning for a war with the USA 245 
took place, but the most likely future opponent was Japan. The fleet was 
smaller than in 1914, but the threat was now more widely spread geographically. 
This meant that British naval planning had to emphasise mobility, meaning that 
reserves of oil were needed at home, in the Far East and on the route to the Far 
East. Slade's view that British security depended on control of the world's fuel 
bunkering was accepted, resulting in plans being made to provide oil stocks for 
merchant shipping. The location of Middle Eastern oil made control of it 
particularly attractive. Plans for the build up of large reserves were devised, but 
the need to cut government spending meant that the completion date for these 
was continually pushed out. Government economies also meant that wartime 
administrative arrangements were not retained. The amounts saved were low, 
but this is probably an example of assuming that every penny counted rather 
than an indication of a downgrading of the importance of oil. 
Reconciliation with the USA over oil began around the same time as the 
Washington Conference. Cadman, who had recently left government service to 
take up a senior post at APOC, was then in the USA and gave a series of 
conciliatory speeches and interviews. The archival evidence shows that his 
presence in the USA at that time was a fortuitous coincidence. His efforts led to 
negotiations to allow US oil companies a share of Iraqi oil. It was realised that 
the US companies could offer valuable technical expertise and capital; control of 
oil bearing territory was more important than the nationality of companies. 
From 1916 to 1924 several attempts were made to merge APOC, Burmah and 
Shell into a single company with a British majority. No scheme that suited all 
parties, or which guaranteed British control, could be devised. RDS supported 
the Allied war effort during the war. The British management of Shell behaved 
patriotically; those who distrusted Royal Dutch never explained why it would act 
against the interests of a country whose navy controlled the world's oceans and 
was the world's biggest consumer of oil. 
On more than one occasion during the early 1920s Britain considered leaving 
Iraq, or at least vacating the Mosul and Baghdad vilayets and holding onto the 
Basra vilayet. The Iraqi Revolt of 1920 raised questions over the cost of 
remaining in Iraq. The solution to this was to place Faisal, who had fought with 
Britain during the war, on the throne and to govern through an Arab 
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strength. The reasons to hold onto Mosul and Baghdad were prestige, the need 
for a defensible frontier, promises to the Arabs and oil. Oil was important both 
because Britain needed secure supplies and because it provided Iraq with 
revenue. This system proved to be long lasting, but it was thrown into question 
in late 1922 by Turkey's victory in its war with Greece. The Treaty of Sèvres had 
to be renegotiated, raising the possibility that Turkey would regain Mosul. The 
fall of the Lloyd George Coalition meant that British policy might change. 
The new Bonar Law Government formed a committee to examine whether or not 
Britain should remain in Iraq. It decided to stay; even those of its members who 
wanted to leave thought that oil was the only reason to stay. Whilst it was 
deliberating, negotiations with Turkey were taking place in Lausanne. One of the 
most problematic questions was whether Mosul should be part of Turkey or of 
Iraq. The Turks stated that they wanted to control only those parts of the 
Ottoman Empire where ethnic Turks comprised the majority of the population; 
they claimed that the Kurds of Mosul were Turkish so Mosul should be Turkish. 
Curzon argued that Mosul should be Iraqi, contending that the Kurds were not 
Turkish. He insisted that oil had nothing to do with his views, claiming that he 
did not know if there was even oil in Mosul. Regardless of what he thought of the 
ethnicity of the Kurds and of the need for Iraq to have defensible frontiers, he 
certainly knew that Mosul was highly likely to contain oil. He had discussed 
Mosul and its oil at Cabinet meetings and had access to reports describing the 
great potential of the Mosul oilfields. The conference was unable to resolve the 
future of Mosul and left the decision to arbitration by the League of Nations, 
which awarded it to Iraq in 1926. 
 If Mosul had become Turkish the oil concession might still have been awarded to 
a British company, but it could also have gone to another group, such as the 
American Chester Concession. A British owned concession in a foreign country 
did not provide as much security of supply as an oilfield in British controlled 
territory. BP was British and RDS partly British, but this did not help Britain when 
the USA threatened to cut off oil supplies after the Anglo-French invasion of 
Suez in 1956.
741 In 1973, following the Yom Kippur War, the Arab countries cut 
                                         
741 T. A. B. Corley, 'Oil Companies and the Role of Government: The Case of Britain, 1900-75,' in 
Competitiveness and the State: Government and Business in Twentieth-Century Britain, ed. G. 247 
back exports and embargoed some consumer countries. The British government 
tried to make BP and RDS favour Britain, but both refused as doing so would be 
in breach of contracts with other consumers and contrary to the interests of 
their shareholders.
742 The award of Mosul to Iraq rather than the grant of the 
concession to the TPC gave Britain control over its oil. 
By 1923 Britain had laid down an oil policy, which was to ensure supplies of oil, 
principally for naval use, by controlling oil bearing territory. Mosul was the 
largest available potential oilfield. Attempts to explore for oil at home failed to 
find significant quantities. Conversion of coal to oil was considered, but the 
necessary plants were expensive and vulnerable to aerial bombing. Building 
tankers to import overseas oil was cheaper. Britain obtained the mandate for 
Iraq and ensured that Mosul was part of Iraq. It did have other interests in the 
region, but most of them required control of only Basra of the three vilayets that 
comprised Iraq. Iraqi oil was well located for a navy that based much of its fleet 
in the Mediterranean, but might have to move it to the Far East in wartime. 
Development of Iraqi oil was initially slow, and it was 1927 before a large strike 
at Baba Gurgur confirmed that there was oil in Mosul. This led Britain to look at 
Venezuela as an alternative source of supply.
743 Iraq output was only around 
100,000 tons in 1933, but reached 4,020,000 tons in 1936.
744 It fell in the early 
years of the Second World War. Most British oil came from the USA, whose 
production had risen rather than declined. Italian entry into the war closed the 
Mediterranean, whilst the RN played a relatively small role in the war with 
Japan. Iraqi and Iranian oil was used mainly to supply forces in the Middle East 
and India.
745 Iraqi output fell from 4,040,000 tons in 1939 to 1,610,000 in 1941, 
before rising to 4,620,000 in 1945. Iranian production was higher; 10,190,000 
tons in 1939, 6,600,000 in 1941 and 16,840,000 in 1945.
746 The output of both 
countries then rose quickly. 
                                                                                                                             
Jones, M. W. Kirby (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), p. 169; Yergin, Prize, pp. 
489-93. 
742 Corley, 'Oil,' pp. 175-76; Yergin, Prize, pp. 623-24. 
743 See McBeth, British. 
744 Longrigg, Oil, pp. 478-79. 
745 See Payton-Smith, Oil. for British oil policy in the Second World War. 
746 Longrigg, Oil, pp. 478-79. 248 
In 1914 Britain's oil policy was largely based on building up reserves cheaply in 
peacetime. It assumed that it could buy oil in the market during wartime. The 
war showed that oil was vital, especially to the RN, but might not be available in 
the desired quantities during wartime. Britain realised this and took action to 
secure future supplies. This affected relations with other countries, including 
France, Italy, Turkey and the USA, and Britain's policy in the Middle East. Britain 
wanted to build a pipeline across French territory, and desired good relations 
with the USA, so gave these countries a share of Iraqi oil. Italy had no bargaining 
counters to offer in return, so was not accommodated. Attempts to create a 
national oil company were unsuccessful, but it was realised that control of oil 
bearing territory was more important than the nationality of companies. The 
desire for oil ensured that Mosul would be part of Iraq, which was governed by 
Faisal's descendants until 1958. By 1923 Britain's oil strategy had achieved its 
objective of having access to secure supplies of oil in a friendly state. 
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Appendix 1: World oil production, 1913-20, tons 
Country  1913  1914  1915  1916  1917  1918  1919  1920 
Australia             5,435            16,016              4,952              5,576            10,121            10,366            10,000              8,000  
Canada           32,583            30,868            30,781            28,303            30,547            43,534            34,352            28,134  
Egypt           12,618          103,605            34,961            54,800          134,700          272,494          232,148          155,578  
India      1,110,211       1,037,371       1,148,374       1,188,759       1,131,038       1,146,340       1,222,607       1,000,000  
New Zealand                444                 412                 556                 560                 600                 600                 500                 400  
Sarawak           19,953            45,039            55,460            90,570            76,738            71,366            85,143          148,633  
Trinidad           70,506            90,092          147,015          129,903          224,324          291,489          257,746          297,588  
United Kingdom         289,684          285,464          263,083          247,472          249,598          242,501          213,886          234,000  
British Empire Total      1,541,434       1,608,867       1,685,182       1,745,943       1,857,666       2,078,690       2,056,382       1,872,333  
Argentina           18,970            40,073            74,650          118,755          166,193          180,790          172,169          207,031  
Dutch East Indies      1,509,566       1,543,998       1,617,032       1,702,374       1,660,272       1,679,246       2,125,017       2,250,000  
France                             47,226            55,000  
Galicia      1,095,506          645,077          666,063          912,535          887,415          667,733          818,333          752,528  
Germany         142,252          142,252          142,252          142,252          142,252          186,000            32,775            30,000  
Italy             6,466              5,453              6,007              6,922              5,577              4,828              4,773              5,400  
Japan and Formosa         273,522          371,628          412,808          417,645          403,371          342,814          285,000          280,000  
Mexico      3,670,899       3,747,915       4,701,501       5,792,245       7,898,967       9,118,332     12,439,000       2,280,000  
Persia         243,621          381,890          474,553          587,502          937,902       1,131,489       1,194,000       1,712,267  
Peru         271,709          248,605          357,325          357,670          341,514          329,618          343,000          360,000  
Romania      1,854,927       1,755,276       1,646,255       1,224,099            56,567       1,194,705          905,064       1,017,382  
Russia      8,976,337       9,574,360       9,792,580     10,400,159       8,362,903       3,143,960       3,642,571       3,483,143  
United States    35,492,319     37,966,076     42,966,737     47,902,229     50,848,817     53,959,857     53,959,857     63,343,143  
Venezuela                       17,962            49,895            63,589            67,429  
World Total    55,097,528     58,031,470     64,542,945     71,310,330     73,587,378     74,067,957     78,088,756     77,715,656  
US as per cent of total  64%  65%  67%  67%  69%  73%  69%  82% 
Source: Marian Kent, Oil and Empire: British Policy and Mesopotamian Oil 1900-1920 (London: MacMillan, 1976), Appendix VIII, pp. 203-4. 250 
Appendix II: US Oil Prices, 1910-29 
U.S. Crude Oil Wellhead Acquisition Price by First Purchasers ($ per Barrel)
$0.00
$0.40
$0.80
$1.20
$1.60
$2.00
$2.40
$2.80
$3.20
1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929
 
 
Year  1910  1911  1912  1913  1914  1915  1916  1917  1918  1919  1920  1921  1922  1923  1924  1925  1926  1927  1928  1929 
Price  $1.19  $0.65  $0.74  $0.95  $0.81  $0.64  $1.10  $1.56  $1.98  $2.01  $3.07  $1.73  $1.61  $1.34  $1.43  $1.68  $1.88  $1.30  $1.17  $1.27 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration <<http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=F000000__3&f=A>> accessed on 16 
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Appendix III: British Naval Fuel Expenditure, 1919-20 to 1923-24. 
Expenditure on Naval Fuel  1919-20  1920-21  1921-22  1922-23  1923-24 
Oil fuel         £    7,234,000    £   2,926,000    £         2,891,300  
Steam vessel coal and patent fuel         £    2,780,000    £       854,000    £             730,000  
Petrol and paraffin         £       125,000    £       100,000    £               65,000  
Steam vessel coal, oil fuel, patent fuel, petroleum spirit etc.   £    14,174,000    £     10,347,000    £ 10,139,000    £   3,880,000    £         3,686,300  
Lubricating oils, oil casks and coal sacks   £         185,000    £          115,000    £       211,000    £       202,000    £             115,500  
Fuel for the fleet   £    14,359,000    £     10,462,000    £ 10,350,000    £   4,082,000    £         3,801,800  
Supplementary Estimate      £       1,063,000           
Fuel for the fleet including Supplementary Estimate   £    14,359,000    £     11,525,000    £ 10,350,000    £   4,082,000    £         3,801,800  
New craft and machinery   £           43,000    £          658,000    £       498,000    £       197,000    £               70,000  
Salaries, wages and allowances   £      1,350,000    £          882,000    £       998,400    £       506,000    £             441,200  
Maintenance of craft   £         800,000    £          761,000    £       694,000    £       450,000    £             377,000  
Total expenditure   £    16,552,000    £     13,826,000    £ 12,540,400    £   5,235,000    £         4,690,000  
Appropriations in aid : Repayments by other government departments   £      9,500,000    £       5,050,000    £    2,500,000    £       600,000    £             400,000  
Net after deduction of appropriations in aid   £      7,052,000    £       8,776,000    £ 10,040,400    £   4,635,000    £         4,290,000  
Total Naval Estimates                
Estimated expenditure after deducting appropriations in aid   £ 157,528,800    £     84,372,300    £ 82,479,000    £ 64,883,700    £       58,000,000  
Supplementary estimate      £       6,500,000    £       965,000        
Estimated expenditure after supplementary estimate   £ 157,528,800    £     90,872,300    £ 83,444,000    £ 64,883,700    £       58,000,000  
Net fuel expenditure as % of total naval expenditure  4.5%  9.7%  12.0%  7.1%  7.4% 
Sources: PP 1919 (217) Navy Estimates for the year 1919-20, 1920 (30) Navy Estimates for the year 1920-21, 1920 (228) Navy (Supplementary Estimate, 
1920-21), 1921 (43) Navy Estimates for the year 1921-22, 1922 (74) Navy Estimates for year 1922-23, 1923 (23) Navy Estimates for year 1923-24. 252 
Bibliography 
Primary Sources 
PRO, National Archives, Kew 
 
ADM 1 Admiralty: Correspondence and papers. 
 
ADM 116 Admiralty: Record Office: Cases. 
 
ADM 116/1804-10: Sir Eric Geddes Papers. 
 
ADM 137: Admiralty: Historical Section: Records used for Official History, First 
World War. 
 
ADM 167 Board of Admiralty: Minutes and Memoranda. 
 
ADM 203 Royal Naval Colleges, Dartmouth and Greenwich: Correspondence and 
Papers. 
 
ADM 265 Admiralty: Architectural and Engineering Works Department, later Civil 
Engineer in Chief's Department: Miscellaneous Papers. 
 
AIR 1 Air Ministry: Air Historical Branch: Papers (Series I). 
 
CAB 1 Cabinet Office: Miscellaneous Records. 
 
CAB 21 Cabinet Office and predecessors: Registered Files. 
 
CAB 23 War Cabinet and Cabinet: Minutes. 
 
CAB 24 War Cabinet and Cabinet: Memoranda (GT,CP and G War Series). 
 
CAB 27 War Cabinet and Cabinet: Miscellaneous Committees: Records (General 
Series). 
 
CAB 37 Cabinet Office: Photographic Copies of Cabinet Papers. 
 
CAB 41 Photographic Copies of Cabinet Letters in the Royal Archives. 
 
CO 730 Colonial Office: Iraq Original Correspondence. 
 
CO 733 Colonial Office: Palestine Original Correspondence. 
 
FO 115 Foreign Office: Embassy and Consulates, United States of America: 
General Correspondence. 
 
FO 141 Foreign Office and Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Embassy and 
Consulates, Egypt: General Correspondence. 
 
FO 195 Foreign Office: Embassy and Consulates, Turkey (formerly Ottoman 
Empire): General Correspondence. 253 
 
FO 371 Foreign Office: Political Departments: General Correspondence. 
 
FO 600 Foreign Office: Consulate, San Francisco, United States of America: 
Registers of Correspondence. 
 
FO 608 Peace Conference: British Delegation, Correspondence and Papers. 
  
FO 800/223 Lord Reading Papers. 
 
MT 25 Ministry of Shipping, 1917 - 1921: Correspondence and Papers. 
 
POWE 2 Board of Trade, Industrial Power and Transport Department, Water-
Power Resources Committee. 
 
POWE 6 Home Office, Mines and Quarries Registered Files. 
 
POWE 33 Ministry of Technology, Petroleum Division, and Predecessors: 
Correspondence and Papers. 
 
POWE 34 Ministry of Fuel and Power, Petroleum Division, and Predecessors: 
Miscellaneous Oil Control Board Papers. 
 
T 161 Treasury: Supply Department: Registered Files (S Series). 
 
WO 32 War Office: Registered Files (General Series). 
 
WO 106 War Office: Directorate of Military Operations and Military Intelligence, 
and predecessors: Correspondence and Papers. 
British Library 
Balfour Papers. 
 
Jellicoe Papers. 
 
Long Papers. 
 
Northcliffe Papers. 
 
Sir Arnold Wilson Papers. 
Churchill College, Cambridge 
 
FISR: Fisher Papers 
 
Esher Papers. 
 
HNKY: Hankey Papers. 
 
ROSK: Roskill Papers. 
 
WMYS: Wemyss Papers. 254 
National Archives of Scotland 
 
GD40/17: Lothian Papers. 
National Maritime Museum 
 
BTY: Beatty Papers. 
 
CBT: Corbett Papers. 
 
MRF 39: Slade Papers. 
Parliamentary Archives 
 
BL: Bonar Law Papers. 
 
LG/F: Lloyd George Papers. 
 
University of Newcastle 
 
"Gertrude Bell Archive", University of Newcastle 
<<http://www.gerty.ncl.ac.uk/index.php>> (accessed| 27 October 2008). 
 
Published Government Papers 
"Foreign Relations of the United States", University of Wisconsin Digital 
Collections Center http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS. 
 
Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, House of Commons. Vol. lv. 
 
Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, House of Commons. Vol. lxiii. 
 
Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, House of Commons. Vol. lxxvii. 
 
Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, House of Commons. Vol. cxxvii. 
 
Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire During the Great War, 1914-
1920 (Uckfield: Naval and Military Press, 1999). 
 
Dockrill, M. L. et al, British Documents on Foreign Affairs--Reports and Papers 
from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Part II, from the First to the 
Second World War. Series I, the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 
(Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, 1988). 
 
PP, Agreement with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Limited, with an Explanatory 
Memorandum, and the Report of the Commission of Experts on Their Local 
Investigations, HMSO 1914 [7419]. 
 
________, Committee on National Expenditure. First Interim Report of Committee 255 
on National Expenditure, HMSO 1922 [Cmd. 1581]. 
 
________, Committee on National Expenditure. Third Report of Committee on 
National Expenditure, HMSO 1922 [Cmd. 1589]. 
 
________, Events Leading to the Rupture of Relations with Turkey, HMSO 1914 
[Cd. 7628]. 
 
________, Lausanne Conference on near Eastern Affairs 1922-1923. Records of 
Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace., HMSO 1923 Cmd. 1814. 
 
________, Mesopotamia Commission. Report of the Commission Appointed by 
Act of Parliament to Enquire into the Operations of War in Mesopotamia, 
Together with a Separate Report by Commander J. Wedgwood, D.S.O., 
M.P., and Appendices, HMSO 1917 [Cd. 8610]. 
 
________, Miscellaneous No. 17 (1921). Despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador 
at Washington Enclosing a Memorandum on the Petroleum Situation, 
HMSO 1921 [Cmd. 1351]. 
 
________, Miscellaneous. No. 11 (1920). Memorandum of Agreement between M. 
Philippe Berthelot, Directeur Des Affaires Politiques Et Commerciales Au 
Ministère Des Affaires Étrangères, and Professor Sir John Cadman, 
K.C.M.G., Director in Charge of His Majesty's Petroleum Department, 
HMSO 1920 [Cmd. 675]. 
 
________, Navy (Supplementary Estimate, 1920-1921). 1920-1921. 
Supplementary Estimate. An Estimate of the Further Sum Required to Be 
Voted for the Navy for the Year Ending 1st March 1921. Six Million Five 
Hundred Thousand Pounds, HMSO 1920 (228). 
 
________, Navy Estimates for the Year 1919-1920 (Revised), HMSO 1919 (217). 
 
________, Navy Estimates for the Year 1920-1921, HMSO 1920 (35). 
 
________, Navy Estimates for the Year 1921-1922, HMSO 1921 (43). 
 
________, Navy Estimates for the Year 1922-23, HMSO 1922 (74). 
 
________, Navy Estimates for the Year 1923-24, HMSO 1923 (23). 
 
________, Navy Estimates, 1920-1921. Statement of the First Lord of the 
Admiralty Explanatory of the Navy Estimates, 1920-1921, HMSO 1920 
[Cmd. 619]. 
 
________, Navy Estimates, 1921-1922. Statement of the First Lord of the 
Admiralty Explanatory of the Navy Estimates, 1921-1922, HMSO 1921 
[Cmd. 1191]. 
 
________, Navy Estimates, 1922-1923. Statement of the First Lord of the 
Admiralty Explanatory of the Navy Estimates, 1922-1923, HMSO 1922 
[Cmd. 1603]. 
 256 
________, Navy Estimates, 1923-1924. Statement of the First Lord of the 
Admiralty Explanatory of the Navy Estimates, 1923-1924, HMSO 1923 
[Cmd. 1818]. 
 
________, Profiteering Act, 1919. Report on Motor Fuel Prepared by a Sub-
Committee Appointed by the Standing Committee on the Investigation of 
Prices, HMSO 1920 [Cmd. 597]. 
 
________, Profiteering Acts, 1919 and 1920. Second Report on Motor Fuel. 
Prepared by a Sub-Committee Appointed by the Standing Committee on 
the Investigation of Prices, HMSO 1921 [Cmd. 1119]. 
 
________, Remarks of the Admiralty on the Interim Report of the Committee on 
National Expenditure, HMSO 1922 [Cmd. 1587]. 
 
Stevenson, D., ed. British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from 
the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Part ii, from the First to the Second 
World War: Series H, the First World War, 1914-1918. Edited by Bourne, 
K., Watt, D. C.,  (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1989). 
 
Tracy, N., ed. The Collective Naval Defence of the Empire, 1900 to 1940 
(Aldershot: Scolar, 1997). 
 
Woodward, E. L. et al, eds Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939. First 
Series (London: H.M.S.O., 1946-86). 
Published Personal Papers and Memoirs 
Barnes, J., Nicholson, D., eds The Leo Amery Diaries (London: Hutchinson, 1980). 
 
Beresford, C. W. d. l. P., The Memoirs of Admiral Lord Charles Beresford. 2 vols. 
(London: Methuen & Co., 1914). 
 
Buchanan, G. C., The Tragedy of Mesopotamia (Edinburgh: William Blackwood & 
Sons, 1938). 
 
Chalmers, W. S., ed. The Life and Letters of David, Earl Beatty (London: Hodder 
and Stoughton, 1951). 
 
Churchill, R. S., Gilbert, M., eds Winston S. Churchill, Companion Documents 
(London: Heinemann, 1967-75). 
 
Churchill, W. S., The World Crisis, 1911- 1918. 2 vols. (London: Odhams Press, 
1939). 
 
Clark, A., ed. A Good Innings: The Private Papers of Viscount Lee of Fareham 
(London: J. Murray, 1974). 
 
Clemenceau, G., Grandeur and Misery of Victory (London,: George G. Harrap & 
Co. Ltd, 1930). 
 
Conyne, G. R., Woodrow Wilson : British Perspectives, 1912-21, Studies in 
Military and Strategic History (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992). 257 
 
Dunsterville, L. C., The Adventures of Dunsterforce (London,, 1920). 
 
Garnett, D., ed. The Letters of T.E. Lawrence (London: Jonathan Cape, 1938). 
 
Haldane, J. A. L., The Insurrection in Mesopotamia, 1920 (Edinburgh: William 
Blackwood & Sons, 1922). 
 
Hankey, M. P. A., The Supreme Command, 1914-1918. (London: George Allen 
and Unwin, 1961). 
 
________, The Supreme Control at the Paris Peace Conference 1919. A 
Commentary (London,, 1963). 
 
Jeffery, K., ed. The Military Correspondence of Field Marshall Sir Henry Wilson 
1918-1922 (London: Bodley Head, 1985). 
 
Jellicoe, J. R., The Crisis of the Naval War (London: Cassell and Company, 1920). 
 
________, The Grand Fleet, 1914-16: Its Creation, Development and Work 
(London: Cassell and Company, 1919). 
 
________, The Submarine Peril: The Admiralty Policy in 1917. (London: Cassell 
and Company, 1934). 
 
Kemp, P. K., ed. The Papers of Admiral Sir John Fisher (London: Navy Records 
Society, 1960). 
 
Keynes, J. M., The Economic Consequences of the Peace (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace and Howe, 1920). 
 
Lawrence, T. E., Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph (London: Cape, 1935). 
 
Link, A. S. et al, eds The Papers of Woodrow Wilson. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1966-93). 
 
Lloyd George, D., The Truth About the Peace Treaties. 2 vols. (London: Victor 
Gollancz, 1938). 
 
________, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George. 2 vols. (London: Odhams, 1938). 
 
Long, W. H., Memories (London,, 1923). 
 
Ludendorff, E., The Nation at War, Translated by Rappoport, A. S. (London: 
Hutchison & Co., 1936). 
 
Marder, A. J., ed. Fear God and Dread Nought: The Correspondence of Admiral of 
the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone (London: Jonathan Cape, 1952-59). 
 
Marshall, W., Memories of Four Fronts (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1929). 
 
Nicolson, H. G., Peacemaking 1919 (London: Constable, 1933). 
 258 
Patterson, A. T., ed. The Jellicoe Papers: Selections from the Private and Official 
Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Earl Jellicoe of Scapa (London: 
Naval Records Society, 1966-68). 
 
Ranft, B., ed. The Beatty Papers: Selections from the Private and Official 
Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty (Aldershot: Scolar 
Press:, 1989-93). 
 
Sims, W. S., Hendrick, B. J., The Victory at Sea (London: J. Murray, 1920). 
 
Townshend, C. V. F., My Campaign in Mesopotamia (London: T. Butterworth Ltd, 
1920). 
 
Wilson, A. T., Loyalties: Mesopotamia, 1914-1917. A Personal and Historical 
Record. (London: Oxford University Press, 1930). 
 
________, Mesopotamia, 1917-1920: A Clash of Loyalties. A Personal and 
Historical Record. (London: Oxford University Press, 1931). 
 
Secondary Sources 
Unpublished Theses 
Brown, W. M., 'The Royal Navy's Fuel Supplies, 1898-1939; the Transition from 
Coal to Oil', University of London, 2003. 
 
Daleziou, E., 'Britain and the Greek-Turkish War and Settlement of 1919-1923: 
The Pursuit of Security by "Proxy" in Western Asia Minor.', University of 
Glasgow, 2002. 
 
Murphy, R., 'Walter Long and the Conservative Party, 1905-1921', University of 
Bristol, 1984. 
 
Snyder, D. A., 'Petroleum and Power: Naval Fuel Technology and the Anglo-
American Struggle for Core Hegemony, 1889-1922', Texas A&M University, 
2001. 
 
Books 
History of the Ministry of Munitions. 12 vols. (London: HMSO, 1920). 
 
Acworth, B., Back to the Coal Standard: The Future of Transport and Power 
(London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1932). 
 
________, The Navies of Today and Tomorrow. A Study of the Naval Crisis from 
Within (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1930). 
 
Adams, R. J. Q., Arms and the Wizard: Lloyd George and the Ministry of 
Munitions, 1915-1916 (London: Cassell, 1978). 
 
Adelson, R., London and the Invention of the Middle East: Money, Power, and 259 
War, 1902-22 (New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press, 1995). 
 
Andrew, C. M., Kanya-Forstner, A. S., France Overseas the Great War and the 
Climax of French Imperial Expansion (London: Thames and Hudson, 1981). 
 
Atabaki, T., ed. Iran and the First World War: Battleground of the Great Powers 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 2006). 
 
Bacon, R. H. S., The Life of Lord Fisher of Kilverstone. 2 vols. (London: Hodder 
and Stoughton, 1929). 
 
Baer, G. W., One Hundred Years of Sea Power : The U.S. Navy, 1890-1990 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994). 
 
Barker, A. J., The Neglected War. Mesopotamia, 1914-1918. (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1967). 
 
Barnett, C., The Collapse of British Power (London: Pan, 2002). 
 
Bell, A. C., A History of the Blockade of Germany and of the Countries Associated 
with Her in the Great War - Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, 1914-
1918 (London: HMSO, 1961). 
 
Bell, C. M., The Royal Navy, Seapower and Strategy between the Wars 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000). 
 
Bell, P. M. H., France and Britain, 1900-1940 : Entente and Estrangement 
(Harlow: Longman, 1996). 
 
Bennett, G. H., British Foreign Policy During the Curzon Period, 1919-24 (New 
York, NY: Macmillan, 1995). 
 
Blake, R., The Unknown Prime Minister. The Life and Times of Andrew Bonar 
Law, 1858-1923. (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1955). 
 
Blyth, R. J., Lambert, A., Rüger, J., eds The Dreadnought and the Edwardian Era 
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2011). 
 
Boemeke, M. F. et al, The Treaty of Versailles : A Reassessment after 75 Years 
(Cambridge: German Historical Institute and Cambridge University Press, 
1998). 
 
Bond, B., British Military Policy between the Two World Wars (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1980). 
 
Bridgland, T., Morgan, A., Tunnel-Master and Arsonist of the Great War: The 
Norton-Griffiths Story (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 2003). 
 
Broadberry, S. N., Harrison, M., eds The Economics of World War I (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
 
Brown, I. M., British Logistics on the Western Front, 1914-1919 (Westport, CT.: 
Praeger, 1998). 260 
 
Bullock, D. L., Allenby's War: The Palestine-Arabian Campaigns, 1916-1918 
(London: Blandford, 1988). 
 
Burk, K., Britain, America and the Sinews of War, 1914-1918 (Boston, MA: Allen & 
Unwin, 1985). 
 
________, War and the State: The Transformation of British Government, 1914-
1919 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1982). 
 
Busch, B. C., Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1894-1914. (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1967). 
 
________, Britain, India, and the Arabs, 1914-1921 (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1971). 
 
________, Mudros to Lausanne: Britain's Frontier in West Asia, 1918-1923 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press., 1976). 
 
Carver, M., The National Army Museum Book of the Turkish Front, 1914-1918: 
The Campaigns at Gallipoli, in Mesopotamia and in Palestine (London: 
Sidgwick & Jackson, 2003). 
 
Cassar, G. H., The French and the Dardanelles: A Study of Failure in the Conduct 
of War (London: Allen and Unwin, 1971). 
 
Catherwood, C., Churchill's Folly: How Winston Churchill Created Modern Iraq 
(New York, NY: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2004). 
 
Chesneau, R., Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships, 1922-1946 (London: 
Conway Maritime Press, 1980). 
 
Chester, E. W., United States Oil Policy and Diplomacy : A Twentieth-Century 
Overview (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1983). 
 
Chickering, R. et al, eds Great War, Total War : Combat and Mobilization on the 
Western Front, 1914-1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
 
Chisholm, A. H. T., The First Kuwait Oil Concession Agreement: A Record of the 
Negotiations, 1911-1934 (London: Cass, 1975). 
 
Churchill, R. S., Young Statesman: Winston S. Churchill, 1901-1914 (London: 
Heinemann, 1966). 
 
Clayton, A., The British Empire as a Superpower, 1919-39 (London: Macmillan, 
1986). 
 
Cohen, S. A., British Policy in Mesopotamia, 1903-1914 (London: Ithaca Press, 
1976). 
 
Coleman, D. C. et al, eds Enterprise and History : Essays in Honour of Charles 
Wilson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). 
 261 
Cooper, M., The Birth of Independent Air Power: British Policy in the First World 
War (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986). 
 
Corbett, J. S., Newbolt, H., Naval Operations. 5 vols. [Second ed. (London: 
HMSO, 1938). 
 
Corley, T. A. B., A History of the Burmah Oil Company, 1886-1924 (London: 
Heinemann, 1983). 
 
Cruttwell, C. R. M. F., A History of the Great War, 1914-1918. 2nd ed. (London: 
Granada, 1982). 
 
Darwin, J., Britain, Egypt and the Middle East: Imperial Policy in the Aftermath of 
War, 1918-1922 (London: Macmillan, 1981). 
 
Davenport, E. H., Cooke, S. R., The Oil Trusts and Anglo-American Relations 
(London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd, 1923). 
 
Davis, P. K., Ends and Means: The British Mesopotamian Campaign and 
Commission (London Associated University Presses, 1994). 
 
Delaisi, F., Oil: Its Influence on Politics, Translated by Leese, C. L. (London: 
George Allen & Unwin, 1922). 
 
Denny, L., We Fight for Oil (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928). 
 
Dockrill, M. L., Fisher, J., The Paris Peace Conference 1919 : Peace without 
Victory? (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001). 
 
Dockrill, M. L., Goold, J. D., Peace without Promise Britain and the Peace 
Conferences 1919-23 (London: Batsford Academic and Educational, 1981). 
 
Dreisziger, N. F., ed. Mobilization for Total War the Canadian, American and 
British Experience 1914-1918, 1939-1945 (Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier 
University Press, 1981). 
 
Ellis, C. H., The Transcaspian Episode, 1918-1919. (London: Hutchison, 1963). 
 
Elwell-Sutton, L. P., Persian Oil. A Study in Power Politics. (London: Lawrence 
and Wishart, 1955). 
 
Engdahl, W., A Century of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New World 
Order. Revised ed. ed. (London: Pluto, 2004). 
 
Fatemi, N. S., Oil Diplomacy: Powderkeg in Iran (New York, NY: Whittier Books, 
1954). 
 
Fayle, C. E., Seaborne Trade. 3 vols. (London: HMSO, 1920). 
 
Ferguson, N., The Pity of War (London: Allen Lane, 1998). 
 
Ferrier, R. W., The History of the British Petroleum Company: Vol.1, the 
Developing Years, 1901-1932 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 262 
1982). 
 
Ferris, J. R., The Evolution of British Strategic Policy, 1919-26 (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1989). 
 
Field, A., Royal Navy Strategy in the Far East, 1919-1939: Preparing for War 
against Japan (London: Frank Cass, 2004). 
 
Fieldhouse, D. K., Western Imperialism in the Middle East, 1914-1958 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006). 
 
Fischer, L., Oil Imperialism: The International Struggle for Petroleum (Westport, 
CT: Hyperion Press, 1976). 
 
Fisher, J., Curzon and British Imperialism in the Middle East, 1916-19 (London: 
Cass, 1999). 
 
Fowler, W. B., Wiseman, W. G. A. S., British-American Relations, 1917-1918. The 
Role of Sir William Wiseman (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1969). 
 
Frank, A. F., Oil Empire: Visions of Prosperity in Austrian Galicia (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2005). 
 
French, D., British Economic and Strategic Planning, 1905-1915 (London: Allen & 
Unwin, 1982). 
 
________, British Strategy & War Aims, 1914-16 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986). 
 
________, The Strategy of the Lloyd George Coalition, 1916-1918 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995). 
 
Friedensburg, F., Das Erdöl Im Weltkrieg (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke, 1939). 
 
Fromkin, D., A Peace to End All Peace: Creating the Modern Middle East, 1914-
1922 (London: Deutsch, 1989). 
 
Geiss, I., German Foreign Policy, 1871-1914 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1976). 
 
Gibson, R. H., Prendergast, M., The German Submarine War, 1914-1918. 
(London: Constable, 1931). 
 
Gilbert, M., The Challenge of War: Winston S. Churchill, 1914-1916 (London: 
Heinemann, 1971). 
 
________, The World in Torment: Winston S. Churchill, 1916-1922 (London: 
Heinemann, 1975). 
 
Goldstein, E., Winning the Peace: British Diplomatic Strategy, Peace Planning, 
and the Paris Peace Conference, 1916-1920 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991). 
 
Goldstein, E., Maurer, J. H., eds The Washington Conference, 1921-22 : Naval 263 
Rivalry, East Asian Stability and the Road to Pearl Harbor (Ilford: Frank 
Cass, 1994). 
 
Goldstein, E., McKercher, B. J. C., eds Power and Stability : British Foreign Policy, 
1865-1965 (London: Frank Cass, 2003). 
 
Gooch, J., The Plans of War; the General Staff and British Military Strategy, 
C.1900-1916 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974). 
 
________, The Prospect of War: Studies in British Defence Policy, 1847-1942 
(London: Cass, 1981). 
 
Grainger, J. D., The Battle for Palestine, 1917 (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2006). 
 
Gray, R., Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships, 1906-1921 (London: Conway 
Maritime Press, 1985). 
 
Grigg, J., Lloyd George from Peace to War, 1912-1916 (London: Methuen, 1985). 
 
________, Lloyd George: War Leader, 1916-1918 (London: Allen Lane, 2002). 
 
Grove, E., The Royal Navy since 1815 : A New Short History (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 
 
Guinn, P., British Strategy and Politics, 1914 to 1918. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1965). 
 
Halpern, P. G., A Naval History of World War I (London: UCL Press, 1994). 
 
Hanighen, F. C., The Secret War (Westport, CT: Hyperion Press, 1976; reprint, 
originally published by the John Day Co., New York, NY, 1934). 
 
Hardach, G., The First World War, 1914-1918 (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1977). 
 
Hardy, A. C., Oil Ships and Sea Transport. A Story of Oil in Relation to Its Effect 
on Sea Transportation. (London: George Routledge and Sons, 1931). 
 
Hart, B. H. L., History of the First World War (London: Cassell, 1970). 
 
Helmreich, P. C., From Paris to Sèvres : The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at 
the Peace Conference of 1919-1920 (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University 
Press, 1974). 
 
Henig, R. B., Versailles and after, 1919-1933 (London: Routledge, 1995). 
 
Herodotus, The History, Translated by Rawlinson, G. (Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago, 1990). 
 
Herwig, H. H., The First World War : Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914-1918 
(London: Arnold, 1997). 
 
________, 'Luxury' Fleet: The Imperial German Navy, 1888-1918 (London: Allen & 
Unwin, 1980). 264 
 
Hinsley, F. H., Command of the Sea: The Naval Side of British History from 1918 
to the End of the Second World War. (London: Christophers, 1950). 
 
Hogan, M. J., Informal Entente: The Private Structure of Cooperation in Anglo-
American Economic Diplomacy, 1918-1928 (Columbia, SC: University of 
Missouri Press, 1977). 
 
Hopkirk, P., On Secret Service East of Constantinople: The Plot to Bring Down the 
British Empire (London: J. Murray, 1994). 
 
Hough, R. A., First Sea Lord: An Authorized Biography of Admiral Lord Fisher 
(London: Severn House, 1977). 
 
________, The Great War at Sea, 1914-1918 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1983). 
 
Howard, M. E., The Continental Commitment (London: Ashfield, 1989). 
 
Howard, R., The Oil Hunters: Exploration and Espionage in the Middle East, 1880-
1939 (London: Hambledon Continuum, 2008). 
 
Howell, G., Daughter of the Desert: The Remarkable Life of Gertrude Bell 
(London: Macmillan, 2006). 
 
Hughes, M., Allenby and British Strategy in the Middle East, 1917-1919 (London: 
Frank Cass, 1999). 
 
Hurd, A. S., The Merchant Navy. 3 vols. (London: HMSO, 1921). 
 
Hurley, E. N., The Bridge to France (Philadelphia, PA: J. B. Lippincott Company, 
1927). 
 
Hyde, H. M., British Air Policy between the Wars, 1918-1939 (London: 
Heinemann, 1976). 
 
Ise, J., The United States Oil Policy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1926). 
 
Issawi, C. P., ed. The Economic History of the Middle East 1800-1914 (Chicago, 
IL: Chicago University Press, 1966). 
 
Jameson, W. S., The Most Formidable Thing: The Story of the Submarine from Its 
Earliest Days to the End of World War I. (London: Rupert Hart-Davis Ltd, 
1965). 
 
Jeffery, K., The British Army and the Crisis of Empire, 1918-22 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1984). 
 
Jones, G., The State and the Emergence of the British Oil Industry (London: 
Macmillan, 1981). 
 
Jones, G., Kirby, M. W., eds Competitiveness and the State : Government and 265 
Business in Twentieth-Century Britain (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1991). 
 
Jonker, J. et al, A History of Royal Dutch Shell. 4 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007). 
 
Karsh, E., Karsh, I., Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle 
East, 1789-1923 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999). 
 
Keating, A., Power, Politics and the Hidden History of Arabian Oil (London: Saqi, 
2006). 
 
Keay, J., Sowing the Wind: The Seeds of Conflict in the Middle East (London: 
John Murray, 2003). 
 
Kedourie, E., England and the Middle East: The Destruction of the Ottoman 
Empire, 1914-1921 (London: Mansell, 1987). 
 
Kennedy, G., ed. British Naval Strategy East of Suez 1900-2000 : Influences and 
Actions (London: Frank Cass, 2005). 
 
Kennedy, G. et al, eds Far-Flung Lines : Essays on Imperial Defence in Honour of 
Donald Mackenzie Schurman (London: Frank Cass, 1997). 
 
Kennedy, P. M., The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: Allen Lane, 
1976). 
 
________, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military 
Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988). 
 
Kennett, L., The First Air War, 1914-1918 (New York, NY: Free Press, 1991). 
 
Kent, M., Moguls and Mandarins: Oil, Imperialism, and the Middle East in British 
Foreign Policy, 1900-1940 (London: Frank Cass, 1993). 
 
________, Oil and Empire: British Policy and Mesopotamian Oil, 1900-1920 
(London: Macmillan, 1976). 
 
Kinvig, C., Churchill's Crusade: The British Invasion of Russia, 1918-1920 
(London: Hambledon Continuum, 2006). 
 
Lambert, N. A., Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution (Columbia, SC: University of 
South Carolina Press, 1999). 
 
Lentin, A., The Versailles Peace Settlement : Peacemaking with Germany 
(Burford: Davenant Press, 2003). 
 
L'Espagnol de la Tramerye, P., The World Struggle for Oil, Translated by Leese, 
C. L. (London: G. Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1923). 
 
Lessor, I. O., Resources and Strategy: Vital Materials in International Conflict, 
1600-Present Day (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989). 
 266 
Longrigg, S. H., Oil in the Middle East: Its Discovery and Development (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1967). 
 
Louis, W. R., British Strategy in the Far East, 1919-1939 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1971). 
 
________, In the Name of God, Go! Leo Amery and the British Empire in the Age 
of Churchill (New York, N.Y.: W.W. Norton, 1992). 
 
Lukitz, L., A Quest in the Middle East: Gertrude Bell and the Making of Modern 
Iraq (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006). 
 
Lyddon, W. G., British War Missions to the United States 1914-1918 (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1938). 
 
Mackay, R. F., Fisher of Kilverstone (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973). 
 
MacMillan, M., Peacemakers: The Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and Its 
Attempt to End War (London: John Murray, 2001). 
 
Mango, A., Atatürk (London: John Murray, 2001). 
 
March, E. J., British Destroyers: A History of Development 1892-1953. (London: 
Seely Service & Co., 1966). 
 
Marder, A. J., From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow; the Royal Navy in the Fisher 
Era, 1904-1919. 5 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1961-70). 
 
Marks, S., The Illusion of Peace : International Relations in Europe, 1918-1933. 
2nd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 
 
Martin, V., ed. Anglo-Iranian Relations since 1800 (London ; New York: Routledge, 
2005). 
 
Massie, R. K., Castles of Steel: Britain, Germany, and the Winning of the Great 
War at Sea (London: Jonathan Cape, 2004). 
 
________, Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War 
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1992). 
 
Maugeri, L., The Age of Oil: The Mythology, History, and Future of the World's 
Most Controversial Resource (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2006). 
 
McBeth, B. S., British Oil Policy, 1919-1939 (London: Cass, 1985). 
 
McKale, D. M., War by Revolution: Germany and Great Britain in the Middle East 
in the Era of World War I (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1998). 
 
McKercher, B. J. C., The Struggle for Supremacy: Aspects of Anglo-American 
Relations in the 1920s (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990). 
 
McMeekin, S., The Berlin-Baghdad Express : The Ottoman Empire and Germany's 
Bid for World Power, 1898-1918 (London: Allen Lane, 2010). 267 
 
Medlicott, W. N. et al, eds Studies in International History. Essays Presented to W. 
Norton Medlicott (London: Longmans, 1967). 
 
Mejcher, H., Imperial Quest for Oil (London: Ithaca Press, 1976). 
 
Melby, E. D. K., Oil and the International System: The Case of France, 1918-1969 
(New York, NY: Arno Press, 1981). 
 
Miller, G., Straits: British Policy Towards the Ottoman Empire and the Origins of 
the Dardanelles Campaign (Hull: University of Hull Press, 1997). 
 
Milward, A. S., War, Economy and Society, 1939-1945 (London: Allen Lane, 
1977). 
 
Moberly, F. J., The Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914-1918. 4 vols. (London: 
HMSO, 1923). 
 
________, Operations in Persia, 1914-1919 (London: HMSO, 1987). 
 
Mohr, A., The Oil War (London: Martin Hopkinson & Co. Ltd, 1926). 
 
Monroe, E., Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 1914-1971 (London: Chatto & 
Windus, 1981). 
 
Morrow, J. H., The Great War in the Air: Military Aviation from 1909 to 1921 
(Washington DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1993). 
 
________, The Great War: An Imperial History (London: Routledge, 2003). 
 
Nash, G. D., United States Oil Policy, 1890-1964. Business and Government in 
Twentieth Century America (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
1968). 
 
Nevakivi, J., Britain, France and the Arab Middle East, 1914-1920 (London: 
Athlone Press, 1969). 
 
Nowell, G. P., Mercantile States and the World Oil Cartel, 1900-1939 (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1994). 
 
O'Brien, P. P., ed. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902-1922 (London: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2004). 
 
________, British and American Naval Power: Politics and Policy, 1900-1936 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998). 
 
Offer, A., The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1989). 
 
Olson, W. J., Anglo-Iranian Relations During World War I (London: Cass, 1984). 
 
Palmer, S., Williams, G., eds Charted and Uncharted Waters: Proceedings of a 
Conference on the Study of British Maritime History (London: National 268 
Maritime Museum, 1982). 
 
Partington, J. R., A History of Greek Fire and Gunpowder (Cambridge,: Heffer, 
1960). 
 
Payton-Smith, D. J., Oil: A Study of War-Time Policy and Administration (London: 
HMSO, 1971). 
 
Pearton, M., The Knowledgeable State: Diplomacy, War and Technology since 
1830 (London: Burnett, 1982). 
 
________, Oil and the Romanian State (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971). 
 
Peden, G. C., Arms, Economics and British Strategy: From Dreadnoughts to 
Hydrogen Bombs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
 
Petrie, C. A., Walter Long and His Times. (London: Hutchison & Co., 1936). 
 
Pogue, J. E., The Economics of Petroleum (New York, NY: John Willey & Sons, 
1921). 
 
Randall, S. J., United States Foreign Oil Policy since World War I: For Profits and 
Security. 2nd ed. (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005). 
 
Ronaldson, J. H., Coal (London: John Murray, 1920). 
 
Roskill, S. W., Hankey: Man of Secrets. 2 vols. (London: Collins, 1970-74). 
 
________, Naval Policy between the Wars: Vol. 1, the Period of Anglo-American 
Antagonism, 1919-1929 (London: Collins, 1968). 
 
Rothwell, V. H., British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy, 1914-1918 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1971). 
 
Rowland, J., Cadman, J. B. C., Ambassador for Oil: The Life of John, First Baron 
Cadman. (London: Herbert Jenkins, 1960). 
 
Salih, Z., Britain and Iraq: A Study in British Foreign Affairs. 2nd ed. (London: 
Books & Books, 1995). 
 
Sharp, A., The Versailles Settlement : Peacemaking after the First World War, 
1919-1923. 2nd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 
 
Shwadran, B., The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers. (London: Atlantic 
Press, 1956). 
 
Simon, R. S., Tejirian, E. H., eds The Creation of Iraq, 1914-1921 (New York ; 
Chichester: Columbia University Press, 2004). 
 
Sluglett, P., Britain in Iraq, 1914-1932 (London: I. B. Tauris, 2007). 
 
Smith, M., British Air Strategy between the Wars (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984). 
 269 
Sprout, H. H., Sprout, M., Toward a New Order of Sea Power. American Naval 
Policy and the World Scene, 1918-1922 (Princeton, N.J.; London,, 1943). 
 
Steiner, Z. S., The Lights That Failed : European International History, 1919-1933 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
 
Steiner, Z. S., Neilson, K., Britain and the Origins of the First World War. 2nd ed. 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003). 
 
Stevenson, D., 1914-1918: The History of the First World War (London: Allen 
Lane, 2004). 
 
Stivers, W., Supremacy and Oil: Iraq, Turkey, and the Anglo-American World 
Order, 1918-1930 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982). 
 
Stocking, G. W., Middle East Oil: A Study in Political and Economic Controversy 
(London: Allen Lane, 1971). 
 
Strachan, H., The First World War : A New Illustrated History (London: Simon & 
Schuster, 2003). 
 
________, The First World War: Vol. 1, to Arms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001). 
 
Tarrant, V. E., The U-Boat Offensive, 1914-1945 (London: Arms and Armour, 
1989). 
 
Terraine, J., Business in Great Waters: The U-Boat Wars, 1916-1945 (London: 
Cooper, 1989). 
 
________, The Great War (London: Hutchison & Co., 1965). 
 
________, White Heat: The New Warfare, 1914-18 (London: Leo Cooper, 1992). 
 
Travers, T., Gallipoli, 1915 (Stroud: Tempus, 2001). 
 
Tripp, C., A History of Iraq. 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007). 
 
Van Creveld, M., Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1977). 
 
Venn, F., Oil Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1986). 
 
Westrate, B., The Arab Bureau: British Policy in the Middle East, 1916-1920 
(University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992). 
 
Wilcox, R., Battles on the Tigris (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2006). 
 
Williamson, S. R., The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for 
War, 1904-1914 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969). 
 
Wilson, T., The Myriad Faces of War: Britain and the Great War, 1914-1918 270 
(Cambridge: Polity, 1986). 
 
Winstone, H. V. F., The Illicit Adventure: The Story of Political and Military 
Intelligence in the Middle East from 1898 to 1926 (London: Cape, 1982). 
 
Wood, J. C., British Economists and the Empire (London: Croom Helm, 1983). 
 
Yapp, M. E., The Making of the Modern near East 1792-1923 (London: Longman, 
1987). 
 
Yergin, D., The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power (New York, NY: 
Simon & Schuster, 1991). 
 
Journal Articles and Book Chapters 
Andrews, C. M., Kanya-Forstner, A. S., 'The French Colonial Party and French 
Colonial War Aims, 1914-1918', Historical Journal 17, no. 1 (1974): pp. 79-
106. 
 
Arslanian, A. H., 'Dunsterville's Adventures: A Reappraisal', International Journal 
of Middle Eastern Studies 12, no. 2 (1980): pp. 199-216. 
 
Ashmore, P., "Ideology and Empire: Securing Britain's Supplies of Oil, C.1918-
1929", ESTER and SBR http://www.isb.ruhr-uni-
bochum.de/forschung/tagungen/mining/papers.html.de (accessed| 28 
January 2008). 
 
Beck, P. J., ''A Tedious and Perilous Controversy': Britain and the Settlement of 
the Mosul Dispute, 1918-1926', Middle Eastern Studies 17, no. 2 (1981): 
pp. 256-276. 
 
Blatt, J., 'The Parity That Meant Superiority: French Naval Policy Towards Italy at 
the Washington Conference, 1921-22, and Interwar French Foreign Policy', 
French Historical Studies 12, no. 2 (1981): pp. 223-248. 
 
Brown, W. M., 'Avoiding the U-Boats: The Clyde-Forth Oil Pipeline', Mariners 
Mirror 90, no. 4 (2004): pp. 427-437. 
 
Bud-Frierman, L. et al, 'Weetman Pearson in Mexico and the Emergence of a 
British Oil Major, 1901-1919', Business History Review 84, no. 2 (2010): pp. 
275-300. 
 
Burk, K., 'Anglo-American Finance During World War I' In Mobilization for Total 
War: The Canadian, American and British Experience, 1914-1918, 1939-
1945, ed. Dreisziger, N. F. (Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1981), 
pp. xvi,115p. 
 
________, 'Diplomacy of Finance: British Financial Missions to the United States 
1914-1918', Historical Journal 22, no. 2 (1979): pp. 351-372. 
 
Cohen, S. A., 'The Genesis of the British Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914', Middle 
Eastern Studies 12, no. 2 (1976): pp. 119-32. 271 
 
________, 'Mesopotamia in British Strategy, 1903-1914', International Journal of 
Middle Eastern Studies 9, no. 2 (1978): pp. 171-81. 
 
Corley, T. A. B., 'Oil Companies and the Role of Government: The Case of Britain, 
1900-75' In Competitiveness and the State: Government and Business in 
Twentieth-Century Britain, eds Jones, G., Kirby, M. W. (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1991), pp. 161-80. 
 
Corrigan, H. S. W., 'German-Turkish Relations and the Outbreak of War in 1914: 
Re-Assessment', Past & Present, no. 36 (1967): pp. 144-152. 
 
Cosar, N., Demirci, S., 'The Mosul Question and the Turkish Republic: Before and 
after the Frontier Treaty, 1926', Middle Eastern Studies 42, no. 1 (2006): pp. 
123-132. 
 
Cox, P., 'Some Gulf Memories', The Times of India Annual  (1928): pp. 
 
Crowley, P. T., 'Operational Lessons of the Mesopotamian Campaign, 1914-18', 
Defence Studies 4, no. 3 (2004): pp. 335-60. 
 
Demirci, S., 'Turco-British Diplomatic Manoeuvres on the Mosul Question in the 
Lausanne Conference, 1922-1923', British Journal of Middle Eastern 
Studies 37, no. 1 (2010): pp. 57-71. 
 
Denovo, J. A., 'The Movement for an Aggressive American Oil Policy Abroad, 
1918-1920', American Historical Review 61, no. 4 (1956): pp. 854-876. 
 
________, 'Petroleum and the United States Navy before World War I', Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review 41, no. 4 (1955): pp. 641-56. 
 
Dockrill, M. L., Steiner, Z., 'The Foreign Office at the Paris Peace Conference in 
1919', International History Review 2, no. 1 (1980): pp. 55-86. 
 
Dunsterville, L. C., 'From Baghdad to the Caspian in 1918', Geographical Journal 
57, no. 3 (1921): pp. 153-66. 
 
Dyer, G., 'The Turkish Armistice of 1918: 1, the Turkish Decision for a Separate 
Peace, Autumn 1918', Middle Eastern Studies 8, no. 2 (1972): pp. 143-78. 
 
________, 'The Turkish Armistice of 1918: 2, a Lost Opportunity: The Armistice 
Negotiations of Mudros', Middle Eastern Studies 8, no. 3 (1972): pp. 313-
48. 
 
Ferrier, R. W., 'French Oil Policy, 1917-30: The Interaction between State and 
Private Interests' In Enterprise and History Essays in Honour of Charles 
Wilson, eds Coleman, D. C., Mathias, P. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1984), pp. 237-62. 
 
Ferris, J., '"It Is Our Business in the Navy to Command the Seas": The Last 
Decade of British Maritime Supremacy, 1919-1929' In Far-Flung Lines: 
Essays on Imperial Defence in Honour of Donald Mackenzie Schurman, 
eds Kennedy, G., Neilson, K. (London: Frank Cass, 1997), pp. 124-69. 272 
 
Ferris, J. R., 'The Greatest Power on Earth: Great Britain in the 1920s', 
International History Review 13, no. 4 (1991): pp. 726-750. 
 
________, 'Treasury Control, the 10 Year Rule and British Service Policies, 1919-
1924', Historical Journal 30, no. 4 (1987): pp. 859-883. 
 
Finefrock, M. M., 'Atatürk, Lloyd George and the Megali Idea: Cause and 
Consequence of the Greek Plan to Seize Constantinople from the Allies, 
June-August 1922', Journal of Modern History 52, no. 1, On-Demand 
Supplement (1980): pp. D1047-D1066. 
 
Fisher, J., '"On the Glacis of India": Lord Curzon and British Policy in the 
Caucasus', Diplomacy and Statecraft 8, no. 2 (1997): pp. 50-82. 
 
________, ''The Safety of Our Indian Empire': Lord Curzon and British 
Predominance in the Arabian Peninsula, 1919', Middle Eastern Studies 33, 
no. 3 (1997): pp. 494-520. 
 
________, 'Syria and Mesopotamia in British Middle Eastern Policy in 1919', 
Middle Eastern Studies 34, no. 2 (1998): pp. 129-170. 
 
Fitzgerald, E. P., 'France's Middle-Eastern Ambitions, the Sykes-Picot 
Negotiations, and the Oil-Fields of Mosul, 1915-1918', Journal of Modern 
History 66, no. 4 (1994): pp. 697-725. 
 
French, D., 'The Empire and the USA in British Strategy in the Spring of 1917' In 
Far-Flung Lines: Essays on Imperial Defence in Honour of Donald 
Mackenzie Schurman, eds Kennedy, G., Neilson, K. (London: Frank Cass, 
1997), pp. 84-102. 
 
Fromkin, D., 'Britain, France, and the Diplomatic Agreements' In The Creation of 
Iraq, 1914-1921, eds Simon, R. S., Tejirian, E. H. (New York NY: Columbia 
University Press, 2004), pp. 134-45. 
 
Fry, M. G., 'The Pacific Dominions and the Washington Conference, 1921–22', 
Diplomacy & Statecraft 4, no. 3 (1993): pp. 60 - 101. 
 
Galbraith, J. S., 'British War Aims in World War I: A Commentary on 
"Statesmanship"', Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 13, no. 1 
(1984-85): pp. 25-45. 
 
________, 'No Man's Child: The Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914-1916', The 
International History Review 6, no. 3 (1984): pp. 358-85. 
 
Gökay, B., 'Turkish Settlement and the Caucasus, 1918-20', Middle Eastern 
Studies 32, no. 2 (1996): pp. 45-76. 
 
Goldstein, E., 'The British Official Mind and the Lausanne Conference, 1922-23.' In 
Power and Stability: British Foreign Policy, 1865-1965, eds Goldstein, E., 
McKercher, B. J. C. (London: Frank Cass, 2003), pp. 185-206. 
 
________, 'British Peace Aims and the Eastern Question: The Political Intelligence 273 
Department and the Eastern Committee', Middle Eastern Studies 23, no. 4 
(1987): pp. 419-36. 
 
________, 'The Eastern Question; the Last Phase' In The Paris Peace Conference 
1919 : Peace without Victory?, eds Dockrill, M. L., Fisher, J. (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2001), pp. 141-55. 
 
________, 'The Evolution of British Diplomatic Strategy for the Washington 
Conference', Diplomacy & Statecraft 4, no. 3 (1993): pp. 4 - 34. 
 
________, 'Great Britain and Greater Greece 1917-1920', Historical Journal 32, 
no. 2 (1989): pp. 339-356. 
 
Goold, D., 'Lord Hardinge and the Mesopotamia Expedition and Inquiry, 1914-
1917', Historical Journal 19, no. 4 (1976): pp. 919-945. 
 
Goold, J. D., 'Hardinge as Ambassador to France, and the Anglo-French Dilemma 
over Germany and the near-East, 1920-1922', Historical Journal 21, no. 4 
(1978): pp. 913-937. 
 
Grove, E., 'The Battleship Dreadnought: Technological, Economic and Strategic 
Contexts' In The Dreadnought and the Edwardian Era, ed. Blyth, R. J., 
Lambert, A., Rüger, J. (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), pp. 165-81. 
 
Gruen, G. E., 'The Oil Resources of Iraq: Their Role in the Policies of the Great 
Powers' In The Creation of Iraq, 1914-1921, eds Simon, R. S., Tejirian, E. 
H. (New York NY: Columbia University Press, 2004), pp. 110-24. 
 
Hall III, H., 'Lloyd George, Briand and the Failure of the Anglo-French Entente', 
Journal of Modern History 50, no. 2 On Demand Supplement (1978): pp. 
D1121-D1138. 
 
Hoffmann, K., 'The Struggle for Oil in Iraq' In The Economic History of the Middle 
East, 1800-1914, ed. Issawi, C. P. (Chicago IL: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1966), pp. 198-202. 
 
Hogan, M. J., 'Informal Entente: Public Policy and Private Management in Anglo-
American Petroleum Affairs, 1918-1924', Business History Review 48, no. 2 
(1974): pp. 187-205. 
 
Jack, M., 'The Purchase of the British Government's Shares in the British 
Petroleum Company, 1912-1914', Past & Present, no. 39 (1968): pp. 139-
168. 
 
Jackson, P., 'French Security and a British „Continental Commitment‟ after the 
First World War: A Reassessment*', The English Historical Review CXXVI, 
no. 519 (2011): pp. 345-385. 
 
Jeffrey, K., 'Sir Henry Wilson and the Defence of the British Empire, 1918-22', 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 5, no. 3 (1977): pp. 270-
293. 
 
Jensen, P. K., 'The Greco-Turkish War, 1920-1922', International Journal of 274 
Middle East Studies 10, no. 4 (1979): pp. 553-565. 
 
Jensen, W. G., 'The Importance of Energy in the First and Second World Wars', 
Historical Journal 11, no. 3 (1968): pp. 538-54. 
 
Jones, G., 'Admirals and Oilmen: The Relationship between the Royal Navy and 
the Oil Companies, 1900-1924' In Charted and Uncharted Waters: 
Proceedings of a Conference on the Study of British Maritime History, eds 
Palmer, S., Williams, G. (London: National Maritime Museum, 1982), pp. 
107-24. 
 
________, 'British Government and Oil Companies 1912-1924: Search for an Oil 
Policy', Historical Journal 20, no. 3 (1977): pp. 647-672. 
 
Jones, G. G., 'The Oil-Fuel Market in Britain, 1900-14: A Lost Cause Revisited', 
Business History 20, no. 2 (1978): pp. 131-52. 
 
________, 'The State and Economic Development in India, 1890-1946: The Case 
of Oil', Modern Asian Studies 13, no. 3 (1979): pp. 353-75. 
 
Kent, M., 'Asiatic Turkey' In British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey, ed. 
Hinsley, F. H. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 436-51. 
 
________, 'Constantinople and Asiatic Turkey, 1905-1914' In British Foreign 
Policy under Sir Edward Grey, ed. Hinsley, F. H. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1977), pp. 148-64. 
 
________, 'Great Britain and the End of the Ottoman Empire' In The Great Powers 
and the End of the Ottoman Empire, ed. Kent, M. (London: Allen & Unwin, 
1984), pp. 172-205. 
 
________, 'Guarding the Bandwagon: Great Britain, Italy, and Middle Eastern Oil, 
1920-1923' In National and International Politics in the Middle East: Essays 
in Honour of Elie Kedourie, ed. Ingram, E. (London: Cass, 1986), pp. 144-
63. 
 
Kernek, S. J., 'Distractions of Peace During War: The Lloyd George's 
Government's  Reactions to Woodrow Wilson, December, 1916-November, 
1918', Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 65, no. 2 (1975): 
pp. 1-117. 
 
Klieman, A. S., 'Britain's War Aims in the Middle East in 1915', Journal of 
Contemporary History 3, no. 3 (1968): pp. 237-251. 
 
Laux, J. M., 'Trucks in the West During the First World War', Journal of Transport 
History Third Series, 6, no. 2 (1985): pp. 64-70. 
 
Lentin, A., '„Une Aberration Inexplicable‟? Clemenceau and the Abortive Anglo-
French Guarantee Treaty of 1919', Diplomacy & Statecraft 8, no. 2 (1997): 
pp. 31 - 49. 
 
Macfie, A. L., 'British Intelligence and the Causes of Unrest in Mesopotamia, 1919-
21', Middle Eastern Studies 35, no. 1 (1999): pp. 165-77. 275 
 
Madureira, N. L., 'Oil in the Age of Steam', Journal of Global History 5, no. 1 
(2010): pp. 75-94. 
 
Malek, M., 'Oil in Iran between the Two World Wars' In Anglo-Iranian Relations 
since 1800, ed. Martin, V. e. (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 128-36. 
 
Martel, G., 'The Meaning of Power: Rethinking the Decline and Fall of Great 
Britain', International History Review 13, no. 4 (1991): pp. 661-694. 
 
Martin, C., 'The Complexity of Strategy: "Jackie" Fisher and the Trouble with 
Submarines', Journal of Military History 75, no. 2 (2011): pp. 441-70. 
 
________, 'The Complexity of Strategy: "Jackie" Fisher and the Trouble with 
Submarines', Journal of Military History 75, no. 2 (2011): pp. 441-470. 
 
Maunsell, F. R., 'The Mesopotamian Petroleum Field', Geographical Journal 9, no. 
5 (1897): pp. 528-32. 
 
McKale, D. M., 'Germany and the Arab Question in the First World War', Middle 
Eastern Studies 29, no. 2 (1993): pp. 236-253. 
 
McKercher, B., 'Wealth, Power, and the New International Order: Britain and the 
American Challenge in the 1920s', Diplomatic History 12, no. 4 (1988): pp. 
411-441. 
 
Mejcher, H., 'British Middle East Policy, 1917-21: The Inter-Departmental Level', 
Journal of Contemporary History 8, no. 4 (1973): pp. 81-101. 
 
________, 'Oil and British Policy Towards Mesopotamia, 1914-1918', Middle 
Eastern Studies 8, no. 3 (1972): pp. 377-91. 
 
Millman, B., 'A Counsel of Despair: British Strategy and War Aims, 1917-18', 
Journal of Contemporary History 36, no. 2 (2001): pp. 241-70. 
 
Morgan, K. O., 'Lloyd George's Premiership: A Study in "Prime Ministerial 
Government"', Historical Journal 13, no. 1 (1970): pp. 130-157. 
 
Neilson, K., '"For Diplomatic, Economic, Strategy and Telegraphic Reasons": 
British Imperial Defence, the Middle East and India, 1914-1918' In Far-
Flung Lines: Essays on Imperial Defence in Honour of Donald Mackenzie 
Schurman, eds Kennedy, G., Neilson, K. (London: Frank Cass, 1997), pp. 
103-23. 
 
________, '"Unbroken Thread": Japan, Maritime Power and British Imperial 
Defence, 1920-32' In British Naval Strategy East of Suez, 1900-2000: 
Influences and Actions, ed. Kennedy, G. (London: Frank Cass, 2005), pp. 
62-89. 
 
Nevakivi, J., 'Lord Kitchener and the Partition of the Ottoman Empire' In Studies in 
International History: Essays Presented to W. Norton Medlicott, eds 
Bourne, K., Watt, D. C. (London: Longmans, 1967), pp. 316-29. 
 276 
O'Brien, P. P., 'Britain and the End of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance' In The Anglo-
Japanese Alliance, 1902-1922, ed. O'Brien, P. P. (London: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), pp. 267-84. 
 
________, 'The Titan Refreshed: Imperial Overstretch and the British Navy before 
the First World War', Past & Present, no. 172 (2001): pp. 146-169. 
 
Paris, T. J., 'British Middle East Policy Making after the First World War', Historical 
Journal 41, no. 3 (1998): pp. 773-92. 
 
Reguer, S., 'Persian Oil and the First Lord: A Chapter in the Career of Winston 
Churchill', Military Affairs 46, no. 3 (1982): pp. 134-138. 
 
Reynolds, M. A., 'Buffers, Not Brethren: Young Turk Military Policy in the First 
World War and the Myth of Panturanism', Past & Present, no. 203 (2009): 
pp. 137-179. 
 
Rose, J. D., 'Batum as Domino, 1919-1920: 'The Defence of India in 
Transcaucasia', International History Review 2, no. 2 (1980): pp. 266-287. 
 
Rothwell, V. H., 'Mesopotamia in British War Aims, 1914-1918', Historical Journal 
13, no. 2 (1970): pp. 273-294. 
 
Satia, P., 'Developing Iraq: Britain, India and the Redemption of Empire and 
Technology in the First World War', Past & Present, no. 197 (2007): pp. 
211-255. 
 
Seidt, H. U., 'From Palestine to the Caucasus: Oskar Niedermayer and Germany's 
Middle Eastern Strategy in 1918', German Studies Review 24, no. 1 (2001): 
pp. 1-18. 
 
Shulman, P., '“Science Can Never Demobilize”: The United States Navy and 
Petroleum Geology, 1898–1924', History and Technology: An International 
Journal 19, no. 4 (2003): pp. 365 - 395. 
 
Singleton, J., 'Britain's Military Use of Horses 1914-1918', Past and Present 139, 
no. 1 (1993): pp. 178-203. 
 
Slade, E. J. W., 'The Influence of Oil on International Politics', Journal of the British 
Institute of International Affairs 2, no. 6 (1923): pp. 251-258. 
 
Smith, C., 'Dreadnought Science: The Cultural Construction of Efficiency and 
Effectiveness' In The Dreadnought and the Edwardian Era, ed. Blyth, R. J., 
Lambert, A., Rüger, J. (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), pp. 135-64. 
 
Smith, C. J., Jr., 'Great Britain and the 1914-1915 Straits Agreement with Russia: 
The British Promise of November 1914', The American Historical Review 
70, no. 4 (1965): pp. 1015-1034. 
 
Steffen, D., 'The Holtzendorff Memorandum of 22 December 1916 and Germany's 
Declaration of Unrestricted U-Boat Warfare', Journal of Military History 68, 
no. 1 (2004): pp. 215-224. 
 277 
Steiner, Z. S., 'The Treaty of Versailles Revisited' In The Paris Peace Conference 
1919 : Peace without Victory?, eds Dockrill, M. L., Fisher, J. (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2001), pp. 13-33. 
 
Steyn, P., 'Oil Exploration in Colonial Nigeria, C.1903-58', Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History 37, no. 2 (2009): pp. 249-274. 
 
Stivers, W., 'International Politics and Iraqi Oil, 1918-1928: A Study in Anglo-
American Diplomacy', Business History Review 55, no. 4 (1981): pp. 517-
540. 
 
Stork, J., 'Middle East Oil and the Energy Crisis: Part 1', MERIP Reports, no. 20 
(1973): pp. 3-20, 26. 
 
Sumida, J. T., 'British Naval Operational Logistics, 1914-1918', Journal of Military 
History 57, no. 3 (1993): pp. 447-480. 
 
Sykes, P., 'South Persia and the Great War', Geographical Journal 58, no. 2 
(1921): pp. 101-16. 
 
Tanenbaum, J. K., 'France and the Arab Middle East, 1914-1920', Transactions of 
the American Philosophical Society 68, no. 7 (1978): pp. 1-50. 
 
Trumpener, U., 'German Military Aid to Turkey in 1914: An Historical Re-
Evaluation', Journal of Modern History 32, no. 2 (1960): pp. 145-149. 
 
________, 'Turkey's Entry into World War 1: An Assessment of Responsibilities', 
Journal of Modern History 34, no. 4 (1962): pp. 369-380. 
 
Ulrichsen, K. C., 'The British Occupation of Mesopotamia, 1914-1922', Journal of 
Strategic Studies 30, no. 2 (2007): pp. 349-77. 
 
van Creveld, M., 'World War I and the Revolution in Logistics' In Great War, Total 
War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914-1918, eds 
Chickering, R., Förster, S. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 
pp. 57-72. 
 
Venn, F., 'A Futile Paper Chase: Anglo-American Relations and Middle East Oil, 
1918-34', Diplomacy and Statecraft 1, no. 2 (1990): pp. 165-84. 
 
________, 'Oleaginous Diplomacy: Oil, Anglo–American Relations and the 
Lausanne Conference, 1922–23', Diplomacy & Statecraft 20, no. 3 (2009): 
pp. 414 - 433. 
 
White, D., 'The Petroleum Resources of the World', Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, no. 89 (1920): pp. 111-134. 
 
Yaphe, J. S., 'The View from Basra: Southern Iraq's Reaction to War and 
Occupation, 1915-1925' In The Creation of Iraq, 1914-1921, eds Simon, R. 
S., Tejirian, E. H. (New York NY: Columbia University Press, 2004), pp. 19-
35. 
 278 
Websites 
"Campaign Atlas to the Great War", The History Department at the United States 
"Campaign Atlas to the Great War", The History Department at the United 
States Military Academy 
<<http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/WorldWarOne/index.ht
m>> (accessed| 11 January 2010). 
 
"New York Times Archive", New York Times 
<<http://www.nytimes.com/ref/membercenter/nytarchive.html>> (accessed| 
1 December 2010). 
 
"Reviews of Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World by Margaret 
Macmillan", Amazon <<http://www.amazon.com/Paris-1919-Months-
Changed-
World/dp/0375760520/ref=sr_1_3?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1281368112&sr
=1-3>> (accessed| 9 August 2010). 
 
"Survey of the Political History of the Modern Middle East", University of Florida 
<<http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/oren/INR4204Middleeast.html>> 
(accessed| 11 January 2010). 
 
"The Times Archive", The Times <<http://archive.timesonline.co.uk/tol/archive/>> 
(accessed| 1 December 2010). 
 
"U.S. Crude Oil Wellhead Acquisition Price by First Purchasers", U.S. Energy 
Information Administration 
<<http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=F000
000__3&f=A>> (accessed| 16 April 2010). 
 
Matthew, H. C. G. et al, "Oxford Dictionary of National Biography", Oxford 
University Press <<http://www.oxforddnb.com/subscribed>>. 
 
 
 
 
 